IN THE SHADOWS OF THE BOMB

An Inquiry into the Public Mood During the Cuban Crisis

by

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INTRODUCTION

The Cuban crisis that erupted in October of 1962 was an event that few people in America could have predicted. During its initial phase, from the day preceding the President's speech on the evening of October 22 and for several days following, the situation was fluid and the outcome was uncertain. The mass media reported the situation with an imagery of extreme crisis. What little the media could learn about how people were responding tended to substantiate the prevailing sense of crisis. For example, there were isolated reports of panic-buying of food and increased demands for civil defense information. All in all, it seemed as if considerable anxiety had swept over the nation.

The situation provided an excellent opportunity to study the impact of a "diplomatic crisis" on the feeling states of the American public, an opportunity that was seized upon by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). NORC had recently embarked on a long-range program of research on mental health related behavior. One of the aims of this research is to study the impact of local, national, and international events and trends on the psychological states of people, and the Cuban crisis offered an eminently suitable opportunity for such a study.

Earlier, in March of 1962, NORC had initiated the first phase of this research. A pilot study, designed to test a questionnaire dealing with feeling states, had been carried out in four Illinois communities selected to represent a range of economically depressed and prosperous communities. The March pre-test provided considerable information on the structure of feeling states, their dimensions and interrelations, as well as data concerning the effects

of local economic conditions on the well-being of people. These findings are fully reported by Bradburn.[1]

When the Cuban crisis developed, plans were quickly made to reinterview respondents in the most prosperous and most depressed of the communities, Brewer and East Parrish respectively. The President addressed the nation on the evening of October 22, 1962. By Saturday, October 27, NORC interviewers were in the field with a questionnaire containing the same measures of feeling states that had appeared on the March version and a special section dealing with opinions and feelings about the Cuban situation. The interviewing took place over a nine-day period during which the crisis itself changed dramatically into a victory for Unites States policy. In all, 547 people in the two communities were reinterviewed in October.[2]

This report describes the results of this panel study. As we shall see in the following pages, it is hard to discern any major impact of the crisis on the feeling states that we have studied. Judging by the ambiguous results, it would seem that an international crisis must reach an even greater degree of danger and uncertainty if it is to affect seriously the mood of the population.

The report is divided into two chapters. The first considers trends in feeling states that developed between March and October. The second deals with data bearing directly on the Cuban crisis. Here we present a measure of worry over the crisis and examine the social and psychological correlates of worry.

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[1] Norman M. Bradburn, In Pursuit of Happiness: A Pilot Study of Behavior Related to Mental Health (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, Report No. 92, May, 1963).

[2] We shall refer to the second wave as the October survey, although the field work, which began on October 27th, lasted until November 4th.

CHAPTER I

TRENDS IN FEELINGS

The main purpose of the March pre-test was to see how various dimensions of psychological well-being--happiness, if you will--are related to each other and to learn, in general, whether it is feasible to study people's mood and feelings through survey methods. Drawing upon previous studies of mental health, we developed a questionnaire that asked about worries, physical symptoms generally regarded as manifestations of anxiety, the incidence of gratifying and frustrating emotions, satisfaction in important spheres of life such as work and marriage, and finally, the respondent's assessment of his happiness.

In this chapter we shall show how these various feeling states changed between March and October. We begin our review by considering an area of feelings that would seem most directly connected with an international crisis, the content of people's worry and concern.

Worries

In both March and October respondents were asked how much, if at all, they worried about various topics during the week preceding the interview. (We ignore until later their responses to an open-ended question about what they were most worried about.) Nine of these worry topics are aspects of people's immediate life-situation, such as money, work, marriage and health--topics that are commonly experienced as problems. Table 1.1 compares the answers to these questions in March with those given in October.

TABLE 1.1

TRENDS IN WORRY TOPICS--MARCH TO OCTOBER

Worry Topic	Time Period	Worries			Total	
		Not at All	Sometimes	Often	Per cent	N
Money	March	12%	41%	47%	100	543
	October	24	42	34	100	545
Growing old	March	59	29	12	100	542
	October	72	20	8	100	544
Work	March	25	25	50	100	541
	October	29	29	42	100	545
Marriage . .	March	67	23	10	100	535
	October	76	17	7	100	545
Getting ahead . . .	March	32	35	33	100	537
	October	45	33	22	100	544
Bringing up children .	March	44	21	35	100	535
	October	48	24	28	100	545
Death	March	63	30	7	100	539
	October	71	24	5	100	544
Health . . .	March	32	47	21	100	542
	October	48	34	18	100	545
Personal enemies . .	March	92	8	0	100	540
	October	95	4	1	100	543

It will be noticed that in every instance worry over these problems decreased. For example, in March, 88 per cent reported that in the previous week they had worried sometimes or often about money; in October, only 75 per cent had worried about money. And the proportion worrying about their health decreased from 68 per cent to 52 per cent. Similar patterns are found for the other items in Table 1.1.

This consistent decline in worry-over day-to-day personal problems might well be attributed to the outbreak of the Cuban situation. At least it is in keeping with the idea that a major crisis confronting the country at large serves to distract people's attention from their own problems, thus serving a "masking" function.

That worries were focused on Cuba is shown by the responses to the one item in the worry battery that referred to an international rather than a personal problem. In both March and October people were asked how much they were worried about the atomic bomb and fall-out. In is not surprising that the trend for this item is quite different from that for the others. The anxiety provoked by the Cuban crisis can be seen from the rather dramatic increase in this worry, shown in Table 1.2.

TABLE 1.2

WORRY OVER THE A-BOMB (OR) FALL-OUT
IN MARCH AND OCTOBER

Time Period	Worries			Total	
	Not at All	Sometimes	Often	Per cent	N
March	72%	22%	6%	100	541
October . . .	35	41	24	100	545

The proportion of people worrying about the A-bomb or fall-out more than doubled in October and the proportion worrying about it often increased four-fold. Most of our respondents, then, had developed a new concern during the period of the Cuban crisis, one that probably took their minds off their other problems.

Trends in Symptoms of Anxiety

We are inclined to think that a serious international situation such as the war scare of October, 1962 brings many an ordinary citizen sleepless nights and increases, however momentarily, his feelings of anxiety. But these vague impressions aside, we actually know little about how international crises affect people's feelings of well-being. It is conceivable that people are drawn closer together by a common danger and find that the psychological rewards of this closeness more than offset the fears and anxieties evoked by the crisis. Or it is possible that the anxiety provoked by these crises is soon dissipated as people adjust to the uncertain world in which they live and go about their everyday business. It may even be that the important determinants of people's moods--of their feeling "good" or "bad"--are restricted to the more immediate events in their lives rather than to events removed from them and seemingly beyond their control.

With the data now at hand, it is possible to explore the psychological impact of a major crisis. In both March and October, respondents in these Illinois communities were asked whether they had experienced in the past week any of a variety of physical symptoms that are generally taken to be signs of anxiety. If the average citizen[3] was made anxious by the Cuban crisis, we should find these symptoms to be more frequent in October than in March. These trends are shown in Table 1.3.

The frequency of these stress symptoms did not change much over the eight-month period. Three of them were somewhat more frequent in October (aches and pains, muscle twitches and nervousness), but two (headaches and rapid heart beat) were slightly less frequent, and one (dizziness) shows hardly any change at all. As can be seen

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[3]Of course, we are not dealing with a national sample, but rather with residents of two relatively small Midwestern cities and their reactions may not be typical of those of people in other sections of the country or in more urbanized places.

from the shift in means (calculated by assigning a score of zero to the absence of the symptoms, of one to experiencing it once or twice, and a score of two for experiencing it more frequently), the largest increase occurred in feelings of "nervousness." Of all the symptoms, this one might be expected to reflect anxiety over the Cuban crisis, and it is somewhat surprising that the increase was not even greater.

TABLE 1.3

TRENDS IN PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS--MARCH TO OCTOBER

Symptom	Time Period	Not at All	Once or Twice	Several Times and Often	Total Per cent	Total Mean	Total N
Dizziness .	March	83%	11%	6%	100	.23	539
	October	85	7	8	100	.23	544
						.00	
Aches and pains . .	March	50	24	26	100	.76	543
	October	52	16	32	100	.80	544
						+.04	
Headaches .	March	52	32	16	100	.64	537
	October	59	25	16	100	.57	544
						-.07	
Muscle twitches	March	85	7	8	100	.23	536
	October	83	7	10	100	.27	543
						+.04	
Nervousness	March	48	24	28	100	.80	538
	October	46	19	35	100	.89	543
						+.09	
Rapid heartbeat	March	83	9	8	100	.25	539
	October	86	7	7	100	.21	542
						-.04	

Summary Index of Symptoms

	None	One	Two or More		
March . . .	19%	39%	42%	100	1.23
October . . .	17	41	42	100	1.25
					+ .02

Perhaps many people had forgotten how nervous they had been by the time they were interviewed or perhaps the amount of anxiety that developed in the population was not as great as might be expected in this age of massive destruction. Still another possibility is that the fear and anxiety provoked by the crisis, although quite real, is not the kind that is readily transformed into physical symptoms. We do know that most of the respondents were worried about the atomic bomb in October, a topic that would not have entered their minds if they were oblivious to the danger of war created by the Cuban crisis.[4]

Whether the Cuban crisis did indeed produce that common sign of anxiety, the "sleepness night," can be determined for at least a part of the sample, the men between the ages of 25 and 49. Men in this age group were interviewed in more detail in March, and it is only for this sub-group that data on sleep patterns are available at both points in time.

The first two columns of Table 1.4 show the trend for the men who were asked this question in both March and October. The figures lend some support to the "sleepless night" idea, for the reports of troubled sleep increased somewhat (six percentage points) in October. The third column presents the October responses of all the respondents, including older men and women of all ages. Presumably women and older men had somewhat more difficulty with their sleep in October than the younger men, for reports of troubled sleep are slightly higher in the entire October sample.

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[4]The distinction often made by psychiatrists between anxiety and fear is perhaps relevant here. Anxiety is a response to a danger that is not clearly understood by the actor, presumably a threat that has been repressed, whereas fear is a response to an objective danger of which the actor is aware. In the Cuban crisis the source of the fear was clearly known. The kinds of psychosomatic symptoms dealth with in Table 1.3 might well be part of the ego's defense mechanisms against anxiety rather than fear. Perhaps this is why their frequency did not increase in October.

TABLE 1.4

SLEEP PATTERNS IN MARCH AND OCTOBER

Sleep Pattern	Men between 25 and 49		All Respondents
	March	October	October
Trouble with sleep . .	33%	39%	41%
No trouble with sleep.	67	61	59
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	154	154	545

Heavy smoking and, particularly, an increase in smoking are indications of anxiety. Again for the men between 25 and 49, we can compare their smoking habits in March and October. Of the 154 men in this age group, 111 were smokers. These people were asked whether they were smoking more or less than usual. In March, 80 per cent reported that their smoking behavior had not changed recently; in October, 81 per cent reported no change in their smoking behavior. But, as Table 1.5 shows, among those reporting a change, slightly more increased their consumption of tobacco in October.

TABLE 1.5

SMOKING BEHAVIOR IN MARCH AND OCTOBER

Smoking More or Less than Usual	Men between 25 and 49		All Respondents
	March	October	October
More	8%	11%	15%
Less	12	8	10
Same	80	81	75
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	111	111	286

In March, the younger men were likely to report that they were smoking less rather than more; in October this pattern was reversed. And among all the smokers interviewed in October (third column), reports of increased smoking were more frequent than reports of decreased smoking. By adding sleep patterns and smoking behavior to the list of symptoms reported in Table 1.3, we find some signs of an increase in anxiety, but the trend in every instance is quite small. Judging from Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5, it would seen that the anxiety level of the sample did not increase greatly in October over what it had been the previous March. If the Cuban crisis did make people anxious, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, there are many signs that people were worried and frightened, it was a form of anxiety that largely escaped through the sieve of the NORC questionnaire.[5]

Trends in Positive and Negative Feelings and Happiness

When moving from the area of manifest worry and anxiety to other aspects of feeling states, we find the ground even less amenable to inferences about the psychological impact of the Cuban crisis. Should we find, for example, that the rates of various positive and negative emotions have changed between March and October we cannot be certain that this is a consequence of the international situation. The change might reflect a difference in attitude toward winter and fall or even possibly, the fact that our respondents have aged almost a year in the interval between interviews. Nevertheless, we shall

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[5] We are forced to assume that the March data provided a suitable baseline for detecting an effect of the Cuban crisis. This is certainly a questionable assumption. March of 1962 may not have been a typical period in the lives of our respondents. For all we know, these symptoms may be more frequent in the winter months. Ideally, we should have had as a baseline a survey conducted shortly before the Cuban crisis arose. We shall have more to say about this methodological weakness in the conclusion to this report.

examine these data as well, for the question of whether various facets of people's mood underwent change is of interest in its own right.

These data refer to specific positive and negative feelings that the respondents experienced during the week prior to the interview. These include rewarding feelings such as interest in and excitement about something, pleasure over an accomplishment and pride in a compliment, and negative feelings such as depression, boredom, loneliness and restlessness. Bradburn has shown that both positive and negative feelings tend to cluster and that each set constitutes a separate dimension of reported happiness. The more positive feelings that people experience, the happier they feel; the more negative ones, the unhappier they are. Furthermore, Bradburn has shown that these dimensions are <u>not</u> related to each other; positive feelings are not the obverse of negative feelings and assessments of personal happiness are largely derived from the balance of these two sets of feelings. Table 1.6 presents the trend data for the set of positive feelings.

The patterns shown in Table 1.6 are quite striking. In every instance the experience of favorable or positive feelings decreased in October, compared with March. Fewer people were feeling "on top of the world," excited or interested, pleased over their accomplishments or proud because they had been complimented. (This consistent trend is easily seen by the decrease in the means for each item.)

It is tempting to leap to the Cuban crisis for an interpretation of this trend. It is plausible that the crisis dampened people's spirits, lowered their motivation to accomplish things from which they themselves might take pleasure or receive the compliments of others. But it is also possible that this consistent decrease is the result of some stimulus other than the international situation--approaching winter, for example. In order to ascertain whether this trend is a result of the international crisis we must know more about

the mechanisms which might link the crisis to feeling states. In the next chapter we will consider whether the people who were most concerned about Cuba were the ones who most exhibited this decrease in pleasurable feelings (a reasonable expectation if the two are linked).

TABLE 1.6

TRENDS IN POSITIVE FEELINGS--MARCH TO OCTOBER

Feeling	Time Period	"In past week, have felt this way"			Total		
		Not at All	Once or Twice	Several Times and Often	Per cent	Mean	N
"Top of the world". . . .	March	53%	13%	34%	100	.81	536
	October	68	9	23	100	.55	544
						-.26	
Excited or interested in something . .	March	36	19	45	100	1.09	531
	October	46	16	38	100	.92	544
						-.17	
Pleased about accomplishing something . .	March	23	25	52	100	1.29	540
	October	32	25	43	100	1.11	544
						-.18	
Proud because someone complimented you	March	38	27	35	100	.97	537
	October	48	22	30	100	.82	544
						-.15	

Summary Index of Positive Feelings

	Low (None)	Medium (One)	High (Two or More)		
March . . .	28%	33%	39%	100	1.11
October . .	37	38	25	100	.88
					-.23

We must also consider the role of social participation. Bradburn found in his analysis of the March data that positive feelings are associated with social interaction and activity generally. (The very wording of the items suggest this. Compliments are by definition rewards from others, and achievements and excitements imply activity, often occurring in a social context.) But first we will examine what happened to negative feelings during the eight-month interval and whether any trends are evident in assessments of happiness.

If the Cuban crisis reduced positive feelings, we might expect that it also increased negative feelings, such as loneliness, depression, restlessness, and uneasiness. But the facts do not bear this out.

As can be seen from Table 1.7, the frequency of various negative feelings did not change much; what small trend was evident was more often in the direction of their reduction rather than increase. Of the five feelings, the incidence of three hardly changed, boredom decreased, and restlessness increased slightly. One might think of plausible reasons why these trends might reflect an impact of the crisis. It could be expected that people would not be bored at such a time (but almost the same number were bored at both times); their increasing restlessness could also be expected. But feelings of depression did not increase nor did feelings of vague uneasiness, which could also be expected if people's moods had responded to the war scare of the previous week. In short, these results give little basis for attributing negative feelings to the Cuban crisis.

TABLE 1.7

TRENDS IN NEGATIVE FEELINGS--MARCH TO OCTOBER

Feeling	Time Period	"In past week, have felt this way"			Total		
		Not at All	Once	Several Times and Often	Per cent	Mean	N
Lonely or remote . . .	March	76%	8%	16%	100	.40	536
	October	78	6	16	100	.38	543
						-.02	
Depressed or very unhappy.	March	70	13	17	100	.47	534
	October	71	11	18	100	.47	543
						.00	
Bored	March	70	10	20	100	.50	536
	October	77	8	15	100	.38	543
						-.12	
So restless couldn't sit still	March	66	8	26	100	.60	540
	October	65	4	31	100	.66	544
						+.06	
Vaguely uneasy without knowing why .	March	69	10	21	100	.52	540
	October	71	8	21	100	.50	542
						-.02	
Summary Index of Negative Feelings							
		Low (None)	Medium (One)	High (Two or More)			
March . . .		35%	24%	41%	100	1.06	
October . .		35	26	39	100	1.04	
						-.02	

The decrease in positive feelings and the persistence of negative feelings might suggest that assessments of happiness also decreased between March and October. But worries, which Bradburn

has shown to be associated with unhappiness, also decreased, and so it is difficult to make predictions about the trend in happiness. In fact, the data given in Table 1.8 indicate that the level of happiness increased slightly in October over what it had been the previous March.

TABLE 1.8

TRENDS IN ESTIMATES OF PERSONAL HAPPINESS

Time Period	Very Happy	Pretty Happy	Not Too Happy	Total	
				Per cent	N
March	23%	61%	16%	100	543
October	28	60	12	100	543

The slight increase in personal happiness is a further reminder that it is hazardous to infer a relationship between people's feelings and an international crisis. Whether the findings on happiness and positive and negative feelings are distorted by the fact that the crisis changed dramatically during the course of the interviewing will be considered shortly. But these results seem to indicate that when people assess their happiness they are more likely to be thinking of their personal successes and failures--the status of their married life and work life--than of events in the world community.

Social Participation

We know something about the informal social participation of the men between 25 and 49 in March and October. We know whether they were more or less likely to chat with friends on the telephone and visit with them socially. Table 1.9 shows that the frequency of these activities hardly changed at all in the eight-month period.

TABLE 1.9

TRENDS IN INFORMAL SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Average Daily Phone Chats	March	October
None	38%	40%
Less than one a day	30	25
One or two a day	22	24
Three or more per day	10	11
Total	100%	100%
	(152)	(152)
Visits with Friends in Past Week		
None	34%	36%
One	24	28
Two	20	17
Three or more	22	19
Total	100%	100%
	(153)	(153)

In spite of the decline in positive feelings shown in Table 1.6, rates of informal social interaction remained fairly constant, at least for the younger men for whom we have the data.

The Effect of Stage of the Cuban Crisis on Trends in Feelings

So far in the analysis we have not uncovered anything that would indicate that the Cuban crisis had a major impact on feelings. True, the respondents in October were generally less worried about their personal problems and more worried about the atomic bomb, and their experiences of positive feelings had noticeably decreased. But their reports of various symptoms of anxiety did not increase much and the frequency of negative feelings remained the same.

But this analysis of gross trends has overlooked an important consideration. We have proceeded as if all the October interviews were conducted on a single day, presumably at the height of the Cuban crisis. But of course this was not so. The interviewing took place over a nine-day period and only in the first few days was the outcome of the crisis uncertain. Most of the interviews, in fact, were conducted at a time when it was clear that the United States had won, that Russia was not going to war over Cuba but rather would acquiesce to U.S. demands. True, our respondents had been asked to report on their feeling states over a period of a week and the interview should have captured feelings evoked by the crisis even if they were not being experienced at the moment.

But perhaps people forget how they were feeling five or six days ago. If the Cuban crisis, then, had any effects on the particular feeling states that we have been examining, these should become evident when the date of the interview is taken into account. For example, those interviewed when the crisis was at a peak may have experienced an increase in anxiety symptoms, while those contacted later on, when the outcome was apparent, may have had fewer such symptoms than in the previous March.

To test this possibility, we shall examine trends in feelings separately for those interviewed at different times in October. We distinguish three groups: those contacted during the first weekend following the President's speech when the outcome was uncertain; those approached during the next three days when the triumph of American policy seemed likely; and those interviewed during the next four days when all uncertainty about the United States victory had vanished and the country was basking in the glory of its victory over the Soviet Union. We have not bothered to replicate all the previous findings taking date of interview into account. Instead we have focused on the summary indices of feelings, the index of psychosomatic symptoms, positive and negative feelings, and the respondent's over-all estimate of his happiness.

It turns out that specifying the results by date of interview does not clarify the previous picture: in only one instance, the experience of negative feelings, does the pattern conform to expectations. Moreover, these data, shown in Table 1.10, introduce some new anomalies.

TABLE 1.10

TRENDS IN FEELING STATES ACCORDING TO TIME OF INTERVIEW IN OCTOBER

Time of October Interview	March	October	Percentage Difference
A. Per cent High on Index of Psychosomatic Symptoms			
First two days . . .	38 (76)	41 (76)	+ 3
Next three days . .	45 (206)	42 (206)	- 3
Last four days . . .	41 (258)	43 (258)	+ 2
B. Per cent High on Positive Feelings (Score of Two)			
First two days . . .	32	14	- 18
Next three days . .	36	23	- 13
Last four days . . .	45	30	- 15
C. Per cent High on Negative Feelings (Score of Two)			
First two days . . .	42	47	+ 5
Next three days . .	40	38	- 2
Last four days . . .	40	38	- 2
D. Per cent "Not Too Happy"			
First two days . . .	25	21	- 4
Next three days . .	20	12	- 8
Last four days . . .	12	9	- 3

Looking first at the trends in psychosomatic symptoms presented in Table 1.10A, we note that those interviewed at the height of the uncertainty about Cuba show a slight increase in symptoms. But this encouraging sign of an effect of the crisis is quickly dissipated by results of later interviews. Those interviewed in the last four days, when the immediate crisis was over, also show a slight increase in psychosomatic symptoms, while those interviewed in the middle period experienced a slight decrease.

The time of the October interview also seems to have had little effect on trends in positive feelings. People interviewed at the different stages of the crisis all experienced significant decreases in positive feelings, the late interviewees almost as much as the early ones. Moreover, trends in happiness (Table 1.10D) show no relationship to the date of the October interview. Whatever the time of the interview, there was a slight trend toward increased happiness.

Only in the data on negative feelings, found in Table 1.10C, are there patterns that suggest the crisis might have affected feelings. Those interviewed during the uncertain days had slightly more negative feelings than they did the previous March, while those interviewed after the peak of the crisis had slightly fewer. But even here indications are slight. All in all, it would seem that the Cuban crisis had little bearing on the state of poeple's feelings between March and October.

Before leaving Table 1.10, it is important to note the patterning of the October responses shown in the second column, particularly those for positive feelings, negative feelings and happiness. If we were to consider only the relationship between these feelings in October and the time of the interview, we would conclude that the Cuban crisis did indeed have an important effect. Notice that high scores on positive feelings steadily increase as the crisis lessens. Negative feelings, as we would expect, were experienced

more often by those contacted during the height of the crisis; finally, reports of unhappiness steadily diminish as the Cuban crisis changes into an American victory. All of these relationships based on a single survey would argue for the profound effect of such a crisis on people's feeling states. But the fact that the trend data present a more ambiguous picture, one that places in question the impact of the crisis on people's feelings, points up the importance of panel studies. The erroneous impression that would have been obtained from the single survey in October stems from the rather strange fact that the people interviewed early in October happen to have been less happy and to have had fewer positive feelings and slightly more negative ones in the previous March. This can be seen most clearly from the data on happiness. What seems to be a significant relationship between stage of the crisis and feeling "not too happy" in October turns out to be false since the same relationship obtains in the March responses. (As we shall see in Chapter II, those interviewed during the early days of the October survey were more likely to be of low socio-economic status--the poorly educated, the low-income, and the older respondents. This association between social status and time of interview may largely account for these patterns, for we know from Bradburn that happiness increases with social status.) Therefore, Table 1.10 should give us pause in evaluating the results of single surveys. What appear to be causal relationships established on the basis of a single survey may well turn out to be spurious relationships when studied over time.

A Note on Stability of Feelings

The trend data presented in this chapter suggest that a number of the feelings we are studying, such as psychosomatic symptoms, negative feelings and happiness, changed very little over the eight-month period. The question of the stability of the various areas of feelings is an important one from the viewpoint of NORC's program

of research on mental health. It is frequently asserted that feelings of happiness or worry--people's moods in general--are basically reflections of deep-seated personality traits and are not likely to change much in the adult personality. According to this view, environmental factors, such as events in the community and society at large, are not apt to have much effect on these feelings.

The trend data appear to support this view. But it must be remembered that trends refer to rates of feelings in the sample and do not tell us what has happened to the feelings of individuals over time. The absence of trends could imply that people do not change, but stable rates could also result from large numbers of people changing in opposite directions so that the net change is close to zero. The stability of people's feelings over time cannot be inferred from trend data alone. To study this we must look at panel tables to see what happens to the feelings of the same people at different points in time.

Change in Feelings

It will be recalled that in the aggregate the respondents were slightly happier in October than in March, the very happy group increasing five percentage points, the "not too happy" group decreasing by four percentage points. But this slight net change is actually the outcome of considerable "turnover" in reports of happiness. This can be seen from Table 1.11.

The people who estimated their level of happiness to be the same in March and October appear in the main diagonal of the table. The constitute 63 per cent of the sample; the remaining 37 per cent revised their estimates of their happiness. Some 23 per cent were happier in October, but this was partially offset by the 14 per cent who had become less happy.

Also to be noted in Table 1.11 is the relationship between the March and October responses. Those who were "very happy" in March were much more likely to be "very happy" in October than those

who were initially "not too happy." There is obviously considerable consistency in the responses in spite of the turnover. Those who changed from the two extreme positions were most likely to move only one step rather than two. A number of people shifted from "very happy" to "pretty happy" and from "not too happy" to "pretty happy"; few went from one end of the spectrum to the other. This consistency of response can be taken as evidence for the reliability of the happiness question. It is obvious that people did not answer it in a random fashion.

TABLE 1.11

TURNOVER IN HAPPINESS: MARCH TO OCTOBER

Time Period	Response	October (Time Two)			N
		Very Happy	Pretty Happy	Not Too Happy	
March (Time One)	Very happy . . .	72	49	4	125
	Pretty happy . .	76	231	22	329
	Not too happy .	3	46	40	89
N		151	326	66	543

The measure of anxiety based on psychosomatic symptoms also showed little trend. The distribution of cases was virtually identical in March and October. Yet, these similar rates conceal considerable turnover, as can be seen from Table 1.12.

From the top row we see that a majority of those who were symptom free in March had picked up one or more symptoms in October. But this change was offset by the substantial number of people who were high on symptoms in March but who reported fewer symptoms in October. The proportion with the same score at both times is only a little more than half--52 per cent. The 48 per cent who changed positions on the index is comprised of 26 per cent who developed

more symptoms and 22 per cent who had fewer in October. Not only are people's assessments of their happiness subject to change over an eight-month period, but even their experience of physical symptoms, which are presumably beyond their control, changes considerably in this relatively short period of time.

TABLE 1.12

TURNOVER IN SCORES ON PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOM INDEX

Time Period	Symptom Index	October (Time Two)			N
		Low (None)	Medium (One)	High (Two)	
March (Time One)	Low . . .	36	58	11	105
	Medium .	37	100	71	208
	High . .	18	63	146	227
N		91	221	228	540

Table 1.13 shows the turnover in negative feelings. We have seen that the frequency of negative feelings hardly changed over the eight-month period. But in this area, too, there was considerable turnover.

TABLE 1.13

TURNOVER IN NEGATIVE FEELINGS

Time Period	Frequency of Feelings	Negative Feelings in October (Time Two)			N
		Low (None)	Medium (One)	High (Two)	
Negative Feelings in March (Time One)	Low (None) .	110	47	37	194
	Medium (One)	49	37	48	134
	High (Two) .	33	58	128	219
N		192	142	213	547

Only half the respondents remained in the same position on this index; 24 per cent reported more negative feelings in October and 26 per cent reported fewer.

Turnover in positive feelings can be seen from Table 1.14.

TABLE 1.14

TURNOVER IN POSITIVE FEELINGS

Time Period	Frequency of Feelings	Positive Feelings in October (Time Two)			N
		Low (None)	Medium (One)	High (Two)	
Positive Feelings in March (Time One)	Low	81	55	15	151
	Medium . .	73	82	27	182
	High . . .	45	70	97	212
N		199	207	139	545

Positive feelings, unlike the other areas, showed a marked trend: substantially fewer people experienced many gratifying feelings in October. Yet we now learn from the turnover table that these feelings were almost as stable as the negative feelings. Almost half (48 per cent) remained constant; 18 per cent experiences more positive feelings in October, and 34 per cent (almost twice as many) experienced fewer.

In spite of the considerable turnover in these tables, they too show a marked association between responses in March and October. It would seem, therefore, that the measures of feelings that have been developed are quite suitable for the purposes of the NORC program of research. Although they show a fair amount of consistency through time, thus indicating their reliability, they also seem to tap dimensions of feeling that do change in relatively short periods of time.

Summary

The main concern of this chapter has been to examine trends in feeling states among our respondents between March and the period of the Cuban crisis in October. We have seen that the rates of certain feeling states changed while others remained fairly constant. Worry over personal problems consistently declined, suggesting that the crisis shifted people's attention from their own troubles to the world situation. But when we look at specific indicators of anxiety, such as psychosomatic symptoms, problems of sleeping and smoking behavior, we saw that most of these symptoms were only slightly more frequent in October and a few were less frequent. A rather sharp decline in positive feelings occurred, but this was not matched by a comparable rise in negative feelings. And when we examined the respondents' self-estimates of happiness, we found that on the whole they were slightly happier in October. Taking into account the changes that occurred in the crisis during the period of the field work did not add much to this picture. Those interviewed at the end of the crisis, when the favorable outcome was clear, did not manifest very different trends in feelings from those interviewed when the outcome was still uncertain. All in all, the trend data do not support the idea that the international situation had a major impact on the feelings of our respondents. Were we limited to these findings we might almost conclude that most of the respondents were indifferent to the Cuban crisis.

But the trend materials on feeling states are not the only basis for assessing the psychological impact of the Cuban crisis. As noted earlier, the October questionnaire contained a number of questions dealing specifically with the Cuban situation. From these we can ascertain how many were worried about Cuba and whether these particularly worried people experienced different feelings from the others. It is to these materials that we turn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

WORRY OVER THE CUBAN CRISIS

The expectation that the Cuban situation affected people's feelings assumes two things: that people were aware of the crisis and that they were concerned or worried about it. In this chapter we shall discuss the extent to which people were aware of the events and develop an index of worry over the crisis. We shall then consider how this worry was distributed through the social structure and whether the "worriers" had feeling states different from the others.

Awareness of the Cuban Crisis

Studies designed to measure the impact of some event on people's attitudes and behavior often find that the impact was much less than anticipated simply because large numbers of people were not aware of the event. The data on hand indicate that such "ignorance of the event" did not exist in the Cuban crisis. Some 79 per cent of the respondents said that they had heard the President's address to the nation on the night of October 22nd. The remaining 21 per cent reported that they quickly learned about the crisis either from the mass media or by word of mouth.

Not only were they aware that there was a crisis, but they were also quite knowledgeable about its nature. When asked what events in Cuba led the President to take action, fully 80 per cent referred to the presence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Only nine per cent had no idea what had happened in Cuba. Their level of knowledge is also indicated by responses to a question asking what actions the President had taken and was prepared to take in

dealing with the situation. About two-thirds mentioned the blockade of shipping and a sizable number of these specified the quarantine applied only to vessels carrying offensive weapons. Others who did not refer to the blockade said that the President was determined to have the missile bases removed, and many pointed out that the President was prepared to use force if necessary to achieve this objective.[6] These findings suggest that nearly everyone was aware of the critical nature of the Cuban situation: if it should turn out that many were not particularly upset, it was not because they did not know about the crisis.

Assessing Worry Over the Cuban Crisis

Respondents were asked specifically about the Cuban situation only toward the end of the interview. But long before that, they were given several opportunities to mention the Cuban crisis if it was on their minds. At the beginning of the interview everyone was asked: "Everything considered, what would you say has bothered you or been on your mind most in the past week or so?" Almost two in every five--38 per cent--at this point made some reference to the Cuban crisis. A sample of these reactions follows.

A 26-year-old man, interviewed on the last day, when it was quite clear that war would not break out, replied: "Well, the war scare. I saw pictures of bombing and radiation. It worries me to death." And a 34-year-old mother told this incident:

> The children brought home typewritten sheets of what to stock for a family of four in case of disaster and the war scare. I went out and bought some supplies to put in the basement when the children brought the list home.

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[6] Later on we shall have occasion to use these responses in an index of knowledge about the crisis. For the time being, it is sufficient to note that hardly anyone was totally ignorant of the Cuban situation.

A 36-year-old housewife, interviewed a week after the President's address, said:

> Nuclear attack, I guess, I don't feel that our basement is safe. I've gathered from other people that it wouldn't be the ideal place to go. It's only half a basement.

A 43-year-old women gave this anxious response:

> The war that is going to come, you know. We're going to be bombed . . . At work, we try to keep from talking about it, but the conversation will go right back to the Cuban situation.

Of interest here is the fact that she too was interviewed on the Monday following the President's address when it was pretty apparent that the Soviet Union was backing down. Her conviction that war was imminent apparently was not shaken by this favorable turn in events. Later on, we shall explore in more detail the apparent lack of connection between the course of events in the crisis and feelings of our respondents.

A 68-year-old man, interviewed on the first day when the outcome was still quite uncertain, said:

> Nothing but the Cuban affair. The trouble in Cuba is on my mind all the time. I'd sure as hell hate to see something happen. I wish I had Khrushchev on top of a bomb and could pull the string.

Another elderly man, approached after the crisis had abated, replied: "Of course, everybody's been thinking about this war situation more than anything else." His feeling that everyone was concerned about the crisis was shared by others. A 67-year-old woman answered: "The Cuban affair . . . It's been on everyone's mind, I think." Another women was still more eloquent:

> The Cuban situation and world conflict is <u>all I've heard talked about</u>. I guess it's bothering me to know that people can't be civilized and get along in a world this big.

Some respondents saw the crisis in more personal terms. A young man replied: "The Cuban situation has been on my mind most.

I'm draft age and have reserve status." And a 41-year-old mother said: "The situation in Cuba. When you have a boy in the service you worry about things like that."

Somewhat later in the interview, respondents were asked a similar open-ended question, this time about the topic they worried about most. Many people mentioned their financial problems, their health, or other personal problems, but 20 per cent of the sample spontaneously made some reference to the international crisis as the topic they were worrying about most. Their comments were similar to those given in response to the earlier question about what had been on their minds. For example, an elderly mother replied: "The Cuban business. It's had a big effect on me because I have a boy in the Marines and he's being sent to the blockade." And a 54-year-old women said: "The Cuban situation and everythings that's going on. That scared everybody. I didn't find any exceptions."

In addition to the spontaneous references of the Cuban crisis in these open-ended questions, items in the section dealing specifically with the Cuban situation indicated how worried people were. One such question read:

> Think back now to when you first heard about the President's proposals regarding Cuba. At the time some people felt relieved because they expected something even more drastic. Others were disturbed to find that things had gotten so bad. Which of these is closest to how you felt when you first heard about the President's proposals?

The distribution of responses was:

	N	Per cent
Felt relieved, expected worse	201	37
Felt disturbed, things were so bad .	298	54
No feelings one way or the other . .	26	5
No answer	22	4
Total	547	100%

The people who were upset by the news comprise more than half the sample.

It is difficult to interpret the reactions of those who said they were relieved because they had expected worse. On the one hand, this group may contain people who were particularly upset by rumors before the President's speech and were perhaps expecting a declaration of war; these would have greeted the proposals with relief even though they still perceived the situation to be serious. On the other hand, this group probably contains people who did not perceive the situation as serious at all, and were not particularly worried about it. Since those who said they felt disturbed that things were so bad tended to manifest other signs of worry, we will treat this response as the one indicating worry over the crisis.[7]

Another indicator of worry over the Cuban crisis is the respondent's perception of the reactions of his acquaintances and his reactions relative to theirs. Everyone was asked whether the people they had talked to were "very worried" or "not particularly worried" about the Cuban situation. On this issue, opinion was rather evenly split. Some 51 per cent said that their associates were "very worried," 41 per cent saw them as "not particularly worried" and eight per cent did not know. This question was followed by another that allows us to infer the respondent's own level of worry--whether the people he had spoken to felt as he did about the crisis. By combining these two questions, we arrive at a crude and very conservative estimate of the proportion who would have

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[7]The October questionnaire was prepared in great haste. In our efforts to cover the various facets of the crisis, such as level of information and the effect of the crisis on behavior, we unfortunately omitted a direct question about the level of worry that was aroused during the height of the crisis. Since the situation was changing daily we tried to capture changes in feelings in our questions. For example, we asked the respondents whether they were more or less worried now than when they first heard of the crisis. A question about degree of initial worry would have helped greatly in the interpretation of the data.

said that they themselves were very worried. This figure comes to 38 per cent of the sample.[8]

Granting the shortcomings of these four indicators of worry about the crisis--the two open-ended questions, the check list questions about initial reaction to the President's proposals, and the combination of perceived worry of friends and friends' position relative to that of the respondent--there is a pragmatic reason for combining them into a single measure of "Cuban worry": each of these indicators is positively related to the others. Since we are less concerned with pinpointing the precise number of people who were worried about the Cuban crisis than with uncovering the correlates of worry, even a crude ordering of the respondents will be sufficient for our purposes. In constructing the index, we have assigned equal weight to each of the four items. When combined, they show the following distribution:

Index of Worry Over the Cuban Crisis

		N	Per cent	
Very Low:	Score 0	116	21	51%
Low:	Score 1	163	30	
Medium:	Score 2	146	27	49%
High:	Score 3	91	16	
Very High:	Score 4	31	6	
	Total	547		

[8] A number of respondents--13 per cent of the sample--reported that the reactions of their associates varied, some agreeing and some disagreeing with their own reaction. Although a number of these people were undoubtedly very worried themselves, we have excluded them from the positive response to this indicator, and so our estimate errs on the conservative side.

We see that about one-fifth of the sample gave no indication of anxiety over the Cuban crisis on any of the four items; almost one-third evidenced one positive response and the rest, about half the sample, gave two or more "worry" responses. For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we shall arbitrarily designate as the worried group those with scores of two or more. (The labels "low" and "high" worry will be used in the subsequent tables, the former consisting of those with scores of zero or one, and latter, those with higher scores.)

The Meaning of "Cuban Worry"

Before showing how worry is distributed among people differentially located in the social structure, we will first examine the measure of "Cuban worry." Our confidence in this index will increase if it is related to other signs of concern over the international crisis. Worry over the atomic bomb and fall-out is an excellent criterion for testing the index. Another item that appeared in the battery of worry questions only in October is also well suited for this purpose: the extent of recent worry over the world situation. Table 2.1 shows how the responses to these questions are related to the index of "Cuban worry."

The results in Table 2.1 are what we would expect. The index of worry about Cuba--based on items referring directly to the Cuban crisis--is strongly related to these other indicators of concern. What it meant to be worried about the Cuban crisis can be filled out by several other pieces of information. All respondents were asked how much time they had spent talking about Cuba with their friends and associates. Thirty-four per cent of those who scored high on the index of worry reported spending "a lot of time" talking about the crisis compared with 16 per cent of the "low worriers." Approximately half in each group said they had spent some time talking about Cuba; only 16 per cent of the "worriers," in contrast with 32 per cent of the "low worriers," said they hardly

talked about the crisis at all. There was apparently a relationship between talking and worrying; what direction did it take? It is quite possible that this was a mutually reinforcing process: those who worried more may have been motivated to talk about it more, and, conversely, those who discovered how disturbed others were may have themselves become disturbed. Responses to a follow-up question, however, suggest that it is more likely that worry led to discussion rather than the other way around. Those who said they had talked to others were asked whether such talks made them feel better or worse. Many more had been reassured by these conversations than had become more disturbed. Thus, some 41 per cent said that talking to others had made them feel better, only five per cent said it made them feel worse, and the remaining 53 per cent reported that talking to others had no effect on their feelings. The worriers, then, were worried in spite of the fact that they, more than the others, spent time in reassuring talks about the crisis.

TABLE 2.1

"CUBAN WORRY" AND CONCERN OVER A-BOMB AND THE WORLD SITUATION

"In past week, were you concerned about":

Variable	Not at All	Sometimes	Often	Per cent	N
A-Bomb and Fall-Out					
Low "Cuban worry" .	45%	38%	17%	100	279
High "Cuban worry".	24	44	32	100	268
The World Situation					
Low "Cuban worry" .	11%	42%	47%	100	279
High "Cuban worry".	3	25	72	100	268

One component of worry about the Cuban situation was the belief that the crisis heightened chances of war and that war in the near future is likely. When asked to assess the effect of the events in Cuba on the chances of war between the United States and Russia, some 45 per cent of the sample felt that the crisis had lessened chances of war; a substantial minority, 28 per cent, felt it had increased the likelihood of war; the others had no opinion. From another question we learn that 47 per cent did not believe that a war involving the United States was likely in the next few years; 38 per cent believed that it was; and 15 per cent had no opinion. As can be seen from Table 2.2, those who were greatly worried about the crisis were more pessimistic about war. The measure of worry over the Cuban crisis thus reflects in part fear of thermonuclear war, a possibility that seemed more real to the worriers than to the the "low worriers."

TABLE 2.2

CUBAN WORRY AND RESPONSES TO TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CHANCES OF WAR

1) Do you think that the Cuban crisis has increased or decreased chances of war?

	Cuban Worry	
	Low	High
Increased	23%	36%
Decreased	50	44
Don't know	27	20
Total	100%	100%

2) Do you think there is a good chance that there will be a major war in the next five years?

	Cuban Worry	
	Low	High
Yes	37%	44%
No	55	48
Don't know	8	8
Total	100%	100%

One thing that "Cuban worry" does not imply, however, is disapproval of the policy of the United States. Respondents were asked which of two possible reactions described their feelings when they learned about the President's actions, whether they felt "glad because the country was taking such firm action" or "very worried because the proposals were unnecessarily risky." The overwhelming majority chose the first.[9] Eighty-seven per cent said that the first alternative was closer to their initial reaction; only seven per cent chose the second, and five per cent had no opinion on the matter. Although it is true that the small minority who considered the United States policy unnecessarily risky were much more likely than the others to score high on the worry index, the fact that there was such unanimity on the President's actions means that the great majority of the "worriers" also approved of the United States' policy.

The relationship between "Cuban worry" and pessimism about war, shown in Table 2.2, prompts the question whether the index of worry may be related to the time of the interview, with those interviewed during the early uncertain period more worried than the others. As can be seen from Table 2.3, there is a relationship between "worry" and date of interview, but it is not a particularly strong one.

TABLE 2.3

"CUBAN WORRY" BY DATE OF INTERVIEW

Date of Interview	Per cent Highly Worried	
First two days	57	(76)
Next three days	49	(208)
Last four days	47	(258)

[9] The question read as follows: "Some people, when they first learned about the President's actions, were glad because our country was taking such firm action. Others were very worried and thought his proposals were unnecessarily risky. Which comes closest to the way you felt at the time?"

Those interviewed during the first two days of the field work, when the outcome was still uncertain, were most likely to be worried, but surprisingly, worry did not decrease markedly as time went on. Only 10 percentage points separate the two extremes.[10] The stage of the crisis, then, by no means accounts for all the variation in worry. It is relevant, therefore, to ask who the "worriers" are, and to ascertain whether they share certain social and psychological characteristics that set them apart from the nonworriers.

Social Correlates of Worry

Much of the variation in attitudes and behavior found in a population can usually be explained by the social positions that people occupy. Sex, age, income, education, and social class have been shown to be important variables in understanding such diverse phenomena as political behavior, organizational membership, leisure-time activities, and mental illness. Since the positions people occupy partly determine their experiences, interests, and values, it is not surprising that predispositions to think and act in certain ways should vary from one social status to another.

But what about a phenomenon such as worry over the Cuban crisis? The threat that hovered over the nation in late October of 1962 was a danger confronting rich and poor alike, old and young, educated and uneducated, men and women. Concern over a national crisis of this dimension would seem to transcent the socially-patterned differences between people. At first glance, the data on hand seem to bear this out. When various demographic characteristics are related to "Cuban worry," we find either minor correlations or none at all. This can be seen from Table 2.4.

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[10] When still more refined breaks are made on data of interview, the pattern becomes more irregular. The proportion highly worried on the eighth day, for example, was almost as great as on the first. Nevertheless, this pattern suggests that if it had been possible for us to get into the field a few days sooner we would have found still greater numbers highly worried.

TABLE 2.4

CUBAN WORRY BY SELECTED SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

(Per cent Highly Worried)

Variable	Per cent	N
Education		
Less than high school	48	242
High school graduate	49	175
Some college	53	75
College graduate	47	53
Income		
Less than $3,000	41	128
$3,000 to $4,999	57	79
$5,000 to $6,999	54	142
$7,000 and over	47	179
Socio-Economic Status		
Low	50	246
High	49	265
Age		
Under 30	56	78
30 - 39	48	111
40 - 49	56	117
50 - 59	55	88
60 - 69	45	71
70 and over	32	79
Sex		
Male	46	279
Female	53	226

The results in Table 2.4 would indicate that socio-economic status has no relationship to worry over the Cuban crisis. There is no difference at all between those of low and high SES. Looking

at two of the components of SES spearately--education and income--we find that education has no relationship to worry and that income shows a curvilinear pattern, with those in the middle somewhat more prone to worry over the crisis than those in the lowest and highest income categories.

In contrast, sex and age do show some association with worry. Women turn out to have been somewhat more worried than men, and age shows a pattern in keeping with the "disengagement theory of aging" advanced by Cumming and Henry.[11] Thus the proportion of "worriers" is fairly constant in each age group up to age 60 but declines noticeably among those over 60.

The women in our sample tend to be older than the men; we can expect, then, that the difference in worry between men and women will be more pronounced when age is held constant. Table 2.5 shows this to be so.

TABLE 2.5

THE JOINT EFFECT OF AGE AND SEX ON "CUBAN WORRY"

(Per cent Highly Worried)

Sex	Age				
	Under 30	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Men	51 (39)	41 (69)	53 (68)	45 (44)	37 (59)
Women	62 (39)	60 (42)	59 (49)	64 (44)	38 (91)
Percentage Difference	11	19	6	19	1

In three of the five age groups we find differences in worry between men and women that are larger than the aggregate difference.

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[11] Elaine Cumming and William E. Henry, Growing Old: The Process of Disengagement (New York: Basic Books, 1961).

Only among those over 60 does the difference disappear. Presumably disengagement from the outside world affects the older women to the same extent as it does the older men.

That women were more likely than men to be worried over the Cuban crisis suggests that family status might be a factor affecting worry. True, everyone is vulnerable to the dangers of a thermonuclear war, but those with families may well be more terrified of such a catastrophe than those with only their own lives to worry about. To test this possibility we must make do with data on family composition collected on the March wave. The format of this question differed somewhat in the two questionnaires used in March, the short form for all women and for men over 49 years of age, and the long form for men between 21 and 49. But in each form it is possible to distinguish between respondents who had one or more children living in the household and those who did not have any children in their households. As can be seen from Table 2.6, the presence of children in the household had some relationship to worry over the crisis.

TABLE 2.6

CUBAN WORRY BY PRESENCE OF CHILDREN IN THE HOUSEHOLD

(Per cent Highly Worried)

Sex	No Children	One or More Children
Total sample	45 (238)	52 (292)
Men	41 (99)	47 (176)
Women	48 (139)	58 (117)

Parental concern may not be the only mechanism accounting for the greater tendency to worry on the part of those with children.

As we saw from the qualitative data presented earlier, school-aged children were often the bearers of messages about the preparations their parents should make to be ready for an emergency. These official communications brought into the family through children might well have intensified the worry of the parents.

Having children is somewhat more related to worry among women than among men (a difference of 10 percentage points compared with one of six percentage points), but this does not fully explain the women's greater propensity to worry, for with or without childre, we still find women more often worried than men.

The absence of a relationship between education and worry, shown in Table 2.5, is surprising, if only because the oldest respondents, whom we know were least worried, are also the most poorly educated. When we consider the simultaneous effects of education and age, we find these characteristics interacting in a rather strange way. (Since almost half the sample had less than a high school education, we differentiate only between those who have and have not completed high school.)

Reading across the rows of Table 2.7, we see that the decline in worry among the oldest respondents occurs primarily in the poorly educated group. Education seems to lessen the tendency toward "disengagement" among the old, for in the better educated group, the oldest respondents were only slightly less worried than the others.

A more puzzling finding emerges from the columns of Table 2.7. Among those under 60, the poorly educated tended to be more worried over the crisis than the better educated. Why should this be? Before explaining this finding, it may be well to recapitulate what we have learned so far. We first discovered that our measure of Cuban worry was more stable than we had expected. Although worry tended to decrease as the crisis waned, the difference between those interviewed during the uncertain days and those interviewed when the crisis was over was not very large.

TABLE 2.7

THE JOINT EFFECTS OF AGE AND EDUCATION ON WORRY OVER THE CUBAN CRISIS

(Per cent Highly Worried)

Education	Age		
	Under 40	40 - 49	60 and Over
Less than high school graduate .	59 (41)	61 (83)	36 (117)
High school graduate or more . .	50 (147)	51 (122)	45 (33)

We then learned that various measures of socio-economic status were not related to worry. We did find that the very old were less worried than others and that women were more worried than men, but our initial hunch that the sex difference could be explained by the woman's greater involvement in family life and with children proved inadequate. And now we are confronted with the anomalous result that, except among the aged, the poorly educated were more worried than the better educated. In puzzling over the latter result, it occurred to us that many of the better educated people might have been less worried when they were interviewed because they were better informed than the poorly educated and knew sooner that the crisis had been resolved favorably. Moreover, numerous studies have shown that those of high social status have broader interests, are more cosmopolitan, and lead more active lives than those of low status; they have, to use Lazarsfeld's phrase, a broader "effective scope." As the crisis lessened, such people may have shifted their attention back to their other, more personal interests and worries. This logic might also explain the greater worry on the part of the women. Men must give their attention to their jobs and so they may have recovered from their anxieties over the crisis more quickly than did women.

All this assumes that the decline in worry through the interviewing period was more characteristic of those in certain statuses than in others. The relevant data are shown in Table 2.8.

TABLE 2.8

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN "CUBAN WORRY" AND SELECTED SOCIAL STATUSES AT VARIOUS STAGES IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

Status	Date of Interview		
	First Two Days	Next Three Days	Last Four Days
Education			
High (High school or more) .	65% (34)	50% (105)	47% (161)
Low (Less than high school).	50 (42)	47 (102)	49 (96)
Income			
High ($5,000 and over) . . .	74 (34)	52 (109)	44 (174)
Low (Under $5,000)	47 (38)	45 (94)	50 (74)
Socio-Economic Status			
High	65 (29)	51 (101)	45 (134)
Low	51 (45)	48 (90)	50 (111)
Sex			
Men	54 (35)	48 (92)	42 (151)
Women	59 (41)	49 (116)	55 (107)
Age			
Under 50	77 (34)	49 (99)	50 (171)
Over 50	42 (41)	47 (108)	41 (87)

The patterns in Table 2.8 are quite striking. In every instance, the group with the broader "effective scope" (assuming this to be men rather than women and those under 50 rather than those

over 50) shows a marked decline in worry as the international situation improved; in contrast, the group with the narrower effective scope was as likely to be worried toward the end as at the beginning. For the three variables dealing with socio-economic status--education, income and the summary measure of SES (which includes occupational status as well)--we find that people of higher status were more prone to worry than those of lower status during the initial uncertain period and somewhat less prone to worry when the favorable resolution of the situation was obvious. The gap in worry between those under and over 50 is particularly great during the first few days. After this the level of worry among those under 50 diminishes and approaches that of the older respondents. Date of interview also helps clarify the difference in level of worry between men and women. We now see that in the early stage the men were almost as worried as the women. But while proportionately fewer men were worried toward the end, the proportion of worried women in this period is almost as high as in the early one.

Another finding in Table 2.8 should be noted. The base figures (appearing in parentheses) indicate an association between status and date of interview. Interviewers presumably had more difficulty contacting the people of higher status, for in each instance, their proportions increase in the later stages of the field work.[12]

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[12]When the percentages are computed, we find that only 45 per cent of the early interviewees were high school graduates compared with 63 per cent in the last period. High income respondents increase from 47 per cent to 70 per cent between the first and last period of the interviewing. Those of high SES comprise 39 per cent of the early interviewees, 53 per cent of those in the middle period and 55 per cent of those in the last period. Sex and age are also related to the interviewing process: men make up 46 per cent of the earliest group of respondents and 59 per cent of the latest group; and 45 per cent of those contacted in the first two days were under 50 years of age compared with 66 per cent of those contacted in the last four days. These differences between early and late interviewees help explain the association between date of interview in October and feelings experienced in March, for we know that happiness and positive feelings are positively related to social status.

The Role of Interest and Knowledge

As we have suggested, at least two mechanisms, singly or in combination, might account for the progessively smaller proportion of worried people among those with broad effective scope over the course of the interviewing period. These people were presumably better informed about the changing character of the crisis. Its critical significance was probably clear to them sooner, and they learned more quickly about the favorable events that were occurring at the time of the field work. This might account for their initially high level of worry and their relatively low level of worry during the closing stages of the crisis. Reinforcing the role of knowledge, perhaps, is the tendency of higher status people, men compared with women, and younger people compared with old, to be more actively engaged in the community. With more things competing for their attention, they might, as the crisis lessened, more readily turn to other matters. The very fact that interviewers had more difficulty finding such people at home is testimony to the greater demands on their time.[13]

With the data on hand, we can study the role of two closely related factors--interest in and knowledge of the Cuban crisis--as possible mechanisms accounting for the patterns in Table 2.9. To

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[13]This reasoning presupposes that our index of "Cuban worry" taps in large part preoccupation with the crisis at the time of the interview and not merely the level of worry that was evoked at the height of the crisis. This seems to apply to at least two of the four items used to measure "Cuban worry," the two open-ended questions calling for the things the respondent was most worried and most bothered about. A third item used in the index, perceived worry of friends, might also be "time bound." This question was phrased in the present tense: "Are the people you've talked to particularly worried?" Those interviewed toward the end might well be more prone to say that their colleagues were not particularly worried at that time. The only question used in the index which on the face of it seems to be unaffected by the course of the crisis is the one asking about initial reaction to the President's proposals: whether the respondent was disturbed that things were so bad or relieved because he had expected worse.

anticipate the subsequent analysis, we shall find that these do not fully explain the striking patterns in Table 2.9, even though it will turn out that those with broad effective scopes were more interested in the crisis and more knowledgeable about it.

TABLE 2.9

KNOWLEDGE OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BY INVOLVEMENT IN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

(Per cent Highly Knowledgeable about Cuba)

Communication Involvement	Per cent	N
Low (Zero)	35	106
Medium (One)	64	179
High (Two to Four)	70	262

A measure of interest in the crisis has been constructed from data on attentiveness to formal and informal channels of communication during the week preceding the interview. In the context of queries about the Cuban situation, respondents were asked whether they spent more time in the preceding week watching TV, listening to radio and reading newspapers. In each instance, about 25 per cent reported giving more time to these activities. Moreover, those who paid more attention to one medium were more likely to pay attention to the others, and so we were able to score people on attentiveness to mass media. This measure, in turn, proved to be strongly related to the amount of time spent talking with others about the Cuban crisis. (Only 12 per cent of those who reported no increase in their mass media habits said they had spent a great deal of time talking about the Cuban crisis; 33 per cent of those who gave more attention to one of these media and 51 per cent who gave more attention to two or all three media said they had spent a "lot of time" discussing Cuba.) Since greater attention to formal media is so strongly related to informal communication, we have combined these

into a single measure of "involvement in channels of communication" which indicates degree of interest in the crisis.[14]

To arrive at a measure of knowledge, we have constructed an index from responses to the two open-ended questions dealing with the situation in Cuba and the nature of the Unites States' actions. As we have noted, some 80 per cent mentioned the construction of Societ missile bases in response to the first question. This answer was scored as one; all others as zero. In answer to the question about actions taken, some 20 per cent specified an American blockade of Soviet ships carrying offensive weapons and another 49 per cent referred to a blockade of shipping without specifying its character. The more knowledgeable response of the former was assigned a score of two; the general reference to a blockade, a score of one; complete failture to mention a blockade of Cuban shipping (31 per cent of the cases), a score of zero. The index thus ranges from zero to three. Fourteen per cent of the sample scored zero and 25 per cent scored one; more than 40 per cent achieved a score of two, and almost 20 per cent, a score of three. We will arbitrarily call that 61 per cent of the sample with scores of two or three highly knowledgeable about the crisis. As can be seen from Table 2.9, involvement in channels of communication is strongly related to knowledge.

Only about one-third of those who did not give increased attention to any form of mass media and who did not talk much about Cuba scored high on the knowledge index, compared with seven in every ten of those who were actively participating in various processes of communication.

Before showing how interest in the Cuban crisis and knowledge of it are related to social status, we should point out how each is related to the course of the crisis. Knowledge of a major

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[14]The index was constructed by assigning scores of zero, one or two to each dimension and adding scores.

event is presumably cumulative. As more and more facts are transmitted through media of communication, we should find that more and more people are knowledgeable. Even those less interested in the event should know more about it in time. In contrast, interest in the crisis and hence attentiveness to channels of communication is not cumulative in the same sense. Since the crisis lessened markedly during the course of the field work we should not find interest to be greater toward the end than toward the beginning; if anything, interest should decline over a period of time. The data bear out these expectations. Among those interviewed during the first two days, 51 per cent were highly knowledgeable about the crisis; in the next three days this proportion rose to 60 per cent and in the last four days it reached 65 per cent. Moreover, this pattern holds true for those of broad and narrow effective scope. With the passing of time, knowledge about the Cuban crisis increased in all status groups in the latter stages.

In contrast, interest, as measured by involvement in communications, did not increase for the sample as a whole between the earlier and later phases of the interviewing. In each time period, slightly less than half the respondents were highly involved in channels of communication.[15]

Tables 2.10 and 2.11 demonstrate that people of higher status, those with broad effective scopes, were both more interested in the Cuban crisis and more knowledgeable about it.

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[15] It follows from these patterns that the relationship between interest in and knowledge of the Cuban crisis is particularly strong in the early days and decreases somewhat in the later stages when even the less interested become more knowledgeable. The data also bear this out. Although the highly interested people were more knowledgeable at every period of the interviewing, their advantage over the less interested was most marked during the first few days. When the indices are dichotomized we find a difference in knowledge of 19 percentage points between the more and less interested during the first two days and a difference of 13 percentage points in the last four days.

TABLE 2.10

INVOLVEMENT IN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BY SELECTED SOCIAL STATUSES AND DATE OF INTERVIEW

(Per cent Highly Involved in Channels of Communication)

Status	Period of Interview			
	Total	First Two Days	Next Three Days	Last Four Days
Education				
High . .	56 (303)	68 (34)	49 (105)	58 (161)
Low . .	37 (242)	33 (42)	41 (102)	34 (96)
Income				
High . .	59 (321)	76 (34)	55 (109)	57 (174)
Low . .	33 (207)	29 (38)	34 (94)	34 (74)
SES				
High . .	60 (267)	72 (29)	51 (101)	63 (134)
Low . .	37 (247)	33 (45)	43 (90)	34 (111)
Age				
Under 50	58 (306)	62 (34)	58 (99)	57 (171)
Over 50	35 (238)	39 (41)	34 (108)	33 (87)
Sex				
Men . .	47 (274)	49 (35)	45 (92)	50 (151)
Women .	48 (271)	49 (41)	47 (116)	48 (107)

In four of the five sets of comparisons shown in Table 2.10, the expected relationship holds. From the first column of percentages we learn that those with a higher level of education, income, and social status and those under 50 years of age were more involved in media of communication and so presumably more interested in the crisis than those with the characteristics indicative of a narrower

effective scope. Moreover these differences are exhibited at every stage of the interviewing although they are particularly marked during the early uncertain period.

TABLE 2.11

KNOWLEDGE OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BY SELECTED SOCIAL STATUSES AND DATE OF INTERVIEW

(Per cent Highly Knowledgeable)

Status	Period of Interview			
	Total	First Two Days	Next Three Days	Last Four Days
Education				
High . . .	74 (303)	65 (34)	77 (105)	73 (161)
Low . . .	46 (202)	40 (42)	42 (102)	52 (96)
Income				
High . . .	72 (321)	68 (34)	72 (109)	72 (174)
Low . . .	47 (207)	42 (38)	48 (94)	47 (74)
SES				
High . . .	68 (267)	62 (29)	71 (101)	72 (134)
Low . . .	52 (247)	42 (45)	48 (90)	59 (111)
Age				
Under 50 .	71 (306)	56 (34)	75 (99)	73 (171)
Over 50 .	48 (238)	49 (41)	46 (108)	51 (87)
Sex				
Men . . .	69 (274)	57 (35)	70 (92)	71 (151)
Women . .	53 (271)	46 (41)	53 (116)	56 (107)

Although in the aggregate, date of interview is not related to this measure of interest, we now see that those with broad effective scope were most apt to report increased attention to channels of communication during the first two days; high status respondents interviewed later on showed less interest. In contrast, the

level of interest of those with narrow effective scope tended to reach a peak after the first two days or else it remained the same throughout the interviewing period. It is as if those with a narrow scope have a slower "reaction time."

The one exception to these patterns occurs when the sample is divided according to sex. Although we have assumed that men have greater effective scope than women, we now see that women were just as likely as men to have been interested in the crisis, at least to the extent of paying more attention than usual to channels of communication.

Table 2.11 shows the relationship between these status characteristics and knowledge of the Cuban crisis. Those with a broad effective scope were in every instance more knowledgeable about the Cuban crisis. Although women were as involved as men in processes of communication, the men, we now see, were better informed. These patterns are not explained by the tendency for higher status people to have been interviewed in the later stages when the general level of knowledge had increased, for in each time period they were apt to know more about the crisis than lower status respondents.

We said earlier that the course of the crisis revealed a pattern of declining worry among people with greater effective scope and suggested as explanation their greater knowledge and waning interest after the critical period. The findings in Table 2.10 and 2.11 would seem to support this. But the hypothesis, however compelling, is not in keeping with the facts. A cross-tabulation of the indices of interest and knowledge with Cuban worry gives the first clue to its inadequacy. If interest and knowledge were the crucial mechanisms explaining the patterns in Table 2.8, we should find that interested and knowledgeable people were more worried than others during the uncertain days and less worried than the others toward the end. But from Table 2.12 we see that such people were more often worried than the others throughout the interviewing period.

TABLE 2.12

"CUBAN WORRY" BY INVOLVEMENT IN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRISIS AT DIFFERENT PERIODS OF TIME

(Per cent Highly Worried)

Variable	Period of Interview			
	Total	First Two Days	Next Three Days	Last Four Days
Interest in Media				
High . . .	58 (259)	73 (37)	55 (95)	55 (127)
Low . . .	41 (283)	41 (39)	43 (113)	40 (131)
Knowledge				
High . . .	52 (382)	59 (39)	50 (125)	51 (168)
Low . . .	45 (210)	54 (37)	47 (83)	40 (90)

Table 2.12 also shows that our measure of interest, communication activity, is more strongly associated with "Cuban worry" than is knowledge of the crisis. This suggests that the index of worry reflects interest in the crisis as well as fear. The interaction between interest and worry and knowledge and worry over a period of time should also be noted. Those highly attentive to news media were particularly prone to worry during the uncertain days. Worry in this group decreased sharply in the next two periods. In contrast, those less attentive to news media show the same level of worry throughout the interviewing period. Both the highly knowledgeable and less informed show a decline in worry over the interviewing period but, contrary to what we had expected, this trend is somewhat more marked among the less knowledgeable.

A full elaboration of the data of Table 2.12 requires the introduction of a fourth variable, the social characteristics of the respondents. In doing this, we reduce the base figures, and

in some cases, the resulting percentages are not very reliable. Nevertheless, this more complicated analysis not only forces us to reject "knowledge" as the crucial mechanism, but also yields some rather strange results that deserve attention. For the sake of simplicity, we shall present these materials only for the index of socio-economic status; the patterns that show up here also appear for the other status characteristics. Furthermore, we shall focus only on the index of knowledge since it bears most directly on our speculations about the trend in worry among those of broad effective scope. The interaction of knowledge, SES, date of interview, and worry can be seen in Table 2.13.

TABLE 2.13

"CUBAN WORRY" BY DATE OF INTERVIEW, SES, AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRISIS

(Per cent Highly Worried)

Period of Interviewing	Level of Knowledge			
	High		Low	
	High SES	Low SES	High SES	Low SES
First two days	72 (18)	47 (19)	55 (11)	54 (26)
Next three days	49 (72)	49 (43)	55 (29)	47 (47)
Last four days	48 (96)	55 (66)	37 (38)	44 (45)

Were knowledge the crucial mechanism explaining the fall-off in worry among the high SES respondents, we should find knowledgeable people on each status level showing less worry over the interview period, and those less informed, whatever their status, having similar proportions of worried people at each stage. Clearly this is not the case.

The highly knowledgeable, high SES respondents interviewed during the first two days were particularly worried. Such people interviewed later on were much less worried. This pattern among the high status knowledgeable respondents approximates what we would expect of people responding mainly to the changing character of the crisis. The less knowledgeable high status respondents (the third column) demonstrate a lesser degree of worry at the outset, but their concern, too, declines through the interviewing period. In this group, however, the break in worry occurs later, between the middle and the end of the interviewing. Less knowledgeable, low status respondents share with the well-informed, high SES group the pattern of decreasing worry except that in this group the decline is not very marked.

The puzzling finding in Table 2.13 is the pattern shown by the highly knowledgeable low status respondents (the second column). Unlike the others, they show a tendency toward <u>increased</u> worry through the interviewing period. In spite of their knowledge about the crisis, they turn out to be the least worried group during the early uncertain period and the most worried toward the end. These same patterns are found when we consider income, education, and age. In every instance the knowledgeable lower status group was more worried toward the end than toward the beginning of the survey, while all other groups show the pattern of declining worry. It is almost as if their feelings lag behind their knowledge.

With this baffling result we conclude the analysis of the social correlates of worry over the Cuban crisis. We have seen that people occupying positions characterized by a broad effective scope tended to be more interested in the crisis and more knowledgeable about it. Furthermore, they seemed to be most sensitive to the changing character of the international situation. During the early days when the outcome was uncertain they were particularly worried, and were progressively less worried as the crisis changed into a victory for the United States. This was especially true of

the more knowledgeable people of higher status. In contrast, the worry of people of narrower effective scope did not lessen toward the end of the interviewing period. But when this group is further specified by level of knowledge, there are, as we have just learned, small but opposing trends: the less knowledgeable were somewhat less worried toward the end, while the more knowledgeable became increasingly worried as the interviewing period proceeded.

We have learned that the impact of a major crisis such as the war scare in the fall of 1962 can vary among people, according to their location in the social structure. Higher status respondents appear to have been more quickly aroused and to have recovered more quickly than those of lower status, a phenomenon not explained by their greater interest in and knowledge of the international situation. At least these are the conclusions suggested if we can assume that the comparisons based on date of interview reflect a process through time rather than inexplicable personality differences between early and late respondents.

Psychological Correlates of Cuban Worry

Now we return to the theme of the first chapter, changes in feelings that might be attributed to the Cuban crisis. We already know that the respondents as a whole demonstrated little change in feelings between March and October. But what about the people who were, for whatever reasons, particularly concerned about the Cuban crisis? Did their feelings change in ways different from the others? As we shall see, the answer to this question is negative, for the most part. The "worriers" did not have feelings very different from the "nonworriers," at least according to our measures of psychosomatic symptoms, positive and negative emotions, and assessments of happiness.

Cuban Worry and Symptoms of Anxiety

At first glance it would seem that worry about the Cuban crisis raised the anxiety level of our respondents, for we find that "Cuban worry" is positively related to various symptoms of anxiety in October. These results are shown in Table 2.14.[16]

TABLE 2.14

WORRY OVER CUBA AND SELECTED INDICATORS OF ANXIETY

	Cuban Worry	
Responses in October	Low	High
Per cent reporting less sleep than usual . .	8	13
Per cent having trouble getting to sleep . .	36	46
Per cent reporting frequent feelings of nervousness	31	39
Per cent reporting having less energy than usual	21	30
Per cent feeling often depressed and very unhappy	14	21

We must examine the March date before we can conclude that concern over the Cuban crisis led to these symptoms of anxiety, for there is always the possibility that people who are anxious generally were more likely to be upset by the Cuban situation.

In testing this possibility we will focus on the index of psychosomatic symptoms as our measure of anxiety. The trend data for low and high "worriers" are shown in Table 2.15. The October responses (second column) show a pattern similar to those in Table 2.14; symptoms are more prevalent among worriers than among nonworriers. But

[16] Although only the question about feelings of nervousness is taken from the battery of anxiety symptoms, the other items listed in Table 2.14--including the question about feeling depressed, which is part of the battery of negative feelings--can easily be interpreted as signs of anxiety.

the same pattern was even more pronounced in March. Neither group manifests much of a trend, but symptoms increased somewhat among nonworriers, and they decreased slightly among worriers. These data cast a very different light on the previous results. The Cuban crisis did not produce symptoms of anxiety; rather, consistent anxiety was heightened. This becomes more evident when the results are percentaged in the other direction, with symptoms in March as the independent variable and "Cuban worry" as the dependent variable. Having done this, we find that worry over Cuba increases from 42 per cent in the low symptom group to 44 per cent in the middle group to 57 per cent in the group high on symptoms in March.

TABLE 2.15

TRENDS IN PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS PRESENTED SEPARATELY FOR THOSE LOW AND HIGH ON "CUBAN WORRY"

(Per cent High on Symptoms)

"Cuban Worry"	March	October	Percentage Difference
Low worry	35 (279)	39 (279)	+ 4
High worry	48 (268)	46 (268)	- 2

Table 2.15 presents simple associations at two different points in time and does not show how initial level of symptoms and subsequent level of symptoms interact with "Cuban worry." The interaction among these variables can be seen from Table 2.16, where level of anxiety in March is held constant.

Controlling for symptoms in March, we find that individuals highly worried about the Cuban crisis were not consistently more likely to have symptoms of anxiety in October than those who were not as worried. Among people whose initial anxiety level was low or medium, nonworriers exhibited more symptoms in October. Only

among those initially high on symptoms do we find the worriers manifesting more symptoms in October, but even this difference is small. We can only conclude that, on the whole, worry over the Cuban crisis did not result in an increase in symptoms of anxiety.

TABLE 2.16

CUBAN WORRY BY PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS IN OCTOBER
HOLDING CONSTANT LEVEL OF SYMPTOMS IN MARCH

Cuban Worry		Level of Symptoms in March					
		Low		Medium		High	
		Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Symptoms in October	Low . . .	33%	35%	16%	19%	10%	6%
	Medium .	53	58	50	46	30	26
	High . .	14	7	34	35	60	68
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(63)	(45)	(117)	(93)	(97)	(130)

Cuban Worry, Positive and Negative Feelings, and Happiness

In Chapter I we saw that experiences of gratifying emotions declined markedly between March and October and that negative feelings did not change much in the aggregate. Table 2.17 shows the trends in these feeling states among worriers and nonworriers.

Looking first at the March column of figures, we learn that the people who were worried over Cuba had both more positive and more negative feelings in March than the others. This is yet another indication of the psychological differences between worriers and nonworriers. In October, these differences tend to disappear. The trends indicate a greater loss in positive feelings for the worriers, a result suggesting an impact of the crisis, but neither group shows a trend in negative feelings.[17]

[17]When March positive feelings are treated as the independent variable we find a rather strong association with October worry. Only

TABLE 2.17

TRENDS IN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEELINGS PRESENTED SEPARATELY FOR THOSE SCORING "LOW" AND "HIGH" ON CUBAN WORRY

Per cent High on ...	March	October	Trend
Positive Feelings			
Low worry	34%	25%	- 9
High worry . . .	44	26	-18
Negative Feelings			
Low worry	36	38	+ 2
High worry . . .	42	42	0

Table 2.18 presents the interaction of positive feelings in both March and October with worry over the Cuban crisis. The picture presented in Table 2.18 is more ambiguous than that shown by the trend data. Among those initially low on positive feelings, worriers were somewhat more likely than nonworriers to experience gratifying feelings in October. Among people initially in the middle group on positive feelings, worriers were more likely to have one positive feeling in October but less likely to have many such feelings. Only among those initially high on positive feelings do we find results conforming with our expectations. Here we see that the nonworriers more often retained their positive feelings in October; the worriers more often lost them.

The comparable results for negative feelings and worry are shown in Table 2.19.

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37 per cent of those low in positive feelings were worriers compared with 51 per cent and 56 per cent of those in the middle and high groups, respectively. The pattern for negative feelings is more irregular. Those low and high in negative feelings in March were more likely to be worriers than those in the middle (49 per cent, 44 per cent, and 52 per cent, respectively).

TABLE 2.18

THE RELATION BETWEEN CUBAN WORRY AND POSITIVE FEELINGS IN OCTOBER CONTROLLING FOR POSITIVE FEELINGS IN MARCH

Positive Feelings in October	Positive Feelings in March					
	Low		Medium		High	
	Cuban Worry					
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Low	56%	50%	43%	38%	13%	28%
Medium . .	36	38	40	49	38	29
High . . .	8	12	17	13	49	43
Total .	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(95)	(56)	(89)	(93)	(93)	(119)

TABLE 2.19

CUBAN WORRY AND NEGATIVE FEELINGS IN OCTOBER CONTROLLING FOR NEGATIVE FEELINGS IN MARCH

Negative Feelings in October	Negative Feelings in March					
	Low		Medium		High	
	Cuban Worry					
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Low	57%	56%	39%	34%	14%	16%
Medium . .	25	24	24	32	35	19
High . . .	18	20	37	34	51	65
Total .	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(98)	(96)	(75)	(59)	(106)	(113)

Although there were no trends in negative feelings among worriers and nonworriers, we now see that when initial level of negative feelings is held constant, some differences emerge between the two groups. No difference shows up among those low on negative

feelings in March; among the initially medium group, worriers were slightly more prone to have one negative feeling in October, but they were less likely to have many. The big difference is seen among those who had many negative feelings in March. In this group the worriers retained their negative feelings in October more often than did the nonworriers.

Turning now to the relationship between worry over the Cuban crisis and self-reports of happiness, we present first the trend data for "worriers" and "nonworriers" and then the association between worry and happiness, with initial reports of happiness held constant (Table 2.20).

TABLE 2.20

TRENDS IN HAPPINESS PRESENTED SEPARATELY FOR THOSE LOW AND HIGH ON CUBAN WORRY

Variable	March	October	Percentage Distribution
(Per cent "Not too happy")			
Low worriers	18 (273)	13 (273)	- 5
High worriers	14 (268)	12 (268)	- 2
(Per cent "Very happy")			
Low worriers	24 (273)	25 (273)	+ 1
High worriers	22 (268)	29 (268)	+ 7

The trend story varies depending upon which end of the happiness scale we look at. We know that in the group as a whole, happiness increased somewhat between March and October. We now see that those worried about the Cuban crisis were slightly less likely than the nonworried to move out of the "not too happy" category, but they were more likely to move into the "very happy" category.

The results when these variables are examined simultaneously appear in Table 2.21.

TABLE 2.21

HAPPINESS AND CUBAN WORRY CONTROLLING FOR INITIAL LEVEL OF HAPPINESS

Happiness in October	Happiness in March					
	Very Happy		Pretty Happy		Not Too Happy	
	Cuban Worry					
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Very happy	58%	54%	19%	27%	-%	3%
Pretty happy	39	42	73	68	59	45
Not too happy	3	3	8	5	41	53
Total	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	101%
	(66)	(59)	(158)	(171)	(49)	(38)

Again the picture is ambiguous. The worried people who were very happy in March show a slightly greater shift toward unhappiness in October than the nonworried in this group; the worried who were initially unhappy were more likely to remain this way in October than their nonworried counterparts. These comparisons suggest that their happiness may have been depressed by worry over the international crisis. But among the initially "pretty happy" people--largest group in the sample--worriers were more likely to have increased their happiness in October. On balance it would seem that worry over the Cuban crisis did not much affect assessments of happiness.

Perhaps the safest conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that worry about Cuba was not an important determinant of the other kinds of feelings people were experiencing. To the extent

that worry did have an effect, it seems to have been confined to those who had rather extreme feelings initially. Thus the "worriers" who had many positive feelings in March were more likely than their counterparts among the nonworriers to experience fewer in October; if the worriers had many negative feelings and psychosomatic symptoms in March, they were more likely than nonworriers to retain them in October; and they were also more prone to remain unhappy if this was their feeling in March.

There is an intimation in these materials that people with certain psychological predispositions were subject to worry about the Cuban crisis. We have seen that people who had many symptoms of anxiety and many positive feelings in March were more likely to be concerned. But these correlations must be approached with some caution. For one thing, neither the March readings on negative feelings nor happiness were related to Cuban worry. For another, when October measures of these various feelings are treated as independent variables, only one association stands out; a positive correlation between happiness and worry. (Some 54 per cent of the very happy people in October were worried about Cuba, compared with 48 per cent of the "pretty happy" and 41 per cent of the "not too happy" people.) Rather than seeking ex post facto interpretations for this strange array of findings, perhaps we should recognize that these correlations could arise merely by chance, the random by-products of a large number of cross-tabulations.

Summary

We have tried in this chapter to measure the public's worry about the Cuban crisis and to show how this worry was distributed over the social structure. Apart from the tendency for older people to have been less worried about Cuba and for women to have been more worried than men, we found no simple correlations between social position and worry. But further specification indicated that people

of higher status, those with a greater range of interests, were more likely to reflect the changing character of the crisis in the spectrum of their concern. As the international situation improved their anxiety lessened, a tendency not shown by those of lower status. Our efforts to trace out the psychological consequences of the crisis have not been too successful. Even for those who were particularly concerned about the crisis, we could find little evidence that their psychological state was particularly affected thereby. . . .

CHAPTER III

SUMMING UP

The small study described in this report should be viewed as experimental research; it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to study systematically the psychological impact of a national crisis. To be sure, there have been studies of reactions to crises, disasters, and other major unexpected events, but such studies have always been limited to the period after the event. This event, in contrast, made use of the panel technique, interviewing the same people before and after the time of stress.

It is not surprising that such panel studies have not been done in the past. Crises, by definition, are unplanned, unexpected phenomena. Although it is relatively easy to set a study in motion after the event has occurred, it is impossible to anticipate such events and so obtain measurements shortly before they take place.[18] That we have data on the psychological states of our respondents before the Cuban crisis arose is no tribute to our foresight. These materials had been collected some months before in a pilot study designed to test our instrument. The ongoing research detoured momentarily to study the impact of the Cuban crisis. Needless to say, the design of this study leaves much to be desired. Its basic methodological weakness is the long period of time between first interview and the reinterview. We have had to assume that the readings on feeling states obtained in March are a suitable baseline for assessing the

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[18] This is one of the reasons why NORC is developing a time series on the population's feeling states. If an annual inventory of feeling states existed for a ten- or twenty-year period, we would be in a better position to trace the impact of major events.

impact of the crisis. This is a dubious assumption at best. It is quite possible that the results are contaminated by a seasonal effect, the difference between later winter and early spring on the one hand, and fall on the other. Ideally, we would have wanted the first wave to have taken place shortly before the crisis, probably in September.

The rapidly changing character of the Cuban crisis posed a second difficulty. Though we returned to the field quickly, we could not keep pace with the changing events. When the field work started the outcome of the crisis was most uncertain, but the bulk of the interviewing took place in a climate of great national relief and pride over a successful confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Both the long interval between waves and the changing objective situation during the second wave are reminders of the wide discrepancies between the conditions of our "experimental" study and the requirements of a carefully controlled field experiment. Furthermore, our sample was in no way representative of the national population. At best it is a sample of adults in small Midwestern cities. The rather ambiguous and inconclusive results of the study must be weighed in this context.

If the first wave had taken place shortly before the crisis and if the crisis itself had retained the same level of intensity throughout the period of the field work, our findings would indeed be newsworthy. The absence of major trends in feeling states would have forced a drastic revision of the popular image of what people experience during periods of national crises. Because of the many uncontrolled variables, our conclusions must be more tentative. And yet, in spite of the methodological shortcomings of the study, these findings have some value. We now know that even during the early days of the field work, when the possibility of an all-out war was still great, most of our respondents were not burdened with symptoms of anxiety, were not so disturbed that they could not sleep, were not so overwhelmed that they could not experience pleasurable emotions,

were not so distressed that they could not feel happy with themselves, were not so preoccupied that they could not think of anything but the Cuban situation. In short, if these feeling states are acutely affected by a war scare, we should have found major trends even though we cannot be certain that the preceding March was a typical period in the lives of our respondents. That we did not find such increases in anxiety-related behavior and feelings is thus evidence that the Cuban crisis did not have a major impact on the feelings of the people we interviewed.

But although we did not uncover any marked effect of the Cuban crisis on feeling states, we cannot, on the basis of the evidence, say that there were no effects. We did find consistent decreases in the reporting of worries over personal problems in October, suggesting that the crisis might have taken people's minds off their own troubles. And we did find a consistent decline in the frequency of emotionally gratifying experiences. In fact, what is perhaps frustrating about our findings is that they were not wholly negative. Throughout the investigation there were tantalizing indications of some impact of the crisis on feelings. For example, in addition to the trends in worry topics and positive feelings, we found that reports of troubled sleeping and heavy smoking did increase somewhat in October. And although major trends did not show up when the results were specified by level of concern about the Cuban crisis (we might have expected marked changes in the feelings of worriers), we did find that worried people who in March had experienced rather extreme emotions were more likely than others to have feeling states in October more in keeping with the expected impact of a crisis. (For example, respondents with extreme feelings in March who were worried about the crisis in October were more likely to lose their positive feelings, retain their negative feelings, anxiety symptoms and feelings of unhappiness.)

Combining this finding with the finding that people who were anxious in March were more likely to worry about the crisis suggests

that the impact of the crisis may have been conditioned by personality characteristics of the respondents.

The analysis of the social patterning of worry about events in Cuba was both fruitful and frustrating. In the aggregate we found little association between social characteristics and worry. But specification by date of interview revealed a characteristic patterning of worry among those occupying positions that create a greater effective scope. Such people, we found, were likely to have been quite worried during the first two days of the field work and progressively less worried as the objective threat diminished. This pattern was not evident among people with a narrower effective scope. We interpreted this finding as indicating differential sensitivity to national events according to varying locations in the social structure. But even this finding is not conclusive because we cannot be certain that the early interviewees were comparable to later interviewees of similar social status. Instead of indicating a course of worry over the life-cycle of the crisis, these findings might be the result of uncontrolled personality differences between early and late respondents. Moreover, assuming that our interpretation in terms of process is correct, we were unable to pinpoint the mechanisms that account for it. Varying degrees of knowledge about the current events were not, as we expected, the crucial factor.

Implications for NORC Program of Research on Mental Health

Apart from the question of the psychological impact of the Cuban crisis, this study has some important implications for NORC's long-range program of research on mental health. The purpose of the initial pilot study was to develop reliable indicators of feeling states. As we have seen, there was a strong relationship between the respondents' reports of their feelings in March and in October. We now know, as a result of this small panel study, that our indicators are reliable; people did not answer our questions in a random

fashion. At the same time, we found that the feeling states we are studying are not such deep-seated personality traits that they do not change in a relatively short period of time. In spite of the great consistency in response, we did find that many respondents underwent changes in their feelings over the eight-month period. Thus it becomes meaningful to ask in future studies what environmental factors account for the increase and decrease in symptoms of anxiety, positive and negative emotions, and assessments of happiness.

Another important outcome of this study is that it demonstrates the value of the panel technique over the traditional survey. As we have seen, we would have been misled several times had we relied only on the October survey. Thus we found in Chapter I that date of interview was correlated with several areas of feelings, indicating a strong effect of the changing character of the crisis on feeling states. However, the same patterns showed up when the time of the October interview was related to feelings in the previous March. In Chapter II we found that worried people were more likely to be anxious in October than those who were less worried, suggesting that worry over the crisis created anxiety. But again we found a similar pattern in the March data and so were able to clarify the time order of the relationship.

Conclusions as to whether the psychological impact of major crises is as small as this provisional study indicates must wait upon more carefully designed studies. At least we have made a beginning.

APPENDIX A

THE INTERVIEW

NORC
SURVEY NUMBER 458S
CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

University of Chicago

(Time begun:_____)

The Interview

1. Thinking back over the last week (7 days)--for instance taking the things that happened to you and your family during the week and the things that happened at work and during your leisure time--would you say that it was an ordinary week or was it different from most weeks?

Ordinary	1
Different	2*

*IF "DIFFERENT," ASK A:

*A. What was it that made it different?

2. Everything considered, what would you say has bothered you or been on your mind most in the past week or so?

3. During the past week did you get together with any friends--I mean things like going out together or visiting in each others' homes?

Not at all	0
Once	1
Twice	2
Three times	3
Four or more times (Write number)_____	4

4. On the average last week, how many times a day did you chat with friends on the telephone?

None	4
Less than once a day	5
Once a day	6
Twice a day	7
Three times a day	8
Four or more times a day (Write number)_____	9

5. Did you meet any people last week (other than those you meet in the course of your work) that you had never met before?

Yes	1
No	2

6. (During last week) what was the furthest ditance you went from your home other than going to work? (Approximate number of miles one way)

Did not leave house	0
Less than 1 mile	1
1 to less than 2½ miles	2
2½ to less than 5 miles	3
5 to less than 10 miles	4
10 to less than 25 miles	5
25 to less than 50 miles	6
50 to less than 100 miles	7
100 to less than 200 miles	8
200 or more miles	9

7. Here are some things that people do. Would you tell me if you did any of them last week and, if so, about how often you did them? (HAND RESPONDENT CARD #1)

	Not at all	Once	Several times	Every day	More than once a day
A. Read a newspaper	0	1	2	3	4
B. Go to the movies	0	1	2	3	4
C. Listen to or watch a news program	0	1	2	3	4
D. Participate in any games or sports activities such as bowling, basketball, hunting, fishing	0	1	2	3	4
E. Go to watch any games or sports activities . . .	0	1	2	3	4
F. Make a bet or gamble . .	0	1	2	3	4
G. Read your horoscope . .	0	1	2	3	4
H. Go for a trip in the car	0	1	2	3	4
I. Read the Bible	0	1	2	3	4
J. Eat in a restaurant . .	0	1	2	3	4

8. About how many hours a day on the average did you watch television last week?

None 0
One hour/day or less 1
Two hours/day 2
Three hours/day 3
Four hours/day 4
Five hours/day 5
More than five hours/day (Write number)_____ 6

9. Now let's shift from things people do to some things people think about. Everybody has some things he worries about more or less. Would you say you worry more now than you used to, or not as much?

More 1
About the same 2
Not as much 3
Never worry 4

10. What kinds of things do you worry about most?

What else?

11. Do you worry about such things a lot or nor very much?

A lot 1
Not very much 2
Other (Specify)_____ 3

12. Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days--would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?

Very happy	7
Pretty happy	8
Not too happy	9

13. Compared with your life today, how were things four or five years ago--were things happier for you then, not quite as happy, or what?

Happier	1
Not quite as happy	2
About the same	3
Other (Specify) _____	4

14. We are interested in the way people are feelings these days. I am going to show you a card which describes some of the ways people feel at different times and you tell me whether you felt like that during the past week. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD #2)

How about the first, during the past week did you ever feel....

		No	IF "YES," ASK: How often did you feel that way?		
			Once	Several times	Often
A.	On top of the world	0	1	2	3
B.	Very lonely or remote from other people	0	1	2	3
C.	Angry at something that usually wouldn't bother you	0	1	2	3
D.	That you couldn't do something because you just couldn't get going	0	1	2	3
E.	Particularly excited or interested in something	0	1	2	3
F.	Depressed or very unhappy	0	1	2	3
G.	Pleased about having accomplished something	0	1	2	3
H.	Bored	0	1	2	3
I.	Proud because someone complimented you on something you had done	0	1	2	3
J.	So restless you couldn't sit long in a chair	0	1	2	3
K.	That you had more things to do than you could get done	0	1	2	3
L.	Vaguely uneasy about something without knowing why	0	1	2	3

15. Now I'm going to read you several things that some people think about. Would you tell me which ones were on your mind during the past week?

	Not at all	Sometimes	Often
A. Money	6	7	8
B. Growing old	6	7	8
C. Work	6	7	8
D. Marriage	6	7	8
E. Getting ahead	6	7	8
F. Bringing up children	6	7	8
G. Death	6	7	8
H. The atom bomb or fall-out	6	7	8
I. Personal enemies	6	7	8
J. Health	6	7	8
K. World situation	6	7	8

16. Some people when they are bothered by things like to talk it over with other people, such as their wife, relatives, neighbors, clergymen, or someone else. I'm going to read you several things that people sometimes talk to other people about and you tell me whether you talked to anyone about any of them during the past week.

	No	IF "YES,": Who did you talk to? (Anyone else?)						
		Wife	Relative	Neighbor	Friend	Clergy	Professional (e.g., Doctor, Social Worker)	Other (Specify)
A. Not having enough money	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
B. Something that happened at work	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
C. Ways to make money	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
D. Health	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
E. Bringing up children	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
F. People you have trouble with.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
G. Family problems	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____
H. World situation	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7_____

17. Compared with your normal feelings, would you say that you had more energy or less energy during the past week?

More 1
Less 2
Same 3

18. (During the past week) have you found yourself eating more or less than you usually do?

More 5
Less 6
Same 7

19. (During the past week) what time did you usually go to bed?

20. (During the past week) what time did you usually get up?

21. Was the amount of sleep you got (during the past week) more or less than usual?

More	1
Less	2
Same	3

22. (Last week) did you have any trouble getting to sleep at night or getting up in the morning?

Trouble getting to sleep	6
Trouble getting up	7
Both	8
Neither	9

23. We've been talking about last week. Now, thinking back over the last six months, what are the events which have had the greatest effect on you and your family--for better or worse?

What else?

24. Now I would like to ask you some questions about your health. Were you sick at any time during the past week?

Yes	1*
No	2

*IF "YES," ASK A:

*A. Did it cause you to cut down on your usual activities?

Yes	5#
No	6

#IF "YES," ASK B:

#B. In what way?

25. I am going to show you a sheet which tells about different troubles or complaints people sometimes have. For each one please tell me how often you were bothered by such a complaint during the past week. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD #3)

	Not at all	One or two times	Several times	Nearly all
A. Dizziness	0	1	2	3
B. General aches and pains	0	1	2	3
C. Headaches	0	1	2	3
D. Muscle twitches or trembling	0	1	2	3
E. Nervousness or tenseness	0	1	2	3
F. Rapid heart beat	0	1	2	3
G. Skin rashes	0	1	2	3
H. Upset stomach	0	1	2	3

26. Now I am going to show you a sheet which tells about some things that people sometimes take to preserve or improve their health. Please tell me how often during the past week you took each of the things listed. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD #4)

	Not at all	One or two times	Several times	Every day
A. Aspirin	6	7	8	9
B. Laxatives	6	7	8	9
C. Sleeping pills	6	7	8	9
D. Stomach medicine (for indigestion)	6	7	8	9
E. Tranquilizers (nerve medicine) . .	6	7	8	9
F. Dietary food for weight control .	6	7	8	9
G. Medicine prescribed by a physician	6	7	8	9

27. Do you ever smoke or use tobacco?

Yes 1*
No 2

*IF "YES," ASK A:

*A. (During the past week) have you been smoking (using it) more or less than you normally do?

More 7
Less 8
Same 9

28. Do you ever take a drink (beer, whiskey, or any other alcoholic drink)?

Yes 1*
No 2**

*IF "YES," ASK A:
**IF "NO," SKIP TO Q. 29

*A. Did you take a drink last week?

Yes . . . . . 5#
No 6

#IF "YES" TO A, ASK B AND C:

#B. About how many times did you take a drink (during the past week)?

Once or twice 1
3 - 4 times 2
Nearly every day 3
Once a day 4
2 times a day 5
3 or more times a day (Specify)_____ 6

#C. Is that more or less often than usual?

More 1
Less 2
Same 3

Now let's turn to another topic.

29. Are you married, single, widowed, divorced, or separated?

Married	1*
Never married	2#
Widowed	3#
Divorced	4#
Separated	5#
Married, spouse absent	6#

*IF "MARRIED," CONTINUE WITH Q. 30.
#IF "NEVER MARRIED," "WIDOWED," "DIVORCED," "SEPARATED," OR "MARRIED BUT SPOUSE ABSENT," SKIP TO Q. 32.

30. Here are some things husbands and wives often have differences of opinion about. Would you tell me which ones have been problems for you in your marriage and whether they caused any differences of opinion or problems during the past week? (HAND RESPONDENT CARD #5)

	Rarely is a problem	Is a problem sometimes but not last week	Was a problem last week
A. Time spent with friends	0	1	2
B. How the house looks	0	1	2
C. Household expenses	0	1	2
D. Being tired	0	1	2
E. Being away from home too much	0	1	2
F. Disciplining children	0	1	2
G. In-laws	0	1	2
H. Not showing love	0	1	2
I. Work	0	1	2
J. How to spend leisure time	0	1	2
K. Work around the house	0	1	2
L. Religion	0	1	2
M. Irritating personal habits	0	1	2
N. Other (Specify) _____	0	1	2

31 Taking all things together, how would you describe your marriage; would you say that your marriage was very happy, a little happier than average, just about average, or not too happy?

Very happy	1
Little happier than average	2
Just about average	3
Not too happy	4

32. Would you say that during the past week your family (others living with you) did more things or less things than usual that make you mad?

More things	1
Less things	2
Same	3

33. Has any member of your family (anyone who lives with you) acted (during the past week) in any way that led you to feel that he (she) was having a hard time or feeling very unhappy?

Yes	1*
No	2

*IF "YES," ASK A AND B:

*A. Who was it?_____

*B. What was he (she) upset about?

And now I would like to ask you a few questions about your work.

34. What is your current employment status?

Employed	1
Self-employed	2
Unemployed or laid-off	3
Retired	4
Part time worker	5
Not working and not looking for a job	6
On strike	7

For HOUSEWIVES, SKIP TO Q. 43.

For UNEMPLOYED, LAID-OFF, RETIRED, ON STRIKE, ANSWER IN TERMS OF LAST FULL TIME JOB.

35. A. What kind of work do (did) you do?

B. In what type of business or industry do (did) you work?

---

36. How long (have you had your present job) (have you been in your present business) (did you have your last job)?

Less than one month	0*
1 - 3 months	1*
4 - 6 months	2*
1 year	3
2 years	4
3 - 5 years	5
6 - 10 years	6
11 - 15 years	7
16 - 20 years	8
20 years or more	9

*IF LESS THAN SIX MONTHS, ASK A:

*A. Is this job considered permanent or temporary?

Permanent	1
Temporary	2#

#IF "TEMPORARY," ASK B:

#B. How long do you expect it to last?

37. How many weeks during the last year were you without work because of unemployment or lay-off?

_____weeks

ASK EVERYONE EXCEPT SELF-EMPLOYED:

38. Do you belong to a union?

Yes . . . . . I*
No 2

*IF "YES," ASK A AND B:

*A. Have you participated in any union activities during the past three months?

Yes 5
No 6

*B. What are your feelings about the union--would you say it is doing a good job, a fair job, a poor job, or would you rather there be no union?

Good 1
Fair 2
Poor 3
No union 4

FOR UNEMPLOYED, LAID OFF, RETIRED, ON STRIKE, SKIP TO Q. 43.

39. During that last week, would you say you were able to do your work better than usual or not as well as usual?

Better 1
Not as well . . . 2
Same 3

40. How satisfied are you with--

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dis-satisfied	Very dis-satisfied
A. Your present wage level? . .	0	1	2	3
B. The kind of work you do? . .	6	7	8	9
C. (DO NOT ASK SELF-EMPLOYED) Your boss or employer? . . .	0	1	2	3
D. Taking all things together, how do you feel about your job (work) (business) as a whole? Would you say you are--	6	7	8	9

41. What kinds of things do you think might occur that might cause you to (lose your present job) (give up or change your business)?

42. Have you gone as far as you can in your present line of work?

Yes 1
No 2*

*IF "NO," ASK A:

*A. What are the chances for advancement in your work (business)--good, fair, or poor?

Good 7
Fair 8
Poor 9

Now, to close out the interview, I'd like to ask you some questions about the Cuban situation that has been in the news recently.

43. Do you remember how you first learned about President Kennedy's actions with regard to Cuba?

IF PRESIDENT'S BROADCAST SPEECH NOT MENTIONED:
Did you happen to hear his address to the nation (APPROPRIATE NUMBER) days ago when he first described the situation?

Yes 1
No 2

---

44. In your opinion, what was happening in Cuba that led the President to take action?

---

45. As you understand it, what kinds of action has the President taken and is he prepared to take in dealing with the situation?

---

46. What is your opinion of the President's actions with regard to Cuba? On the whole, do you approve or disapprove of them?

Approve 1
Disapprove 2
No opinion . . . 3

---

47. Would you yourself have preferred the President to have taken a different course of action?

Yes 5*
No 6

*IF "YES," ASK A:
*A. What kind of action would you have preferred?

---

48. Think back now to when you first heard about the President's proposals regarding Cuba. At the time, some people felt relieved because they expected something even more drastic. Others were disturbed to find that things had gotten that bad. Which of these is closest to how you felt when you first heard about the President's proposals?

Felt relieved, expected worse 1
Felt disturbed, things were so bad . 2
No feelings one way or the other . . 3

---

49. Some people, when they first learned about the President's actions, were glad because our country was taking such firm action. Others were very worried and thought his proposals were unnecessarily risky. Which comes closest to the way you felt at the time?

Glad, firm action 5
Very worried, unnecessarily risky 6
No feelings one way or other 7

50. Compared with how you felt when you first heard the news, how do you feel about the situation today? Are you more worried about the situation now, less worried, or about the same?

More worried now	1
Less worried now	2
About the same	3

51. In the last week or so, have there been any changes in your activities as a result of the Cuban situation? For example, is there anything that you did or did not do because of it?

Yes	1*
No	2

*IF "YES," ASK A:
*A. What was that?

52. In the past week or so, have you spent a lot of time talking about the Cuban situation, some time, or hardly any time?

A lot of time	1
Some time	2
Hardly any	3

A. Who have you talked to about it? (CHECK AS MANY AS APPLY)

Family	5
Relatives	6
Friends	7
Co-workers	8
Others	9

B. Are most people you've talked to very worried about the situation, or not particularly worried?

Very worried	1
Not particularly worried	2

C. Did it make you feel better or worse to talk to these people?

Better	7
Worse	8
No difference	9

D. Do the people you've talked to feel the same way as you do about the situation, or do they feel different?

Same	1
Different	2
Some same, some different	3

53. Do you feel that the newspapers, radio, and television have been paying too much attention to the Cuban situation or not enough attention to it?

Too much	7
Not enough	8
Right amount	9

54. Did you happen to hear or see any special programs on the Cuban situation in the last week or so?

Yes	1*
No	2

*IF "YES," ASK A:

*A. Which ones were they?

---

55. During the past week or so, did you listen to your radio more often than usual, less often, or about the same?

More often	7
Less often	8
Same	9

---

56. How about television? Did you watch it more often, less often, or about the same (in the past week or so)?

More often	1
Less often	2
Same	3

---

57. In the last ten days or so have you spent more time reading newspapers, less or about the same?

More time	7
Less time	8
Same	9

---

58. What do you think is going to happen as a result of the Cuban situation?

---

59. A. Do you think that the chances of war between the United States and Russia have increased or decreased because of the Cuban situation?

Increased	1
Decreased	2
Don't know	3

B. Do you think there will be a war within the next few years?

Yes	1
No	2

---

60. Suppose a war did break out. In your opinion whose fault would it be?

---

61. If a war did break out, how would it affect you personally?

62. A. During World War II and the Korean War, how seriously were you and your family affected personally--very much affected, fairly much affected, not personally affected?

Very much affected	1*
Fairly affected	2*
Not personally affected	3

*IF "AFFECTED," ASK B:

*B. In what ways?

C. When voting, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or what?

Democrat	5
Republican	6
Other	7

Now we would like to ask you a few questions about your background.

(FOR MALES ONLY)

63. Did you ever serve in the armed forces?

Yes	1*
No	2

*IF "YES," ASK A AND B:

*A. In what years did you serve?

*B. Were you ever in combat?

Yes	8
No	9

---

64. What's your present status relative to the armed forces? Are you eligible for the draft, in the reserves, the national guard, or are you ineligible for military service?

Eligible for draft	1
In reserves	2
In National Guard	3
Ineligible	4

---

65. How old were you on your last birthday? _____

---

66. How much education have you had?

8th grade or less	1
Part high school	2
High school graduate	3
Part college	4
College graduate or more	5

---

67. What is your religious preference?

Protestant	1
Roman Catholic	2
Jewish	3
Other	4
None	5

68. About what do you think your total family income from all sources will be this year for yourself and your immediate family? (HAND RESPONDENT CARD #6)

Less than $1,000	0
$1,000 - $1,999	1
$2,000 - $2,999	2
$3,000 - $3,999	3
$4,000 - $4,999	4
$5,000 - $5,999	5
$6,000 - $6,999	6
$7,000 - $7,999	7
$8,000 - $9,999	8
$10,000 and over	9

I. Time interview ended: _____ A.M. P.M.

II. Total length of interview _____ hr. and _____ min.

III. Was anyone else present during any part of the interview?

Yes	y*
No	X

*IF "YES":

*Who was it?

Wife	1
Child(ren)	2
Parent	3
Other (Specify)_____	4

IV. In general, what was the respondent's attitude toward the interview?

Friendly and eager	6
Cooperative but not particularly eager	7
Indifferent and bored	8
Hostile	9

INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE: _____