

Joy in Mudville


Public Reaction to the Surprise Sounding of Chicago's  
Air Raid Sirens

Prepared for the Disaster Research Group  
National Academy of Science--National Research Council

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER  
University of Chicago

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Oh, somewhere in this favored land the sun is shining bright,  
The band is playing somewhere, and somewhere hearts are light;  
And somewhere men are laughing, and somewhere children shout,  
But there is no joy in Mudville--mighty Casey has struck out.

From "Casey at the Bat"  
by Ernest Lawrence Thayer, 1888

## PREFACE

This is a working paper. It was prepared quickly with several purposes in mind. First, it was designed to serve the immediate needs of the Disaster Research Group which lent major financial support to the prosecution of the study. The Disaster Research Group is now in the process of piecing together the various studies which it has undertaken over the years and is trying to generalize from them. This paper, we hope, will contribute to that end, and we are led to believe that it may contribute more in its present form than it would later on in a more polished version.

Our second reason for rushing into print is to establish a working baseline for the participants in the study themselves. The project having been initiated by a team of graduate students, each of the team members has ideas concerning where he would like to take the study from this point forward; each is planning to work with a different aspect of the problem.<sup>1</sup> We felt that a working paper of this sort would help, at least, "to get the story straight" and thus permit more theoretically-oriented departures from a common starting point.

Third, it is our belief that the story of what actually happened on the night of September 22 in Chicago is worth telling as a piece of news.<sup>2</sup> We know of no way that we could have done this much more quickly than we have--even so, more than half a year has elapsed since the event upon which we are reporting--but the more painstaking analysis which these data deserve will clearly take much longer.

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<sup>1</sup>"Perception of the Siren and Symbolic Interpretations," Ph.D. Thesis by Leonard J. Pinto is forthcoming. "Verifactory Action and Communication Behavior," M.A. Thesis by John L. McCoy is also in progress.

<sup>2</sup>Chicago Sun-Times article, April 24, 1960, "The Night the Sirens Wailed in Chicago" is based directly on this report.

For these reasons, therefore, we have decided to report now on what we have done to date.

As will be made clear below, this study originated in the minds of four graduate students. They enlisted the senior author of this report, a member of the Department of Sociology and the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, as faculty advisor. They obtained the support of Professor Clyde Hart, Director of the National Opinion Research Center, who responded sympathetically to the student-training character of the project and made NORC facilities available at less than cost. Thereupon, modest financial aid was obtained from the Disaster Research Group of the National Research Council-National Academy of Science whose director, Dr. George W. Baker, has followed the progress of the study with interest and encouragement. The Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago provided a grant-in-aid. Additional work is also being made possible through the help of John H. O'Dowd, Dean of Students at University College, and the Publicity Club of Chicago. All of this assistance--moral and material--is gratefully acknowledged.

At key points in the analysis, we have computed tests of statistical significance to substantiate our interpretation of the relationships among variables. Except where otherwise indicated, key tables which are appropriately tested by the Chi Square are significant at the .05 level of confidence. Our analysis does not rest exclusively on tests of significance, however. Indeed, we base our interpretation rather more on the repeated substantiation of a relationship while holding other factors constant. It is for this reason that we have occasionally included findings that do not meet the usual criterion of statistical significance.


Selma Monsky, director, and Marlene Simon, assistant director of the NORC field department, participated in the development of the questionnaire and in the conduct of the field work. Mary Booth gave expert advice and aid at many points

in the coding of the data and Sanford Abrams did most of the machine tabulations, often under trying circumstances. Jacob J. Feldman advised in the selection of the sample and in the sampling procedure. Terrance Nosanchuk aided in the statistical computations. Duncan MacRae, Jr., Assistant Professor of Political Science, deserves special thanks for his encouragement and enthusiasm during a crucial stage early in the study.

The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan provided access to its files when this study was in its formulation.

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## I. JOY IN MUDVILLE

After many years of trying, the Chicago White Sox succeeded in rising to the top of the American League in 1959. The last game of the season, against the Cleveland Indians, was played on the night of September 22nd, in Cleveland. The game was broadcast and telecast from Cleveland and when news of the long-anticipated victory reached Chicago, White Sox fans and local patriots were jubilant. Indeed, some days before the victory, the Chicago City Council had "further resolved that bells ring, whistles blow, bands play and general joy be unconfined when the coveted pennant has been won by the heroes of 35th Street."

Proceeding in the spirit of this municipal proclamation, and adding a touch of personal inspiration, Fire Commissioner Quinn--also acting Director of the Chicago Civil Defense Corps--decided to sound the air-raid warning sirens. The newspapers report that the Commissioner tried to reach the Mayor to consult with him as to the propriety of the proposed action, but was unable to do so.<sup>1</sup> In a personal communication, the Commissioner has indicated to us that prior to the sounding of the sirens "proper notification" had been made to the police and fire departments, the public utilities, and to all radio and television stations and newspapers. The arrival of the notice, however, preceded the sounding of the sirens by only a very few minutes and, in general, the public had no warning of the event. Indeed, some of the media of communication and the utilities were unable to channel the message to their announcers and telephone operators until after the siren had actually sounded. Newspaper reports state that, at first, Illinois Bell Telephone operators were instructing anxious callers to "take cover" and await further information. In the telephone company, and elsewhere, internal alarm systems --because they are connected with the municipal system--were triggered off as well.

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<sup>1</sup>Appendix C is a series of selected newspaper articles which appeared shortly after the event occurred.

The sirens sounded at 10:30 p.m., some 40 minutes following the end of the ball game, at an hour when many Chicagoans were preparing to retire for the night. The "ALERT" signal--"a steady blast of 3 to 5 minutes"--was chosen for the occasion, and was sounded for a full five minutes, shutting off at 10:35 p.m. The signal is supposed to mean that there is a possibility of an air attack but that there remain at least 31 minutes until the attack is expected. The appropriate instructions in such an eventuality are to "tune your AM radio to a frequency (640 or 1240) for official directions. Proceed according to your community's emergency action plan, DON'T use the telephone."

From reading the newspapers the next morning, it was clear that many Chicagoans had become quite upset. Many did not know what to think or do. Others, knowing that the siren signalled only the White Sox victory, were irate over the inappropriate use of a "sacred" symbol. Editorials and letters to the editor were indignant. The Commissioner bravely took sole responsibility and suggested that the resultant confusion might serve as a beneficial lesson to Chicagoans concerning how ill-informed and ill-prepared they were for coping with a genuine alert. The Commissioner reasoned that those who did not know why the sirens were being sounded should have behaved as if there were a genuine alert, and he had good reason to suspect that they did not so behave.

#### The Origin of the Study

Sociologists are interested in how people behave both in the normal round of life and in extraordinary circumstances. In fact, sometimes the extraordinary helps us to learn something about the ordinary, just as sickness helps to teach medical science about the state of normal health.

There is a long tradition of sociological study of the extraordinary. There are studies of mass movements, of violent labor strikes, of lynch mobs, and of the reaction of communities to floods or other natural disasters. Indeed, a number of

leading sociologists were once journalists who became so interested in "the news behind the news" and in new methods of fact-finding that they abandoned journalism for sociology. The present study likes to think of itself as belonging in this tradition.

When the siren sounded on the night of September 22, four graduate students in the Departments of Sociology and Communication decided that it would be interesting to make a systematic investigation of how people reacted. They saw in the situation elements closely resembling what happened some years ago when Orson Wells broadcast his documentary-style report on "The Invasion From Mars" and frightened large numbers of people.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, their knowledge of this event came, not from first-hand experience, but from their reading of a sociological study of what happened. Using this study as a model, the group spent several days planning how to investigate what happened in Chicago and seeking sources of further ideas and further support. They found the former in a study directed by William A. Scott of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, for the Federal Civil Defense Administration.<sup>2</sup> Scott studied the sounding of a false alert in Oakland, California on May 5, 1955, at 10:42 in the morning. The Oakland study provides an excellent basis for comparison with the present study.

As for further support, the group found this in a variety of ways, as is detailed in the Preface of this report.

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<sup>1</sup>Hadley Cantril. The Invasion From Mars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940).

<sup>2</sup>William A. Scott. Public Reaction to a Surprise Civil Defense Alert in Oakland, California. (Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1955.)

The Design of the Study

It was decided to interview 250 persons randomly distributed within the city of Chicago. Each respondent was asked to recall his whereabouts and his reactions to the siren on the night of September 22 and was aided, by the interviewer, in reconstructing exactly what he thought and did. Furthermore, a large amount of additional information was obtained from each respondent to enable us to relate variations in response to the siren to attributes of the individual (such as age, education, sex, etc.); to situational factors (was the individual alone or with others, for example); to attitudinal factors (such as whether the individual is a baseball fan or whether he feels war is imminent); and to more deep-rooted personality traits (such as his attitudes toward authority). Finally, each respondent was asked questions designed to reveal his knowledge of civil defense procedures, his afterthoughts concerning the propriety of sounding the siren and what, if anything, he personally learned from the situation.

The sampling procedure is detailed in Appendix B. Briefly, it involved ordering all census tracts within the city according to median income and systematically selecting 25 tracts from this array. This method was designed to produce a wide "scatter" over the entire city, and to minimize the clustering of tracts within densely populated and higher-income areas. Within each tract, two blocks were randomly selected and five dwelling units in each block were assigned to the interviewers. Male and female heads-of-household were alternately interviewed. Interviewers were authorized to substitute the next adjacent dwelling unit in case of refusal or in case of respondents not-at-home after two attempts for an interview.

Of the 250 interviews called for by the sampling design, 241 were actually obtained although, as Appendix B points out, the substitution rate was extremely high. Nevertheless, the sample seems to be representative of the population

according to a number of known criteria: for example, the proportion of non-whites in the sample (24.5%) closely approximates the estimate of the Population Research and Training Center for July, 1957 (20%), and our Catholic (30.9%) and Jewish (9.7%) respondents roughly correspond to the estimates of the Church Federation of Greater Chicago (36% and 6% respectively). Similarly, the distribution of our respondents' reported incomes matches the "Survey of Buying Power" for Chicago in 1958; for example, 25% of our respondents report family incomes under \$3999 compared with the Survey's 25%. Or, as a final example, compare our data on readership of daily newspapers with the 1959 report of the Audit Bureau of Circulation: we are able to predict rather accurately, from our respondents' reported readership, the proportion of total circulation represented by each of Chicago's leading newspapers. (See Appendix B.)

On the other hand, our respondents seem to be more highly educated than one would expect from the census. Thus, the sample includes 22 % who have had at least some college education, compared with the 13% estimated by the Chicago Community Inventory on the basis of projections from 1950 Census Data. In sum, however, there is good reason to believe that the sample is reasonably representative of the city although perhaps somewhat biased, probably as a result of a higher refusal rate among the less well educated. (Many of the major findings in the pages that follow are reproduced separately for each educational level.) Appendix B reports all of this in somewhat more careful detail.

More worrisome, perhaps, is the fact that the completion and pre-testing of the interview schedule, obtaining of financing, recruitment and training of interviewers, and the drawing of the sample were not completed until some five weeks had elapsed. Interviewing was not begun, in other words, until five weeks after the event being studied and took about 8-9 weeks to complete. Thus, the last respondents to be interviewed were being asked about something they had experienced

as long as 12-13 weeks earlier. Some of our concern was relieved, however, by our interviewers' reports concerning the respondents' ability to recollect what had happened. Interviewers assigned "very vivid recollection" to 55% of the respondents, "not too vivid a recollection" to 38% and "very poor recollection" to only 7%. More important, for our purposes, is the fact that the distribution of respondents' replies to key questions (such as what they believed the siren was sounding for) do not vary appreciably when those who were interviewed early and late are compared.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 67 in Appendix B.



## II. THE SOCIAL SETTING INTO WHICH THE SIREN INTRUDED

Unlike the Oakland siren which sounded in the middle of the morning, the Chicago siren sounded at 10:30 at night. Most people in Oakland thought the siren a mistake or a test. In Chicago, sirens are tested routinely at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday mornings and, although the September 22 siren sounded at 10:30 p.m. on a Tuesday night, only a small handful of people thought the siren was a test or a mistake which, somehow, had been mis-timed by twelve hours. Of course, an alternative hypothesis was available in Chicago: the ball game. Yet, despite the availability of this interpretation (presumed so obvious by the authorities) the data below will demonstrate that the people of Chicago took the siren more seriously than the people of Oakland. In part, this is surely because it happened at night.

### Sociology of the Night

Many things happen at night.<sup>1</sup> The theater lights up a portion of the night while the audience sits, atomized, in the dark. Crime and deviations of all kinds proceed stealthily under cover of the night; people who are up and about at night are somehow not decent and, sometimes, suspect. The night shift makes for greater solidarity among workers and greater informality between supervisors and employees. But these are the dramatic aspects of night.

Less dramatic, but much more common, are the nightly family reunions in which members of the family who have been abroad during the day return home for dinner, for television, and for sleep. This is a time for the re-establishment of the primary bonds that unite family members, for the re-assertion of male parental control over growing children, for easing the strains of business and work. It is also a time when society is sub-divided into its largest number of small units, each essentially isolated from the others. Indeed, the family in modern society is referred to as the "isolated nuclear family" meaning that it consists of husband,

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<sup>1</sup>Some of the ideas in this section were suggested by Vilhelm Aubert and Harrison White, "Sleep: A Sociological Interpretation," Acta Sociologica, (1959), 46-54, 1-16.

wife and children maintaining a joint residence that is also separate (and usually distant) from the residences of the parental families of both husband and wife and from other relatives. But the family is also "isolated" and "nuclear" not only by comparison with the extended family of an earlier day, but also by comparison with the office, the factory, the school, the supermarket and all of the "daytime groups" to which its members belong. When the street is deserted and the neighbors are asleep, one sometimes feels "cut off" from the world. A strange sound in the night can be very disturbing.

#### The Social Setting

The night of September 22 was not altogether ordinary, of course. It was the night on which Chicago baseball fans--and others who were caught up momentarily by the excitement of the pennant competition--awaited news that the White Sox had won. Many, of course, had watched the game to its conclusion and then continued to watch the televised locker room interviews with the triumphant players.

Most people were at home, doing much the same thing they do on ordinary nights--watching television, then preparing for bed. In fact, it may well be that more than the normal proportion of the population was at home; or, so it seems, from an examination of Table 1 in which respondents report exactly what they were doing on the Tuesday night when the sirens sounded.

Almost everybody was at home. A few were out of town, a few were at work, a few were visiting in other homes. One respondent was at the movies and three were at other places of recreation. Altogether, one cannot help suspecting that this was an especially poor night for such establishments. On the other hand, we do not have data on more nearly normal weekday nights; it may be that this is not as small a number as it seems. Equally unfortunate is the fact that we did not

ask whether the respondent had been out earlier in the evening, since he may have been out and back by the time the sirens sounded.

TABLE 1  
LOCATION OF RESPONDENTS ON NIGHT SIREN SOUNDED\*

Location	Per cent
At home . . . . .	78
At home of friend, neighbor . . . . .	3
At work . . . . .	4
Recreation . . . . .	2
Private vehicle . . . . .	2
Public place, vehicle or street . . . . .	3
Out of town . . . . .	6
Doesn't remember, no answer . . . . .	2

100\*\*

N (all respondents) = 241

\* Refers to Question 3 in Interview Schedule (See Appendix A).

\*\* Percentage totals of either 101% or 99% have been rounded to 100%.

Each respondent was asked whether he had personally heard the siren. Eighty-three per cent replied in the affirmative; this is slightly more than the proportion who reported hearing the Oakland siren (75%). Seventeen per cent did not hear it; one per cent did not remember. A majority of those who did not hear the siren were either out of town (in which case they could not have heard it) or asleep. By the following day, most of them learned that the siren had sounded. Some people, however, (11 respondents, or about 25% of those who did not hear the siren) say that they do not know what the air-raid siren sounds like. Further analysis of these non-hearers is attempted in the following chapter.

Of those who heard the siren, the largest majority reported that there were other people with them; this is obvious, of course, from the fact that nearly everybody was at home with his family. There were some 17%, however, who reported that

they were alone. Furthermore, as we have seen, a minority was out visiting other people or elsewhere. Altogether, non-family members figured in about 20% of the reports of respondents who were with other people.

A summary of the social setting of all those who heard the siren is presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2

WHO RESPONDENT WAS WITH\*  
(FOR THOSE HEARING SIREN ONLY)

	Per cent
Alone . . . . .	17
With Family . . . . .	65
With Non-family . . . . .	13
Mixed family and non-family . . . . .	5
	100

N (All hearers) = 197

\* Refers to Question 4 in Interview Schedule.

Almost two-thirds of the respondents who heard the siren reported that they had watched the game and a sizable proportion of these had also stayed to watch the locker-room interviews following the game. By the time the siren sounded, 40 minutes following the game, some 42% were still watching TV; 13% were engaged in conversation, and 13% were preparing for bed. The entire distribution is reported in Table 3 (which adds to more than 100% because some people reported more than one activity).

Our data, then present quite a clear picture of what Chicagoans were doing when the siren sounded. The vast majority were home with their families.

TABLE 3

WHAT RESPONDENTS WERE DOING WHEN THE SIREN SOUNDED\*

	Per cent
Watching TV . . . . .	42
Conversing . . . . .	13
Preparing for bed . . . . .	13
Listening to radio, reading . . . . .	8
Other recreation . . . . .	6
Household chores . . . . .	6
Driving, walking . . . . .	6
Asleep . . . . .	6
At work . . . . .	3
Other . . . . .	4
No Answer . . . . .	2

109\*\*

N (All hearers) = 197

\* Refers to Question 5 in Interview Schedule  
\*\* Adds to more than 100% because of multiple answers.

Having watched the game, a sizable proportion continued to view TV, while others were conversing, preparing for bed or doing other things around the household. A minority of respondents were alone; some were with non-family friends. The overall picture is one of a routine weekday evening, with an added touch of excitement due to the baseball victory.

This was the moment that the siren blasted forth.

### III. WHAT PEOPLE HEARD

We have established that most people (83%) heard the siren. In this chapter, we want to investigate exactly what they heard and how it made them feel.

Bearing in mind that the interviews were conducted between five and thirteen weeks following the sounding of the siren, we must be somewhat cautious in accepting the respondent's word concerning the details of exactly what he heard. Yet, it is interesting to observe that respondents generally were (1) quite accurate about the length of time that had elapsed between the ball game and the sounding of the siren, and (2) quite inaccurate in their description of the type of signal that had been sounded.

#### Estimates of Elapsed Time Between Game and Siren

All of those who heard the game and/or the locker-room interviews which followed the game were asked (Q. 5D), "About how long was it after the (ball game) (locker-room interviews) went off the air that the sirens were sounded? The facts are that the game ended at 9:49 p.m., and the locker-room interviews were over some 20 minutes later. The sirens sounded at 10:30 p.m.; that is, some 40 minutes after the game and some 20 minutes after the interviews.

The vast majority of respondents (78%) who ventured a guess estimated that the siren sounded within 45 minutes following the game. About a third pinpointed the time almost exactly, giving estimates between 20 and 45 minutes. Thus, respondents were generally accurate in their estimates. Much more interesting, however, is the fact that the errors in estimation tended to be in the direction of under-estimating the elapsed time between the game and the siren rather than in over-estimating it. Indeed, more than a third reported that the siren was sounded less than 10 minutes after the game. This suggests that in recalling the two events people tend to tie them together in time. This finding would seem to be





relevant for the general problem of reconstructing events on the basis of testimony and appears to be congruent with the concept of "assimilation" in studies of perception and memory.<sup>1</sup>

What Did People Hear

All respondents were handed a card with four different types of lines. One line consisted of short, broken dashes; the second line was wavy, alternately curving up and down; the third was a long, unbroken line; and the fourth was three long, broken dashes. Interviewers asked respondents (Q. 2) to tell which of these pictures comes closest "to the way the air-raid siren sounded to you that night" or, for those who did not hear the siren "the way you think the air-raid siren sounds." Table 4 presents the distribution of respondents' choices among the four lines, all of which are reproduced in the table in words and pictures exactly as they were presented to the respondent.

TABLE 4

IMAGE OF THE SOUND OF THE AIR-RAID SIREN\*

	Those Who Reported Hearing the Siren	Those Who Did Not Hear the Siren
 "Lots of Short Blasts" . . . . .	3	7
 "Wailing" . . . . .	35	28
 "A Steady Blast for about Three Minutes"	37	24
 "Three Steady Blasts for about One Minute Each" . . . . .	10	17
Other - "Like Tuesday".	2	-
Don't Know; No Answer .	13	24
Total . . . . .	100	100
N . . . . .	(197)	(41)

\*Refers to Question 2 in Interview Schedule.

<sup>1</sup>Gordon W. Allport and Leo F. Postman, "The Basic Psychology of Rumor," reprinted in Newcomb and Hartley, Readings in Social Psychology, Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947).

The siren that actually sounded that night was line #3--the long, steady blast. Of those who reported having heard the siren, 37% indicated that this was the sound they heard. Almost as many indicated that they heard the wailing sound. If we count item three as correct, and all else as wrong, it is clear that the largest majority of those who heard the siren could not correctly identify the sound that they heard; and this is all the more surprising in view of the fact that the steady blast is sounded every Tuesday morning in Chicago.

The main import of the data, however, is that respondents--by and large--chose equally between the two types of signals that are actually associated with an air-alert. This suggests that, in general, there is some confusion concerning the two signals. It surely implies that most people know the two relevant signals but, at least in this instance, it is safe to assume that most people were guessing as to which had been sounded. In part, of course, this is simply a product of the time that had elapsed between the actual occurrence and the interview. Moreover, those who were certain that the sirens were heralding the baseball victory probably did not pay much attention to the type of signal. On the other hand, it is very likely--though we have no data to establish this--that many people have no notion of what the two signals stand for and have not trained themselves to listen and be able to distinguish between them. The Oakland study found, in effect, that people know that "the sirens are blowing" but do not know the several signals or their meanings.<sup>1</sup>

#### Those Who Did Not Hear

We have just seen that those who did not hear the siren are somewhat less accurate in identifying either of the two types of signal: 48% of this group as compared with 26% of those who did hear the siren chose incorrectly, or did not know which to choose. It is probably worthwhile to examine this group more carefully

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<sup>1</sup>See Scott, op. cit., p. 11



to get some idea of which part of the population is less accessible to the air-raid warning system.

To begin with, of course, it is necessary to distinguish between those who were in town and those who were out of town when the sirens sounded. The latter, of course, could not have heard the signal. Excluding the 14 persons who were out of town, then, it is possible to delineate the non-hearers by comparison with those who did hear.

First, those who did not hear were more likely to report that they were asleep. Indeed, when asked where they were when the siren sounded (Q. 3), 10 of the 24 respondents (37%) who did not hear the siren said that they were asleep as compared with only 1% of those who did hear. Table 5 presents the relevant data.

TABLE 5

LOCATION OF HEARERS AND NON-HEARERS OF THE SIREN\*

	Heard the Siren	Did Not Hear
At home . . . . .	84	33
At home, asleep . . . .	1	37
At home of friend . . .	4	-
At work . . . . .	3	15
Recreation, movies . .	2	4
Private vehicle . . . .	3	-
Public place . . . . .	3	-
Don't recall . . . . .	-	11
Total . . . . .	100	100
N . . . . .	(197)	(27)

\*Refers to Question 3 in Interview Schedule.

Apart from reporting themselves at home and asleep, the group that did not hear--though there are very few cases--exceeded the group that did in locating themselves at work and in not recalling where they were. The single respondent who was at the movies said he did not hear. (One should be somewhat cautious in

accepting "asleep" as an adequate response since we learned, at other points in the interview, that some persons who had reported themselves at home also had been asleep, and were awakened by the noise of the siren.)

Those who did not hear were more likely to be somewhat poorer than those who did, to be less well-educated and more likely to be Negroes or other non-whites, as Table 6 reveals.

TABLE 6

INCOME, EDUCATION, AND RACE OF THOSE WHO DID AND DID NOT HEAR\*

	Heard the Siren	Did Not Hear
Family Income		
Per cent under \$5000 . . . . .	36	48
Education		
Per cent with no High School . .	27	48
Race		
Per cent non-white . . . . .	24	42
N . . . . .	(197)	(27)

\*Refers to Question 88 and Interview Remarks-Question 3.

It is no wonder, in view of the above, that we found a concentration of non-hearers in certain census tracts.

The non-hearers are disproportionately likely to include the very young and the very old as Table 7 demonstrates.

In sum, the non-hearers are poorer, less well-educated, more non-white and both older and younger than those who heard. Their knowledge of the siren seems less accurate and they were more likely than the hearers to report that they were asleep when the sirens sounded. Most indicate that they learned that the siren

had sounded the next day from a friend, neighbor or family member. Further analysis will probably reveal this group as consisting, in part, of chronic "know-nothings." It may be that some of them cannot identify the siren when it is sounded.

TABLE 7  
AGE AND HEARING OF THE SIREN\*

	Heard the Siren	Did Not Hear
Under 25 . . . . .	6	16
26-45 . . . . .	57	42
46-65 . . . . .	30	26
66 and Over . . . . .	7	16
Total . . . . .	100	100
N . . . . .	(193)	(38)

\*Refers to Question 97 in Interview Schedule

The Out-of-Towners

Those who were out-of-town were quite different from the non-hearers who were in Chicago at the time. Indeed, they are different from the hearers, too. They are better educated, more likely to be males and the chief breadwinners of their households, and are more likely to be Jewish than those who were in town. They learned about the siren the next day or even later from strangers or from the mass media.

#### IV. WHAT PEOPLE THOUGHT: THE MEANING OF THE SIREN

Now we want to know what people made of the siren when they heard it. Did they think immediately that it was being sounded to celebrate the baseball victory or not? Did they think it was a test of some kind, a disaster or emergency, or did they think it might be a genuine alert?

This is the key question of our study, of course, and it was approached in a variety of ways. Every attempt was made by the interviewer to help the respondent to "transplant" himself back to where he sat on the night of September 22 and to guide him--by means of a series of structured questions--through the assortment of his memories of the event. The questioning was begun with (Q. 7A) "When you first heard the signal, what did you think it meant; that is, what was the very first thing that came to mind?" This was followed by a series of questions (7B,C,D) aimed at evoking other thoughts that the respondent had that night concerning the possible meaning of the sounding of the sirens. Then, the interviewer went back to each of the ideas that the respondent volunteered and asked the respondent to help him to be sure that they were ordered in the same sequence in which the respondent recalled experiencing them (8A-D). If the respondent did not report having considered the possibility of a genuine alert, the interviewer asked (Q. 12) "Did you--even for a second--think it might be a real air-raid warning?"

Despite all this, respondents sometimes recalled later in the interview that they had entertained an idea which was not recorded earlier. Or, more frequently, a respondent would insist that he thought from the very first that the sirens were being sounded only for the ball game and that he never entertained another notion; yet, later in the interview--when asked why he was convinced that the sirens were sounded to celebrate the baseball victory--he might say "because I looked up into the sky and didn't see any planes." In such an event, the interviewer--or, in 16 cases, the coder--would go back and correct the summary question of "things thought"

to include the untimely "discovery" suggesting that the respondent did admit the thought of a raid. Table 8 reports on "the very first thing that came to mind."

TABLE 8

THE MEANING OF THE SIREN: FIRST THOUGHT

	Per Cent
Ball Game . . . . .	37
Air Raid Alert . . . . .	33
Fire, fire engines . . . . .	15
Disaster, major accident . . . . .	3
Practice Alert . . . . .	3
Siren sounded by mistake . . . . .	1
"Something bad" (unspecified) . . . . .	2
Police, ambulance . . . . .	-
Other . . . . .	5
	<hr/>
	100

N (All hearers) = (197)

If we accept these attempts to reconstruct a sequence of thought that was experienced weeks before--and there is obvious reason to be wary here--it is clear from Table 8 that there are only three major "first thoughts." Of the respondents who heard the sirens, about one-third thought immediately that it was for the game while another third thought it might be a genuine alert. Fire was an idea that occurred to some 15% who thought that the sirens might be those of fire engines or, in one neighborhood, of a nearby paint factory. Notice that almost none thought that the sirens meant a practice alert or that they were sounded by mistake.

Compare these first-thoughts with those reported in the Oakland study where the sirens sounded, due to an electrical short-circuit, on a weekday morning.

A very large proportion of the Oakland sample considered the sirens a practice alert; very few first-thoughts in Chicago were directed toward this possibility. On the other hand, more Chicagoans than Oaklanders considered the possibility that the alert was real.

TABLE 9

THE MEANING OF THE OAKLAND SIREN: FIRST THOUGHTS<sup>1</sup>

	Per Cent
Air Raid Alert . . . . .	22
Practice Alert . . . . .	46
Siren sounded by mistake . . . . .	5
Fire, ambulance . . . . .	5
Disbelief, doubt, unspecified . . . . .	24
	102

N (All hearers) = (87)

It is curious that the Chicagoans took their siren more seriously given the "obvious" opportunity to discount it as a celebration of the baseball victory. Yet, despite the fact that a sizable proportion of the population did exactly that, there were enough people who did not accept this idea--or to whom the idea did not occur--to make the Chicago affair more serious than Oakland which had nothing to celebrate. The explanation that seems most plausible is the fact that the Chicago siren sounded at night; the Oakland siren sounded in the middle of the morning. Another relevant factor may be the greater frequency of practice alerts in Oakland; we understand that Oakland has many practice alerts while Chicago has none at all except for the weekly test of the siren which, for Chicagoans, simply means that it is Tuesday, 10:30 a.m.

Of the 197 persons who told us their first thoughts, 109 went on to give us a second thought and, of these, 24 continued to report third and--very rarely--fourth thoughts. Altogether, then, 45% of the respondents had only one thought, while 55% had two or more. Let us compare the distribution of second thoughts with the distribution of first thoughts for the 109 respondents who had two thoughts.

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<sup>1</sup>Adapted from Scott, op. cit., Table 2, p. 10.

TABLE 10

THE MEANING OF THE SIREN: FIRST AND SECOND THOUGHTS  
OF THOSE WHO HAD TWO THOUGHTS

	First Thought	Second Thought
Ball Game . . . . .	16	47
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	43	29
Fire, fire engines . . . . .	25	5
Disaster, major accident . .	5	2
Practice Alert . . . . .	3	7
Siren sounded by mistake . .	1	5
"Something bad" unspecified .	3	-
Police, ambulance . . . . .	-	4
Other . . . . .	5	2
Total .	100	100
N =	(109)	(109)

From Table 10 it is evident that the sequence of thoughts for those who had more than one thought went, typically, from air-raid to ball game. The proportion of respondents who suspected that the sirens were sounded by mistake or that they signaled a practice alert also increased by comparison with the distribution of first thoughts. It is also clear that fire, an instinctive first thought, was dismissed as a possibility upon second thought.

Third thoughts bring still a larger proportion of ball game (63%), a larger proportion of sounded-by-mistake or practice alert (20%), and a much smaller proportion of air-raid (12%).

Taken together, Tables 8 and 10 tell the following story: A little less than half of the respondents had only one thought (45%); a little more than half had two or more (55%). Of those who had one thought, the large majority (some 65%) thought the sirens were being sounded to celebrate the baseball victory. Of those who had more than one thought, the majority went from thoughts of an air-raid to thoughts of the ball game. A sizable minority, however, considered air-raid as a second

thought and, presumably, dispelled this concern in later thoughts. The sequence of things thought by the respondent are, in some cases, a product of attempts to verify the meaning of the siren.

Rather than linger on data arising from the respondent's reconstruction of his thoughts of some weeks earlier, however, it would seem more realistic to analyze everything our respondents thought without regard to sequence. Table 11, therefore, presents the sum total of all meanings assigned to the siren expressed as a percentage of all respondents who heard it.

TABLE 11  
THE MEANING OF THE SIREN: PROPORTION OF TOTAL HEARERS  
OF SIREN WHO MENTION EACH MEANING

	Per Cent
Ball Game . . . . .	73
Air Raid Alert . . . . .	51
Fire, fire engines . . . . .	18
Disaster, major acci- dent . . . . .	4
Practice Alert . . . . .	9
Siren sounded by mistake . . . . .	5
"Something bad" un- specified . . . . .	2
Police, ambulance . . . . .	3
Other . . . . .	6

\*  
N (All Hearers) = (197)

\*Adds to more than 100% because of multiple answers.

Seventy-three per cent of all those who heard the sirens mention the ball game. (The remaining 27% were asked, later in the interview (Q.8E), when they heard for certain that the sirens were sounded for the ball game. Ten per cent told us that they heard later that night; 11%, however, did not learn until the



next day or even later. The remainder gave no reply.) Thus, the fact that 27% of the respondents did not report the ball game as one of their interpretations of the siren suggests, in about half of the cases, that they did not actually know until the next day or later what the noise was all about. They went to sleep, content or discontent, with their hypotheses. For our purposes, we may assume that almost everybody knew rather soon that the sirens had sounded for the baseball victory.

Much more important for our subsequent analysis is the fact that at one time or another, more than half of the population entertained the possibility that the sirens might be sounding a genuine alert. Sizable proportions considered a fire (18%), a practice alert or a mistake (14%, combined). One cannot escape the impression that many people seriously considered the possibility of an air-attack.

#### How Certain and How Long

On the other hand, one should not exaggerate the situation. Asked how certain they felt "that this could be the explanation" (Q. 13B), respondents who considered the possibility of a genuine attack replied as follows: About one-quarter said they felt "certain"; another quarter felt either "almost" or "fairly" certain; a third quarter was "not too certain" and the final quarter was "very doubtful."\* This means that about half of those who heard the siren and thought it might be a genuine alert were at least fairly certain that this was the case; the other half were, in varying degrees, skeptical. Still, extrapolating this percentage to the population of heads of household in the city of Chicago would mean a large number of frightened people. If we assume that there are about 1,200,000 households in the city, then, on the night of September 22, we would have found as many as 200,000 households in which the household head felt at least "fairly certain" that the sirens signaled a real alert.

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\*23 respondents did not reply to this question; they are excluded here.

People did not think that the sirens were real for very long, however. We asked (Q. 13G): "About how long--that is, about how many minutes--would you say you thought it meant a real air-raid warning?" Table 12 presents the results.

TABLE 12  
HOW LONG RESPONDENTS THOUGHT THE SIRENS  
WERE SIGNALING A REAL ALERT

	Per Cent
A few seconds . . . . .	26
A minute or so . . . . .	33
Five to ten minutes . . . . .	37
Thirty minutes or more (less than one hour) . . . . .	4
An hour or more . . . . .	-
	<hr/>
N = (84)	100

The majority of those who heard the siren--as Table 12 indicates--did not seriously entertain the idea of an air-raid more than a minute or so, according to their own retrospective estimates. A fairly large group (37%) thought so for as long as five to ten minutes.

Why People Thought What They Did

There remains the question of how people explained their thoughts to themselves. In other words, how did people rationalize their interpretation of the sirens? For those who thought the siren signaled the baseball victory, we want to ask how they came to associate the siren with the game; surely there was no self-evident connection between the two. For those who thought the siren signaled a genuine alert, on the other hand, we shall want to know what ideas flashed through their minds to support the hypothesis of an impending enemy attack. Similarly, for fire.

We shall not attempt to cover this subject exhaustively here. Rather, an attempt will be made to give some idea of the kinds of reasons respondents offered

in support of their interpretations of the meaning of the siren as well as the kinds of reasons that made them doubt that their interpretations were correct. Here, again, it should be remembered, the evidence comes exclusively from the retrospections of the respondents (although it may not matter very much if the reasons they give were exactly the ones they thought on September 22 or ones which were salient when they were interviewed). In a later chapter, we shall proceed more objectively by cross-tabulating different interpretations of the siren with a variety of background factors, situational factors, attitudinal variables and values.

Fire is the easiest place to begin. Respondents who thought of fire were asked, (9A, 10A, 11A), "What made you think it could have been that? I mean, what passed through your mind that made you think it might be a fire?" Most answered quite simply that the siren sounded like a fire siren. Some said "there are lots of fires around here; lots of fire engines pass through the neighborhood." (It would be interesting to see whether respondents who offered this reason are concentrated in the same neighborhoods--that is, whether this is objectively the case.)

Asked what, if anything, made them doubt that their interpretation was correct (Q. 9B, 10B, 11B), a majority of respondents who hypothesized a fire said that "It lasted too long to be a fire alarm," and a smaller number said, in effect, "There wasn't any commotion outside; nothing going on like a fire that I could see."

How about the reasons for and against the thought that the siren signaled the baseball victory? Here, it may be interesting to report separately on those who thought only of the game and those who considered the game as one possible interpretation but entertained other possibilities as well.

TABLE 13

REASONS FOR BELIEVING THE SIREN MEANT THE BASEBALL VICTORY\*

	Replies of those Who Thought Only of the Ball Game		Replies of Those Who Thought of the Game Plus Other Things	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Was expecting celebration for victory; it's human to celebrate; everyone was happy about it; I knew they won the game	43	(27)	49	(62)
Read it (heard it) in newspaper, radio, TV that they were going to ring bells, etc. (in general, heard something about plans for celebration some time previous to the end of the game) . . .	29	(18)	2	(2)
Heard specifically that the sirens were going to be used for celebration . . . . .	7	(4)	-	(0)
There was a lot of racket in street; everyone else was blowing horns; saw people, cars in street . .	3	(2)	11	(14)
Was told so by others; others thought it was the game . . . . .	3	(2)	29	(36)
No news of any trouble; radio would have announced if real alert . .	6	(4)	-	(0)
Other . . . . .	9	(5)	9	(11)
Total Replies (= 100%)	(62)		(125)	

\*Refers to Questions 9A, 10A in Interview Schedule.

Almost half of the replies from respondents in both groups emphasized the "natural" connection between the sirens and the baseball victory. The logic of the occasion seems to have been: "I am happy; everybody is happy; what's that?--oh, it's the air-raid sirens; it must be because of the White Sox; it's human to celebrate." Intuitively, this pattern would seem to be more characteristic of those who thought only of the game than of those who entertained other possibilities. Yet, the fact that so large a proportion of the replies of those who thought of other possible meanings of the siren also fell into this category suggests that the victory may simply have been less salient for these respondents. But, after overcoming their initial inclinations, the thought of the game occurred to them and seemed "natural." In addition, there are those who thought of the game first--for these very reasons--and then began to doubt that anybody could have decided to use air-raid sirens for this purpose.

The greater preparedness of those who thought only of the ball game is reflected in the fact that almost a third of this group (29%) reported hearing, in advance, about plans to celebrate. Many of these respondents had heard of the resolution of the City Council proclaiming that "bells ring, whistles blow, bands play and general joy be unconfined when the coveted pennant is won by the heroes of 35th Street." Indeed, another 7% insisted that it heard advance warning that the air-raid sirens would be sounded. Further probing on this point in the interview schedule suggests that not more than 10 respondents in the entire sample heard this warning although many were listening to radio or television. There may be a possibility that one or more stations got the Fire Commissioner's message on the air prior to the actual sounding of the siren but, if so, this could not be true of more than one or two stations and certainly the message was not heard by more than a very few people.

Reflecting the lesser preparedness of those who entertained other interpretations along with the ball game, almost a third of the reasons offered by this group

(29%) have to do with being informed by other people that the sirens were being sounded to celebrate. This, of course, was not the intention of our question; we emphasized, "What passed through your mind that made you think it might be an air-raid alert?" But respondents insisted on answering the question in terms of being informed by others rather than in terms of the reasons that made sense to them. Still, this answer reflects the fact that these particular respondents did not tend to think of the ball game as the initial explanation that occurred to them, and had to have their minds changed by others.

When asked what, if anything, made them doubt that the ball game was the true interpretation, few people could find a reason for doubting it. This was an especially difficult question, of course, in view of the fact that this was the right answer, and that most people with more than one interpretation thought of the ball game last. Still, a handful of people said that they doubted that the sirens were sounded to celebrate the baseball victory because they could not believe that the sirens would be used for that.

Finally, let us turn to consider the reasons given for and against the interpretation of the siren as a genuine air-alert. There were some 87 codable replies offered by the 102 people who entertained the possibility of an air-raid, and their distribution is reported in Table 14.

The largest single concentration of reasons (40%) was in the category "that's what the sirens are for." In other words, 40% of the explanations offered for believing the sirens were sounding a genuine alarm emphasize the "sacredness" of the sirens. Sacred means to be dedicated; that is, to be set apart for some special, awesome purpose. That is the way these people perceive the siren. One gets the impression that these respondents and those who thought it was "natural" to sound the siren for the victory live in two different worlds. Each is saying, in a somewhat different way, that that's what the sirens are for.

TABLE 14

REPLIES TO "WHAT MADE YOU THINK IT COULD HAVE BEEN AN AIR-RAID?"\*

	Per Cent
It is just the signal; that's what you associate with it; that is the only meaning the sirens have to me; it's the logical thing to assume; that's what they are for. . . . .	40
Because of the time of the siren; it doesn't usually sound at night; Sirens don't sound except on Tuesday at 10:30 in the morning; It lasted so long; it was so loud, different than other sirens you hear; longer than Tuesday siren . . . . .	33
Tense world situation; Khrushchev was here, and I thought something started off, Russians wanted to get rid of Khrushchev with a plot . . . . .	14
Other . . . . .	11
Total Replies (= 100%) (87)	

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\*Refers to Question 13A in Interview Schedule.

The next largest group of replies (33%) emphasize that the siren sounded different, somehow, than the way it does during the usual Tuesday morning tests. Implicitly, of course, these respondents are saying that they thought first of the possibility of a test--even though that may not have been explicitly indicated to the interviewer--and decided that it could not be a test. Indeed, it was longer than the Tuesday siren which sounds for only three minutes; this time, the siren sounded for five full minutes. Of course, it couldn't have been "louder" or "different than what you usually hear," although respondents thought it was. What was dramatically different was the fact that it sounded at night, and that it was longer. In fact, it is worth conjecturing that had the signal lasted for a longer period, and thereby with greater intensity, more people would have come to believe it to be sounding for a real alert.

A third group of replies--much smaller than the first two--made reference to the international situation or, interestingly, to the fact that Khrushchev was here. Some thought Khrushchev's presence might be Pearl Harbor-like: the Japanese envoys were in Washington acting as decoys while the Japanese air force attacked Pearl Harbor. A few thought that a plot was hatched in the Kremlin to attack the United States and get rid of Khrushchev all at once.

Turning now to the reasons why respondents thought it might not be an air-raid, we must again distinguish between those who never thought it was a raid and those who did. The former, who replied negatively to the question (Q. 12), "Did you--even for a second--think it might be a real air-raid warning?" were immediately asked (Q. 12A), "Why not?" The latter who did consider the possibility that the sirens were signaling a genuine alert were asked why they thought so (answers to which are reported above) and--except for those who were "certain" (Q. 13B) that it was a raid--were then asked (Q. 13C), "What made you think it might not be that--I mean what in your mind made you doubt this explanation?"

The major difference between the two groups can best be explained, again, in terms of what seemed "natural" to each. For the group who never considered a real alert as a possibility, it seemed "natural" that the siren sounded to celebrate the game, and this was the only reason they could give for not considering an air-raid. The exception is the handful of people who insisted that they heard an announcement that the sirens would sound.

The other group considers the siren a "natural" warning of danger. This group, then, seriously considered an alert but found no corroboration for the warning on radio, TV or Conelrad (21%) or outside on the street (6%).

About an equal number of both groups (15%) gave some thought to the international situation. A minority felt that they somehow would "expect more" of the siren if the danger were real.



TABLE 15

REASONS FOR DOUBTING THE SIRENS MEANT A GENUINE ALERT\*

	Replies of Those Who Never Con- sidered an Air-raid	Replies of Those Who Considered An Air-raid
I was sure it was for the White Sox; it was a big event in Chicago; first pennant in 40 years; everyone was happy about it; heard radio and TV announce it was for the White Sox victory. . . . .	46%	16%
Radio and TV were still on; they're supposed to go off the air in case of a real attack; no news of anything happening; the Conelrad station was not on; programs would have been interrupted. . . . .	7	21
No tense situation; I knew there was no war; Russia knows we're strong, they won't attack; Khrushchev was here and they wouldn't bomb us. . .	16	15
Siren stopped; didn't sound like an alert signal; it was a short blast, like when they are testing . . . .	3	9
We never had a real attack; don't expect an attack in this country. . .	2	4
Looked out and saw lights, cars, people; couldn't be a raid if lights were on. . . . .	-	6
Other; just uncertain . . . . .	26	29
Total replied (= 100%)	(61)	(68)

\*Refers to Questions 12A, 13C in Interview Schedule.

## V. FACTORS AFFECTING DIFFERENTIAL PERCEPTION OF THE SIREN

In this chapter, we propose to examine some of the factors that made for differential perception of the meaning of the siren. It is certainly reasonable to expect that whether a person is a baseball fan or not, ought to have influenced his initial interpretation of the siren. Similarly, we might expect that background factors such as sex or education, or situational factors such as the respondent's whereabouts when the siren sounded, or attitudinal and personality factors of various kinds might have influenced interpretations of the siren.

To make this task more manageable, and more meaningful, we shall treat only three categories of interpretation into which all of our respondents can be placed. The first category will consist of all those who thought immediately of the ball game and never considered any other interpretation of the siren as plausible; this is the Game Only category. Then, there are those people who, whether or not they considered the game as a possible interpretation, thought of such things as fire, practice alert, accident or disaster, etc., but did not consider the possibility of an air-raid; we shall call this the Other category. The third category consists of all those who included a raid in their set of interpretations regardless of what other ideas they may have had. We shall call this the Raid category.

The distribution of respondents among these three categories is as follows:

TABLE 16  
DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS IN THE THREE CATEGORIES OF MEANING

	Per Cent	Total %
I. Game only . . . . .		28
II. Other . . . . .		21
Other Only . . . . .	10	
Game and Other . . . . .	11	
III. Raid . . . . .		51
Raid Only . . . . .	8	
Raid and Other . . . . .	8	
Raid and Game . . . . .	10	
Raid, Game, Other . . . . .	25	
Total Hearers	( = 100%)	(197)

The Influence of Interest in Baseball on Interpretation of the Siren

Almost the most obvious factor expected to be relevant to the problem of why people assigned such different meanings to the same, presumably unambiguous, stimulus is baseball fanship. It stands to reason that a White Sox fan who has followed his team on the road to glory ought to have been much more "set" to interpret the siren as heralding the long-awaited victory than a non-fan. Table 2 compares the two groups as defined in terms of the straightforward question, (Q. 62), "Are you a baseball fan?"

TABLE 17

BASEBALL FANSHIP\* AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Fans	Non-Fans
Game Only . . . . .	33	16
Other . . . . .	17	27
Air-raid Alert. . . . .	50	56
Total Respondents ( = 100%)	(114)	(62)

\*Refers to Question 62 in Interview Schedule

Thirty-three per cent of the fans, as compared with 16% of the non-fans knew immediately that the siren sounded for the baseball victory. It is evident, then, that an interest in baseball made it considerably easier to decode the message of the siren. Non-fans were more likely to think the siren meant something else. This same kind of relationship can be observed if one examines the influence of having heard or seen the game on differential interpretation of the siren, as reported in Table 18.

The relationship between having seen or heard the game and interpretation of the siren is the same as that between fanship and interpretation. Indeed, it is obvious that these are, by and large, the very same people. It is also clear,

however, that not all of the fans and not all of those who saw the game thought immediately or exclusively that the siren sounded only for the victory. In fact, two-thirds of these groups entertained at least one other thought and half of them considered the possibility of a genuine alert.

TABLE 18

VIEWING OF THE BALL GAME\* AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Saw or Heard the Game	Did Not See or Hear the Game
Game Only . . . . .	36	13
Other . . . . .	15	32
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	49	55
Total Respondents ( = 100%)	(126)	(71)

\*Refers to Question 5A in Interview Schedule.

Other Situational Factors

Being a baseball fan (about two-thirds of Chicagoans who heard the siren so consider themselves) or watching the game on television are, respectively, a background factor and a situational factor that influenced interpretation of the siren. Obviously, they were factors that were appropriate to the particular event of last September 22nd, but might not be relevant at all should the siren sound for some other reason at some other time.

However, there probably are other background and situational variables among those which were relevant to the interpretation of the siren that night which would also be related to the interpretation of future sirens or similar warning messages. One set of situational factors that might be relevant in this way has to do with the location of individuals when the siren sounds.

As was pointed out in the preceding chapter, most everybody was at home with

his family that night. It might be expected that being alone or with others would have some influence on differential interpretation of the siren if only for the reason that the presence of others would have contributed to the likelihood of a correct interpretation. But, as Table 19 indicates, this was not the case.

TABLE 19  
BEING ALONE OR WITH OTHERS\* AND INTERPRETATION OF  
THE SIREN

	Alone	With Others
Game Only . . . . .	21%	29%
Other . . . . .	32	18
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	47	53
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(34)	(164)

\*Refers to Question 4 in Interview Schedule

Being alone, one was slightly less likely to think only of the game, but one was also less likely to think of an air-raid. Altogether, then, this table seems to indicate that being alone or with others made no difference in one's interpretation of the siren and certainly did not influence one's thoughts in the direction of considering an air-raid.

On the other hand, the influence of whom one was with is more readily apparent. If one was with family members exclusively, one was less likely to think that it was a game than if one was spending the evening with others who were not family members.

Table 20 indicates that respondents who were with non-family members when the sirens sounded were more likely than those who were with family members only to perceive the siren as signaling the baseball victory and only the baseball victory. For those who were with their own families there was a slightly greater tendency for them to think game only than those who were alone (as a glance back to Table 19

will reveal).

TABLE 20

WHOM RESPONDENT WAS WITH\* AND INTERPRETATION OF SIREN

	Family Members Only	Family and Others, or Others Only
Game Only . . . . .	28	50
Other . . . . .	20	3
Air-Raid Alert.	52	47
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(138)	(38)

\*Refers to Question 41E in Interview Schedule

This seems to suggest that there is something about being in contact with other people that made for greater understanding of the true meaning of the siren. This is also clear from Table 21 where respondents who were and were not at home are contrasted. Similar findings were reported in the Oakland study; non-family members influenced respondents to disbelieve the siren, except when the respondents were at home.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE 21

AT HOME OR ELSEWHERE\* AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	At Home	Elsewhere
Game Only . . . . .	26	40
Other . . . . .	21	20
Air -Raid Alert . . . . .	53	40
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(170)	(30)

\*Refers to Question 3 in Interview Schedule

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<sup>1</sup>Scott, op cit., p. 17

The differences between individuals who were home or elsewhere and those who were with non-family members or family members only, may be explained in a number of different ways. It might be suggested that those who were away from home or with non-family members were more likely to have seen the ball game, or even more apt to be fans. But when fanship and whether one watched the game are controlled, the reported differences in interpretation remain clear-cut.

These findings furnish support for a second explanation: when one is at home, amidst spouse and children, one is little more likely than when one is alone to feel completely "in touch" with what is going on in the outside world. Somehow, one learns to associate being "in touch" with the daytime world of one's associates. For males, this means the people with whom they come into contact on-the-job; for women, this means other housewives or, in the case of working wives, on-the-job associates. In this sense, the family unit probably experiences itself as being somewhat cut off when it assembles together at night. One may feel somewhat more reluctant in accepting the judgment of one's spouse about the siren than in accepting the judgment of some daytime associate. Related to this explanation is the possibility that there may be a greater reservoir of diverse opinion in meetings of persons who do not belong to the same family than there is--even given the same number of individuals--when the family is alone. Thus, the chance of hearing a right answer, or being prepared to accept the validity of an hypothesis, may be greater in social situations that are not limited to family members than in those that are.

This interpretation, of course, can be put to further test. And it is planned to do so in the second phase of our analysis.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>One way to test this explanation might be to see whether there were more attempts to find out what was going on by references to sources outside the immediate group present in the same location. Strictly speaking, this interpretation violates an assumption that has been made in the study to the effect that respondents reported their thoughts concerning the siren before being influenced by others. It is more reasonable, however, to assume that if an influential associate, immediately upon hearing the siren, said "that's for the White Sox," that one would have little time to have one's "own" ideas.

Even within the home, however, the data indicate that being occupied with different sorts of activities seems to be correlated with variations in the interpretation of the siren. For example, people who reported that they were watching TV or conversing when the siren sounded were much more likely to have assumed that the siren was for the ball game than, say, people who were reading or preparing for bed or engaged in household chores.

TABLE 22  
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE HOME\* AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Per Cent Who Thought "Game Only"
Asleep . . . . .	27 (11)
Going to bed (but not yet asleep). . .	4 (27)
Reading, listening to phonograph . . .	11 (9)
Performing household chores . . . . .	9 (11)
Listening to TV, radio . . . . .	30 (90)
Conversing . . . . .	38 (26)

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\*Refers to Question 5 in Interview Schedule

Note: Numbers in parentheses are bases upon which percentages are based. The two latter categories include some who were in other persons' homes.

Undoubtedly, the results reported in Table 22 are confounded by a large number of factors such as age, sex, education and the like, which influenced what different people were doing that evening. We shall examine some of these factors below. The table is rather suggestive, however, in that it appears to distinguish--with the anomalous exception of those who were asleep--people who were "in touch" with their immediate environment and people who were "out of touch." Thus, those watching TV, or conversing with others may be assumed to have more immediate contact with relevant goings-on at that particular moment than persons engaged in more individualistic activities which were less immediately connected to the social or



physical environment, such as going to bed, or performing a household chore. Unfortunately, this interpretation is upset by the small group of respondents who reported that they were already asleep when the siren sounded; a high proportion of them maintain, nevertheless, that they knew immediately that the siren was being sounded for the ball game. Conceivably, these were people who had watched the game and then gone to sleep. Later analysis will examine this and other possibilities.

The final point that needs to be made in connection with the influence of the social situation on interpretation of the siren concerns the relative homogeneity of opinion that prevailed among people who were together that night. Respondents were asked (Q. 16), "Generally, what did the people (person) you were with think the siren meant?" Of course, answers to questions of this sort are in danger of being biased by the respondent's possible tendency to project his own thoughts and feelings onto the others he is asked to describe.<sup>1</sup> One should examine Table 23 with this limitation in mind.

TABLE 23

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SIREN BY RESPONDENTS AND THEIR COMPANIONS\*

Respondents Who Said They Thought	Reported Their Companions as Thinking			Total Replies (= 100%)
	Game	Other	Raid	
Game Only . . . . .	64%	18	18	(22)
Game and Other . . . . .	50%	50	-	(10)
Other Only . . . . .	-	89	11	(9)
Raid and Game . . . . .	36%	16	48	(31)
Raid and Other . . . . .	10%	40	50	(10)
Raid, Game, Other . . . . .	7%	7	86	(14)
Raid Only . . . . .	15%	15	69	(13)

\*Refers to Question 16 in Interview Schedule

<sup>1</sup>B. B. Hudson, "Anxiety in Response to the Unfamiliar," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. X, No. 3, p. 54. Hudson found that subjects would often "see events and attitudes in their environment as confirmation of their own attitudes and feelings...even events that are highly contradictory."

Notice that where the respondent reports having had only one interpretation (game only, other only, raid only), two-thirds or more of the thoughts of his associates fall into that same category. Where the respondent thought more than one thing, his associates divide rather neatly among the same combinations of thoughts. In other words, it appears that respondents and their companions tended to think the same thoughts. But there is by no means complete consensus. Also, it is probable that those who thought the sirens were sounded to celebrate the game were undoubtedly influential for those of their companions who thought otherwise and vice versa.

Background Factors

Now that we have examined some of the situational factors and the way in which they contributed to variations in interpretations of the siren, we want to turn to consider the influence of some of the background factors. Factors such as age, sex, education and the like tend to operate indirectly. Thus, they cause some persons rather than others to become baseball fans, or to work on the night shift, or to have a different kind of outlook on, say, international affairs.

In part, therefore, when we discover a relationship--as we shall--between sex and interpretation of the siren, we shall want to see to what extent the greater likelihood that men rather than women have an interest in baseball can account for the fact that more men than women tended to associate the siren with the baseball victory.

TABLE 24  
SEX AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Men	Women
Game Only . . . . .	36	21
Other . . . . .	21	21
Air-Raid Alert. .	43	58
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(90)	(109)

Table 24 indicates that women exceed men in the extent to which they considered the possibility of a genuine alert, while men exceed women in the extent to which they considered the baseball game as the only possible interpretation.

TABLE 25  
SEX, FANSHIP AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Fans		Non-Fans	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Game Only . . . . .	37	27	27	14
Other . . . . .	24	9	9	30
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	39	64	64	56
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(72)	(45)	(11)	(50)

Holding "fanship" constant, men and women still differ in their interpretations. Among fans and non-fans alike, more men thought only of the ball game when they heard the sirens blast. Furthermore, comparing the fans and the non-fans of each sex, it is clear that the fans were more likely to have thought only of the game than the non-fans. The original sex difference in the degree of thinking "air-raid" is rather less clear-cut.

The same sort of relationship holds for race. Among both fans and non-fans, Negroes exceed Whites in the extent to which they thought the siren meant the ball game. On the other hand, race and fanship seem to have little effect in determining the extent to which an individual was likely to think air-raid. (Table 26.)

TABLE 26  
RACE, FANSHIP AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Fans		Non-Fans	
	White	Negro	White	Negro
Game Only . . . . .	32	40	13	30
Other . . . . .	21	10	29	10
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	47	50	57	60
N = (100%)	(85)	(30)	(51)	(10)

The relationship between education and interpretation of the siren is somewhat more complicated but no less interesting. (Table 27.)

TABLE 27  
EDUCATION, FANSHIP AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Fans		Non-Fans	
	Low Education	High Education	Low Education	High Education
Game Only . . . . .	39	29	9	25
Other , . . . . .	21	13	30	21
Air-Raid Alert . .	40	58	61	54
	(53)	(62)	(33)	(28)

Among the fans, education does not make very much difference. About equal proportions of highly educated and poorly educated fans thought only of the ball game when they heard the sirens. This is also true--though very slightly less so--among the highly educated non-fans. Only the poorly educated non-fans differ from the other groups.

The interpretation that seems most plausible is as follows: Being a fan meant that one knew about the game and, hearing the siren, one tended to associate it with the game. Not being a fan, however, tended to deprive one of this knowledge unless--and here is the crux of the matter--one were well educated and generally awake to what is going on (whether or not one is particularly interested).

Looking at the educational groupings in the population more carefully suggests that it was the middle educated group--those who have had at least some high school but no college--that was most apprehensive about the siren. This was the group that was most likely to entertain the possibility of an air raid. Interestingly, this greater apprehension among the middle educated group was a finding of the Oakland study, too. High school educated people were most likely to take the siren seriously.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Scott, op. cit., p. 17

Other demographic factors related to differential perception of the siren include the following: (1) Age--The older the respondent was, the less likely was he to associate the sirens with a raid. Conversely, older people were more apt to think other things rather than raid or game. (2) Religion--Some groups, like the Baptists, were certain the siren meant only the ball game; others, like the Lutherans, rarely considered the game as the only possibility and gave serious thought to raid. Factors such as education and race confound these findings, of course. Still it appears that Lutherans approached the siren with a kind of "no nonsense" attitude and reacted to it very soberly. (3) Place of Origin--Among people who were born outside of Chicago, those from small towns (2,500-10,000 population) were most likely to know that the siren meant only the game. This may be because of the small-town tradition of sounding the fire-house siren when the high school football or baseball team wins their game.

#### Attitudinal Variables

The second phase of the analysis will concentrate on the relationship between a variety of values and attitudes and interpretation of the siren. As a key example of this approach, let us consider here the relationship between optimism about the progress of international affairs and attitude toward the siren. We asked, (Q.52), "Do you think that the international situation is better or worse than it was five years ago--about a year after the Korean War was over?"

Table 28 indicates that those who think the international situation has improved in the last five years were more likely to think that the siren meant the ball game and less likely to think it meant an air-raid than those who think that the international situation has deteriorated. This holds true even when educational level and "fanship" are held constant. A similar relationship is shown by Scott in the Oakland Study. Scott found that people who regarded the danger of war and enemy attack as great were more likely to believe the air-raid siren.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Scott, op. cit., p. 12.

TABLE 28\*

ATTITUDE TOWARD INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS\*\*  
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Situation is Better	Situation is Worse
Game Only . . . . .	33	17
Other . . . . .	15	17
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	52	66
N (All Hearers) = 100%	(105)	(42)

\*This table falls slightly short of the .10 level of confidence using the Chi Square Test. The relationship is consistent, however, in each of the many sub-groups created by degree of fan-ship, levels of education, etc.

\*\*Refers to Question 52 in the Interview Schedule.

Conclusions

We have reviewed the several kinds of factors that are related to differential perception of the meaning of the siren. Among the background factors are sex, education, race, place of origin and religion. Fanship, perhaps, deserves to be included among the background factors.

Among the situational factors, we have discussed whether or not respondents watched the game, whom they were with, what they were doing, what their companions thought and the like.

Finally, we have indicated one type of attitudinal variable which was related to differentials in the interpretation of the siren. If you were among those who think that the world situation is deteriorating, and are pessimistic about it, you were less likely to interpret the siren as a celebration of the ball game and more likely to think it might be a genuine alert. In this sense, the siren served as a kind of "projective test."

VI. WHAT PEOPLE FELT: REACTIONS TO THE SIREN

In this chapter, we attempt a preliminary analysis of how people felt when they heard the siren. Of course, how people felt is immediately related to what they thought the siren meant. The first thing that must be done, therefore, is to examine the relationship between things thought and the respondents' emotional reactions. To do this, we shall focus rather exclusively on a series of questions which asked the respondent to "try to remember how you felt when you heard the siren." The first question was, "Did you feel scared, even for a moment?" Other questions asked about feeling uneasy, annoyed, curious, etc. All respondents--regardless of how they interpreted the siren--were asked these questions.

TABLE 29  
EMOTIONAL REACTIONS TO THE MEANING OF THE SIREN\*

	Respondent Thought the Siren Meant		
	Game Only	Other	Raid
Per Cent Who Felt			
Scared . . . . .	2	17	63
Excited. . . . .	6	10	56
Uneasy . . . . .	7	24	66
Curious . . . . .	11	78	82
Annoyed . . . . .	4	17	34
Didn't care . . . . .	9	24	11
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(53)	(41)	(98)

\*Refers to Question 6 in the Interview Schedule.

Table 29 employs the same basic breakdown of interpretations-of-the-siren that was introduced in the preceding chapter. Respondents are divided into those who thought from the very first that the siren meant the game and entertained no other possibility. The second group, headed "Other," considered possibilities such as a fire, a practice alert, and the like; they may or may not have mentioned ball

game as well (although most, of course, did). The third group consists of those who thought--even for a fleeting moment--that the sirens might be signaling a genuine alert (regardless of whether or not they also considered other possibilities).

It is extremely clear, from Table 29, that those who thought there might be an impending air-raid were very disturbed. This is true absolutely--in the sense that more than a majority of this group reported having experienced each of the emotional reactions. It is also true relatively--in the sense that the group that interpreted the sirens as representing a genuine alert was considerably more upset than either of the other two groups. The group that thought only of the game, in fact, was not really upset at all.

Thus, this table serves a dual purpose. First, it establishes beyond any doubt that a sizable proportion of the population was genuinely upset by the sounding of the sirens. Second, it validates the meaningfulness of the replies which respondents gave concerning the siren as well as the categories into which they have been grouped.

Respondents who thought the siren might be a real raid were also asked--it will be recalled--how certain they were that this could be the explanation. Table 30 relates degree of certainty that the siren signaled an attack to emotional reaction.

TABLE 30  
EMOTIONAL REACTIONS AND CERTAINTY OF RAID\*

Per Cent Who Felt	Certain	Almost Certain	Not too Certain
		Fairly Certain	Very Doubtful
Scared . . . . .	94	82	57
Excited . . . . .	88	88	42
Uneasy . . . . .	93	82	70
Curious . . . . .	73	83	85
Annoyed . . . . .	47	47	35
Didn't Care . . . . .	6	6	10
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(16)	(18)	(40)

\*Refers to Question 13B in Interview Schedule.



Those who were most certain that the air-raid sirens were real were most scared, most excited and most uneasy. They had rather less curiosity than those who were less certain because curiosity is a reaction which is much too detached for people who think that an enemy attack is on its way.

Susceptibility to Fear: Demographic Factors

Having now established that those who thought the alert might be genuine were most upset, we want now to pinpoint more carefully those groups which were most susceptible to fear. To do this, we shall "hold constant" respondents' interpretations of the siren. Table 31, for example, contrasts the extent of fear reported by men and women who thought the sirens were signaling something "other" than either game or raid and by men and women who thought an air-raid was a possibility.

TABLE 31

SEX AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Men	Women
Per Cent Who Felt Scared		
Among those who thought "Other"	7 (16)	27 (22)
Among those who thought "Raid"	42 (36)	76 (62)

Table 31 indicates that women are more susceptible to fear--or at least more ready to acknowledge having been frightened--than men. Among those who thought of fire or some other interpretation of the siren, 27% of the women were frightened as compared with 7% of the men. Among those who believed that the siren meant an air-raid, three-quarters of the women report having been frightened compared with only 42% of the men.

Another basic demographic factor associated with differentials in fear is race. Whites report more fear than Negroes, although the racial difference--as compared with the sex difference--is relatively small as Table 32 shows.

TABLE 32

RACE AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	White	Negro
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among those who thought "Raid"	62 (48)	55 (12)

Marital status is also somewhat related to fear. Married persons report themselves as having been somewhat less frightened than persons who are single, divorced, widowed or separated. While, altogether, there are very few non-married persons in our sample, the latter three groups--rather than the single persons--seem to deserve special attention, as Table 33 shows.

TABLE 33

MARITAL STATUS AND FEELING FRIGHTENED\*

	Married	Single	Divorced, Widowed, Separated
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among those who thought "Raid" . . . . .	60	67	80
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(77)	(6)	(10)

\*Refers to Question 98 in Interview Schedule.

It is interesting to speculate that having once been married, persons who are now widowed, separated or divorced are more susceptible than either married or single persons to fear. If this finding could be confirmed with a larger sample, it would seem to suggest that it is the deprivation of companionship--once that companionship has been experienced--that appears to make the difference. Sociologists will recognize the connection to the notion of "relative deprivation."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 227-50.

Susceptibility to Fear: Situational Factors

Apart from demographic factors which influenced the extent to which respondents reacted with fear, there are situational factors operative as well. Having listened to the ball game is a good example.

TABLE 34

LISTENING TO THE GAME AND FEELING FRIGHTENED\*

	Listened to the Game	Did Not Listen
Per Cent Who Felt Scared		
Among those who thought "Other" . .	12 (17)	24 (21)
Among those who thought "Raid" . .	50 (60)	84 (37)

\*Refers to Question 5A in Interview Schedule.

Table 34 indicates that those who did not hear the baseball game on radio, or watch it on television, were more likely to have been frightened by the siren. (This is true--it must be borne in mind--even among those who entertained the possibility of a raid.) Of course, it suggests that those who did not watch the game were less ready with an alternative interpretation of the siren--hence were more likely to have been frightened, and for a longer period--than those who heard the game.

The same relationship, obviously, is true of being a baseball fan and feeling frightened: Again, even among those who thought that the alert might be genuine, the fans were less likely to feel frightened.

Apart from interest in baseball--which, in the present instance, must be treated as a factor relevant to the special situation under study--several other situational factors are somewhat related to feeling fright. The most important of these, perhaps, relates to the respondents' descriptions of the people they were with.

TABLE 35

BEHAVIOR OF ASSOCIATES AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Associates Were		
	Excited and Nervous	Confused and Uncertain	Calm and Collected
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	89	76	48
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(27)	(21)	(23)

Table 35 indicates that respondents who described their associates as nervous and excited were very likely to be frightened themselves. When one's associates are agitated, one is likely to become agitated oneself and thus to produce still greater agitation in one's associates. This is the mutually reinforcing effect of social situations.

Exactly what people were doing at the time of the sounding of the siren seem to have little systematic effect on how frightened they became.

TABLE 36

RELATIVES VS NON-RELATIVES  
 BEING IN THE PRESENCE OF FAMILY MEMBER ONLY AND NON-FAMILY  
 MEMBER ONLY AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Family Members Only	Non-Family Members Only
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	62 (42)	68 (13)

Variations in types of activity at the time of the sounding of the siren (conversing, watching TV, working around the house, etc.) seems to have had little systematic effect on how frightened people became. That is, if a respondent reported having entertained the thought of a genuine alert, he was just as likely to be

frightened while performing one activity rather than another. Similarly, as Table 36 indicates, the extent of feeling frightened--among those who thought it might be a real air-raid--does not vary substantially as between those who were with family members only and those who were with non-family members; there is a slight tendency for the former to have been more frightened. This finding--and Tables 20 and 21--seem to imply that, if anything, being with one's family created greater anxiety than being with others. This seems to be at odds with the findings of Cantril, Danzig and Killian<sup>1</sup> that being separated from one's family reduces one's "critical ability" and increases anxiety by virtue of the overriding concern for the welfare of absent family members. The proper interpretation of this negative finding in the light of these earlier studies is not immediately apparent; further research will give serious attention to this problem.

Outlook on the International Situation and Feeling Frightened

An interesting set of attitudes that influenced the extent to which respondents reported being frightened by the siren are those having to do with international affairs. Respondents who perceive the international situation as ominous were more likely to have been frightened by the siren.

TABLE 37  
EXPECTATION OF WAR\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Another World War Is			
	Certain	Almost Certain	Very Likely	Not at All Likely
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	100	71	62	53
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(7)	(7)	(21)	(77)

\*Refers to Question 53 in Interview Schedule.

<sup>1</sup>Cantril, *op. cit.*, p. 144; Lewis M. Killian, "The Significance of Multiple Group Membership in Disaster," *American Journal of Sociology*, 57 (1952), pp. 309-14; Elliott R. Danzig, Paul Thayer, Lila Galanter, The Effects of a Threatening Rumor On A Disaster Stricken Community, Disaster Study No. 10, National Academy of Science National Research Council, Washington, D.C.

Respondents were asked, "How likely do you think it is that we are in for another world war?" and they were invited to reply in the categories listed in Table 37. On the whole, people seem quite optimistic that another world war is not imminent, but the minority who thinks war is likely were very frightened when the sirens sounded.

The same thing is true for those who perceive the international situation as having deteriorated recently, as Table 38 indicates.

TABLE 38

CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL SITUATION\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Situation is Worse	Situation is Better
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid"	73	57
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(26)	(53)

\*Refers to Question 52A in Interview Schedule.

Another indication of this same general outlook--and its emotional consequences--is given by reactions to the statement, "It is probable that someone will press the wrong button and set off World War III by mistake."

TABLE 39

WAR-BY-MISTAKE\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	86 (7)	66 (33)	57 (40)	43 (7)

\*Refers to Question 83L in Interview Schedule.

It is clear from Table 39 that the more strongly one agrees with this proposition the more likely one was to feel frightened when the sirens sounded. And--it

should again be emphasized--this is true even among that group of people all of whom thought the siren might mean an air-raid. All of these data, then, are highly consistent. They indicate that a respondent's perception of the international situation influenced the extent to which he was frightened by his own hypothesis. People who thought the sirens might mean a raid quickly combatted the fear accompanying this idea by reminding themselves that they did not regard the present world situation as threatening. People who do so regard the situation, however, had every reason to be frightened by their interpretation of the siren, and so they were.

Those who are more up-to-date on international affairs are the ones who were most optimistic about the situation, it seems. At any rate, they are the ones least likely to have been seriously frightened by the siren, as Table 40 makes clear.

TABLE 40

BEING UP-TO-DATE ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Not Up-to-Date At All	Not Too Up-To-Date	Very Up-To-Date
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	81	67	45
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(21)	(45)	(29)

\* Refers to Question 54 in Interview Schedule.

Individuals who do not consider themselves up-to-date at all were very likely to feel frightened when the siren sounded provided they gave some credence to the possibility that it was real. On the other hand, as Table 40 shows, more up-to-date individuals who entertained the possibility of a genuine alert were much quicker to discredit it in view of their knowledge of the international situation, the fact that Khrushchev was visiting in the country, and so on.

This last factor puts the earlier findings into broader perspective. It is people who are less well-informed (and, of course, up-to-dateness is highly correlated with education) who were more likely to be frightened if they entertained the possibility of a genuine alert. These are also the people who are more nervous about the international situation and more likely to think it has gotten worse in recent years. In addition to their lack of information, however, there may also be a psychological component to their fear. At any rate, it is evident that lack of knowledge of, and lack of confidence in, the international situation made matters worse for those who took the siren seriously.

#### Attitudes Toward Civilian Defense and Feeling Frightened

Now, we want to see whether an interest in Civilian Defense and confidence in its activity and potential served to reduce fear in any way. And, at the same time, we shall be asking whether the fact of having been frightened by the siren is associated with any particular patterns of thought and action concerning the proper behavior in case of a real alert.

We asked people what they would do in case of a genuine alert. A majority of people said they would go to their basements, and this was true both of those who were frightened and those who were not frightened by the false alarm, although it was somewhat more characteristic of the latter. The more frightened had a larger number of ideas than those who were not frightened, such as making certain of the safety of their families (11% of the replies, compared to 3% of the unfrightened group), lie down on the floor, look for a shelter, etc. Much more important, however (since the two groups were not essentially different in kinds of anticipated action), is the fact that there is a large difference between those who were and were not frightened in their answers to the question (Q. 68), "Did you ever think about this before just now?" This was one of those rare opportunities in survey



research to ask the respondent not only whether or not he has an opinion, but whether the opinion is really "his" or not, in the sense of his having considered it before being stimulated to do so by the interviewer.

TABLE 41

PREVIOUS THOUGHT OF PROTECTIVE ACTION\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Had Given Previous Thought	Had Not Given Previous Thought
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	63	44
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(60)	(18)

\*Refers to Question 68 in Interview Schedule.

Most of the people who considered the thought of a raid claimed also to have given previous thought to how to protect themselves. As we shall see, this is also true of respondents who did not associate the siren with an air-raid this time. But Table 41 goes on to indicate that those who have given previous thought to protective action were more likely to have been frightened by the siren than others who have not. This suggests that people who have been occupied or preoccupied by thoughts of civilian defense--and who may even have some idea of what kinds of protective action are appropriate (though their ideas differ little, as we have said, from those who have not thought about it)--take little comfort in their knowledge or concern. A related finding is that those who know the Conelrad numbers on the radio dial (Q. 71C), were more likely to report having been frightened.

Similarly, those who are more accurate in their knowledge of how to obtain further information in case of a real alert are more likely to have been frightened, as Table 42 shows.

TABLE 42

SOURCE OF FURTHER INFORMATION IN REAL ALERT\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Would Turn to		
	Radio, Conelrad, TV	Telephone	Other
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	67	47	63
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(83)	(32)	(8)

\*Refers to Question 70 in Interview Schedule.

Use of the telephone during a real alert is against the rules of Civil Defense authorities. Again, it is clear that those who know more about what is appropriate to the situation of a genuine alert were more frightened in the false alert which they underwent.

Another related finding is that people who were frightened by the siren would be more ready to volunteer for Civilian Defense work, as Table 43 shows.

TABLE 43

READINESS TO VOLUNTEER FOR CD WORK\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Willing to Volunteer	Not Willing to Volunteer
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	69	54
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(51)	(35)

\*Refers to Question 80 in Interview Schedule.

The question was: "If you were asked, would you be willing to give two or three hours of your time a week to train yourself as a Civilian Defense worker?" As we shall see below, the sample as a whole split 50-50 in answer to this question. The base figures in Table 43 show that among those who thought the siren might mean

a raid, there was a somewhat greater readiness to volunteer. The table itself shows further that among those who entertained the thought of a raid, a greater proportion of those who were frightened would be prepared to volunteer than those who were not frightened. It is difficult to say whether the fright which they experienced increased their motivation or whether their greater preoccupation with matters of Civilian Defense tended to heighten their sensitivity to the possibility of a raid and thus to increase the likelihood of their being frightened. The latter interpretation would appear to fit nicely with the findings reported throughout this section.

The only partial exception to the line of thought we have been developing is to be found in reaction to the statement, "Some people have said that in the event of an atomic attack Civil Defense would be useless in aiding civilians to survive."

TABLE 44  
USEFULNESS OF CIVIL DEFENSE\* AND FEELING FRIGHTENED

	Civilian Defense is Useless			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Per Cent Who Felt Scared Among Those Who Thought "Raid" . . . . .	40	85	64	50
Total Respondents (= 100%)	(5)	(13)	(52)	(20)

\*Refers to Question 77 in Interview Schedule.

If we ignore the "strongly agree" category--because it contains only five cases--Table 44 provides evidence that the more one values Civilian Defense, the less frightened one was likely to have been during the false alert. Thus, people who strongly disagree with the statement that Civilian Defense would be useless were least likely to report having been frightened. On the other hand, if we choose not to ignore the five cases who "strongly agree" we are confronted again with the possibility that those who refuse to occupy themselves in any way with thoughts of

effective measures for self- and community-protection are least likely to have been upset by the false alarm.

The suggestions we have developed in the last few pages require considerably more analysis, of course. Indeed, there is every possibility that they may be spurious and that some heretofore unrevealed factor will explain away some of these perhaps anomalous--but intriguing--findings. Should these suggestions still stand, after further research, they would seem to imply that an active program of Civil Defense must reconcile itself to increasing the level of apprehensiveness in the community.

## VII. WHAT PEOPLE DID: VERIFICATION AND PROTECTION

We have seen that a lot of people were genuinely frightened. Now we want to ask what they did about it. Did the widespread belief in the possibility of a real alert lead to any overt action?

There are two sorts of action that we shall be discussing. The first is protective action; the second is communicative actions--attempts to verify the meaning of the siren.

Let us begin with protective action--because nobody took any.

### Contemplated Protective Action

"While you still thought it might be a real air-raid warning, did you want to do anything?" we asked (Q. 13H). And in order to guide the respondent to thoughts of protective action rather than verification, we added, "I mean besides trying to find out for sure what the sirens meant."

About 40% of the respondents answered this question affirmatively and another 15% responded to a later probe--addressed to those who did not volunteer that they had contemplated any action--which asked, (Q. 13H2) "Did you ever think of anything you might do to protect yourself?" Altogether, that is, some 55% of the respondents who entertained the possibility of a raid, reported having contemplated some form of action. This is about 25% of all respondents who heard the siren.

Asked what sort of action they considered, two-thirds of all respondents said that they thought of going into the basement. In addition, there was an assortment of other replies, but no concentration in any one category. It seems quite clear that people think of the basement when they think of air-raid shelter.

Those who thought it might be a real raid but did not contemplate action were asked, (Q. 13H2b) "Why do you think it never occurred to you to try to protect yourself?" Basically, as Table 45 indicates, there were three sorts of replies.

TABLE 45

REASONS FOR NOT CONSIDERING PROTECTIVE ACTION\*

	Per Cent
<u>Disbelief:</u>	
Respondent was still unsure about it; didn't think it was a raid for long . . . . .	41
<u>Lack of Corroboration:</u>	
There was no supporting evidence in the environment; no announcements on radio, lights were on, people were in streets, etc. . . . .	31
<u>Futility, Ignorance:</u>	
There is no effective action that one can take any way; Respondent wouldn't know what to do even if decided to do something . . . . .	33
Other . . . . .	10
Don't remember . . . . .	2
Total Respondents . . . . .	(39)

Note: Table adds to more than 100% because respondents sometimes gave more than one reason.

A little more than a third emphasized disbelief: the thought of a raid was not really certain enough, the respondent implied, to warrant taking action. A third of the respondents emphasized the absence of any other evidence which confirmed that the siren might be sounding a genuine alert. Finally, a third of the respondents emphasized the futility of taking any action or their ignorance of what action would be worth taking.

Again, some groups more than others contemplated protective action. For example, 56% of the females as compared with 45% of the males considered taking action, as did 58% of the white respondents as compared with only 35% of the Negroes. These variables, it will be recalled, were also associated with differentials in interpretation of the siren and, among those who thought the siren might mean a real raid, with differences in the degree of feeling

frightened. Indeed, apart from sex and race, age is about the only other background factor that relates to protective action: older persons were somewhat more likely to consider taking action. Neither education nor income--or even the fact of being a baseball fan or having watched the game--are related to the consideration of protective action among those who considered an air-raid a genuine possibility.

#### The Taking of Action

So far, we have talked about the contemplation of action, and have seen that somewhat over half of those to whom the thought of a real alert presented itself considered some form of action. Of these, however, only six persons in all actually took any form of protective action whatsoever.

The most thoroughgoing action story in these few cases is that of the family which "got the children up and got them dressed and were going to find a place under the stairs where they would be safe . . . . Started to get blankets and water and some canned food, radio, flashlights, and to take down everything Civil Defense told us to do if we hear the siren..." But this, obviously, was an extraordinary case. Two others went down to their basements; one got the children out of bed; another hid under the table; another just ran around the house trying to do something, though she didn't know what. Five of these six were women with children.<sup>1</sup>

Whether or not they contemplated action, respondents who did not take action were asked why. Again, their answers can be readily classified into the three categories introduced above.

Again, the primary emphasis is on disbelief. But sizable proportions of the respondents in Table 46 mention the absence of corroborative evidence in the environment: There were lights in the city; there was no sound of bombs; there was no announcement on radio or TV; people in the street did not seem panicky. And a sizable proportion, again, say that there is nothing to do anyway; or, if there is, they don't know what.

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<sup>1</sup>Danzig, Thayer and Galanter, op. cit., p. 64, Table 36, reports that women are more likely to take action when threat of disaster is imminent.

TABLE 46

REASONS FOR NOT TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION\*

	Per Cent
Disbelief . . . . .	51
Lack of Corroboration . . . .	29
Futility, Ignorance . . . . .	29
Other . . . . .	14
Don't Remember . . . . .	-
Total Respondents . . . . .	(83)

Note: Table adds to more than 100% because respondents sometimes gave more than one reason.

\*Refers to Question 15A in Interview Schedule.

It is interesting to examine the differences among the kinds of people who give different reasons for their lack of action. Women more than men, for example, emphasize the futility of action or their ignorance of any appropriate action, as Table 47 indicates.

TABLE 47

SEX AND REASONS FOR NOT TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION

	Women	Men
Disbelief . . . . .	44	40
Lack of Corroboration	18	36
Futility, Ignorance . . . . .	27	16
Other . . . . .	15	8
Total Respondents	(55)	(25)

Note: Columns add to more than 100% because respondents sometimes gave more than one reason.

Since we know that women were more frightened than men--even when only those members of both groups who thought of a raid are compared--Table 47 suggests that being frightened ought to be associated with the type of reasons offered for not taking action. Table 48 shows that this is so.



TABLE 48

FEELING FRIGHTENED AND REASONS FOR NOT TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION

	Scared	Not Scared
Disbelief . . . . .	41	50
Lack of Corroboration . . . . .	22	32
Futility, Ignorance . . . . .	26	10
Total Respondents . .	(54)	(22)

Note: Does not add to 100% because other categories are lacking.

Table 48 suggests, therefore, that those who were frightened wanted to take some form of action but did not because, to a considerable degree, there is no action known to them that is worth taking.

Being a baseball fan was also related to the type of reason preferred for not taking action: non-fans were more likely than fans to mention the futility of action or their ignorance of the proper action to take, if any.

Just as in our discussion of the correlates of greater fear, so here, too, it seems that to a certain extent we are finding that among those who thought of the possibility of a genuine alert there were some who thought so more seriously than others.<sup>1</sup> In general, those who were more serious in their consideration of an alert were those who were less likely to have any ready alternatives in mind. Non-baseball fans are the most obvious example. In addition, however, the factor of sex (and perhaps race) appears to persist even after such things as being a baseball fan are held constant: Among fans, women were more likely to interpret the siren as an alert, to feel frightened, and to rationalize their inaction in terms of the futility of action or their ignorance of what to do.

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<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of disbelief of the Oakland siren see Scott, op. cit., p. 8.

### Types of Verification

While almost nobody took protective action, it is clear already--by inference from some of the preceding materials--that people did attempt corroborative action. People attempted to scan the environment for evidence that would confirm or disconfirm the interpretation of the siren that first occurred to them.

After describing the things they thought about the meaning of the siren, about protective action, about the behavior of the people they were with, respondents were asked (Q. 18), "What, if anything, did you do to find out for sure what the sirens meant. What kinds of things did you do to check on whether you were right about what the sirens meant?" And this open-ended question was followed by a check-list: (Q. 19): "Did you ask someone who was with you what he or she thought the siren meant? Did you look outside to see if you could hear or see anything? Did you try to call someone you know on the phone to ask about the siren?" And so on. The percentage of respondents who attempted each of these several types of verification is reported, in Table 49, separately for those who thought the siren meant a raid (regardless of what else they thought) and for those who thought the siren meant something other than a raid (such as fire, or a practice alert, etc.). This is the same classification that was employed in Chapter IV, omitting only those who thought just of the ball game since none of these were asked whether they attempted to verify their interpretation.

Respondents who thought the siren might mean a genuine alert were much more likely to try to obtain additional information than those who thought otherwise. This is true for every one of the forms of verification listed in Table 49. Whether this involved simply turning to somebody else in the same room or making a telephone call or going outside, the action was reported by a larger proportion of the group which considered the possibility of a real air-raid.

TABLE 49

VERIFICATION\* ACCORDING TO INTERPRETATION OF THE SIREN

	Other (Fire, etc.)	Raid
Per Cent Who Answered Affirmatively		
Did you ask someone who was with you what he or she thought the siren meant? . . . . .	28	42
Did you <u>look outside</u> to see if you could hear or see anything? . . . . .	49	60
Did you <u>go outside</u> to look around, . . . or maybe to	8	19
<u>Ask someone (outside)</u> what was going on?	9	11
Did you try to <u>call someone you know</u> on the phone to ask about the siren? . .	-	4
How about the police or the phone company --did you try to <u>call any public agency</u> like that to find out? . . . . .	3	6
Did you do anything like <u>turning on the radio</u> or TV or looking in the newspaper for information?, . . . . .	45	68
Total Respondents . . . . .	(33)	(95)

\*Refers to Question 19 in Interview Schedule.

Note: There are slight differences in the base figures due to variations in the number of "no answers." Totals equal smallest number on which percentages are based.

The rank order of items in both lists is very similar. However, if you thought the siren might be signaling a real air-raid, you were very likely to turn on your radio or television or, if it was already on, to pay sharp attention to it. Next most frequent action was looking outside to see what could be seen. These are also the two most frequent actions reported by those who thought that the siren might mean a fire, or a disaster, or perhaps a practice alert.

The third most important form of verification for both groups is turning to someone in the same room to get another opinion.

For the group that thought air-raid, this is followed by actually going outside and, in some cases, asking somebody outside for an opinion. These were also the two next-most-frequent actions of the group that thought the siren meant something other than a raid.

Finally, some 10% of those who thought it might be a raid made a telephone call. Their calls went either to an acquaintance (4%) or to some public agency (6%). Together with the single phone call made by a respondent who did not think of an air-raid, there were a total of 11 phone calls made on this occasion by our 241 respondents. That is to say, slightly under 5% of this sample of Chicago households made a special call on this occasion. Although this percentage seems very small--and is, of course, subject to serious sampling error--extrapolating to the total number of households of the City of Chicago yields a very large number of calls (something in the neighborhood of, say, 50,000).<sup>1</sup> Withey found that 40% of a national sample stated they would use the telephone in order to gain more information in a real emergency.<sup>2</sup> Along with the normal load of calls, this concentration of calls in a very few minutes was enough to jam many of the telephone switchboards. In fact, some of our respondents did not complete their calls because they could not get a dial tone; this frightened them even more.

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<sup>1</sup>Scott estimated as many as 10,000 people in Oakland used their phones.

<sup>2</sup>Stephen B. Withey. Survey of Public Knowledge and Attitudes Concerning Civil Defense. Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Sept., 1954, Table 7-7, p. 114.

Except for using the telephone, then, those who thought raid and those who thought something else tended to do the same sorts of things, more or less, to verify their hypotheses about what the siren meant. The major difference is (1) that those who thought it might be a raid did more of everything, and (2) used the telephone.

#### Sequence of Verificative Actions Taken

An analysis of the typical sequence of information-seeking actions reveals that the most frequent first actions consisted in either discussing the situation with a handy associate or looking outside to see what was going on in the street. Turning on--or paying stricter attention--to radio or television was also frequently mentioned as a first action, although considerably less often than the former two. For those who went on to a second action, turning to the mass media was frequently cited, while looking outside was mentioned almost as frequently. Those who reported three or more actions tended to be the ones who actually went outside to see or to ask. A typical sequence of communication-oriented activity would thus be (1) talking to a companion and/or looking outside; (2) tuning in the radio; (3) actually going outside. Although going outside was only the third typical action, it should be borne in mind that, if these data are extrapolated again, out of every ten householders (and perhaps slightly more) went out into the street that night.

#### The Respondent as Informant

Altogether, the few minutes of uncertainty after the siren blew were filled with a tremendous exchange of information. Every newspaper office, radio station, telephone exchange, police headquarters and the like were swamped with inquiries. The newspapers treat this aspect of the story very fully.

But, in addition to the formal agencies of inquiry anybody who was with anybody else discussed the siren and theorized about it. Before asking respondents

where they turned to seek information, we asked them whether anybody had asked them for advice. "When the sirens went off," the question (Q. 17) asked, "did anyone ask you what you thought the sirens meant?" About one-third of the respondents to whom we put the question (persons who had heard the siren and who entertained a hypothesis other than ball game only) said yes. About three-quarters of these people were consulted by others in the same room or apartment and about one-quarter was contacted in person or by phone from "outside." Interestingly, respondents did not define this question in terms of inquiries from family members, for very few of them mentioned spouse or other relatives. Absent, too, was any contact with strangers. Most mentioned friends.

#### Summary of Actions Taken

Almost nobody took protective action. The six persons who did, represent about 2% of our overall sample and about 6% of those who thought it might be a raid. Many more persons, however, contemplated action--predominantly thinking of going to the basement.

Prominent among the reasons for not taking action--among those who took the siren seriously--was a lurking suspicion that the sirens were not sounding a genuine alarm, a lack of knowledge of what to do and a general feeling that nothing can be done and, third, the lack of any real supporting evidence in the environment.

This emphasis on supporting evidence implies that people sought out additional information before acting. In general, they discussed the situation with someone who was present in the household, turned on the radio, looked outside and, sometimes, went outside.

However unambiguous the air-raid siren is as a warning of an impending enemy attack--and its ambiguity is increased, of course, when the siren is used the way it was on September 22 and, perhaps, even when it is tested on Tuesday mornings--it is evident that most people do not feel that the siren alone represents a clear-cut

message. They feel the need for additional information to corroborate what they think the siren means.<sup>1</sup> And, if the sources they consult do not reinforce the siren, people will not act in accord with it.

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<sup>1</sup>The Port Jervis study demonstrated that ambiguity in a situation increases the need for confirmation. Danzig, op. cit., p. 59.

VIII. ATTITUDES OF CHICAGOANS TOWARD THE THREAT OF WAR  
AND THE EFFICACY OF CIVIL DEFENSE

We have seen that many Chicagoans took the sirens seriously. To this point, however, we have been concentrating on reactions to the specific stimulus of the sirens on the night of September 22. It would seem worthwhile, however, to take a step further back and try to examine more deep-rooted attitudes toward the international situation and the threat of war. Have Chicagoans given thought to the possibility of war? What do they think they would do in their own defense? Have they confidence in the Civil Defense administration?

The Likelihood of War

We asked respondents about the likelihood of another world war (Q. 53) and the distribution of their replies is as reported in Table 50.

TABLE 50

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR\*

War is:	Per Cent
Certain . . . . .	8
Almost certain . . . . .	10
Very Likely . . . . .	22
Not at all Likely . . . . .	48
Don't Know . . . . .	12
	100
N = (225)	

\*Refers to Question 53 in Interview Schedule.

About half of all Chicagoans who answered this question emphatically believe that war is "not at all likely." On the other hand, 40% believe that there is a genuine possibility that there will be another world war. So, the population is very divided over this question.

The population is not at all divided, however, on whether Chicago would be endangered in case of war. "In the event of atomic attack," we asked, "do you



think Chicago will be bombed?" (Q.78) and almost 9 out of every 10 respondents answered affirmatively. Only 12% think that Chicago would not be attacked.

When we asked how much warning time might be expected before an enemy attack (Q.69), a majority of Chicagoans replied that the warning time would be less than thirty minutes. In fact, 40% think that there will be less than fifteen minutes in which to prepare!

If bombed, fully 60% of Chicagoans expect total destruction! (Q.79) They do not expect themselves or, indeed, anyone else in the city to survive an atomic attack. Only about one-third of the respondents qualified their remarks in any way or gave any indication of optimism about the possibility of survival following an atomic attack.

All this can be summarized as follows: (1) The population is divided over the likelihood of war; 40% believe that another world war is a real possibility. (2) If war comes, however, almost everybody believes that Chicago will be bombed. (3) If Chicago is threatened with attack, most people expect very little advance warning. (4) If the attack actually comes, most people expect total death and destruction.

#### Contemplated Action in Case of Attack

We asked, "What do you think you would do if you got the signal that there was going to be an enemy attack?" (Q. 69). Most respondents mentioned some form of specific protective behavior, by far the most frequent of which was going to the basement to seek shelter. About 5% said that they would leave town if there were enough time. About 10% said that they would seek further information and/or await Civil Defense instructions as to what to do; and over 10% voiced complete despair about the worthwhileness of doing anything. Most respondents gave several answers to this question, thus making it difficult to compare with the rather

similar question asked in the Oakland study. Nevertheless, it appears that the distribution of replies is rather similar except that more Oaklanders than Chicagoans may have protested that they did know what to do.

Following this question, Chicagoans were asked whether they had ever thought about this subject "before just now." We were interested, of course, in the extent to which people had given previous thought to these matters. More than half of the respondents answered that they had thought about it before.

Then we asked, (Q. 70), "If you heard a warning and wanted to get some more information about what was going on and what to do, where would you try to get it?" Table 51 reports the results.

TABLE 51  
EXPECTED SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

	Chicago	Oakland <sup>1</sup>
Radio . . . . .	33	22
Television . . . . .	10	-
CONELRAD . . . . .	23	35
Ask some person . . . . .	3	6
Telephone . . . . .	32	36
Other . . . . .	10	-
Don't Know . . . . .	5	10
N (Total Respondents)	(241)	(124)

Note: Percentages equal more than 100 because of multiple replies.

In both Chicago and Oakland, only a minority of respondents explicitly mention Conelrad as a source of additional information. On the other hand, more than a third of the respondents in both cities say that they would use the telephone to gain additional information. In Chicago, a majority of this latter group say that they would call the telephone company or dial "operator." Others would telephone

<sup>1</sup>Adapted from Scott, op. cit., p. 26.

police, Civil Defense, the fire company, the newspapers. A large proportion in Chicago, and somewhat fewer in Oakland, say that they would tune in their radios (and some say their television sets; these were relatively unavailable at the time of the Oakland study).

Compared with what people actually did on September 22 (see Chapter VII), the kinds of verification which Chicagoans anticipate attempting in the case of a real alert fall heavily in the "Conelrad" and "telephone" categories and only lightly in categories such as "going outside" or "looking outside." When the sirens sounded for the White Sox, that is, almost nobody tuned in Conelrad and only about 5% of those who thought it might be a raid used the telephone as compared with 23% and 32% respectively who say that they would do so in the event of a real alert.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, many people looked or went outside or asked other people; people do not often mention these categories when they are asked to anticipate their behavior in the event of a real alert. Turning to the radio or TV for further information seems to be the most stable response of all.

#### Knowledge of Civilian Defense

Only about one-quarter of the population spontaneously mention Conelrad when asked where they would go for additional information in the event of an enemy attack. To see whether this reflects the extent of knowledge of the existence of Conelrad, we asked respondents whether they were aware of a civil defense radio station broadcasting in Chicago (Q. 71). Even though this question invites respondents to answer "yes" (even if they do not really know of the station), 40% of Chicago household heads answer "no" or "don't know." If the respondent answered "yes" (about 60% did), he was asked whether he knew the name of the station and whether he knew the numbers on the radio

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<sup>1</sup>The Oakland and Chicago results concerning anticipated use of the telephone compare closely with the figure obtained by Withey, op. cit., using a national sample.

dial (Q. 71A,B,C). About half of those who claimed to know that civil defense operates a radio station in Chicago knew the correct name (Conelrad). As for the correct numbers, Table 52 reports the distribution of replies.

TABLE 52  
KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE STATION  
ON RADIO DIAL

	Per Cent
Gives correct numbers . . . . .	27
Doesn't know numbers, but numbers are marked on dial . . . . .	10
Respondent says he knows numbers, but gives incor- rect numbers . . . . .	16
Respondent doesn't know numbers, but knows other stations leave air . . . . .	3
Other . . . . .	3
Doesn't know numbers . . . . .	40
	<hr/>
	99
N (Those who know there is a Civil Defense station) . . . . .	(147)

Table 52 indicates that only about 40% of Chicago household heads who know that there is such a thing, know where to find their Civil Defense station on their own radio. Only 27% actually know the numbers. All the others do not. That means that only about 1 of every 4 household heads in Chicago knows both that (1) Conelrad exists and (2) where to find it. This figure corresponds very well with the 23% who say that they would tune their radios to Conelrad in the event of an enemy attack (Table 51).

Table 53 examines the relationship between education and information about Conelrad.

TABLE 53

KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL DEFENSE STATION AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

	Grammar School or less	Some High School	High School Graduate	Some College or More
Per cent who know that there is a C. D. sta- tion in Chicago . . .	36 (67)	57 (51)	79 (57)	74 (49)
Per cent (of those who know there is a sta- tion) who name Conel- rad . . . . .	37	55	53	53

Education is positively related to knowledge of the existence of a civil de-  
fense station in Chicago (though those with College education are no more likely  
than High School graduates to know this). A similar finding is reported by Withey.<sup>1</sup>  
Of those who know that the station exists, about half of each group, except the  
Grammar School group, know that its name is Conelrad; only 37% of the Grammar School  
group who know that there is a civil defense station can correctly identify it by  
name.

Whose Job Is It To Sound Siren?

Respondents were also asked, "As you understand it, whose job is it to decide  
to ring the sirens in case of a real attack?" (Q. 64). Their answers appear in  
Table 54.

TABLE 54

WHOSE JOB IS IT TO RING SIRENS?\*

	Per Cent
Civil Defense . . . . .	28
Mayor . . . . .	16
Fire Chief . . . . .	12
Government . . . . .	2
Air-raid wardens . . . . .	1
Other . . . . .	12
Don't Know . . . . .	35

N = 225

\*\*

\*Refers to Question 64 in Interview Schedule.

\*\*Adds to more than 100 because of multiple replies.

<sup>1</sup>Withey, op. cit., p. 85.

Clearly, Chicagoans are confused on this point. They do not have any real idea whose responsibility it is to make the decision that the sirens should sound. The large number of mentions of the mayor and the fire commissioner are understandable in view of the publicity given to the September 22 siren. We will return to this point in the following chapter in evaluating what people learned from that night's experience.

Attitudes Toward Civil Defense

Before concluding this chapter, however, it is important to examine the attitudes of Chicagoans toward the efficacy of civil defense, particularly in view of the overall pessimism in the population concerning the chances of survival following an atomic attack. To ascertain how Chicagoans feel about this matter, the following question was asked: "Some people have said that in the event of an atomic attack Civil Defense would be useless in aiding civilians to survive. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?"

TABLE 55

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EFFICACY OF CIVIL DEFENSE\*

"Civil Defense Would Be Useless"	Per Cent
Strongly Agree . . . . .	8
Agree . . . . .	15
Disagree . . . . .	48
Strongly Disagree . . . . .	21
Don't Know, undecided . . . . .	8
<hr/>	
N = 241	100
*Refers to Question 77 in Interview Schedule.	

Nearly one-quarter of the heads of households in the city of Chicago agree with the statement that "Civil Defense would be useless in the event of an atomic attack." Two-thirds of this population disagree, among whom about 20% disagree strongly.

A related question was asked in Oakland, although it had a very different emphasis. "All in all," Oaklanders were asked, "what's your general opinion of Civil Defense in Oakland? Do you think it's necessary? Do you think it works well?" Oakland was virtually unanimous in affirming the worthwhileness of civil defense. If we assume that there is at least some inherent comparability in the two questions and the two situations, it appears that Chicagoans are very much more negative concerning the efficacy and desirability of the organization for civil defense than the Oaklanders. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the Chicago question would be answered both by critics of the existing civil defence administration and by those who think that no human effort or organization can cope with an atomic attack. It is difficult to sort out these two meanings, although there is no doubt that the critical replies include some which are critical of the civil defense organization. Indeed, a number of those who disagreed with the statement that civil defense would be useless nevertheless volunteered criticism of its present organizational activity.

We asked respondents whether they would be willing to give time to train as civil defense workers. Table 56 reports the results.

TABLE 56  
WILLING TO GIVE TIME AS CIVIL DEFENSE WORKER?\*

	Per Cent
Yes . . . . .	45
No . . . . .	45
Don't Know . . . . .	9
Already giving time . . . .	1
N = 212	<hr/> 100

\*Refers to Question 80 in Interview Schedule.

Equal proportions of Chicago household heads say that they would and would not be willing to give time to train as a worker in the civil defense organization. One per cent say that they are already enrolled in some sort of civil defense work and,

elsewhere in the interview (Q. 73), it was ascertained that some 14% consider that they are presently receiving, or already have received, some civil defense training. On-the-job training accounts for the largest proportion (31%) of this latter group while others cite experience and training in the service (26%), air-raid drills at school (15%) and other sources of training.

Interestingly, as Table 57 shows, one's general attitude toward the efficacy of civil defense seems to have little direct bearing on one's willingness to volunteer to be trained or to work in civil defense.

TABLE 57

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EFFICACY OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND WILLINGNESS TO GIVE TIME TO CIVIL DEFENSE WORK

Willing to Give Time As Civil Defense Worker	"Civil Defense is Useless"	
	Strongly Agree, Agree	Strongly Disagree Disagree
Yes . . . . .	43	49
No . . . . .	47	44
Don't Know . . . . .	10	6
Already giving time . . . . .	-	1
	100	100
N =	(49)	(144)

One would expect that those who affirm the value of civilian defense would be more willing to volunteer. But Table 57 shows very little difference in willingness to give time between those who agree or disagree with the statement. The small differences are in the expected direction, but they are small indeed.

Conclusions

Altogether, then, we get a picture of a city that is not unconcerned about the possibility of a genuine air-raid. People have given thought to the question of what they would do should a real raid come. Most people have some vague notions of



taking cover, though many doubt the efficacy of any sort of action. One-quarter of the population believes that civil defense would be useless in case of a real attack. But even those who do indicate how they would try to protect themselves, and even those who do believe that civil defense would be of some use, are nevertheless convinced that war will bring an atomic attack and that an atomic attack on Chicago would bring total destruction. Half think that war is inevitable; the other half think it "not at all likely."

IX. WHAT PEOPLE LEARNED FROM THE EXPERIENCE

Finally, we want to ask whether there was any profit at all in the experience of the night of September 22. Did anybody learn anything useful, for example?

Attitudes Toward the Propriety of Sounding the Sirens

First, as background, it would be well to consider people's reactions to the decision to sound the sirens. Did they think it a good idea? (Q. 63A).

TABLE 58

WAS IT A GOOD IDEA TO SOUND THE SIRENS FOR THE WHITE SOX?

	Per Cent
Good idea . . . . .	18
Not a good idea . . . . .	79
Ambivalent (good and bad) . .	3
N = (225)	<u>100</u>

Four out of five respondents thought that it was not a good idea to sound the sirens. Every fifth person, however, seemed to agree that it was a good idea or, at least, a not altogether bad idea. Table 59 shows how opinions about the sounding of the sirens differed among the several educational groups.

TABLE 59

EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOUNDING OF THE SIRENS

	Per Cent Who Think It Was a Good Idea
Low education . . . . .	20 (69)
Medium education . . . . .	19 (112)
High education . . . . .	6 (53)

The group with least education is proportionately more favorable to the idea of the sounding of the sirens than the medium education group, and the latter is about

as unfavorable as the group with a college education. Nonetheless, even the lowest-educated group contains no more than about 20% who approve.

Let us now see how differences in interpretation of the sirens--when they sounded--affect opinions about the propriety of having sounded them.

TABLE 60

MEANING OF THE SIRENS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD SOUNDING THEM

Respondents Who Thought:	Per Cent Who Thought It Was Good Idea
Game Only . . . . .	35 (18)
Other . . . . .	17 (7)
Air-Raid Alert . . . . .	8 (8)

Table 60 indicates that those who knew immediately that the sirens were sounded only to signal the baseball victory were considerably more favorable to the idea that they were sounded than those who thought otherwise. This stands to reason, of course, but it should be noted nevertheless that, even among this group, a large majority felt that the sounding of the sirens was a bad idea.

The overwhelming opposition to the decision of September 22 dwindled considerably when we asked, "If there had been enough time to warn everybody by announcing it in the papers and on radio and TV, do you think it would have been a good idea to ring the sirens?" Had there been such advance warning, about half of the heads of Chicago households say that they would have been in favor of sounding the sirens. These people, of course, are saying that they don't see anything "sacred" about the sirens in the sense of their being "set apart" for a specific purpose and for that purpose only. They are willing to see them used for other things, too, providing that adequate warning is given. On the other hand, about half of the population disagrees.

What Did People Learn?

But what, specifically, did people learn from their having sounded? There are two ways in which we have tried to answer this question. One way was to ask the people who could correctly identify Conelrad, or who had some idea of whose job it is to sound the sirens, when they had learned this. The other way was to ask respondents directly what they had learned from the experience.

As for answers to the "when did you learn this?" questions, there are conflicting results. Of the people who knew the Conelrad numbers on the radio dial (see Table 50 of the previous chapter), only two persons altogether said that they had learned this following the episode of September 22. All the others said they had known this before. In view of the widespread newspaper coverage, and the frequent mention of Conelrad in these stories, it is surprising that more people did not learn a piece of information which many explicitly thought they should know! The desire for such information and, in general, for instructions concerning what to do in case of an enemy attack seems to be high, but the actual learning of relevant information--especially considering its easy availability in the newspapers--was surprisingly low.

On the other hand, in replying to the "when did you learn this?" question that was appended to "Whose job is it to ring the sirens in case of attack?" almost one-third of those who replied said that they had learned this after the night of September 22. As we have pointed out, most of the replies to this question were incorrect in one way or another, but the fact remains nevertheless that a sizable proportion who learned (or mis-learned) that it is the mayor, or the fire commissioner or somebody else who has charge of sounding the sirens, learned this as a result of the sirens sounded for the White Sox pennant victory.

Turning now to the direct question (Q. 100), we must now analyze open-ended replies to the query: "Just to sum it all up, what did you learn from this

experience that might be useful to people who have to plan for future emergencies?" Table 61 is an attempt to organize these answers into meaningful categories.

TABLE 61  
WHAT DID PEOPLE LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE

Learned About	Per Cent
<u>Irresponsibility</u> of use of siren; people should have been warned; sirens should be sounded only for emergencies, etc. . . . .	39
<u>Civil defense:</u> paucity of information about civil defense procedures; inadequate facilities (e.g. shelters) . . . . .	32
<u>People:</u> that they become frightened easily, that they cannot be counted on to act rationally; that situation is jittery . . . . .	13
<u>Futility</u> of defense: that there is no real defense against atomic attack . . . . .	1
<u>Next time</u> will know what to do . . . . .	2
Learned nothing . . . . .	12
N (Total replies = 200)	100

The largest group of replies centered on the inappropriateness and irresponsibility of those who sounded the siren; people emphasized that they hoped that this would teach a lesson for future occasions.

The next largest category emphasizes the realization that people are poorly informed and poorly trained for coping with a genuine alert. Some people felt that more extensive civil defense training should be given; others were simply concerned with the fact that they did not know the Conelrad numbers; while still others were concerned over the absence of accessible air-raid shelters.

A third group of replies--considerably smaller than the first two--dwelt on what had been learned about people: that they were easily frightened, that the international situation has made people tense and jittery, and the like. A few people

felt that they had learned what to do next time the sirens sound, while another handful reiterated the futility of any kind of preparation. Finally, a not inconsiderable group (larger than the 12% in the table since this figure is based on total replies rather than total people) say they learned nothing at all.

Here are a few typical replies:

- #12: "Well, I learned it shouldn't be used as a play-toy; it was developed as a disaster warning."
- #11: "We learned in this way how confused and how scared people become, that when something like this happens, people are helpless--don't know what to do."
- #131: "I think they should tell us about the civil defense station-- where to find out on the radio, and further instructions on what to do in case we have an air-raid. Now I know I don't know enough and just get excited."
- #20: "People are not prepared enough in case of a real alert... They should advise people a little more about what they should do in case of a real alert. Perhaps build more shelters, but I don't know if that would help much because of radioactivity."

#### Conclusions

Altogether, the experience was probably not wasted on Chicagoans in the sense that many gave some thought to the question, "What if it had been real?" Nor is it irrelevant that they called these lessons to mind some weeks after the event itself--that is, when the interviewing took place. Still, one senses that such "lessons" are rapidly lost unless they are activated immediately. Certainly, the one specific piece of information people might have learned--the Conelrad frequencies--was not learned at all.

## X. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

Following are the major findings of our study:

### Reactions to the Siren

1. About 83% of heads-of-households in Chicago heard the air-raid sirens when they were sounded on the night of September 22 at 10:30 p.m. Six per cent were out of town. The remainder claim not to have heard.

2. The non-hearers were disproportionately likely to be poorly educated, with low incomes. There was a high proportion of Negroes among the non-hearers.

3. Most people were at home with their families when the sirens sounded. A majority had watched the baseball game.

4. When the sirens sounded, 28% of those who heard the siren immediately knew it was for the ball game and never entertained any other thought. But fully half of the population (of household heads) gave at least momentary thought to the possibility of a genuine alert.

5. Of these latter, 25% were "certain" that the alert was genuine; another quarter felt "almost" or "fairly" certain.

6. Differential perception of the meaning of the sirens is related to a variety of factors. Those who were more likely to entertain the thought of a raid (and less likely to have considered only the game) were also more likely (1) to be non-baseball fans, (2) to have been in the company of family members, (3) to have been in the presence of others who thought it might be a raid; (4) to be women, (5) to be younger, (6) to be lower-educated non-fans; (7) to believe that the international situation is getting worse.

7. A majority of those who entertained the thought of a real air-raid reported themselves as "scared." Holding interpretations of the siren constant, those most frightened were (1) women, (2) white, (3) people who believe that war

is "certain," or (4) that the international situation is worsening, or (5) that World War III will be set off by mistake. Those who are (6) least up-to-date on international affairs were more frightened than those more up-to-date. Those who are (7) more preoccupied with civil defense were more frightened than those who give little thought to civil defense. Finally, (8) those who were with individuals who were nervous were more likely to be frightened, as were (9) those who were away from their families.

8. Very few people took protective action of any kind. Respondents gave three reasons for failing to take action even when they thought it might be a genuine alert. A large group was "not sure enough" (disbelief). A second group felt that there were no other messages or signals to corroborate the interpretation of the siren as a genuine alert. A third group said that it was futile to take action or that they were ignorant of the proper action, if any. Women, and those who were most frightened, tended to give the last response most frequently.

9. On the other hand, many people attempted verifactory action; they tried to find additional information concerning the true meaning of the sirens. The largest group turned on their radios; many looked out into the street; many consulted others in the room or in the same dwelling unit. A typical sequence of verifactory activity was (1) consulting someone in the same dwelling and/or looking outside; (2) tuning in the radio; (3) going outside.

10. Ten per cent of those who thought it might be a real air-raid used their telephones to try to obtain additional information.

#### Other Attitudes and Opinions

1. Half of the household-heads in Chicago think that war is "not at all likely." The other half is less optimistic and think that war is probable.

2. If war does come, however, almost everybody believes that Chicago will be



attacked.

3. If Chicago is attacked, a majority feel that there will be total death and destruction.

4. In the event of an attack, people say that they would go to the basement, or take other protective action. But nobody is very sure about what to do.

5. To obtain further information, respondents say they would use their radios. A third, however, say they would make a telephone call.

6. Only 27% of the population know where to find Conelrad on the radio dial.

7. About one-quarter of the population feel that civil defense would be useless in case of an attack. More than two-thirds feel that it would be useful.

8. Almost everybody believes that it was a bad idea to use the air-raid sirens to celebrate the baseball victory.

9. Respondents say that they learned something from the experience, however. Many said that they learned that the siren ought not to be used in the way it was. Many felt that more thought and planning should be given to preparing the populace for atomic attack and to training for civil defense roles. Thirteen per cent said that they learned something about people; that they become frightened easily, for example.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A. THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Page 47 missing from  
Questionnaire.

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER  
University of Chicago

Survey No. 425, November, 1959

REACTION TO AN UNSCHEDULED AIR-RAID SIREN

NO. \_\_\_\_\_ INTERVIEW NO. \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS: \_\_\_\_\_

INTERVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

TIME INTERVIEW BEGAN: \_\_\_\_\_

---

"Hello. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I work  
for the National Opinion Research Center, and I would  
like to ask you a few questions.

"About a month ago, on a Tuesday night, September 22, air-  
raid sirens were sounded in Chicago. The sirens were  
sounded to celebrate the White Sox baseball victory. We  
are interested in finding out people's reactions to them  
and how you feel about the whole thing."

1. Did you personally hear the siren? (PROBE, IF NECESSARY: it was the night the White Sox won the game with Cleveland. They won the pennant. It was a Tuesday and the sirens were sounded about 10:30. Do you remember hearing the sirens?)

Yes . . . . . 15- 1\*  
No . . . . . 2\*\*  
Don't remember . . . 3\*\*

\* IF "YES," SKIP TO Q. 2:

\*\* IF "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW," ASK A AND B:

A. Even if you didn't hear the sirens yourself, did you find out later that they had been sounded (rung)?

Yes . . . . . 16- 1#  
No . . . . . 2##

## IF "NO," SKIP TO B:

# IF "YES," ASK (1) AND (2):

(1) How soon did you hear that the sirens were sounded? Was it a few minutes after the sirens went off, later that night, the next day, or when?

Within a few minutes . . . . . 17- 1  
Later that night . . . . . 2  
The next day . . . . . 3  
Later than the next day . . . . . 4  
Don't know . . . . . 9

(2) How did you first hear about it?

Friend, neighbor . . . . . 18- 0  
Relative (SPECIFY)\_\_\_\_\_ 1  
Stranger, passerby . . . . . 2  
Radio, TV . . . . . 3  
Newspapers . . . . . 4  
Other (SPECIFY)\_\_\_\_\_ 5  
Don't know, don't remember . . . . . 9

B. Do you know what the air-raid siren sounds like?

Yes . . . . . 19- 1  
No . . . . . 2

2. ASK EVERYBODY:

Here is a card with pictures on it. I would like you to tell me which of these pictures comes closest to (the way the air-raid sounded to you that night) (the way you think the air-raid siren sounds).

- 1 . . . . . 20- 6
- 2 . . . . . 7
- 3 . . . . . 8
- 4 . . . . . 9
- Don't know, no answer . . . . . X

---

3. I wonder if you can remember where you were that Tuesday night, a little over a month ago. I mean, were you home or someplace else? (PROBE: It was September 22, at about 10:30 at night, the night the White Sox won the pennant. That was a Tuesday night; is there anything special that you usually do on Tuesday nights? Do you think you could have been doing something special on that night? Some people were already asleep-- what time do you usually go to bed?)

- Doesn't remember, doesn't recall . . . . . 21- y
- At home . . . . . 0
- At home of friend, relative or neighbor . . . . . 1
- At work . . . . . 2
- At store, shopping . . . . . 3
- Place of recreation
  - Movie . . . . . 4
  - Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_ 5
- Private vehicle . . . . . 6
- Public place, vehicle, street, etc. . . . . 7
- Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_
- Asleep . . . . . 8
- Out of town . . . . . 9

INTERVIEWER:

AT THIS POINT, STOP AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

- I. IF RESPONDENT HEARD THE SIREN ("YES" TO Q. 1)  
ASK Q. 4.
- II. IF RESPONDENT DID NOT HEAR THE SIREN ("NO" TO  
Q. 1) BUT WAS TOLD ABOUT IT "WITHIN A FEW  
MINUTES" /Q. 1 A (1)7 ASK Q. 4.
- III. FOR ALL OTHERS WHO DID NOT HEAR THE SIREN  
("NO" TO Q. 1) SKIP TO Q. 52,

---

4. Were you all by yourself or with other people when the siren went off?

Alone . . . . .	27- 3*
With others . . . . .	4**
Don't remember . . . . .	5

\* IF "ALONE," SKIP TO Q. 5:

\*\* IF "WITH OTHERS," SEE QUESTIONS ON PAGE 4.

4. (CONTINUED)

\* IF "WITH OTHERS," ASK:

A. How many people were with you? (CIRCLE ONE)

- One . . . . . 28- 1
- Two . . . . . 2
- Three . . . . . 3
- Four . . . . . 4
- Five . . . . . 5
- More than five. . . . . 6

B. How many, if any, of these people were relatives? (CIRCLE ONE)

- One . . . . . 29- 1#
- Two . . . . . 2#
- Three . . . . . 3#
- Four . . . . . 4#
- Five . . . . . 5#
- More than five. . . . . 6#
- None . . . . . 7

#C. UNLESS "NONE": Who were they? (I.E., Wife, brother-in-law, etc.)

30-

D. How many of these people were friends and neighbors? (CIRCLE ONE)

- One . . . . . 31- 1
- Two . . . . . 2
- Three . . . . . 3
- Four . . . . . 4
- Five . . . . . 5
- More than five. . . . . 6
- None . . . . . 7

E. How many of these people were strangers? (CIRCLE ONE)

- One . . . . . 32- 1
- Two . . . . . 2
- Three . . . . . 3
- Four . . . . . 4
- Five . . . . . 5
- More than five. . . . . 6
- None . . . . . 7

5. What were you doing?

33-

33-34-35-

**A** IF RESPONDENT DID NOT MENTION WATCHING THE GAME: Did you watch the game (between the White Sox and the Indians) that night?

Yes . . . . .	36- 1
No . . . . .	2
Don't know, no answer	3

**B.** ASK ALL: How about the locker room interviews on TV after the game, did you happen to see them (also)?

Yes . . . . .	37- 5*
No . . . . .	6
Don't know, no answer	7

**C.** ~~IF YES TO A OR B~~ Did you watch the (ball game) (locker room interviews) until (it) (they) was/were finished?

Yes . . . . .	38- 1#
No . . . . .	2

**D:** IF "YES" TO C: About how long was it after the (ball game) (locker room interviews) went off the air that the sirens were sounded?

0-10 minutes . . . . .	39- 4
11-20 minutes . . . . .	5
21-30 minutes . . . . .	6
31-45 minutes . . . . .	7
46 minutes-one hour . . . . .	8
Over an hour, later (SPECIFY)	

---



6. Try to remember how you felt when you heard the siren:		Yes	No	DK
A. Did you feel scared, even for a moment? . . . . .	40-	y**	X	0
B. Did you feel or get excited? . . . . .	41-	2**	3	4
C. What about uneasy, would you say you felt uneasy? . .	42-	6**	7	8
D. Were you annoyed, do you think? . . . . .	43-	y**	X	0
E. Did it make you curious--I mean about what the sirens meant? . . . . .	44-	2**	3	4
F. Or, didn't you care at all about what the sirens meant? . . . . .	45-	6	7	8
G. Do you remember any other feeling you had at the time?	46-	y*	X	0

\* (1) IF "YES" TO G: How would you describe the way you felt?

47-

\*\* (2) IF "YES" TO A, B, C, D, OR E: While you were (scared) (excited) (uneasy) (curious), would you say you were quite worried, a little bit worried, not a bit worried?

Quite worried . . . . .	48-	1#
A little bit worried . . . . .		2#
Not a bit worried . . . . .		3
Don't know, no answer . . . . .		4

# (a) IF AT ALL WORRIED: What were you worried about?

49-

---

50- 51- 52- 53- 54- 55- 56- 57- 58- 59-  
60- 61- 62- 63- 64- 65- 66- 67- 68-

7. A. When you first heard the signal, what did you think it meant?  
(PROBE: Was that the very first thing that came to mind?)

B. What else did you think it might mean?

C. Did any other explanations for the siren occur to you?

D. Anything else? (What was the final conclusion you came to?)

12-

IF ONLY "TO CELEBRATE VICTORY," ASK E AND F:

E. Lots of people did not realize what the sirens were for. What do you think made you realize that the sirens were sounded to celebrate the White Sox victory?

13-

F. IF MENTIONS HEARING ABOUT SIRENS ON RADIO, TV (IN 8E):

How much time would you say there was between the time you first heard the siren and the time you heard the radio (TV) announcement? Would you say you heard them at exactly the same time, or did you hear the announcement after the sirens, even if only a few seconds after the sirens went off?

Before . . . . .	14- 1*
During . . . . .	2**
After . . . . .	3**

\*IF "BEFORE": Did you hear anyone on radio (TV) specifically say that the air-raid sirens would be rung?

Yes . . . . .	15- 5+
No . . . . .	6++

+IF YES, GO TO Q. 52

++IF NO, SKIP TO Q. 52 9

\*\*IF "DURING" OR "AFTER": Did you ever, even for a second, think it could have been a real air-raid warning?

Yes . . . . .	16- 1#
No . . . . .	2##

#IF "YES" GO TO Q. 8

##IF "NO" SKIP TO Q. 52

8. FOR THOSE WHO MENTIONED MORE THAN ONE EXPLANATION IN Q. 7:

Now you've told me about the different things you thought the siren meant; I mean before you found out what it actually was. I would just like to make sure that I know which one you thought of first, and then second, (and third), etc.

A. Which was first?

16a- 3

WIRE

B. Which was second

17- 1

VICTORY

C. Which was third?

18-

D. Which was fourth?

19-

INTERVIEWER NOTE CAREFULLY:

IF RESPONDENT HAS NOT MENTIONED UNTIL NOW THAT HE THOUGHT OR FINALLY FOUND OUT THAT THE SIRENS WERE FOR THE WHITE SOX ASK "E".

E. When did you hear for certain that the siren was sounded to celebrate the White Sox victory?

20-

IF SAME NIGHT,

ASK Q. 10 (or 11)

IF NEXT DAY OR LATER ASK "F".

F. How did you find out?

21-

9. FOR FIRST EXPLANATION IN Q. 8A [or 7] (OTHER THAN REAL ALERT): You told me that you thought the sirens could have meant (REPEAT 8 A [or 7] ). Did this occur to you on your own or did someone or something suggest it to you?

On own . . . . .	21a- 1*
Suggested . . . . .	2**
Don't know, don't recall . . . . .	3*

\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," SKIP TO D:

\* IF "ON OWN" OR "DON'T KNOW, DON'T RECALL," ASK A AND B:

A. What made you think it could have been that? I mean, what passed through your mind that made you think it might be (8 A [or 7] )\_\_\_\_\_?

22- V

B. What made you think it might not be that--I mean what ideas occurred to you that made you doubt this explanation?

23-

\*\* IF "SUGGESTED", IN ANSWER TO 9 ABOVE; ASK D, E, and F:

D. Who or what gave you this idea?

24-

E. What thought occurred to you that made you think that it could have been \_\_\_\_\_(8 a)?

25-

F. Did something run through your mind and make you wonder about this explanation?

26-

27-

9. (CONTINUED)

29-  
30-  
31-

10. FOR SECOND EXPLANATION IN Q. 8 (OTHER THAN REAL ALERT):  
You told me that you thought the sirens could have meant (REPEAT 8 B).  
Did this occur to you on your own or did someone or something suggest  
it to you?

On own . . . . . 32- 1\*  
Suggested . . . . . 2\*\*  
Don't know, don't recall . . . 3\*

\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," SKIP TO D:

\* IF "ON OWN" OR "DON'T KNOW, DON'T RECALL," ASK A AND B:

A. What made you think it could have been that? I mean, what passed  
through your mind that made you think it might be (8 B)\_\_\_\_\_?

33- /1

B. What made you think it might not be that--I mean what did you happen  
to think of that made you doubt this explanation?

35-

10. (CONTINUED)

**\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," IN ANSWER TO 10 ABOVE, ASK D, E, AND F:**

D. Who or what gave you this idea?

36-

E. What thought occurred to you that made you think that it could have been \_\_\_\_\_ (8 B)?

37-

F. Did something run through your mind and make you wonder about this explanation?

38-

ASK ALL:

G. About how long--that is, about how many minutes--would you say you thought it meant \_\_\_\_\_ (8 B)?

- A few seconds . . . . . 39- 1
- A minute or so . . . . . 2
- Five to ten minutes . . . . . 3
- Thirty minutes or more . . . . . 4
- An hour or more . . . . . 5
- Don't know, don't remember,  
can't say . . . . . 6

40-  
41-  
42-

**11. FOR THIRD EXPLANATION IN Q. 8 . . . . . (OTHER THAN REAL ALERT):**

You told me that you thought the sirens could have meant \_\_\_\_\_  
(REPEAT 8 C). Did this occur to you on your own or did someone or something suggest it to you?

- On own . . . . . 43- 1\*
- Suggested . . . . . 2\*\*
- Don't know, don't recall . . . . . 3\*

**\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," SKIP TO D:**

**\* IF "ON OWN" OR "DON'T KNOW, DON'T RECALL," ASK A AND B:**

A. What made you think it could have been that? I mean, what passed through your mind that made you think it might be (8 G) \_\_\_\_\_?

44-

11. (CONTINUED)

\* IF "ON OWN," ASK A AND B: Continued

B. What made you think it might not be that--I mean what in your mind made you doubt this explanation?

46-

\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," IN ANSWER TO 11 ABOVE, ASK D, E, AND F:

D. Who or what gave you this idea?

47-

E. What thought occurred to you that made you think that it could have been \_\_\_\_\_ (8 C)?

48-

F. Did something run through your mind and make you wonder about this explanation?

49-

12. FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT MENTION AIR-RAID WARNING AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION:

Did you--even for a second--think it might be a real air-raid warning?

Yes . . . . . 54- 1\*  
No . . . . . 2\*\*

\* IF "YES," ASK QUESTION 13:

\*\* IF "NO," ASK A AND SKIP TO Q. 16:

A. Why not? (At the time, why didn't you consider the possibility?)

55-

13. IF EVER MENTIONED AIR-RAID ALERT (IN Q's. 7, 8 OR 12) ASK:

You told me you thought the siren could have meant a real air-raid alert. Did this occur to you on your own or did someone or something suggest it to you?

On own . . . . . 56- 1\*  
Suggested . . . . . 2\*\*

\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," SKIP TO D:

\* IF "ON OWN," ASK A AND B:

A. What made you think it could have been that? I mean, what passed through your mind that made you think it might be a real air-raid warning?

57-

B. You told me that you thought (at least for a moment) that the siren meant a real air-raid warning. Would you say that you were certain of this, almost certain, fairly certain, not too certain, or very doubtful that this could be the explanation?

Certain . . . . . 58- 1  
Almost certain . . . . . 2+  
Fairly certain . . . . . 3+  
Not too certain . . . . . 4+  
Very doubtful . . . . . 5+

+ UNLESS "CERTAIN," ASK C:

C. What made you think it might not be that--I mean what in your mind made you doubt this explanation?

59-

\*\* IF "SUGGESTED," IN ANSWER TO A ABOVE, ASK D, E, AND F:

D. Who or what gave you this idea?

60-

E. What thought occurred to you that made you think it could have been a real air-raid warning?

61-

E. Did something run through your mind and make you wonder about this explanation?

62-



13. (CONTINUED)

ASK ALL:

G. About how long--that is, about how many minutes--would you say you thought it meant a real air-raid warning?

- A few seconds . . . . . 63- 1
- A minute or so . . . . . 2
- Five to ten minutes . . . . . 3
- Thirty minutes or more . . . . . 4
- An hour or more . . . . . 5
- Don't know, don't remember,  
can't say . . . . . 6

H. While you still thought it might be a real air-raid warning, did you want to do anything, I mean besides trying to find out for sure what the sirens meant?

- Thoughts of taking some form of action . . . 64- 1#
- No thoughts about taking action . . . . . 2##

# (1) IF "THOUGHTS OF TAKING SOME FORM OF ACTION": What was that?

65-

IF DOES NOT MENTION PROTECTION, ASK (2):

## IF "NO," ASK (2):

(2) Did you ever think of anything you might do to protect yourself (and/or the people you were with)?

- Yes . . . . . 66- 4+
- No . . . . . 5++

+ (a) IF "YES": What did you think of?

67-

++ (b) IF "NO": Why do you think it never occurred to you to try to protect yourself (and the people you were with)?

68-

14. Did you think a real attack was possible that night?

Yes . . . . .	13-	1*
Yes, but didn't take it too seriously . .		2*
No . . . . .		3
Don't know, can't decide . . . . .		4*

---

15. Now I'd like to talk to you about what you really did during the time you thought it might be a real air-raid alert. I mean the things that you did beside trying to find out for sure what the sirens meant. What did you do at this time? (PROBE) At this time did you call anyone to see if he or she was safe?

15. (CONTINUED)

A. Whose idea was it (to \_\_\_\_\_), yours or someone else's?

- Own idea . . . . . 17- 1
- Someone else's . . . . . 2
- Don't know . . . . . 3

IF NO MENTION OF ACTION THAT WOULD FURNISH PROTECTION: Why do you suppose you didn't do anything to protect yourself (and the people with you) from danger?

18-  
19-

---

16. IF WITH OTHERS WHEN THE SIREN SOUNDED: Generally, what did the people (person) you were with think the siren meant? (What kinds of things did they think it was before they found out for sure?)

20-

A. On the whole, did you think (his) (her) (these) ideas were right or wrong?

- Right . . . . . 21- 5\*
- Wrong . . . . . 6\*
- Don't know . . . . . 7

\* (1) UNLESS "DON'T KNOW": Why did you think that?

22-

16. (CONTINUED)

B. Which of these would you say best describes the person (people) you were with? (CIRCLE ONLY ONE) Would you say he was (they were)--

- Excited and nervous . . . . . 23- 1
- Confused and uncertain . . . . . 2
- Calm and collected . . . . . 3
- Amused at what was happening. . . . . 4
- Angry . . . . . 5

Or would you say he (they) just didn't seem to care what the siren meant . . . . . 6

C. What did he (they) do?

24-

IF ANY FORM OF VERIFICATION WAS SOUGHT: (What did he see?) (Did he get the person on the phone?) (What was he told?), etc.

25-

D. Whose idea was it that he (they) should (do this)?

26-

E. Did you think that this was the right thing to do? Why?

27-

IF SOUGHT VERIFICATION, ASK F AND G:

F. What did he (she) (they) think then?

28-

G. Did you think this or something else?

29-

16. (CONTINUED)

H. What did they do then?

30-

I. Did you think this was the right thing to do?

Yes . . . . .	31- 1
No . . . . .	2
Don't know . . . . .	3

J. Why did you think this?

32-

17. When the sirens went off, did anyone ask you what you thought the sirens meant?

Yes . . . . .	33- 1*
No . . . . .	2
Don't know . . . . .	3

\* A. IF "YES": Who was it?

34-

B. Was he with you in the same (car) (apartment) or ((house) or did he come to see you or call you on the phone?

In same car, apartment, or dwelling unit . . . . .	35- 1#
From outside vehicle, apartment, etc. . . . .	2##

# (1) IF SAME: Did anyone outside call you (or knock on your door) to ask you what the sirens meant?

Yes . . . . .	36- 1+
No . . . . .	2
Don't know . . . . .	3

+ (a) IF "YES": Who was it?

37-

17. (CONTINUED)

## (2) IF FROM OUTSIDE, IN ANSWER TO B: Did anyone with you ask you what the sirens meant?

Yes . . . . .	38- 1++
No . . . . .	2
Don't know . . . . .	3

++ (a) Who was this person?

39-

C. What did you tell (first PERSON MENTIONED)?

40-

D. What did (he) (she) say and do then?

41-

E. What did you tell (second PERSON MENTIONED)

42-

F. What did (second PERSON MENTIONED) say and do then?

43-

---

18. Now I would like to ask you what, if anything, you did to find out for sure what the sirens meant. What kinds of things did you do to check on whether you were right about what the sirens meant?

44-

19. Now I have to make sure that I wrote down everything you might have done at this time. (READ AND CHECK ALL APPLICABLE)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>DK</u>	<u>ORDER (CIRCLE ONE FOR EACH APPLICABLE)</u>								
a. Did you ask someone who was with you what he or she thought the siren meant? . . . 45-	y	X	0	53-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
b. Did you look (outside) to see if you could hear or see anything? . . . . . 46-	2	3	4	54-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
c. Did you go (outside) to look around or maybe to <u>/READ D/</u> 47-	6	7	8	55-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
d. Ask someone what was going on? . . . . . 48-	y	X	0	56-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
e. Did you try to call someone you know on the phone to ask about the siren? . . . . 49-	2	3	4	57-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
f. How about the police or the phone company--did you try to call any public agency like that to find out? . . . 50-	6	7	8	58-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
g. Did you do anything like turning on the radio or TV or looking in the newspaper for information? . . . . . 51-	y	X	0	59-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
h. Anything else? LIST _____ 52-	2	3	4	60-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

20. IF MORE THAN ONE ACTION WAS CHECKED IN Q. 19:

Now, if I'm not mistaken, first you..... (APPROPRIATE ACTION ABOVE). Is that right?

A. Then you .... (APPROPRIATE ACTION ABOVE). Is that right?

B. Then you .... (APPROPRIATE ACTION ABOVE), etc.

REPEAT UNTIL ALL ACTIONS TAKEN ARE ORDERED.

C. INDICATE ORDER OF ACTION BY CIRCLING NUMBERS IN Q. 19.

21. IF MORE THAN ONE ACTION IN Q. 19, READ ALL APPLICABLE:

Please tell me which one thing influenced you most in deciding what the sirens meant. Would you say that it was...

- a. Something said by a person you know, like a relative or friend, that influenced you most? . . . . . 61- 1
- b. Something you saw or heard when you looked outside? . . . . . 2
- c. Something a stranger said? . . . . . 3
- d. Something an official like a telephone operator or policeman said? 4
- e. Something you heard on the radio or TV? . . . . . 5
- f. Something you read in the newspaper? . . . . . 6

INTERVIEWER: PAGES 21 - 37 (QUESTIONS 22-51) FOLLOW UP THE ANSWERS TO QUESTION 19. THEREFORE:

<u>IF RESPONDENT</u> <u>ANSWERED "YES" TO:</u>	<u>ASK QUESTIONS</u> <u>ON PAGES:</u>
19 a. . . . .	21-24
19 b. . . . .	25
19 c. . . . .	26
19 d. . . . .	27-29
19 e. . . . .	30-32
19 f. . . . .	33-35
19 g. . . . .	36-37

ASK QUESTIONS ON PAGES 21-37 IN ORDER INDICATED IN Q.20



ASK THESE QUESTIONS OF RESPONDENTS WHO ASKED PEOPLE WHO WERE WITH THEM WHAT THE SIRENS MEANT: FOR THOSE WHO CHECKED Q. 19 a.

22. Now I would like to go back and talk to you about the people whom you asked about the sirens--I mean the people who were with you when you first heard the sirens. Exactly who was it you asked?

- a. Husband - wife . . . . . 14- 1
- b. Relative (other) . . . . . 2
- c. Neighbor . . . . . 3
- d. Friend . . . . . 4
- e. Stranger . . . . . 5
- f. Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_ 6

ASK THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS FOR FIRST PERSON THE RESPONDENT ASKED FOR ADVICE:

23. A. Why did you ask \_\_\_\_\_ for information on what the siren meant?

15-

B. What did \_\_\_\_\_ tell you about the sirens?

16-

C. Did you accept his explanation as the right one?

- Yes . . . . . 17- 1\*
- No . . . . . 2\*

\* (1) IF EITHER "YES" OR "NO": Why did (didn't) you accept this explanation of what the sirens meant?

18-

23. (CONTINUED)

D. When something is bothering you do you ever talk things over with \_\_\_\_\_?

Yes . . . . . 19- 8#  
No . . . . . 9

# (1) IF "YES": Would you say that's very often, not too often, or does it happen rarely?

Very often . . . . . 20- 1  
Not too often . . . . . 2  
Rarely . . . . . 3

# (2) IF "YES": When you do talk things over with him, what things do you generally talk about? (Can you give me an example of something you talked about recently?)

21-

E. Do other people ask \_\_\_\_\_ for advice?

Yes . . . . . 22- 1  
No . . . . . 2  
Don't know . . . . . 3

F. About how old is \_\_\_\_\_?

Age \_\_\_\_\_ 23-24-

G. Where does he (she) work--I mean what company or kind of business is he in?

25-

H. What does he do there?

26-

ASK THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS FOR SECOND PERSON THE RESPONDENT ASKED FOR ADVICE:

24. A. Why did you ask \_\_\_\_\_ for information on what the siren meant?

28-

B. What did \_\_\_\_\_ tell you about the sirens?

29-

C. Did you accept his explanation as the right one?

Yes . . . . . 30- 1\*

No . . . . . 2\*

\* (1) IF EITHER "YES" OR "NO": Why did (didn't) you accept this explanation of what the sirens meant?

31-

D. When something is bothering you do you ever talk things over with \_\_\_\_\_?

Yes . . . . . 32- 8#

No . . . . . 9

# (1) IF "YES": Would you say that's very often, not too often, or does it happen rarely?

Very often . . . 33- 1

Not too often . 2

Rarely . . . . . 3

# (2) IF "YES": When you do talk things over with him, what things do you generally talk about? (Can you give me an example of something you talked about recently?)

34-

24. (CONTINUED)

- E. Do other people ask \_\_\_\_\_ for advice?
- |                      |     |   |
|----------------------|-----|---|
| Yes . . . . .        | 35- | 1 |
| No . . . . .         |     | 2 |
| Don't know . . . . . |     | 3 |
- F. About how old is \_\_\_\_\_? Age \_\_\_\_\_ 36-
- G. Where does he (she) work--I mean what company or kind of business is he in?
- 37-
- H. What does he do there?
- 38-

---

39- 40- 41- 42- 43- .-

FOR THOSE WHO LOOKED (OUTSIDE) OR TRIED TO HEAR SOMETHING THAT INDICATED SIREN'S MEANING: (ASK IF Q. 19 b IS CHECKED)

25. You told me earlier that you looked (outside) to get an idea about the sirens. Were you listening or looking (outside) for anything in particular?

Yes . . . . . 44- 1\*  
No . . . . . 2

\* A. IF "YES": What were you looking (listening) for?

45-

---

26. What did you see? (What else?)

46-

---

27. What did you think when you saw \_\_\_\_\_ (FIRST THING MENTIONED IN Q. 26 ABOVE, I.E., CHILDREN PLAYING, CAR SPEEDING)?

47-

---

28. What did you think when you saw \_\_\_\_\_ (SECOND THING MENTIONED)?

48-

ASK THOSE WHO WENT( OUTSIDE )TO LOOK AROUND: (ASK IF 19 c IS CHECKED)

Begin Card V 1-13-

29. You mentioned before that when you heard the sirens you went( outside )  
to look around. Were you looking for anything in particular when you  
went (outside) (there)?

Yes . . . . . 14- 1\*

No . . . . . 2

\* IF "YES": What was it you were looking for?  
(Probe)

15-

---

30. What did you see? (Probe)

16-

---

31. What did you think when you saw \_\_\_\_\_ (first THING MENTIONED)?  
(Probe)

17-

---

32. What did you think when you saw \_\_\_\_\_ (second THING  
MENTIONED)? (Probe)

18-

---

33. What did you do then?

19-

ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF THOSE WHO WENT (OUTSIDE) TO ASK SOME PERSON (IF 19 d IS CHECKED):

34. You told me that you went (outside) to ask someone what the sirens meant. Where did you go?

24-

IF NOT ALREADY CLEAR, ASK B:

B. Did you have anyone specific in mind when you went (outside) to ask someone?

Yes . . . . . 25- 1\*

No . . . . . 2\*\*

\*\* IF "NO," ASK G:

\* IF "YES," ASK C - F:

C. Who did you have in mind?

26-

D. Why do you suppose you wanted to ask \_\_\_\_\_ what the sirens meant?

27-

E. About how old is \_\_\_\_\_?

28-29-

F. Did you talk to \_\_\_\_\_?

Yes . . . . . 30- 1#

No . . . . . 2##

# IF "YES," /TALKED TO (HIM) / SKIP TO Q. 36:

## (1) IF "NO," /DID NOT TALK TO HIM/: Did you talk to someone else?

Yes . . . . . 31- 1+

No . . . . . 2++

+ IF "YES," SKIP TO Q. 35:

++ (a) IF "NO": What did you do then?

32-

\*\* G. IF "NO" TO B: Did you ask anyone about it?

Yes . . . . . 33- 4+

No . . . . . 5++

+ IF "YES," SKIP TO Q. 35:

++ (1) IF "NO": What did you do then?

34-

35. ASK A AND B IF RESPONDENTS ASKED INDIVIDUALS THEY DID NOT HAVE SPECIFICALLY IN MIND:

A. Who did you ask?

35-

B. How old is (he) (she)?

36-

---

36. IF RESPONDENT ASKED ANYONE, ASK:

A. What did \_\_\_\_\_ say the sirens meant?

37-

IF DIDN'T KNOW: What did you do then?

38-

B. IF PERSON GAVE RESPONDENT AN EXPLANATION: Did you accept this explanation?

Yes . . . . . 39- 1\*

No . . . . . 2\*

\* (1) ASK ALL: Why did (didn't) you accept this explanation?

40-

---

IF RESPONDENT ASKED MORE THAN ONE PERSON WHAT THE SIRENS MEANT, ASK Q. 37.

---



37. ASK OF SECOND PERSON RESPONDENT ASKED ABOUT THE SIRENS:

A. About how old is (he) (she)?

41-42-

B. What did \_\_\_\_\_ say the sirens meant?

43-

IF DIDN'T KNOW: What did you do then?

44-

C. IF PERSON GAVE RESPONDENT AN EXPLANATION: Did you accept this explanation?

Yes . . . . . 45- 1\*

No . . . . . 2\*

\* (1) ASK ALL: Why did (didn't) you accept this explanation?

46-

---

47- 48- 49- 50- 51- 52- 53- 54- 55- 56-  
 57- 58- 59- 60- 61- 62- 63- 64- 65- 66- 67- 68-

ASK FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF THOSE FOR WHOM YOU CHECKED 19 e:

38. Earlier you said you tried to telephone someone you knew to find out what the sirens meant. Who was this person you tried to call?  
(Probe: Anyone else?)

Begin Card VI 1-13

- a. Husband - wife . . . . . 14- 1
- b. Relative (other) . . . . . 2
- c. Neighbor . . . . . 3
- d. Friend . . . . . 4
- e. Stranger . . . . . 5
- f. Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_ 6

A. Were you able to get \_\_\_\_\_ (first person mentioned)?

- Yes . . . . . 15- 1\*
- No . . . . . 2\*\*

\*\* IF "NO," SKIP TO 38 E AND F:

\* IF "YES," ASK B, C, AND D:

- B. What did (he) (she) think the sirens meant? 16-
- C. Did you accept this explanation? 17-
- D. What did you do then? 18-

\*\* IF "NO," ASK E AND F:

- E. Why weren't you able to get \_\_\_\_\_ on the phone? 19-
- F. What did you think then? 20-

---

39. Why do you suppose you (wanted to) ask \_\_\_\_\_ what the sirens meant?

40. About how old is \_\_\_\_\_ (first person called)?

22-23-

41. Where does (he) (she) work--I mean what company or kind of business is he (she) in?

24-

42. What does he do there?

25-

43. Were you able to get \_\_\_\_\_ (second person phoned)?

Yes . . . . . 26- 1\*

No . . . . . 2\*\*

\*\* IF "NO," SKIP TO 43 D and E:

\* IF "YES," ASK A, B, AND C:

A. What did (he) (she) think the sirens meant?

27-

B. Did you accept this explanation?

28-

C. What did you do then?

29-

\*\* IF "NO," ASK D AND E:

D. Why weren't you able to get \_\_\_\_\_ on the phone?

30-

E. What did you think then?

31-

44. Why do you suppose you (wanted to) ask \_\_\_\_\_ what the sirens meant?

32-

---

45. About how old is \_\_\_\_\_ (second person mentioned)?

33-34-

---

46. Where does (he) (she) work--I mean what company or kind of business is he (she) in?

35-

---

47. What does he do there?

36-

---

37- 38- 39- 40- 41- 42- 43- 44-

ASK THOSE WHO TRIED TO CALL PUBLIC AGENCIES THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: (ASK IF 19 f IS CHECKED)

48. You mentioned trying to get the \_\_\_\_\_ (and \_\_\_\_\_) on the phone. Did you call any other agency? (Probe: Is that all?...Or did you call another agency?)

- a. Telephone company . . . . . 45- 1
- b. Police . . . . . 2
- c. Fire . . . . . 3
- d. Civil Defense . . . . . 4
- e. Newspapers . . . . . 5
- f. Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_ 6
- g. List "Other" agencies called . . . . . 46-

A. Did you call any place like the newspapers?

- Yes . . . . . 47- 1
- No . . . . . 2

49. Were you able to get the \_\_\_\_\_ (first AGENCY LISTED)?

- Yes . . . . . 48- 8\*
- No . . . . . 9\*\*

\*\* IF "NO," ASK D - F:

\* IF "YES," ASK A, B, AND C:

A. What were you told?

49-

B. IF TOLD IT WAS NOT A RAID: Was there any question in your mind after that?

- Yes . . . . . 50- 1#
- No . . . . . 2

# (1) IF "YES": What did you do then?

51-

C. IF RESPONDENT WAS NOT TOLD IT WAS NOT AN AIR RAID, I.E., IF TOLD TO TAKE COVER OR THAT THE ADVISOR DID NOT KNOW, ETC.: What did you do then?

52-

Q. 49. (CONTINUED)

**\*\* IF "NO" TO Q. 49; ASK D - F:**

D. Why didn't you complete your call to \_\_\_\_\_?

53-

E. What did you think then?

54-

F. What did you do then?

55-

57-

50. Were you able to get \_\_\_\_\_ (second agency listed)?

Yes . . . . . 58- 1\*

No . . . . . 2\*\*

**\*\* IF "NO," ASK D - F:**

**\* IF "YES," ASK A, B, AND C:**

A. What were you told?

59-

B. IF TOLD IT WAS NOT A RAID:

Was there any question in your mind after that?

Yes . . . . . 60- 4#

No . . . . . 5

# (1) IF "YES": What did you do then?

61-

C. IF RESPONDENT WAS NOT TOLD IT WAS NOT AN AIR RAID, I.E., IF TOLD TO TAKE COVER OR THAT THE ADVISOR DID NOT KNOW, ETC.:

What did you do then? (Probe)

62-

50. (CONTINUED)

\*\* IF "NO," ASK D - F:

D. Why do you think you couldn't complete your call to \_\_\_\_\_

63-

E. What did you think then? (Probe)

64-

F. What did you do then? (Probe)

65-

---

66- 67- 68-

FOR THOSE WHO TURNED ON THE RADIO, TV, OR LOOKED AT A NEWSPAPER, ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF 19 g IS CHECKED:

Begin Card VII 1-13-

51. Before, you said that you tried to check on what the sirens meant. Did you turn on the radio, or TV, or look at the newspapers to find what they meant?

Radio . . . . .	14- 1*
TV . . . . .	2**
Newspapers . . . . .	3***

\* IF "RADIO," ASK A - D:

A. Did you try one particular station or just spin the dial to try to pick up information on any station?

Particular station . . . . .	15- 5#
No . . . . .	6

# IF "PARTICULAR STATION," ASK (1) AND (2):

(1) What station did you try to get?

16-

(2) Did you get it?

Yes . . . . .	17- 8
No . . . . .	9

B. What did you hear?

18-

C. What did you think then?

19-

D. What did you do then?

20-



51. (CONTINUED)

\*\* IF "TELEVISION," ASK E - H:

E. Why do you think you chose TV and not the radio?

21-

F. Did you try one particular station or just spin the dial to try to pick up information on any station?

Particular station . . . . . 22- 4+

No . . . . . 5

+ IF "PARTICULAR STATION," ASK (1) AND (2):

(1) What station did you try to get?

23-

(2) Did you get it?

Yes . . . . . 24- 7

No . . . . . 8

G. What did you see?

25-

H. What did you think then?

26-

\*\*\* IF "NEWSPAPERS," ASK I & J:

I. When you looked in the newspapers what did you have in mind?

27-

J. Did you find anything in the newspapers that gave you an idea of what the sirens could have meant?

Yes . . . . . 28- 6+

No . . . . . 7++

+ IF "YES," ASK (1) - (2):

(1) What was that?

29-

(2) What did you think then?

++ IF "NO": What did you think then?

30-

31-

Begin Card VIII 1-10-

52. We've been talking about the air-raid siren, but now I'd like to talk about current happenings, and some of your own interests.

A. Do you think that the international situation is better or worse than it was five years ago -- about a year after the Korean War was over?

Better . . . . .	11- 1 *
Worse . . . . .	2 *
Same . . . . .	3 *
DK . . . . .	4

\* B. UNLESS "DON'T KNOW": Why do you think so?

12-13-

53. How likely do you think it is that we are in for another world war? Would you say it is certain, almost certain, very likely, not at all likely, or highly improbable?

Certain . . . . .	14- 0 *
Almost certain . . . . .	1 *
Very likely . . . . .	2 *
Not at all likely . . . . .	3 *
Highly improbable . . . . .	4 *
Don't know . . . . .	5

\* A. UNLESS "DON'T KNOW": Will you tell me why you think that?

15-

54. Compared with other people you know, how up-to-date would you say you are concerning international affairs? Do you feel very up-to-date, not too up-to-date, or not up-to-date at all?

Very up-to-date . . . . .	16- 6
Not too up-to-date . . . . .	7
Not up-to-date at all . . . . .	8

---

55. Which of these sources of information give you the most help in keeping up with foreign affairs? Is it the radio or television, newspapers, or magazines, or is it your friends, neighbors and relatives? (CIRCLE ONLY ONE IN COLUMN B BELOW)

	<u>Most important medium</u>
(a) By listening to the radio . . . . .	18- 5
(b) By looking at television . . . . .	6
(c) By reading newspapers . . . . .	7
(d) By reading magazines . . . . .	8
(e) By talking to friends, neighbors or relatives . . . . .	9

---

56. How truthful a picture do you think (MEDIUM IN Q. 55 B) gives of what is happening in foreign affairs? Would you say it's a truthful picture, a not too truthful one, or a pretty false picture?

Truthful . . . . .	19- 1
Not too truthful . . . . .	2
Pretty false picture . . . . .	3

57. Do you read any newspapers regularly?

Yes . . . . . 20- y\*  
No . . . . . X

\* A. IF "YES": What paper(s) do you read?

Sun Times . . . . . 21- 1  
Tribune . . . . . 2  
Daily News . . . . . 3  
Herald American . . . . . 4  
Defender . . . . . 5  
New York Times . . . . . 6  
Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_

---

58. A. What part of the paper do you turn to first?

22-

B. What part do you read after that?

23-

---

59. Which magazines, if any, do you read regularly?

LIFE . . . . . 24- X  
LOOK . . . . . y  
TIME . . . . . 0  
NEWSWEEK . . . . . 1  
POST . . . . . 2  
EBONY . . . . . 3  
Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_

25-26-27-28-29-

60. On the average week day, how many hours do you watch television both in the daytime and at night? Do you watch--

- Less than one hour . . . . . 30- 4
- One hour . . . . . 5
- Two hours . . . . . 6
- Three hours . . . . . 7
- Four hours . . . . . 8
- Five hours or more . . . . . 9

31-

62. Are you a baseball fan?

- Yes . . . . . 32- y\*
- No . . . . . X\*\*

\*\* IF "NO," SKIP TO Q. 63:

\* IF "YES," ASK A \_\_\_\_.

A. What is your favorite team?

34-

63. ASK ALL:

A. Did you think it was a good idea to ring the sirens when the White Sox won, or not such a good idea?

Good idea . . . . . 41- 1\*

Not a good idea . . . . . 2\*\*

\* B. IF "GOOD IDEA": Why do you feel that way?

42-43-

\*\* C. IF "NOT A GOOD IDEA": ASK (1) and (2) and (3):

(1) Why do you feel that way?

44-

(2) If there had been enough time to warn everybody by announcing it in the papers and on radio and TV, do you think it would have been a good idea to ring the sirens? (Why?) (Why not?)

(3) Why do you think it would be wrong to ring the sirens on other occasions (besides an alert)?

45-

(4) How strongly do you feel about this?

46-

64. As you understand it, whose job is it to decide to ring the siren in case of a real attack?

IF DON'T KNOW, SKIP TO Q's. 67 and 68.

47-

---

65. When did you learn this? (See Q. 64). Did you find out about this after the sirens were sounded or did you know it all along?

Before sirens went off . . . 48- 1  
After sirens were sounded. . . 2

---

66. Do you think this person (group) is the best one for the job?

Yes . . . . . 49- 1  
No . . . . . 2\*  
Don't know . . . . . 3

\* (1) IF "NO": Who would do a better job?

50-

67. What do you think you would do if you got the signal that there was going to be an enemy attack?

51-

---

68. Did you ever think about this before just now?

Yes . . . . . 52- 5  
No . . . . . 6\*

\* A. IF "NO": Why do you think you never thought about it before?

53-

---

69. If you heard the warning signals, how much time do you think you would have before a missile attack started?

54-

---

70. If you heard the warning and wanted to get some more information about what was going on and what to do, where would you try to get it?

55-56-



CODE ALL PARTS OF Q. 71, ASKING ONLY WHATEVER IS NOT OBVIOUS:

71. Do you know if there is a Civil Defense radio station broadcasting in Chicago?

Yes . . . . . 57- 1\*  
No . . . . . 2

\* IF "YES," ASK

[Empty box for handwritten responses]

Do you happen to know what numbers they are on the radio dial?  
A (WRITE IN COMMENTS!!)

Yes . . . . . 59- 1  
No . . . . . 2

• By any chance, do you know the official name of the Civil Defense station?

Conelrad . . . . . 60- 1\*\*  
Don't know . . . . . 2  
Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_

(1) IF MENTIONS CONELRAD: When did you first find out about Conelrad? Was it before the sirens were sounded last month or after?

Before . . . . . 61- 8  
After . . . . . 9

62- 63- 64- 65- 66- 67- 68-

Begin Card IX 1-12-

73. Have you ever had or are you getting any Civil Defense training or experience on your job, or in the armed forces or in some other place?

Yes . . . . . 15- 4\*

No . . . . . 5

\*IF YES ASK A AND B

A. Where did you get (are you getting) this training (experience)?

---

16-

B. How many hours a week would you say you spend (spent) on Civil Defense training?

17-

77. Some people have said that in the event of an atomic attack Civil Defense would be useless in aiding civilians to survive. Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement? (How strongly do you feel about it?)

Strongly agree . . . . .	26- 4
Agree . . . . .	5
Disagree . . . . .	6
Strongly disagree . . . . .	7
Undecided . . . . .	8

---

78. If a World War were to break out, do you think that atomic bombs would be dropped on Chicago or not?

Would be . . . . .	27- 1
Would not be . . . . .	2
Don't know . . . . .	3

---

79. Supposing there were an atomic attack on Chicago. What do you think would happen to you and your family? (What else would happen?)

28-29-

---

80. If you were asked, would you be willing to give two or three hours of your time a week to train yourself as a Civil Defense worker?

Yes . . . . .	30- 1
No . . . . .	2
Don't know . . . . .	3

81. As you (probably) know, we've had important Russian visitors in the United States recently and President Eisenhower is going to visit Russia next spring. Thinking back, can you remember some of the names of the Russians who have visited our country?

Yes . . . . . 32- 1  
No . . . . . 2\*

(LIST)

\* IF KHRUSHCHEV NOT MENTIONED, ASK A:

A. Did you hear or read anything about the recent visit of Premier . . . . . in the United States?

Yes . . . . . 33- 4  
No . . . . . 5\*

\* IF "NO," SKIP TO Q. 83

34- 35- 36-

82. A. Now that Khrushchev has been to the United States, and you got to see more of him, I'd like to know your own impressions of what type of person he is. Here is a card with words on it. Would you tell me which words best describe what you think Khrushchev is like?

B. Thinking back, I wonder if you could remember how you felt about Khrushchev before he came to the United States. Which of the words on the card would best describe your impression of him about six months before he came here.

	(A) <u>After</u>	(B) <u>Before</u>
Intelligent . . . . .	37- 0	38- 0
Cruel . . . . .	1	1
Cooperative . . . . .	2	2
Shrewd . . . . .	3	3
Flies off the handle . . . . .	4	4
Wants more power . . . . .	5	5
Sociable . . . . .	6	6
Untrustworthy . . . . .	7	7
Sincere . . . . .	8	8
"Butcher" . . . . .	9	9
Don't know . . . . .	X	X

83. ASK A - L:

Here are some statements that you may agree or disagree with. Tell me how strongly you personally feel about each one.

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>	<u>Can't decide</u>
A. Planning only makes a person unhappy since your plans hardly ever work out anyway . . .	39- 4	5	6	7	8
B. Obedience and respect for the American government are the most important virtues a citizen can have . . . . .	40- y	X	0	1	2
C. It is somehow unnatural to place women in positions of authority over men . . . . .	41- 4	5	6	7	8
D. The government often holds back information the people should know about . . . . .	42- y	X	0	1	2
E. When a man is born, the success he's going to have is already in the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it . . . . .	43- 4	5	6	7	8
F. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders, in whom the people can put their faith . . . . .	44- y	X	0	1	2
G. The world is a hazardous place in which men are basically evil and dangerous . . .	45- 4	5	6	7	8
H. A child should never be allowed to talk back to his parents, or else he will lose respect for them . . . . .	46- y	X	0	1	2
I.. Nowadays, with world conditions the way they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself. . .	47- 4	5	6	7	8

83. (CONTINUED)

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>	<u>Can't decide</u>
K. Some people believe that there are many important things that can never be understood by the human mind. Do you: . . . . .	49- 4	5	6	7	8
L. It is probable that someone will press the wrong button and set off World War III by mistake . . . . .	50- y	X	0	1	2

51-52-53-

84. Here's another kind of question--

A. If you had to choose, which would you rather have--obedient children or educated children?

Obedient children . . . . .	54- y
Educated . . . . .	X
Can't decide . . . . .	0

B. Which would you rather have, success on the job or a friendly atmosphere at work?

Success on job . . . . .	55- 1
Friendly atmosphere . . . . .	2
Can't decide . . . . .	3

Demographic Information

Begin Card X 1-10-

85. What do you usually do--work full-time, work part-time, keep house, go to school, or something else?

- Work full-time . . . . . 11- 1\*
- Work part-time . . . . . 2\*
- Keep house . . . . . 3
- Go to school . . . . . 4
- Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_ 5

\* A. IF "USUALLY WORKS" OR "USED TO WORK": What sort of work do you do (did you do when you worked)?

- OCCUPATION: \_\_\_\_\_ 12-
- INDUSTRY: \_\_\_\_\_ 13-
- \_\_\_\_\_ 14-

86. Who is the main earner in this family?

- Respondent . . . . . 15- 1
- Spouse . . . . . 2\*
- Parent . . . . . 3\*
- Other . . . . . 4\*

\* IF RESPONDENT IS NOT THE MAIN EARNER, ASK A AND B:

A. What sort of work does (main earner) do [did (main earner) do when (he, she) worked/?

- OCCUPATION: \_\_\_\_\_ 16-
- INDUSTRY: \_\_\_\_\_ 17-
- \_\_\_\_\_ 18-

87. Has anyone else in the family here earned any income during the last twelve months?

- Yes . . . . . 19- 1
- No . . . . . 2

88. Well, adding together the whole family income, as well as any other money the family here may have received from pensions, unemployment compensation or other sources--in which one of these general groups did the total income of your family fall during the last twelve months--before taxes, that is? (HAND RESPONDENT GREEN INCOME CARD)

- A. Under \$500 . . . . . 20- 1
- B. \$500 to \$999 . . . . . 2
- C. \$1,000 to \$1,999 . . . . . 3
- D. \$2,000 to \$2,999 . . . . . 4
- E. \$3,000 to \$3,999 . . . . . 5
- F. \$4,000 to \$4,999 . . . . . 6
- G. \$5,000 to \$7,499 . . . . . 7
- H. \$7,500 to \$9,999 . . . . . 8
- I. \$10,000 or over . . . . . 9
- J. Don't know . . . . . 0

89. A. What was the highest grade of school you completed?

B. IF MARRIED: What was the highest grade of school your (spouse) completed?

	A	B
	<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Spouse</u>
Completed 0-4 years . . . . .	21- 1	22- 1
Completed 5-6 years . . . . .	2	2
Completed 7-8 years . . . . .	3	3
Completed 9-11 years . . . . .	4	4
Completed 12 years . . . . .	5	5
Completed 1-3 years college . . . . .	6	6
Completed 4 or more years college . . . . .	7	7

90. A. Were your grandparents born in the U.S. or some other country?

In.U.S. . . . .	23- 1
Other . . . . .	2
In U.S. . . . .	3
Other . . . . .	4
In U.S. . . . .	5
Other . . . . .	6
In U.S. . . . .	7
Other . . . . .	8
Don't know . . . . .	9

B. In what country was your father born?

24-

C. In what country was your mother born?

25-

D. IF EITHER PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.: And in what country were you born?

26-

91. What kind of work did your father do when you were a child?

OCCUPATION: \_\_\_\_\_

27-

INDUSTRY: \_\_\_\_\_

28-

29-

92. Where did you grow up--I mean where did you live most of the time, during the ages of about 10 to 19--did you live in Chicago or some place else?

Chicago . . . . . 30- 1

Other (SPECIFY) \_\_\_\_\_ \*

City

31-32-

State

\* 1.

\* A. IF OTHER THAN CHICAGO: How old were you when you came to Chicago?

33-34-



93. Do you own or do you rent this home?

Own . . . . .	35- 1*
Rent . . . . .	2**

\* A. IF "OWN": About how much would you say this home is worth?

\$ \_\_\_\_\_ 36-

\*\* B. IF "RENT": How much rent do you pay per month?

\$ \_\_\_\_\_ 37-

94. A. What is your religious preference?

Protestant . . . . .	38- 0*
Catholic . . . . .	5
Jewish . . . . .	6
Other (SPECIFY) _____	7
None . . . . .	9

\* (1) IF "PROTESTANT": What denomination?

39-

B. How often do you attend Church (Synagogue) services? Do you attend--

Once a week or more . . . . .	40- y#
1-3 times a month . . . . .	X#
Less than once a month . . . . .	0#
Never . . . . .	1

# IF "CATHOLIC" AND IF EVER ATTENDS CHURCH: May I ask how often you receive communion--do you receive--

More than once a month . . . . .	41- 2
About once a month . . . . .	3
A few times a year . . . . .	4
Very rarely . . . . .	5

C. Quite apart from Church (Synagogue) going, how important would you say religion is to you--very important, fairly important, or not important at all?

Very important . . . . .	42- 6
Fairly important . . . . .	7
Not important at all . . . . .	8
Don't know . . . . .	9

95. In politics today, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent?

Democrat . . . . .	43- 1
Republican . . . . .	2
Independent . . . . .	3
Other . . . . .	4
Don't know . . . . .	5

---

96. Did you vote in the last Presidential election? That was in 1956.

Yes . . . . .	44- 1
No . . . . .	2

---

97. Would you tell me your age?

45-46-

---

98. Are you married, single, divorced, widowed or separated?

married . . . . .	47- 1
single . . . . .	2
divorced . . . . .	3
widowed . . . . .	4
separated . . . . .	5

---

99. How many children do you have? (Total number of children; not only those living at home.)

none . . . . .	48- 0
one . . . . .	1
two . . . . .	2
three . . . . .	3
four . . . . .	4
five . . . . .	5
six . . . . .	6
seven . . . . .	7
more than seven .	8

---

100. Just to sum it all up, what did you learn from this experience of the air-raid siren going off, that might be useful to people who have to plan for future emergencies?

INTERVIEWER REMARKS

(TO BE FILLED OUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER YOU HAVE LEFT THE RESPONDENT'S HOME)

1. If you were unable to secure family's total income for the year, enter here your best estimate of their income. Make an estimate in all such cases!

\$ \_\_\_\_\_ 48-

2. A. How would you class the level of living of this family as compared to the average level in Chicago?

Very high . . . . .	49- 1
High . . . . .	2
Average . . . . .	3
Low . . . . .	4
Very low . . . . .	5

- B. Discuss your choice in terms of the quality of furnishings and decorations in the home, the way family members were dressed, any evidence of luxuries or lack of luxuries, etc. (TRY TO IGNORE DIFFERENCES IN PERSONAL TASTE.)

50-

3. Race of Respondent:
 

White . . . . .	51- 6
Negro . . . . .	7
Other (SPECIFY) _____	

4. Sex of Respondent:
 

Male . . . . .	52- 1
Female . . . . .	2

5. A. Is there any evidence that the respondent was not completely candid about his attitudes or behavior?
 

Yes . . . . .	53- 1*
No . . . . .	2

\* B. IF "YES": In which questions is this particularly true?

54-

6. Would you say the respondent had a vivid recollection of the events which took place the night the sirens were sounded?

Very vivid recollection . . . 55- 1  
Not too vivid a recollection . 2  
Very poor recollection . . . . 3

---

7. To what extent did the respondent seem emotionally involved in the incident? Did he indicate intense emotional involvement, medium involvement or almost no involvement at all?

Intense emotional involvement. 56- 5  
Medium emotional involvement . 6  
Almost no emotional involvement 7

---

8. INTERVIEWER: PLEASE INDICATE ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH YOU FEEL WOULD BE HELPFUL IN EVALUATING THIS INTERVIEW AND RESPONDENT:

---

9. TIME INTERVIEW ENDED: \_\_\_\_\_

---

10. DATE OF INTERVIEW: \_\_\_\_\_

---

11. INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX B. SAMPLING DESIGN AND COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS  
OF SAMPLE WITH KNOWN STATISTICS

The sample was selected on the basis of 250 dwelling units. Of this number, 241 were actually obtained. A general outline of this procedure is as follows: Twenty-five census tracts were systematically selected with probability proportionate to the number of households in 1950 from a list of all tracts in the city of Chicago, ordered according to their median income (1950 Census). This method was designed to insure a representative distribution of neighborhoods and to make possible the conduct of approximately equal numbers of interviews in each of the sample areas.

Within each census tract two blocks were selected with probability proportionate to the 1950 Census dwelling unit count. In order to insure an adequate spread of blocks within census tracts, the blocks were ordered in terms of location and sampled systematically.

The "expected take" for each block was set at five dwelling units, thus giving a total of ten dwelling units per tract and 250 for the intended sample size. The "expected" number of dwelling units for each block was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Block Statistics for the City of Chicago, 1950. The sampling interval for each block was set as the total number of occupied dwelling units in that block in 1950 divided by five. A random number (obtained from The Table of Random Numbers) was chosen which was always smaller than the sampling interval. This selected random number was used to designate the first dwelling unit for interview in the block. Systematically every  $n$ th succeeding dwelling unit was selected for interview; i.e., every counted dwelling unit corresponding to the random number plus the quotient obtained by dividing 5 into the total number of occupied dwelling units within the block.

At all stages of the selection process--from census tract, to block, to

dwelling unit, to respondent--individual choice was minimized in order to obtain as nearly an unbiased sample as feasible, given the budgetary limitations under which the study was conducted.

Explicit instructions were given the interviewer for the selection of the dwelling unit within the sample block. Each interviewer was given a set of instructions and a "Sample Block Diagram" guiding him in the procedures for counting and selecting the respondent by dwelling unit. The entire method was a systematic procedure designed to leave little to the discretion of the interviewer. He was instructed always to begin at the Northwest Corner of the block and proceed "clockwise" to count the dwelling units. After the initial counting he was then to proceed, once again, from the Northwest Corner and select for interview the head of household (male or female) in the specific dwelling unit determined by the sample sequence. The alternation of male and female heads of household in the sample sequence was rigorously controlled by instructing the interviewer to select as his first respondent in Block One of his tract, always a male respondent and in Block Two, always a female respondent.

Interviewers were given special instructions to cover such difficulties as non-existent blocks, blocks with net gains or losses in their numbers of dwelling units since 1950, all adults in a given household being of the same sex, not-at-homes, call-backs, and refusals. In no instance was the interviewer to make independent decisions about such matters without first reviewing the instructions or consulting with the field supervisor.

In case of not-at-homes, the interviewer was required to make one additional call at a later date and, if no contact was made the second time, the interviewer proceeded to the dwelling unit adjoining that of the originally designated one. In the case of refusals--after one contact had been made with the designated respondent and all hope lost for obtaining an interview--the interviewer was instructed to proceed immediately to the adjoining dwelling unit and select a

respondent meeting the requirements of the interview sequence. (~~For a discussion of this procedure see the Instructions for Interviewers, Appendix A.~~)

A record of all refusals, call-backs, and not-at-homes was kept by the interviewer on the Sampling Unit Record Sheet. Generally, this information was used by the Field Supervisor as a gauge of interviewer contact with the originally selected sample. A rather high rate of substitution gave some cause for concern as to whether our sample was representative of the larger Chicago population. By-and-large, we had used graduate students in the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago for our interviewers, many of whom had little previous experience. From the onset we had seasonal difficulties, severe cold, and the like. As the interviewing continued from late November into December, shopping activities and preparations for the holidays contributed to the rate of refusals. It is a well known fact that Chicago is a notoriously bad place in which to interview. The "climate of suspicion" existing in this city, reinforced by the above factors, serves to explain why we had rather poor success in obtaining interviews with the original sample.

An analysis was made of all information listed on the interviewers' Sampling Unit Record Sheets. A break-down of the total calls made of all people contacted follows:

Per cent		
40.0	interviews obtained of all contacts	(N = 241)
21.7	refused to be interviewed	(N = 131)
32.0	not-at-home after second attempt	(N = 193)
6.3	no English spoken	(N = 38)
<hr/>		<hr/>
100.0	Total cases contacted	(N = 603)

Percentage actually interviewed of the originally designated sample - 35.0

Representativeness of the Sample

Available demographic comparisons, however, indicate that the sample population is roughly representative of the larger Chicago population, at least with respect to background variables.

TABLE 62

CIRCULATION COMPARISON OF FIVE NEWSPAPERS MENTIONED BY RESPONDENTS WITH FIGURES OF AUDIT BUREAU OF CIRCULATION, MARCH 31, 1959

	ABC-City Zone	Sample Data
	Per cent	Per cent
Sun Times . . . . .	25	29
Tribune . . . . .	29	32
American . . . . .	22	18
News . . . . .	22	18
Defender . . . . .	2	3
Total . . . . .	100	100

TABLE 63

COMPARISON OF HOUSEHOLD INCOMES MENTIONED BY RESPONDENTS WITH FIGURES OF SALES MANAGEMENT: THE MAGAZINE OF MARKETING, MAY 10, 1959, "SURVEY OF BUYING POWER."

	Sales Management	Sample Data
	Per cent	Per cent
\$ 0 - 3,999 . . . . .	25	25
\$ 4,000-9,999 . . . . .	63	57
\$10,000 - . . . . .	12	18
Total . . . . .	100	100

TABLE 64

COMPARISON OF SAMPLE POPULATION OF CATHOLICS AND JEWS WITH PROJECTED ESTIMATE OF CHURCH FEDERATION OF GREATER CHICAGO

	Church Federation	Sample Data
Catholics . . . . .	36	31
Jews . . . . .	6	9



TABLE 65

COMPARISON OF NEGRO SAMPLE POPULATION WITH JULY 1957 FIGURES FOR NON-WHITE POPULATION OF CHICAGO COMMUNITY INVENTORY (CITY OF CHICAGO)

<u>Community Inventory</u>	<u>Sample Data</u>
20%	23%

TABLE 66

COMPARISON OF EDUCATION OF SAMPLE POPULATION WITH FIGURES OF 1950 LOCAL COMMUNITY FACT BOOK, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1953

	Fact Book	Sample Data
	Per cent	Per cent
Elementary . . . . .	24	17
Completed High School . . . . .	22	23
1-3 Years College . . . . .	7	11
4 or more Years College . . . . .	6	11
Total . . . . .	59	62*

\*Does not total 100% since intermediate comparisons are missing.

Given that the interviewing continued through December, 1959--that is, some three months after the event--it is important to raise a question concerning the validity of the responses. Judging from our interviews, we have reason to believe that the event remained highly salient. Interviewers estimate that 55% of the respondents recalled the event vividly, and only 7% of the respondents were judged to have poor recollections of it. More interesting is the fact that a comparison of the interviews completed in November with those completed in December indicates no substantial difference in the distribution of interpretations concerning what the sirens meant. As Table 67 points out, essentially the same proportion of people during November and December reported that at the time they thought the sirens meant an air-raid alert, or that they signalled only the White Sox victory,

a fire engine or ambulance, or something else.

TABLE 67

COMPARISON OF INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SIREN DURING  
THE MONTHS OF NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER

	November	December
	Per cent	Per cent
Game Only . . . . .	29	25
Other . . . . .	21	20
Air-Raid Alert . .	50	55
Total . . . . .	100	100

## APPENDIX C. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE EVENT

For approximately one week following the sounding of the air-raid sirens on September 22, Chicago newspapers carried articles featuring the event. This Appendix section presents a sampling of these news stories, letters to the editor and editorials. We are grateful to the publishers who granted us permission to reproduce them.

These newspaper clippings are interesting from two points of view: First, they support and further document our findings and, second, they provide an opportunity to compare coverage of the very same news event by newspapers and by methods of public opinion research.

As for the first point, it is clear from the clippings that Chicagoans were seriously agitated over the sounding of the siren. Letters to the editor and editorials were irate over the mis-use of the sirens and the character of the news coverage reveals the saliency of the entire episode. Here, the news stories and our survey closely coincide.

On the other hand, however, comparison of the news stories and of the survey also highlights some of the idiosyncracies of these two types of reporting. The newspapers are rather more dramatic: they tend to imply that panic was close at hand. The survey, of course, puts public reaction in quieter perspective. But if survey methods provide a more balanced picture of public reaction, the newspapers are better equipped to analyze actions and reactions at the level of officials and organizations. Thus, the newspapers reported on how the decision to sound the sirens was made by the Fire Commissioner, what Civil Defense officials thought about it, etc. It is obvious that both sides of the story are vital. It is also obvious that the "news" is all but forgotten by the time the survey researcher gets around to reporting it.

# When The Sirens Sounded

Reprinted from CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Thursday, September 24, 1959

Fire Comr. Quinn has apologized for his frivolous use of the area's air raid warning siren system to celebrate the Sox pennant victory. His civic enthusiasm got the better of his judgment. He caused anxious moments for many Chicagoans.

The people have had drilled into them the instructions that the sounding of the air raid signal—except for the weekly test at 10:30 Tuesday mornings—means an air raid. Some persons connected the sounding of the sirens to the Sox victory and were unperturbed. But thousands who could not conceive of the sirens being used for a baseball victory—particularly since they were touched off 45 minutes after the crucial game was won—suffered several minutes of real apprehension.

It is true, as Quinn has pointed out, that there should have been no cause for alarm if the public understood the warning system.

A take cover signal would be a series of short blasts or a wailing up and down tone for three minutes. (What sounded was a steady tone.) The public should then tune in Conelrad—640 and 1240 on the radio dial

—to get the "all clear" signal. If citizens had known this and had used their radios, there would have been no confusion, Quinn says. But these afterthoughts do not excuse the misuse of the sirens and they show that city and civil defense officials have done a poor job in educating the public about the system.

Many persons were asleep and their first reaction was to reach for their telephones to call the police and newspapers to find out the reason for the sirens. This happened on such a large scale, the telephone automatic switchboards were overloaded and, in effect, thousands of telephones "went dead." This added to the general apprehension.

Many persons fearfully headed for their basements first and tuned their radios later, as they thought they had been told to do.

The use of the sirens was supposed to be authorized by a Chicago City Council resolution calling for the ringing of bells and blowing of whistles when the Sox won

the pennant. But the Chicago system is tied in to the suburban system.

One war veteran told us the next day, "We did a lot of horsing around during the war, but we never fooled with the air raid siren. That thing scared me."

The eerie episode, like an ill wind, may blow some good, however.

It showed, the hard way, as Quinn says, that many persons do not know what to do when the siren sounds.

The fiasco also may start Americans thinking about the uselessness of an air raid siren system. If the Russians launch a missile attack the atomic nose cones would land before the sirens could be sounded. The incident should provoke not only indignation over use of the siren to add to baseball hilarity but should provoke discussion of the entire problem of civil defense.

## Hands Off Those Sirens!

Reprinted from CHICAGO AMERICAN, Thursday, September 24, 1959

**I**T PROBABLY would have been impossible to spoil the evening for Chicago, but the geniuses who decided to sound the air raid sirens as a White Sox victory signal came as close to it as anyone could. The terrifying wail scared people all over the city, brought hundreds out into the street in their night clothes, swamped switchboards with frightened inquiries, and made a sizable part of Chicago good and mad.

In a proclamation issued last Wednesday, the city council directed that "bells ring, whistles blow, bands play and general joy be unconfined" when the pennant was won. Fire Commissioner Robert Quinn took this order to include sounding of the air raid sirens, and he ordered them sounded. The kindest thing we can find to say about the whole idea is that it wasn't very bright.



**A**LTHO the fact has tended to slip our minds, there are a great many people in Chicago who don't keep up with sports

and were not greatly interested in who won the pennant. When these people heard an air raid warning, they very naturally supposed that an air raid was on the way.

Tuesday night's blasts lessened the effectiveness of the sirens as a warning, and guaranteed extra confusion if they ever do have to be sounded in earnest.



**T**HE SIRENS are not a signal for rejoicing. They are the signal for a terrible emergency, and they SHOULD NOT BE TOUCHED for any purpose but their real one or for the regular Tuesday morning practice blasts.

The city council should right now forbid unscheduled use of air raid warnings for any other reason whatever, including tornado warnings, and make sure that its decision is well publicized and rigidly enforced.

With that proviso, we're willing to forget and forgive. After all, it's been 40 years.

## FALSE ALARM

Reprinted from CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Thursday, September 24, 1959

There was wailing in the streets of Chicago soon after the Sox clinched the pennant at Cleveland. The wailing was from the civil defense sirens, and injected a few million anxious moments into what otherwise would have been a thorough joyous evening.

The air raid sirens have a well understood, serious meaning. Unannounced activation of the warning sirens should mean just one thing. If it does not, it will soon mean nothing.

We hope that our neighbors, the Milwaukee Braves, win the National league race—and that no civil defense warning systems will be touched off in celebration of their triumph. Those sirens have nothing to do with "general joy unconfined." We never want to hear those expensive sirens again, except in their regular and expected Tuesday morning tests.

## Quinn Apologizes

# Air Raid Scare Stirs More Howls

Reprinted from  
**CHICAGO AMERICAN,**  
Thursday, September 24, 1959

The controversy raged on today over Tuesday night's blast of air raid sirens after the White Sox won the American league pennant.

Scores of angry citizens either phoned or sent protest letters to newspapers, the mayor's office, Fire Commissioner Robert J. Quinn, and Maj. Gen. Robert W. Woodward, state civil defense director.

### Action Demanded

Most of them demanded immediate action be taken to prevent a repetition of the confusion created by the eerie wails of the warning system.

The callers and letter writers joined other thousands who had jammed newspaper, radio, and television station switchboards Tuesday night with questions and later with protests.

Typical of the continuing indignation is this comment from Sidney Schaffe of 6543 N. Francisco:

"This fake air raid meant for jubilation over the Sox winning the pennant may result in thousands ignoring a real raid, if one ever comes. Let's hope to God it will never come.

"Fire Commissioner Quinn must have failed in his duty."

Ald. John J. Hoellen [47th] said he would demand that the city council at its Oct. 2 session make a formal investigation and censure the party who ordered the sirens sounded.

### Quinn Takes Blame

Quinn, acting city defense corps director, has assumed responsibility for the incident which caused thousands

# Civil Defense Chief Praises Chicagoans In Siren Incident

Robert M. Woodward, Illinois director of civil defense, declared Friday that Chicagoans acted admirably when the air raid sirens blared Tuesday night.

In praising the citizens, Woodward appeared to be aiming new criticism at Fire Comr. Robert J. Quinn, the man who authorized the siren-sounding following the White Sox pennant victory.

Quinn has said the near-panic touched off by the sirens indicated many Chicagoans still have much to learn about civil defense procedures.

Without mentioning Quinn, Woodward said Friday: "Anyone who says this shows that people don't pay attention to sirens and blames the people for their undue alarm is, in my opinion, adding insult to injury.

"The people behaved in a manner which was most admirable under the circumstances and they understood the grave significance of the sirens."

Woodward added, "I wish to emphasize that the public did

to flee into streets in near panic here and in Evanston. That suburb is connected to the Chicago warning network.

Quinn said he "feels bad" over the scare. He said:

"I am sorry if anyone was inconvenienced or alarmed. It certainly was not in my mind to create confusion.

"This was intended as just a tribute to a great team that brought Chicago a pennant, and not to frighten the people."

But Quinn, while admitting responsibility, said:

"If anything, it proved the inadequacy of civilian defense."

Quinn explained that those who protested the sirens were at fault because they would have known the air raid was not real if they had tuned in their radios to Conelrad frequencies of 640 or 1240 as required. [Conelrad is reserved for broadcasts during emergencies.] Quinn said:

"This shows that people don't pay attention to our

Reprinted from **CHICAGO SUN-TIMES**, Saturday, September 26, 1959

are prepared for an emergency."

He still is receiving hundreds of complaints from irate citizens because of the sounding of the sirens, Woodward said.

But Quinn said Friday he has received about 100 letters from Chicagoans with "just as many fine compliments as complaints.

"Some of the letters said, 'We are with you,' 'We are for you and This shows that the people of Chicago are not up on their civil defense procedures.'"

The siren incident could help point up shortcoming in the siren system, he asserted.

"It had been brought to my attention that many people never even heard the sirens," the commissioner said.

Furthermore, said Quinn, it is his opinion that public reaction to the siren incident will "boomerang" after citizens "calm down and began thinking about how inadequately they

efforts to educate them in civil defense."

### Mayor Apologetic

Mayor Daley, who was in Troy, N. Y., last night for a speaking engagement, said:

"If anyone was offended, we are very apologetic to them. We had hoped that no one would be inconvenienced. We had certainly hoped it wouldn't happen."

Woodward, terming the incident shocking, asked the federal office of civil defense mobilization to investigate.

United States Atty. Robert Ticken said his office is studying the case to determine whether any federal law was violated. Woodward said federal regulations clearly state that air raid sirens may be sounded only in event of an enemy attack, for test drills, or in event of a natural disaster.

Some hospitals said the sirens caused them to make hasty preparations for patient evacuations and to summon doctors for emergency duty.

Reprinted from  
**CHICAGO TRIBUNE,**  
Friday, September 25, 1959

### THE AIR RAID SIREN

Chicago, Sept. 22—Our rejoicing over the victory of the White Sox has just been turned to fright and even panic by the wailing of the civil defense sirens. Nothing on "Conelrad," nothing about the sirens anywhere — until finally an announcer told us not to get alarmed. Let's not cry "wolf" too often. Who was the nincompoop who was responsible for this?

VIVIAN KAY

Chicago, Sept. 22 — A few minutes ago the air raid siren erased everything from our minds except Russia and a screaming baby.

"They wouldn't attack now," I said. "Khrushchev is here." "On the contrary," said a neighbor from his back porch, "it would be a good chance for them to get rid of him."

We are proud of the White Sox, but in the future let's save the sirens for disaster.

MRS. WILLIAM W. ADORJAN

Chicago, Sept. 23—The indiscriminate use of the air raid siren to celebrate the White Sox victory is an example of the way the city is run. No thought is given to the interests of the majority; just what will please the chosen few.

MRS. MILDRED PACEK

Chicago, Sept. 23—What is the difference between teen-age hoodlums turning in false fire alarms and firemen turning in false air raid alarms?

IRATE CITIZEN

Arlington Heights, Sept. 23—Kid punks, drunks, and pranksters get jail sentences and fines for relatively trivial offenses such as turning in false fire alarms, but Fire Commissioner Quinn apparently can get away with misusing the air raid siren.

RICHARD T. OLDENBURG

Chicago, Sept. 22 — Anyone so stupid as to sound the air raid alarm simply to celebrate a baseball victory should immediately be removed from his post.

# Sirens Blow Up Flood Of Angry, Name-Calling Letters

By William Braden

Now Chicago's mayor and fire commissioner know how Pandora must have felt.

The woman who in Greek mythology opened the box that let all the miseries loose upon the world could scarcely have been the object of greater resentment than the two city officials appeared to be Thursday in the eyes of some Chicagoans.

A flash flood of mail to The Sun-Times indicated that many citizens are more than a little angry over the near panic that resulted Tuesday night when air raid sirens were sounded to celebrate the White Sox pennant victory.

## Unleash Adjectives

As a thermometer of the writers' wrath, here are adjectives they used to condemn the action: "Stupid, pitiful, thick-skulled, fantastically irresponsible, juvenile, disgraceful, sad, ridiculous, crass, frivolous, unwarranted, ill-timed, outrageous and shameful."

And here are a few typical nouns applied to persons the writers considered responsible for the deed: "Muttonheads, crackpots, incompetents, nitwits and irresponsible delinquents."

Fire Comr. Robert J. Quinn had said Wednesday that he assumed full responsibility for ordering the city's 106 sirens turned on. But many of the angry blasts were directed equally at Mayor Daley, who admitted he had given Quinn his blessing

Robert A. Kraft of 3818 N. Sawyer, protesting the sounding of air-raid sirens to salute the White Sox pennant victory:

"Am I now to sit on the edge of my chair every time a siren sounds and wonder whether a nuclear missile is about to slice into the city and burn us all to a crisp—or whether it is merely an announcement that the Barrington Bloomer Girls have won a smashing table tennis victory over their opponents?"

when the commissioner contacted him shortly after the tocsins sounded.

The majority of writers seemed particularly concerned that playful use of the sirens would lessen their effectiveness in a real raid. As Robert A. Kraft of 3818 N. Sawyer put it:

"Am I now to sit on the edge of my chair every time a siren sounds and wonder whether a nuclear missile is about to slice into the city and burn us all to a crisp—or whether it is merely an announcement that the Barrington Bloomer Girls have won a smashing table tennis victory over their opponents?"

Some who didn't panic were annoyed by the noise. "A five-

minute blast of an air raid siren is deafening to those of us who live in the immediate vicinity of one," wrote John Myles, 1719 W. Greenleaf.

The wailing sirens struck particular terror in some hearts. "My wife has been through this in Europe," wrote Robert F. Burns, 4244 W. West End. "She awakened the children and was prepared to rush them to the basement. . . ."

## Few Ask Resignations

Only a few writers saw fit to call for the resignation or firing of those responsible, and an even lesser number demanded a fine and jail sentence. Matching these were a handful of letters that either backed up

Reprinted from CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Fri., Sept. 25, 1959

## OPINION OF THE PEOPLE

### Outraged

The Chicago White Sox after 40 long years finally won the American League Pennant. Joy and celebration is only natural but blowing the air raid sirens is just too much. My family and I lived in Europe during the last war and we had only one thought—air attack.

Robert R. Nussle

Tuesday night a cold terror ran through my body. I had to console three little, terrified children who know the meaning of those blasts, and comfort a mother who has a coronary. Stupid antics from responsible people. Shame!

Mrs. N. Balzanto

The American tradition of being sports-minded is fine but to use the defense signal for war, which is not a game, is ridiculous. There was little boy who watched sheep and cried "wolf" once too often. Let our Civil Defense signal only be used as intended.

Mrs. R. Zane

Fire Comr. Quinn's self-righteous rebuttal that the public should have known better than to panic was as

irresponsible as blowing the sirens in the first place. This was just about the most irresponsible and incompetent action in his power to take.

Dean Lierle Jr.

The stupidity of those in charge of the sirens! Are they a group of children playing games? If this is all those sirens mean to them, they ought to be removed from that responsibility. God help us if that siren is ever used in truth to warn of disaster—and our citizens ignore it because of this prank.

Milton James Neruda

### It Was A Good Thing

Probably a lot of people will be complaining about the sirens but it sure brought home one thing to me—I didn't have the slightest idea what to do—and I think that is what really made me mad. My neglect was so apparent.

Congratulations to the Sox who brought home a pennant and to Mayor Daley who brought home a point.

T. Hachiya

Wake up Chicagoans and hang your heads in shame. How totally unprepared we

the officials or tempered their criticism with thoughtful deliberation.

Wrote Patricia Miller of 9825 S. Ingleside: "My hat is off to Mayor Daley and his all-American way of celebration for a great team — our White Sox!"

More typical of the constructive approach was a letter from Edward Small, 575 N. Long, who first gave the mayor a verbal drubbing for "stupidity" and then added:

"But we all make mistakes. Let's turn this mistake to good use by demanding a careful check of the air raid alarm chain of command."

After Pandora opened her box only one thing was left in it, and that was hope. From letters received, it was apparent that was true in Chicago, too. Everybody seemed agreed in hoping that it would never happen again.

find ourselves when confronted with the unknown! The protests of the people should not be against the misuse of the sirens, but rather against ourselves for how little we know how to act in an emergency. I do not condone our city officials' actions, but I cannot condemn them either, for we have been shown how totally unprepared we are. Now let's hope our Civil Defense leaders will make an even greater effort to instruct us in protection. Air raid drills and alarms are not for children alone to learn.

Mrs. Constance Bata

Air raid sirens panic thousands. Just how stupid can people get? For months Civil Defense has been hammering into our heads that in the event of an air raid, sirens will start and ALL TV and radio stations will go off the air, except for Conelrad stations. The very fact that all broadcasting was continued during the sirens' wail should have been the clue that all was okay. I'll bet not one single person of those who panicked was able to remember the Conelrad frequencies.

Mrs. B. P. Biedron