

MILITARY SERVICE IN AMERICAN LIFE SINCE WORLD WAR II

AN OVERVIEW

by

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PREFACE

A Department of Defense memorandum of February 4, 1964, ordered that a plan be developed for a comprehensive study of military manpower. Part of the plan developed required surveys of military personnel and draft-age civilian men. By late spring NORC was very much involved in the survey plans for the study, which gradually became known popularly as the "End the Draft" study. From June to September of 1964 staff members of NORC were participating full-time with a number of other task groups brought together by the Pentagon in the general design of the necessary surveys and development of questionnaires by which the data were to be gathered. The data were gathered on self-administered questionnaires by the Armed Forces, from 102,000 men in uniform, and by the Bureau of the Census, from some 3,000 veterans and 6,000 nonveterans, during the months of November and December 1964.

The major responsibility remaining to NORC has been the development of analyses relevant to the study as a whole but independent of government efforts, using the data gathered in the surveys, as well as any other relevant and available data. From this effort of NORC has come this report and a series of seven working papers (all now available except No. 6, in process). In the overall plan this report has been developed to provide an overview of the dimensions of military experience in the United States since World War II. This report was originally written as a working paper. Its two parts--the main body of substantive analysis and the appendices--each originated as continuous manuscripts and were divided into chapters later, as the paper was reclassified as an NORC report.

The appendices portion came first, as an effort to deal with a minimum of methodological necessities, specifically description of the characteristics of the All-American Sample and the development of an indicator of the experience of rejection for service. This minimum of methodological necessity blossomed into a maximum effort which only practical necessity

has been able to bring to a halt. The major part of that effort has been to find ways of making satisfactory comparisons between the rejection rate estimates based on the data to be used in the substantive analysis and rejection rate estimates, published and unpublished, originating in government materials. In order to interrupt the seemingly never-ending flow of this methodological venture it has been broken up into Appendices I-V.

This manuscript, essentially in its present form, has been submitted to the Department of Defense eight weeks prior to this writing, with the explicit request that errors in our treatment of government materials in comparison with our own data be called to our attention. No errors have been called to our attention and we have yet to find such errors ourselves.

Only after a threshold of satisfaction was realized in that task, to the effect that NORC measures of rejection experience might be within a reasonable margin or error, was the substantive analysis begun. The substantive analysis to be found in the following pages may be thought of as an intensive exercise in reading complex tables of rates. It does not boast a finely honed edge that has cut through every confronting question. Nor does it have a carefully balanced treatment of those questions, in terms of the number of paragraphs spent in ratio to the import of the questions at hand. Again, it originated as a working paper, in which an analysis has moved within predefined limits, to the point where an optimum of completeness has been achieved in the illumination of a picked set of variables. After this was done it was broken up into topical parts as Chapters I-V. Then an overview chapter was developed in an attempt to get at the essence and implications of the analysis relevant to current policy concerns.

Finally, another kind of appendix has been added. It serves several purposes. Recognizing that it may be vexing to some that no substantive data are given to represent age groups under 27 years of age in 1964, nor to differentiate cohorts of prime age for Korean service, in this special appendix we present selected sets of rates for the 1964 age groups 16-23, 24-26, 27-30, and 31-34 years of age. We of course will insist that those who seek to interpret the data of men aged 16-23 run the risk of serious distortion if their interpretation does not incorporate recognition that

many in this age range having not yet served will yet enter service. Furthermore, the manner in which they may yet approach service will have a different mode-of-entry distribution than that of men from these young cohorts who have already entered. This will be true only to a minor extent for the age group 24-26 years. Finally, those men aged 31-34 years, having been of prime age for the Korean conflict, can be compared with men aged 24-26 and 27-30 to get some idea of the effects of Korean conflict manpower requirements as compared with those of the post-Korean period. With these data a brief commentary is provided simply to give some idea of how they are to be understood.

While in large part these data fall beyond the limits set for the analysis in the main body of this report, it was convenient and of virtually no added cost to produce these tabulations while those for the main stream of the analysis were produced. We have felt obliged to those of the academic and policy-making communities to make this added information available even though at the time of this report no opportunity for extended analysis has been afforded us in this direction.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I shall begin with the least heard-of people first. Richard Martin is responsible for the lion's share of the tasks that went into organizing the data to enable a most trouble-free data processing for analysis. Frank Rothacker and James Jasper served as computer programmers for this preparation phase.

Statistical and other clerical assistance was provided by Mrs. Corazon Graessle, Joan Gallagher, and Mrs. Harriet Beckman during the summer of 1965, and during that period Matthew Crenson and Karen Oppenheim, as graduate student research assistants with their own tasks of analysis, also contributed a great deal to the early efforts of coming to grips with the data. Throughout the 1965-66 academic year Ruth Moser, a Stouffer Fellow and research assistant of NORC, has been assigned to this project. A major share of the tasks of preparing the tables for this report and statistics for the analysis of reenlistment has been hers. Margaret Rappaport, through her participation in Antioch College's cooperative work-study program, bore an enormous part of the task that has made possible the presentation of data in the special appendix. Miss E. Kitch Childs, as research assistant in charge of bibliographic and review of the literature tasks on this project, has helped to uncover sources which might otherwise have gone unknown. Finally, in the area of data processing, Patrick S. Page, as Computer Systems Programmer, and Richard Bennett, Computer Operator, have translated our data-processing "run orders" into computer operations on which all of the data analyses of this project have been based.

I have personal thanks to express to Ramon J. Rivera, a former Study Director of NORC, for inviting my participation in the Military Manpower Policy Study. And James A. Davis, as teacher and as Senior Study Director of the Military Manpower Policy Study at NORC, has always been available for council in the planning and carrying out of this analysis. The three of us, with Richard D. Jaffe as Assistant Director of NORC, mingled grueling

days and many sleepless nights in a long hot summer of commuting to Washington as the surveys inched their way into final form.

Finally, thanks are due Professor Morris Janowitz, of the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology, and Robert W. Hodge, a Study Director of NORC, for critical reading of the manuscript of this analysis. Thanks are also due to Paul Sheatsley, Director of the Survey Research Service of NORC, for a critical reading of the final chapter pulling together the essence and implications of the analysis.

Of course, in spite of the fact that so much is due to so many, I must claim for myself the responsibility for any shortcomings to be found within the limits set for this research.

For preparation of the final manuscript, I wish to thank Mrs. Ann Jacobs, editor, and the NORC steno pool.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	xiv
 Chapter	
I. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS ANALYSIS	1
II. EDUCATION: THE MAJOR DETERMINANT OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE RATES	9
III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY OBLIGATION	27
IV. LIFE CHANCES AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT	47
V. THE GEOGRAPHY OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND UNFITNESS RATES .	67
VI. MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND REJECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II	89
 APPENDICES	
I. THE ANATOMY OF A SURVEY SAMPLE	113
II. THE MILITARY SERVICE QUALIFICATION INDEX: AN INDEX BASED ON AMBIGUOUS QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS	133
III. ONE-THIRD OF A NATION? ONE-FIFTH OF A NATION?	153
IV. ADJUSTMENTS AND DETAILED COMPARISONS WITH RATES FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SELECTIVE SERVICE SOURCES . .	171
V. PROVISIONAL SUMMARY CONCERNING RATES OF UNFITNESS	199
VI. SELECTED RATES BY SELECTED VARIABLES, FOR THE ENTIRE ALL-AMERICAN SAMPLE	217
VII. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES	261
REFERENCES	287

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
II.1	Military Obligation Rates by Educational Attainment before Service	15
II.2	Overall Rejection Rates Showing Reason for Rejection, by Educational Attainment before Service	21
II.3	Adaptation of Table II.2	22
III.1	Military Obligation Rates by Father's Education	30
III.2	Military Obligation Rates by Father's Occupation	34
III.3	Military Obligation Rates by Race	36
III.4	Military Obligation Rates by Race and Socio-Economic Background	41
III.5	Military Obligation Rates by Race and Details of Socio-Economic Background	44
IV.1	Military Obligation Rates by Race, Controlling for Educational Attainment	50
IV.2	Military Obligation Rates by Socio-Economic Status, Controlling for Educational Attainment (Among Men Aged 27-34 in 1964 Who Never Entered College)	54
IV.3	Military Obligation Rates by Socio-Economic Status, Controlling for Educational Attainment (Among Men Aged 27-34 in 1964 Who at Least Entered College)	55
IV.4	Military Obligation Rates, Comparing Whites from Farm Homes with Whites from Blue Collar Homes, Controlling for Educational Attainment	61
V.1	Military Obligation Rates by Pre-Fifteen Urban/Rural Residence	68
V.2	Military Obligation Rates by Pre-Fifteen Geographic Division	72
V.3	Military Obligation Rates by Geographic Background	73
V.4	Military Obligation Rates by Geographic Origin, Controlling for Race	76

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table	Page
V.5 Overall Rejection Rates of Regions, Controlling for Rural/ Urban Origin, Race, and Educational Attainment	78
V.6 Rates of Military Experience and of "Deferment," by Region, Controlling for Rural/Urban Origin, Race, and Educational Attainment, with Notation of Relative Magnitude of Overall Rejection Rates (from Table V.5)	83
A-I.1 NORC All-American Sample with Full CPS Weight	123
A-I.2 NORC All-American Sample with NORC Modified Weight	132
A-II.1 First Stage of the MSQI, for Men of the All-American Sample Aged 24-34	143
A-II.2 First Stage MSQI by Draft Classification, for Men Aged 24-34	145
A-II.3 Expectation of Entering Military Service, by First Stage MSQI and Draft Classification	148
A-III.1 Military Service Qualification for the Entire All-American Sample, by Age Group	157
A-IV.1 Cohort Rates of Active Military Service Experience	174
A-IV.2 Comparison of "Overall Disqualification Rates"	179
A-IV.3 Extent of Rejection for and Fulfillment of Military Service Obligation among Men Born 1930- '31- '32- '33, as Reflected in the 1959 Selective Service Sample Inventory and the 1964 Military Manpower Survey	183
A-IV.4 Draft Classification Distribution, Excluding Veterans, Servicemen, and Unclassified, for Men Born 1930-33	186
A-IV.5 Comparative Data Indicative of the Extent to Which Men Are Never Evaluated	190
A-IV.6 Comparisons of Military Experience Rate Sets	193
A-VI.1a Per Cent Serving, of Entire Age Group, by Respondent's Education	230
A-VI.1b Per Cent Serving, of Entire Age Group, by Father's Education	231
A-VI.1c Per Cent Serving, of Entire Age Group, by Father's Occupation	232

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table	Page
A-VI.1d Per Cent Serving, of Entire Age Group, by Race and Socio-Economic Background	233
A-VI.1e Per Cent Serving, of Entire Age Group, by Geographic Origin.	234
A-VI.2a Per Cent Deferred, of Entire Age Group, by Respondent's Education	235
A-VI.2b Per Cent Deferred, of Entire Age Group, by Father's Education	236
A-VI.2c Per Cent Deferred, of Entire Age Group, by Father's Occupation	237
A-VI.2d Per Cent Deferred, of Entire Age Group, by Race and Socio-Economic Background	238
A-VI.2e Per Cent Deferred, of Entire Age Group, by Geographic Origin	239
A-VI.3a Per Cent Rejected, of Those Evaluated, by Respondent's Education	240
A-VI.3b Per Cent Rejected, of Those Evaluated, by Father's Education	241
A-VI.3c Per Cent Rejected, of Those Evaluated, by Father's Occupation.	242
A-VI.3d Per Cent Rejected, of Those Evaluated, by Race and Socio-Economic Background	243
A-VI.3e Per Cent Rejected, of Those Evaluated, by Geographic Origin	244
A-VI.4a Per Cent Regular Enlisted of Those Entering Service, by Respondent's Education	245
A-VI.4b Per Cent Regular Enlisted of Those Entering Service, by Father's Education	246
A-VI.4c Per Cent Regular Enlisted of Those Entering Service, by Father's Occupation	247
A-VI.4d Per Cent Regular Enlisted of Those Entering Service, by Race and Socio-Economic Background	248
A-VI.4e Per Cent Regular Enlisted of Those Entering Service, by Geographic Origin	249

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table		Page
A-VI.5a	Per Cent Drafted of Those Entering Active Service, by Respondent's Education	250
A-VI.5b	Per Cent Drafted of Those Entering Active Service, by Father's Education	251
A-VI.5c	Per Cent Drafted of Those Entering Active Service, by Father's Occupation	252
A-VI.5d	Per Cent Drafted of Those Entering Active Service, by Race and Socio-Economic Background	253
A-VI.5e	Per Cent Drafted of Those Entering Active Service, by Geographic Origin	254
A-VI.6a	Per Cent Officer or Candidate of Those Entering Service, by Respondent's Education	255
A-VI.6b	Per Cent Officer or Candidate of Those Entering Service, by Father's Education	256
A-VI.6c	Per Cent Officer or Candidate of Those Entering Service, by Father's Occupation	257
A-VI.6d	Per Cent Officer or Candidate of Those Entering Service, by Race and Socio-Economic Background	258
A-VI.6e	Per Cent Officer or Candidate of Those Entering Service, by Geographic Origin	259

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure		Page
V.1	Census Divisions of the United States (Based on Bureau of the Census Map)	71
VI.1	Rates of Military Service, "Deferment," and Unfitness, by Educational Attainment, Race, and Socio-Economic Background, among Men Aged 27-34 in 1964	96
A-II.1	Questions Addressed to Nonveterans	136
A-II.2	Results of First Stage of Development of NORC Military Service Qualification Index	141

CHAPTER I

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS ANALYSIS

The full picture of post-World War II military experience of American man is a vast complex of detailed and interdependent patterns. No one will ever see this panorama in its entirety, but it is possible to gain considerable familiarity with it by a careful look at some of the dominant patterns, using the Military Manpower Policy Study (see Appendix I). We shall do this in the following chapters, sometimes taking one pattern at a time, and sometimes looking at one pattern in its interdependence with other patterns. In the materials to be presented a "pattern" will be in the form of a statistical association--a set of probabilities--concerning military experience in relation to some relevant factor or attribute. The relevant attribute could be education achieved, or race, or whether childhood was in an urban or rural setting.

For example, one may wish to explore the varying probabilities of military experience for men on differing school/career development tracks. Again, one may be interested in the patterns to be found in the military experience of Negroes. Or one can focus on the extent of military experience in rural life. Then there is the suggestion that prospects of military service are viewed differently in different areas of the nation. There is of course no limit to the array of patterns we might look at, other than the practical limit set by what was included in our survey questionnaire.

We will approach this picture one part at a time. We will pick a pattern--a variable--which is of some importance to us and then seek to understand the probabilities of military experience confronting us in this pattern by looking at variations in these probabilities when other variables are taken into account. Then we will try to arrive at points where we come closer to viewing the picture as a whole.

Attempting to analyze the distribution of military experience will reveal several complications which we must take into account. For example, both entry and nonentry into active service may be either voluntary or involuntary. In addition to asking why some subpopulations show higher rates of military experience than others, we shall be tempted to ask "How much of this experience was voluntary, how much compulsory?" and "Of those remaining civilians, how many are rejected volunteers, how many rejected draftees?"

Actually too often these turn out to be rhetorical questions whose answers are not accessible. On the surface it would seem easy to distinguish between volunteers and nonvolunteers. But the prevalence of "draft-motivated enlistment" forbids such ever-simplification. The implications of this "draft-motivation" concept inject ambiguities into any attempt to develop the volunteer-nonvolunteer distinction.

This problem is important because of the numerous ways in which one is tempted to attribute motives to "kinds of people" as represented by the subpopulations in our sample. For instance, we may be tempted to assume that certain subpopulations with high rates of military experience are doing more than their patriotic share (while other subpopulations are doing less). But there may be subpopulations with low rates of military experience that also have exceptionally high volunteer rates. Such can be the case when the nation has permitted educational and other socio-economic deprivations so serious that a subpopulation with high volunteer rates may have high rejection rates as well.

A subpopulation with especially low military service rates may contribute more than its share of much needed civilian manpower in the sciences, the professions, and related occupations (engineering, teaching, medicine, administration; research, and clinical work). If military experience interfered too much with the production of such civilian manpower, no amount of military manpower might insure this nation's security. This is so because military power is too much a function of scientific and technical prowess. Yet it seems easy to view extended study as avoiding the draft, and student deferments

as detrimental to national security, when a low rate of military service seems to indicate a subpopulation lacks patriotic ardor.

As a final warning against such assumptions, note that a subpopulation with a high service rate may be peculiarly vulnerable to the military manpower procurement system. In such instances the high rate of military experience would be more a mark of the subpopulation's victimization than of an abundance of zeal for service. This vulnerability could be due to low rates of higher education, or low rates of early marriage, or high rates of deferring child bearing after marriage. It could result from any combination of these conditions or from resignation to conscription, or the notion that military experience plays an inevitable part in the lives of American young men. Such resignation--sometimes under the label of social or political "alienation"--has often been shown to be correlated with inadequate education. In this way high rates of volunteering could have little to do with patriotic ardor.

In brief, the complications we have discussed are the ambiguity of the voluntary-nonvoluntary distinction and, related to this ambiguity, the problems which threaten any attempts at value-laden inferences about fervor for service based on general military experience rates. The convergence of these complications has prompted a basic restriction on the analysis that will be reported here, and it dictates a technical feature of our strategy for presenting the data of this analysis.

The restriction consists of permitting only a basic array of demographic and socio-economic variables to enter into this analysis. Insofar as complete understanding of variations in service rates might depend on attitudinal and value-expressive data, such understanding--itself a large and complex task--awaits research beyond the limits of the present report.

The technical feature of data presentation prompted by the above complications consists of presenting more than mere sets of military experience rates for various subpopulations. In fact, for each subpopulation we shall present the following rates:

1. percentage rejected of those evaluated
2. post-evaluation deferments (qualified but never entered) as a percentage of the subpopulation in question
3. deferment in general, as a percentage of the subpopulation in question
4. incidence of unfitness, as a percentage of the subpopulation in question
5. combined incidence of veterans and those currently on active service, as a percentage of the subpopulation in question.

Whether the reader's use of these data remains on a simple level or is carried to a more complex level of perception depends on individual interests and mental dexterity. In this manner we have at least provided ourselves with frequent reminders of some of the complications to be lived with, and more than doubled the illumination provided by the analysis.

There is yet another complication to be avoided by the further restriction of our analysis. The matters of the aging of individuals and the passing of calendar time are of course of utmost importance in any comprehensive analysis of military experience rates. In fact, in another, separate effort the author of the present report is attempting to develop two entire schemes of analysis by which the dynamics of this age/time interaction might be explored. However, for the purposes of the analysis at hand we shall avoid as many of the age/time considerations as possible.

With reference to calendar time we note that from 1950 through 1953 military manpower experience was affected by the Korean war. Then came a period during which the reverberations of Korea diminished, disrupted eight years later (fall 1961) by the Berlin Crisis build-up. Another important development since Korea consists of the many additions and changes in military manpower procurement schemes. Because of these circumstances and their apparent effects observed in the All-American Sample data, considerable attention has been lavished in analysis planning, in terms of certain age-groups of the sample: men 31 through 34 years of age in 1964 were of prime service age for Korea; men 27 through 30 were "too young" for Korea; men 26, 25, and perhaps 24 in 1964 apparently were prime for the Berlin build-up. This brings us from the calendar part of the problem to its age or maturation aspect.

First, it is commonly known that with few exceptions men cannot enter military service under age 17, and for all practical purposes none enter after their twenty-sixth birthday. We also know that since World War II by far the majority of men drafted were beyond age 20, ranging upward to age 26, with the average depending on a variety of factors which do not concern us here. In addition to these matters, until recent years the Selective Service procedure of investigating a given man's fitness for service was not likely to occur until the imminence of his induction had been increased to six months or less.

This means that to the extent the researcher allows his analysis to include substantial portions of men somewhat less than 26 years of age he must contend with the concomitant risks that some of the men having not yet entered service may yet serve, and of those not yet evaluated for service some will still be evaluated and either accepted or rejected. Accordingly, when the task is to understand variability of military service rates of various subpopulations, if the researcher permits the inclusion of men under age 26 in his analysis he is in effect tolerating "measurement error" in the data at the very crux of his dependent variable. The amount of such "measurement error" is increasingly large according to how large a part of his data involve men at ages increasingly less than 26 years.

Of course, comparing rates of subpopulations would not be upset by such measurement error, provided that (1) all subpopulations involved have the same age distribution and that (2) each subpopulation has the same set of age-specific rates of being evaluated and of entering service for ages beyond its "current age." Note that for practical purposes both severe conditions just stated are neatly dealt with when analysis is restricted to data involving only men age 26 and over: Taking the conditions in reverse order, the age-specific rates of evaluation and of entry are virtually nil for any subpopulation beyond age 26; then of course (as far as is relevant to evaluation and service entry) it is fairly safe to say that the age distribution of any subpopulation including no man under age 26 is comprised of one grand category, "over-age," thus justifying comparisons among such subpopulations.

What has not happened by age 26 (i.e.) evaluation for and induction into service) is not likely to happen. Or, putting it another way, rates

involving men under 26 must be thought of as "premature" or "immature" rates in the present context, whereas rates involving only men past the twenty-sixth birthday may be regarded as "mature," "final," or "ultimate" rates.

Now the upshot of this discussion of the "age/time" dynamics--both with respect to calendar time and age or maturity of survey respondents--is that to avoid age/time considerations in these chapters we had best restrict our analysis to men 26 and over. Beyond that gross cut-off point we are confronted with the question whether this is the place to take into account the Korea/post-Korea/Berlin Crisis distinctions mentioned earlier. For several reasons that is a task crying to be done, but for two reasons this is not the proper time to address it.

1. Critically related to that set of distinctions is the matter of trying to deal with the problem of manner of service entry in general, and the problem of the volunteer-nonvolunteer distinction in particular. These tasks have already been consigned to later efforts.

2. The structure of this analysis as now delineated can have a unity and finiteness about it which could hardly be preserved were these other considerations to be woven into its fabric.

For the sake of conformity with features of future analyses, and to facilitate comparisons of rates, one concession has been made to the age/time distinctions explained above. With the age group viewed as "prime" for the Berlin Crisis consisting of men 24 through 26 years of age, while the Korea and post-Korea age groups are comprised of men 27 through 34, we come close to the "26 and older" distinction by concentrating on the men aged 27 through 34, ignoring the Berlin Crisis age group. Two of the three Berlin Crisis cohorts still have "premature rates" as of November 1964--thus we are discarding for this analysis only one cohort usable by our "maturity of rates" criterion.

In summary, this effort concerning the distributions of rejection and procurement of manpower for military service is an exploration of the most rudimentary aspects of military experience in the United States. Here we insist on dealing only with "final" rates, and this is virtually the only way

in which age/time problems shall be taken into account here. We are also avoiding problems of motivation or attitude--the analytic and policy issues of voluntary-nonvoluntary military service.

Thus, like the biologist or the chemist, each with his established procedures for classifying, explaining, and predicting the features and behavior of biological and chemical phenomena, with this analysis we apply rudimentary survey analysis techniques to explore the characteristics and variability of a variable which no one has had occasion to examine before.

This is indeed true for the complex variable we call "military experience rates." For example, to what extent will educational attainment be found to be a fundamental condition of probability of service, as education is so often fundamental in the probabilities of other social phenomena? And if education is fundamental, do we find education-conditioned variations in probability of service which encourage obvious interpretations, or are we coerced into probing hypothesis testing to understand military experience conditioned by education in ways which are not immediately obvious?

It should become clear now that the present effort serves two functions:

1. For both theoretician and policy maker this is a descriptive overview, as provided by a population survey frame of reference.
2. Situated as it is in the headwaters of a great watershed of research on military experience, from this analysis will flow more questions than answers, providing viable entres for many additional analyses.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION: THE MAJOR DETERMINANT OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE RATES

Education and "Mental Quality" in Military Manpower Procurement

Spokesmen for the Department of Defense persist in the explanation that the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) and related tests are not intended primarily to be measures of educational attainment or available intelligence (IQ). It is admitted, however, that the failure levels of the AFQT and related examinations can be thought of in relation to grade level achievement, at least as rough approximations. For example, in the report One-Third of a Nation we are told that a provisional threshold is roughly equivalent to eighth grade attainment, while a more absolute threshold--as of that time--was approximately fifth grade ability (U.S. President's Task Force..., p. 9).

In the same report we learn that on occasion these thresholds are modified according to the "needs" of the Department of Defense. Such adjustments have a rationale which is couched in such terms as "with increased manpower requirements it will be necessary to lower the mental quality standards." Or on other occasions, "given the quality and volume of recent acquisitions the mental standards will be raised somewhat for the coming month."

In a similar manner the mental quality standards can be used from month to month as sluice gates, but they are always operated from below rather than from above. That is to say, we know of no instance when this kind of mechanism is used to regulate the flow of high mental quality inductions, though the flow of low quality inductions is regulated as much as is judged desirable or necessary. If more men are needed the sluice gates must be lowered, unless student or dependency deferments are to be tampered with. Before leaving the problem of regulated flow at the lower levels of manpower quality, we should note that less formal regulation is possible. For example, from time to time one service or another may order its recruiting officers to turn down high

school dropouts, advising them to return to enlist after completing high school, thus effectively reducing the influx of lower quality men.

Now as a matter of fact the flow of top mental quality is greatly regulated also, though generally never by such fine increments changing over such short periods of time as from month to month. This is accomplished by student deferments, the characteristics and standards of which have been changed from time to time according to manpower needs. When the needs have been defined as most urgent, then such standards as academic standing among classmates or score on a special Selective Service college student examination have been applied to restrict the number of student deferments. But there are two ways in which college student deferment has operated in the interests of Department of Defense concerns, even though it might appear as an obstacle.¹

First, a manpower procurement system which did not recognize college studies as grounds for deferment would cut off the major sources of commissioned officers--the variety of officer training programs operated in colleges and universities across the country. It would also disrupt the supply of men with college and advanced technical school experience entering service as enlisted men.

Second, during the period from the relaxation of manpower requirements following the Korean war until the rising strength levels associated with Vietnam, there was increasing concern that military manpower requirements would involve increasingly smaller proportions of prime age cohorts. There was the prospect of need for less than 50 per cent of a prime age cohort in

¹A quasi-official statement of a rationale concerning student deferments, with a set of recommendations to the President, Congress, the Selective Service System, the Department of Defense, and the Secretaries of the three Armed Services, has been published by the National Manpower Council. In that publication the argument is presented that student deferment is important in the conservation and development of higher quality manpower resources, but it must not become a matter of "exemption" from service (where "deferment" is given to mean postponement while "exemption" refers to permanent escape from military service). It suggests that for those qualifying for student deferment (by class standing and/or Selective Service College Qualification Test score), deferment should permit completion of college degree study and even advanced study, provided that men so deferred must yet enter military service before age 26. The possibility of manipulating student deferment standards according to military and civilian manpower requirements is also recommended (but see National Manpower Council, 1952).

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Spokesmen for the Department of Defense persist in the explanation that the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) and related tests are not intended primarily to be measures of educational attainment or available intelligence (IQ). It is admitted, however, that the failure levels of the AFQT and related examinations can be thought of in relation to grade level achievement, at least as rough approximations. For example, in the report One-Third of a Nation we are told that a provisional threshold is roughly equivalent to eighth grade attainment, while a more absolute threshold--as of that time--was approximately fifth grade ability (U.S. President's Task Force..., p. 9).

In the same report we learn that on occasion these thresholds are modified according to the "needs" of the Department of Defense. Such adjustments have a rationale which is couched in such terms as "with increased manpower requirements it will be necessary to lower the mental quality standards." Or on other occasions, "given the quality and volume of recent acquisitions the mental standards will be raised somewhat for the coming month."

In a similar manner the mental quality standards can be used from month to month as sluice gates, but they are always operated from below rather than from above. That is to say, we know of no instance when this kind of mechanism is used to regulate the flow of high mental quality inductions, though the flow of low quality inductions is regulated as much as is judged desirable or necessary. If more men are needed the sluice gates must be lowered, unless student or dependency deferments are to be tampered with. Before leaving the problem of regulated flow at the lower levels of manpower quality, we should note that less formal regulation is possible. For example, from time to time one service or another may order its recruiting officers to turn down high

in the not too distant future. (In connection with this kind of concern, President Kennedy was of course prompted to extend safety from conscription to childless husbands by his Executive Order No. 11,119 of 10 September 1963.)

However, the important point for the purposes of our discussion here is the student deferment provides Selective Service with a means for a wide range of manipulations to regulate the flow of manpower, so long as the Department of Defense can afford the consequent fluctuations in amounts of high mental quality manpower made available. This of course provides the individual registrant with a wider range of possibilities by which to attempt his own manipulations if he is so inclined. At any rate, during the years of concern with the decreasing proportions of cohorts needed, the utilities of manipulatable student deferments did not go unnoticed. Not until 1966, in connection with increasing manpower commitments in Vietnam, have the more stringent criteria of class standing and special Selective Service college student examinations been revived.

But even during the more placid manpower procurement interim (roughly 1954 through 1964), problems with two aspects of students' deferments perennially beset the Selective Service System in general and many local draft boards in particular.

Both problems stemmed from the possibility that a draft board could question whether a registrant's study plans were motivated by chances of avoiding the draft or by career commitments. The first arises when a registrant who has left school decides to return and in this connection asks for a deferment. Draft boards in particular, and the Selective Service System generally, have been suspicious of such behavior.

The second emerges when registrants' plans for schooling become extended beyond a standard four- or five-year course of study for a bachelor's degree. There are many recent indications of tendencies to view study at postbaccalaureate levels as a sort of luxury, or drifting, or study for the sake of study, or unwillingness to leave Academia for the real world. Of course, these are all possibilities in specific cases. However, in the "manpower revolution" with which this nation is currently grappling, a primary problem is the rapidly

growing need of scientific and technical manpower involving many occupations which require advanced degrees such as the Master's and the Doctorate. Many men may find their vocations in these areas while yet seeking their bachelor's degrees, but many others will find such a calling only after postbaccalaureate experience with the labor force.

Now, with very few exceptions, commitments to the development of careers such as these are indeed expensive, no matter when they are undertaken, in terms of both time and money. It is customary for doctoral study programs to be described officially as requiring from three to five years' study beyond the bachelor's degree. With the modal ages for receiving bachelor's degrees being 21, 22, and 23 years, one might expect problems to arise when draft boards do not readily relinquish claims to registrants who have committed themselves to careers requiring graduate study for advanced degrees.

Having thus summarily reviewed the ways in which educational attainment is related to military manpower procurement both at the upper and the lower levels of mental quality, we have created a context within which to consider data concerning this perhaps most crucial variable of our analysis.

Patterns of Military Experience and Rejection According
to Educational Attainment

With the variable "educational attainment," as with the other variables to be analyzed, we shall utilize a probabilistic model for conceptualizing its relevance to military experience and rejection rates. With a probabilistic model we are prone to think of a set of conditions, each with its own particular probability associated with it, and here educational attainment will be no exception. We expect differing levels of attainment to have differing probabilities of unfitness and of service. Put most simply, we would expect the probabilities of ever entering service to be relatively low at the lowest level of attainment, in connection with the relatively high amounts of functional illiteracy and other mental deficiencies to be found there. The probabilities of service should increase with successive levels of educational attainment, to the point where accrual of additional years of education spells such increasing likelihood of school-marriage-fatherhood deferment combinations that probabilities of service entry decrease.

This is surely a somewhat oversimplified set of expectations. However, the worst problem may have to do rather with gathering data which will properly fit the model. The model locates educational attainment as a set of preconditions out of which a set of service probabilities emerges. Thus a question which asks the respondent to report the level of education he has now completed will not fit the requirements of the model. The presently attained graduate study level, as that question is answered by a veteran, may represent the fact that, aided by the G.I. Bill, the veteran has accumulated four years of college and some graduate study since his military experience. And both the veteran and the man now in uniform may have gained a high school graduate certificate or some college study while in service. On the other hand, among those who never entered there will be those who tried to enlist early, but after being rejected decided to go ahead with a college education which they had not immediately intended.

There is no simple way to deal with this quandary, because there is no fixed age at which all men are evaluated for service; for those who are never evaluated there is no way of determining a level of educational attainment for such an age comparable to the level of those actually evaluated. These are crucial requirements of the most perfect and straightforward way of using our model of conditional probabilities.

Lacking data which could be fit to the model in a manner free of criticism, the following strategy has been chosen. For those who have entered service, we have used the data yielded by the question, "What is the highest grade of regular school you had completed before you first entered active service?" Then for the nonveterans--the ones who in all likelihood will never enter service--we have used the data from the "education now completed" question as though it were fair to conceptualize it as "education attained before entry." On these grounds we shall be cautious of conclusions to be drawn in the present analysis, consider this a provisional attempt, and wait for a more elaborate age/time-based analysis for added illumination. We shall only note here that this strategy will bias our analysis to a limited extent by exaggerating the number of nonveterans (both the rejected and the deferred)

at the upper educational levels. We expect this exaggeration to be slight, perhaps "negligible," though there is no guarantee that this is negligible.

By now the question may have occurred to the reader, "But why such an elaborate treatment for what should be a straightforward lead-in to the discussion of whatever correlation is to be found between education and military experience?" Put most simply, the answer is that we have the difficult problem of knowing that education may in several ways affect probabilities of entering service, but military experience and the avoidance of it in several ways may affect educational attainment levels. So much for the operational definitions and problems concerning "educational attainment."

In Table II.1 the general tendencies or "pattern" of the data are very much what one would expect. But the differences in the probabilities associated with the various education levels are striking. We find all five education attainment levels from ninth grade through the bachelor's degree accompanied with service entry within about four percentage points of 70 per cent. We note also that for these education levels the proportions deferred and the overall rejection rates have even smaller ranges of variability. While percentage deferred varies only from 14 to 18, overall disqualification ranges only from 11.8 to 18 per cent, for these intermediate levels of education.

In contrast to these intermediate education levels are the groups reporting eighth grade and less, and the group having attained graduate study. The men with an eighth-grade education but no more show an overall disqualification rate of 32.6 per cent, twice that of the intermediate groups, and in association with that their portion entering service has been right at 50 per cent, or about three-fourths of the overall average proportion of 64 per cent with military experience.

Directly in line with these expected observations, we find that among those having less than an eighth-grade education very nearly three-fifths of those examined were found unfit (the 58.7 per cent overall rate), and largely because of that only 30 per cent ever served. In addition, we note one thing which the two lowest education groups have in common: nearly one-fourth of each (22.7 and 23.3 per cent) are being deferred, although both groups are at

TABLE II.1

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BEFORE SERVICE^a
 (Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Education Attained	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Less than eighth grade . .	0.9	2.7	22.7	46.9	30.3	99.9	292	58.7 (234)
Eighth grade . .	1.6	3.8	23.3	26.3	50.5	100.1	352	32.6 (284)
9th, 10th, or 11th grade . .	0.7	3.8	16.3	13.7	69.9	99.9	905	15.7 (791)
High school graduate	1.6	3.8	16.2	10.4	73.5	100.1	1,305	11.8 (1,144)
<u>College</u>								
Under 2 years . .	3.2	3.7	16.7	13.8	69.5	100.0	330	15.8 (287)
2 years or more .	2.5	7.9	18.1	16.2	65.7	100.0	217	18.0 (195)
B.A. or B.S. degree	0.5	7.8	13.9	15.5	70.6	100.0	285	16.5 (267)
Graduate study . .	3.3	18.8	56.9	16.6	26.6	100.1	183	26.8 (114)
NA	^b	-	-	-	-	-	8	- (6)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aMETHODOLOGICAL NOTE FOR TABLE II.1. Tables II.1 and III.1 through V.4 are identical in format. Each is an expression of the probabilistic model involving independent variables the categories of which (the stub) are thought of as pre-conditions for varying rates (probabilities) of three general outcomes of military obligation experience: "deferred," "unfit," and "served."

With the exception of Table IV.4, the entire male population, civilian and military, ages 27 through 34 is represented in Tables II.1 through V.4. The total given in the last row of any table shows that the weighted sample size representing this population is 3,876. The veteran and active service sample components combined constitute 64.0 per cent of our sample, those nonveteran civilians who indicate rejection are 16.7 per cent, and nonveteran civilians giving no indication of rejection are 19.3 per cent of the sample. The latter

the lowest extreme in rate of qualified men remaining civilians. We anticipate that this combination of associations relates to the fact that the farm population has its own unique access to deferment in "agricultural occupation" deferments, and it is the farm population that has more than its proportional share of men lacking a high school education. We can return to the problems of verifying this anticipation later.

Problems of Data Interpretation Peculiar to Men with
Advanced Educational Attainment

We find the group reporting attainment of graduate study altogether different from those with intermediate and with lowest attainment levels. This group registers the lowest rate of military experience, at only 26.6 per cent, and except for those having no high school experience this group has the highest overall disqualification rate, at 26.8 per cent. The rest of the picture is that nearly three-fifths, or 56.9 per cent, are deferred,

are labeled "deferred" on the grounds that the Selective Service and the Department of Defense report less than 0.5 per cent go without military experience without being rejected or deferred. Arithmetically, for these tables, "deferred" is the residual category including all not serving and not rejected. Thus the three categories of military obligation used here are derived directly from the Military Service Qualification Index developed in Appendix II. Per cent "never evaluated" can be gotten by subtracting Columns 1 and 2 from the "deferred" column.

The last column of each table presents "overall rejection rate" information, i.e., the rejected as a percentage of those examined only. To show the arithmetic basis for these rates, the "fit but never served" column is included. The sum of "fit but never served," "unfit," and "have served" rates is the base on which the percentage "unfit" can be transformed into an "overall rejection rate." For example, in the "total" row, $(5.0 + 16.7 + 64.0) = 85.7$ and 3,320 is 85.7 per cent of 3,876. Then $16.7/85.7 = 19.5$ per cent.

Finally, the column on the far left provides the rates of cases with insufficient information to be located in the Military Service Qualification Index, to deal with questions of biases in fitness data.

In general, this explanation applies to all the arithmetic relationships among the rates appearing in any given row in Tables II.1 through V.4.

^b Too few cases to percentage.

though about one-third of these (18.8 per cent) did get sufficiently involved in induction procedures to be evaluated and found fit for service.

The reader by this time may have guessed that we consider it a most difficult task to assess and interpret this information about men attaining graduate study. As a matter of fact they cannot be fully understood at this rudimentary level of analysis, and it is not altogether clear that a conclusive interpretation will be possible even with the most exhaustive treatment we can muster with the data at hand. It may become possible to say more about it than we can here, but the nexus between military manpower procurement and educational attainment at the graduate study level was not a primary concern in the design of questionnaires.

Table II.1 gives some indication of why this should be so: the 183 who who attained graduate study are only 4.7 per cent of the total with which we are concerned. For those concerned with loss of access to, or "availability" of manpower, let us point out that 62 per cent of this 4.7 per cent were sufficiently in the mill to be evaluated, apparently leaving only about 1.8 per cent of the total population out of reach of Selective Service in connection with graduate study. Items of inquiry are seldom added to questionnaires to deal with analysis problems involving such a small percentage of the population.

Having so washed our hands of the task of a conclusive analysis we may proceed briefly to speculate on what we think these facts depict about graduate students coping with military service obligations. It is possible that the central feature underlying these facts is a sort of tug-of-war between students and their draft boards, resulting from indeterminate policy and contradictory concerns on the part of the federal government in general, and relevant statutory provisions in particular. The problems of such policy and concern as they confront draft boards were described earlier.

Of course, the facts that command our attention here are that over one-half of those reporting graduate study are in our "deferred" category, though they are not probably in a student deferment class now, and about one-third of these (the 18.8 per cent) have gone through preinduction procedures to be found

fit for service. In this connection there are additional data, focusing on rejectees, which we have not troubled to enter in the table. It is possible to combine the "deferred" and "unfit" columns to constitute a proportion we may think of as "never entered." The new question we ask now is, "Of these who never entered, what percentage were rejected?"

Looked at in this manner, our data show all educational attainment categories except graduate study averaging about 50 per cent unfit of those never entering. They range from about 40 per cent for high school graduates to 53 per cent for those at eighth grade level and those who completed college, and up to as many as 67 per cent unfit of those never entering, among men with less than an eighth grade education.

But the graduate students are at the other extreme, with less than 23 per cent unfit among those never entering; this emphasizes that unfitness is not a primary factor in the low rate of entrance into service on the part of men attaining the graduate study level. Actually, one might marvel that the rate of service is as high as it is for these men, given the nature of graduate study and of the kinds of careers which develop from it. It may be that more than one-fourth of them entered service because that many are graduate school dropouts. We will not be able to identify men as dropouts from graduate study. On the other hand, medicine and dentistry are among the many kinds of advanced training, or graduate study, and there are special provisions--even special training and procurement programs and draft calls--by which the Department of Defense fills its special needs for such personnel. If it seemed worthwhile, it would be possible to determine, of the 26.6 per cent entering service among those attaining graduate study level, how many (if any) are in or are headed for medical or other health profession careers.

Finally, let us point out speculatively that the moderately elevated overall disqualification rate of 26.8 per cent for men at the graduate study level can be interpreted in a variety of ways. In Appendix V, in proposing a plausible rationale concerning the dynamics of unfitness rates, the suggestion was made that among men having no desire for military service, those feeling fairly certain of a disqualifying condition would have no need to avoid pre-induction evaluation (in fact, they might seek it out for the assurance of being rejected). On the other hand, those having no desire for service and

believing themselves to be fit enough might take considerable care to avoid the initiation of preinduction evaluation proceedings. If this is especially true of men in graduate study this might explain the moderately elevated "overall disqualification rate" among them.

Others may propose another possible contributor to these somewhat elevated rates, in terms of physical unfitness. For example, Walton (1965, esp. pp. 75-84) attempts to discount socio-economic disadvantage as a source of unfitness, preferring rather to ascribe it to affluence, and especially parental indulgence of children resulting in such problems as being overweight and physically weak.² While there is every indication that the roots of most mental and medical disqualification lie deep in the soil of socio-economic disadvantage, our data do not enable us to test Walton's hypothesis of the "physical flab of affluence." We would not expect attainment of graduate study to be the best indicator of affluence. (We shall see the patterns of unfitness related to affluence--and poverty--in the next chapter.)

For the third interpretation we must note once more that it is possible that experience of rejection has enabled some to proceed with education, including graduate study, which others were forced to defer until after military service. Following from this, and the form in which we have used our data, we are faced with the chance of some distortion in our interpreting attainment of graduate study as a precondition associated with probabilities of unfitness and of entering military service.

Thus we have before us three major possibilities for the interpretation of elevated rates of rejection among men of advanced educational attainment:

1. The label "reversal of temporal sequence" might be applied to the methodological interpretation that rejection experience may have permitted continuation of education beyond what otherwise would have been preservice entry attainment levels.

²We are reluctant to call this book to the reader's attention. The chapter just cited presents the most misguided and erroneous interpretations of rates of unfitness we have yet found. However, it does seem necessary to deal with some of the ideas that the author propounds. For evidence and explanation of such error see Karpinos (1962, pp. 1-6).

2. The "flab of affluence" label adequately reminds us of Walton's (1965) proposition.

3. The phrase "selective submission to evaluation" represents the proposition that of those who have relatively elaborate civilian career plans, the ones who know themselves to be unfit for service may not go to great lengths to avoid evaluation via deferments, but those who believe they are fit for service can be expected to avoid induction procedures by maintaining Selective Service deferments.

There may be other possibilities of interpretation which have not entered into our considerations here. Note also that these three interpretations are not mutually exclusive--all three together in varying degrees of magnitude might contribute to the overall picture confronting us. In fact, we are certain of the presence of the "reversal of temporal sequence" problem, though we do not know its magnitude, while the extent to which the "flab of affluence" and the "selective submission to evaluation" circumstances are operative in addition to the "temporal sequence" problem seems to be the issue here.

To explore this issue we have prepared Table II.2. This table is merely an elaboration of the "overall rejection rate" column of Table II.1. Because the number of cases is small and the rates are similar we have combined the three highest categories of educational attainment level.

This is an exceedingly treacherous table to interpret, because in general anywhere from one-fourth to one-half of those unfit are not giving us specific data concerning reason for their rejection, mainly because they do not know the reason.³ (In fact, for this very reason we earlier indicated that we would generally not attend to any matters concerning reason for rejection.)

The single important observation to be made from Table II.2 is that rejection rates on grounds of mental test failure diminish by large decrements

³It is well known that at least until the end of 1963 high proportions of rejectees were given little explanation for their rejection, though Army regulations intended that they at least be told whether the basis was medical, or "administrative" (see U.S. President's Task Force..., 1964, p. 31).

TABLE II.2

OVERALL REJECTION RATES SHOWING REASON FOR REJECTION, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BEFORE SERVICE ^a
(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Education Attained	Reason for Rejection				Subtotals		Total Evaluated	
	Other or Unknown Reasons	Mental Tests Only	Mental and Medical	Medical Exam Only	Overall Rejection Rate ^b	Qualified (Includes Nonveterans) ^b	Per Cent	N
							100.0	234
Less than eighth	30.7	6.7	12.7	8.5	58.6	41.4	100.0	234
Eighth grade	16.7	4.2	3.3	8.4	32.6	67.4	100.0	284
Ninth, tenth, or eleventh	7.1	0.8	1.0	6.8	15.7	84.3	100.0	791
High school graduate	3.5	0.4	0.3	7.6	11.8	88.1	99.9	1,144
<u>College</u>								
Less than two years	4.6	0.0	0.3	10.9	15.8	84.2	100.0	287
Two years or more	4.9	0.0	0.0	14.2	19.1	80.9	100.0	576
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Total	7.8	1.2	1.5	9.0	19.5	80.5	100.0	3,320

^a See Methodological Note, Table II.1.

^b From Table II.1.

going up the education ladder, while the medical rejection rates seem to diminish more slowly up to the high school level and then increase with increasing education beyond high school.

We arrive at this observation cautiously by two steps. For the first step we modify Table II.2 by adding the rate of men failing both mental and medical, first to the "mental tests only" rate and then to the "medical exam only" rate. The result is Table II.3. We have included the "reasons unknown"

TABLE II.3
ADAPTATION OF TABLE II.2

Education Attained	Mental Test	Medical Exam	Reasons Unknown
Less than eighth grade.	19.4	21.2	30.7
Eighth grade.	7.5	11.7	16.7
Ninth, tenth, or eleventh grade . . .	1.8	7.8	7.1
High school graduate.	0.7	7.9	3.5
College:			
Less than two years	0.3	11.2	4.6
Two years or more	0.0	14.2	4.9
Weighted averages	2.7	9.0	7.8

rates here, unmodified, for convenience in going to the second step: We note here that at the high school graduate level and above, regardless of the kinds of rejection which may be involved singly or in multiples in the "reasons unknown" category, the rates of unknown reasons for rejection are relatively small and very nearly constant, ranging between 3.5 and 4.9 per cent. Thus with small and undifferentiated rates here, we can say cautiously that whatever their composition with respect to reason for rejection they could hardly modify substantially the two-part "single important observation" we made above.

We can now go one step further: Regardless of the composition of those in the "unknown reasons" category, at the education level of high school and above the tendency toward elevation of the medical rejection rate must be a basic factor in the elevation of the overall rejection rate at these education levels.

The crucial question still has not received a conclusive answer. But of the three interpretations, the "flab of affluence" has suffered most.

The evidence seems unequivocal. We must compare the one-eighth of the male population which did not progress beyond eighth grade with the approximately one-eighth which has at least two years of college. The former show a medical rejection rate of 16 per cent (a weighted average of 21.2 and the 11.7 per cent) somewhat above the 14.2 per cent medical rejection rate of the latter. The 21 per cent for those with less than an eighth grade education is half again of the 14 per cent of those with two or more years of college. Between these extremes there are of course the much lower rates of less than 8 per cent medical rejection for those with at least high school but no more.

Walton's (1965) argument was that the 2,500 rejectees sample used for the One-third of a Nation study (U.S. President's Task Force..., 1964) was badly distorted in the direction of including derelicts, the unemployed, welfare recipients, etc., to the neglect of the rejectees who were enrolled in school, had jobs, or were otherwise meaningfully occupied. It is by this argument that he proposes to replace "poverty" with "affluence" as the culprit producing disproportionate numbers of physically substandard men.

Our data suggest there may be three general categories of medically substandard persons. Category (1) would include such medical inadequacies whose incidences are not peculiar to education or lack of it, nor to certain socio-economic conditions, etc.; perhaps congenital defects and mental retardation would be good examples. Category (2) might be thought of as a product of the deprivation, "hard knocks," and inept use or lack of proper health and medical care resources--such conditions as we find associated with a life of poverty generally. Category (3) of medically substandard persons might consist of those for whom physical fitness is a matter of secondary or less than secondary concern. While there may be some proximal fit here with the "flab of affluence" notion, we are also familiar with physical well-being problems associated with the sedentary life of hard-working intellectuals and business executives, as well as lower status white collar workers.⁴

⁴After the original drafting of this section, another less speculative possibility of characterizing this third category of medically substandard persons has arisen. In a review of this analysis, Harold Wool, Director for Procurement Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), related to

If it were really this simple, and if we were as near to firm conclusions as we would like, we could simply contrive names for three categories of unfitness and leave it at that. However, we have been unable by this brief analytic foray to resolve the issues of our three interpretations of elevated rejection rates associated with higher educational attainment. We shall leave it here.

Summary Concerning Educational Attainment and Military Obligation

Earlier in this chapter we stated a set of expectations which have been borne out by the data: The probabilities of ever entering service will be relatively low at the lowest level of educational attainment in connection with relatively high rates of unfitness. From the least educated level, with nearly 60 per cent rejected and only 30 per cent entering service, the rejection rates go down to less than 12 per cent and service entry rates go up to nearly 75 per cent among those completing high school but with no college.

For men attaining more than high school education our expectations are only partially fulfilled. Of those who did not go beyond college, roughly 70 per cent have served, but of those with at least some graduate study only, about 25 per cent have served. We did not expect the latter group to show over one-fourth (26.8 per cent) as a rejection rate, though we did expect an enormous rate of deferment and consequent never serving.

Concerning those attending college but with no graduate study, we did not anticipate the relatively low deferment rates (16 to 18 per cent) nor the somewhat elevated rejection rates (16 to 18 per cent). This, coupled with the 26.8 per cent rejection rate of those with graduate educations, leads us to explore three independent and potentially concurrent interpretations:

us some findings of a Department of Defense study about this same problem. Those findings indicate that the increment in rejections among the better educated is constituted by rejections due to conditions which are matters of medical case histories (not readily observed or detected clinically). Thus it would make sense to propose that the better life chances which accompany better education include more detection and development of case histories concerning conditions which are perhaps never detected, or detected only after induction into service, among those of lesser educational attainment.

1. There is some reversal of temporal sequence distorting our data, involving higher education levels achieved after rejection, rather than rejection after attaining the reported education level.

2. There is a social process of selective submission to evaluation by which, of those who develop civilian career plans, the unfit are willing to be evaluated but the fit avoid evaluation by maintaining deferments, thereby yielding an elevated rejection rate.

3. A disproportionate share of unfitness comes from affluence rather than from poverty conditions.

The data required that we modify the "flab of affluence" interpretation in one way: The apparently elevated rejection rates of men of college experience, and especially of those with graduate study experience, may not be subject to the "flab of affluence" interpretation at all, but if it is: (a) the lower levels of education are associated with much higher rates both of mental test and medical rejection; furthermore, (b) if there is an actual elevation (not an operational artifact) of rejection rates associated with higher education it is limited to medical rejection; and (c) mental test rejections at the levels of high school graduate and above are quite certainly 5 per cent or lower, and may be virtually nonexistent.

Definitive research is needed to deal with the possibilities of the three interpretations we have explored--or any other tenable interpretation, for that matter. It may be that one general category of unfitness originates in poverty and ignorance while another originates in sedentary life and/or more extensive and sophisticated medical attention. Such research must be designed with care to deal with the "reversal of temporal sequence" problem.

CHAPTER III

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY OBLIGATION

Conceptualizing Socio-economic Background

Among the words often used hand in hand with the idea of probability, perhaps the two most popular are "risk" and "chance." It is not unusual, when reference is being made to the ultimate in risks and chances, to hear such a phrase as "a matter of life and death." And in one of the earliest developments of a science of society we find a concept of "life chances" playing an important part.

Max Weber chose to utilize the concept of "life chances" in his now classic response to the Marxian theory of class struggle. Postulating three major substructures of society--the economic, the social, and the political--as consisting of "classes," "status groups," and "parties" he proceeded to explain what he meant by "class" (Weber, 1946, p. 181):

- I. A class consists of those members of a social order who are in about the same "class situation"
- II. A class situation is a configuration of life chances
 - A. concerning access to
 1. the products of the economy
 2. kinds of external living conditions
 3. kinds of personal life experiences
 - B. in as much as these chances are determined by the incomes those members receive for goods and services they contribute to the economy of their society.

Here we see the idea of life chances in a context filled with connotations of opportunity and risk, of advantage and disadvantage. At the same time, this context strongly suggests that life chances are closely linked with occupation,

income, and indirectly, education. In this way it becomes easy to ask and deal with relevant questions about how rates of military experience, and of fitness for service, are related to persons' class situations, or life chances. On the operational level such questions involve the three familiar socio-economic dimensions: education, occupation, and income.

The liability to military service, and of course the majority of conditions constituting unfitness, have their onset for the individual at an age where he has done little if anything to contribute to, or modify his own life chances. At that tender age his chances, in the Weberian sense, are still largely determined by the class situation of his father, whether or not that has any relevance to the probabilities of military experience, and the related possibilities of fitness or unfitness for service. And this is precisely the question with which we wish to deal next.

In what ways, if any, do the class situations in which men are reared constitute a set of conditions which are accompanied by varying probabilities of unfitness, and of entering military service? On the operational level the data required to deal with this question in the contemporary United States lie in four areas: (1) father's occupation; (2) family financial resources (income, property); (3) father's education; and (4) race.

Of these four socio-economic factors, the second might seem the most obviously and directly related to life chances. Be that as it may, family financial resources is the one factor not represented in our data. The reason for this lies in our belief that it is unreasonable to expect older men or adolescents to reliably report the income and assets of their parental families as they themselves approached adulthood.

One might not as readily forego the financial resources data, were it not that data on father's occupation and education quite certainly involve much less in the way of reliability problems and at the same time are known to be closely correlated with financial resources. We do have data on father's education and on occupation of the father about the time of the respondent's fifteenth birthday.

Having gone to the trouble of elaborating the ideas of social class and life chances along Weberian lines, our inclusion of race as a factor here might be questioned. Certainly, even in this latter half of the twentieth century the average Negro American has yet to break free of the risks and disadvantages that are his simply because of his race. By Weber's definition this is not a "class" but rather a "status" phenomenon--the life chances of the Negro cannot be adequately accounted for by purely economic factors. However, we have increasingly specific evidence of the economic cost of being Negro (Siegel, 1965). It is on these non-Weberian grounds that we are including race as a socio-economic factor.

We begin with Table III.1. The format of presentation is identical to that of Table II.1, but here we look at rates with respect to education of the respondent's father. We find for the most part remarkably little variability among the several kinds of rates shown. For men with fathers having education ranging all the way from little beyond eight grade upward through college there is only one deviation from the uniformity we see. At each of these levels of father's education, just a bit under 70 per cent of our respondents entered service and, with only one exceptional category, about one-fifth were deferred while one-eighth were rejected for service. The one exception occurs among the relatively small number reporting fathers with college degrees. Here we find a sort of reversal between deferment and rejection rates, with about one-eighth (11.3 per cent) found fit but deferred, while only 6 per cent have been rejected. With sons of college-educated fathers being the small part of the whole that they are, we will not press for a thoroughgoing explanation of this. Though this is a group from which one might expect a disproportionately large number of graduate students, the set of rates here is not at all like what we found with graduate students in our earlier analysis.

Another small part of the whole which we shall note here only in passing consists of those reporting fathers who attained graduate study. This is another group which we would expect to provide more than its share of graduate students. And we note that in this case such an interpretation may be justified; the combination of rates tends to conform, though not nearly reaching the extremes, to the combination of rates we found characterizing men who had attained graduate

TABLE III.1
 MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY FATHER'S EDUCATION^a
 (Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Father's Education	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
No male head of household . . .	0.4	4.7	16.3	16.7	66.9	99.9	404	18.9 (357)
Eighth grade or less . .	1.2	4.6	19.3	19.9	60.8	100.0	1,870	23.3 (1,596)
9th - 11th grade . . .	3.2	4.4	19.8	12.7	67.5	100.0	645	15.0 (546)
High school graduate . .	1.3	5.5	19.2	11.7	69.2	100.1	470	13.6 (406)
Some college . .	0.5	6.3	19.0	11.3	69.7	100.0	204	13.0 (179)
B.A.- B.S.	0.8	11.3	25.0	6.0	69.0	100.0	90	6.9 (78)
Graduate study . . .	4.1	6.9	28.5	16.6	55.0	100.1	88	21.1 (69)
NA	3.2	3.2	16.4	25.3	58.4	100.1	104	29.1 (91)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

study themselves. Thus we would expect that if we went to the trouble of examining this further we would find numerous men with graduate study experience in this small grouping.

Now there are only two substantive categories in Table III.1 about which we have not yet commented. However, that of men whose fathers' education never got beyond eighth grade includes more than one-half of the men reporting their father's education. The other category yet to be discussed is of those reporting "was not living with father, and no male head of the household at age 15," which includes over one-tenth of the population. Consider these first.

Although from time to time the fatherless home is depicted as a home of the disadvantaged, the data before us give no evidence of this. The set of rates given here, for men having no fathers or male heads of household at age fifteen, conforms strikingly with the overall average set of rates shown in the total row of Table III.1. This might lead us to suspect that fatherless homes of mid-twentieth century America have about the same variance in life chances as does the population of the United States as a whole.

We have yet to consider the roughly one-half of the men who report fathers with education not progressing beyond the eighth grade. This group appears similar to the other half, as far as incidence of deferments is concerned. Their uniqueness, as nearly as we can determine here, is restricted to the fact that they have an overall disqualification rate roughly half again as much as the other half of the population; consequently they have a military experience rate of about 61 per cent, while the other half averages 67 or 68 per cent.

In short, we expect that father's education has had substantial impact upon the sorts of life chances experienced in childhood. However, it is possible that by the time respondents have reached adulthood their own opportunities, particularly with respect to educational attainment, have greatly diminished most of the reverberations which might have echoed from their father's education or lack of it. Of course, the main reasoning which relates father's education to "class situation" is that the father's education is his own means to better careers and greater income. It may be only when it bears its full fruit in this respect that father's education makes big differences in other ways, such as military experience and rejection rates of sons.

Father's Occupation

Now we consider the effects of the father's occupation, as of the respondent's fifteenth birthday. We had intended to treat occupation data in somewhat greater detail. Circumstance leads to a summary treatment here, involving the following gross categories:

1. "PTOM white collar" is our abbreviation for "Professional, Technical, Official, and Managerial" (part of the detailed occupation categories known as "Professional, Technical, and Kindred" and "Managerial, Official, and Proprietary" occupations).

2. "Other white collar" includes the detailed categories known as "Clerical and Kindred" and "Sales Workers."

3. "Blue collar" includes all the remaining detailed categories not pertaining to "Farm"; i.e., "Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred," "Operatives and Kindred," and "Laborers, non-farm." Included here are the few reporting military occupations of fathers.

4. "Farm" includes any of the several detailed categories pertaining to agricultural occupation: owners and tenants, managers, foremen, laborers, etc.

5. "Unemployed, or no male" is nearly identical to the "no male" category used for the "father's education" data: Men having no father at age fifteen, and no male head of household, constitute the larger part of men counted here; however, also included are a few who reported their fathers to be unemployed. We shall have no more to say of this category here, because of this redundancy with "father's education" data.

These are the five categories of fathers' occupations used in Table III.2. We find roughly one-fifth of our respondents indicating a farm background. About one-eighth locate themselves in the "no male, or father unemployed" category. The remaining two-thirds of our respondents report fathers or household heads in the urban labor force. We are in this peculiar fashion glimpsing the labor force as it appeared during the approximate period 1945-1955, taking into account only those who were fathers of 15-year-old boys during that period.

For sons of lower status white collar and all blue collar fathers the probabilities of entering military service are essentially identical--69.3 and 68.1 per cent, respectively. There is a marginal difference between the two, however, in how they get that way. Sons from the blue collar ranks show an overall disqualification rate about half again as large as that of the sons of low status white collar fathers. On the other side of it, the latter show a deferment rate nearly one-third above that of the former--19.3 per cent compared with 15.5 per cent. It is a simple matter at this point to guess that sons of white collar fathers--even lower status white collar--have an advantage both in schooling and in the informal education of primary socialization processes; an advantage which one might deduce from the implied literacy of the "white collar" label, when compared with sons of blue collar and farm extraction. This would lead us to expect a relatively lower unfitness rate for white collar sons compared with sons of both blue collar and farm parents. The relatively higher deferment rate for sons of low status white collar fathers, when compared with those of blue collar homes, may be due to more college educations for the sons of the white collar homes.

Looking at farm sons we find further support for earlier speculation. It was suggested that the pattern of rates for men whose educational attainment is limited to eighth grade and less is to be understood in relation to the workings of agricultural occupation deferments and the relatively lower levels of education in the rural population (cf. Table II.1 and above, p.). Now in Table III.2 we find a pattern of rates for farm sons which has characteristics much the same as the patterns of rates in Table II.1, for those with less than nine years of education: proportion having entered service is the lowest of any category in the table; unfitness rates are the highest in the table; farm sons have a higher proportion of deferment than sons of any of the other occupation categories. Further along we shall of course look at the interworkings of education and father's occupation.

Finally, with the sons of high status white collar fathers--fathers with careers as professionals, officials, in management, and as proprietors--we are looking at a grouping of sons which includes any who were "born with silver spoons in their mouths." However, by far the majority of the men in this category are

TABLE III.2

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION^a
 (Summary Categories)
 (Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Father's Occupation	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
PTOM white collar. . .	3.7	8.0	23.3	12.9	63.8	100.0	568	15.2 (481)
Other white collar. . .	1.9	3.7	19.3	11.4	69.3	100.0	203	13.5 (171)
Blue collar.	1.2	3.6	15.5	16.4	68.1	100.0	1,752	18.6 (1,544)
Farm	0.9	5.9	25.1	23.0	51.9	100.0	735	28.5 (594)
Unemployed, or no male head of household .	0.9	5.5	19.6	15.4	65.0	100.0	470	18.0 (404)
NA	1.8	4.3	18.8	14.5	66.6	99.9	148	17.0 (126)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34.	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

telling us of fathers of such more common title as public school teachers, civil engineers, accountants, managers and proprietors of small businesses, local officials, and so on. The point we are making here is that while this is the category which includes sons born to superlative advantage, the great bulk of men in the high status white collar category are products of solid middle class upbringing, if there is such a thing. With this understood we can talk of this as the category of greatest socio-economic advantage, given the categories we have here.

Table III.2 shows that this part of the population is not substantially different in rejection experience from those of lower status white collar background. Both of these groupings are at the lower extreme of rejection rates. However, in connection with a high rate of deferments--exceeded only by that for the farm population--the sons of high status white collar families enter service at a somewhat lower rate--64 per cent as compared with 68 or 69 per cent--than the lower status white collar and blue collar sons. We suspect this is because this part of the population provides more than its proportional share of men attaining college and graduate study levels of education. This suspicion is supported by the relatively high rate of 8 per cent of this subpopulation having been evaluated for service and found qualified, yet remaining civilians. The reader will recall that this kind of phenomenon confronted us previously, specifically among men getting beyond the second year of college, and especially among those reaching graduate study (cf. Table II.1).

Race

The final factor listed in our introductory remarks concerning social class, socio-economic conditions, and life chances was race. Because of the many great differences race has made in individuals' lives historically, and because of the turbulent moral and policy considerations which locate race near the center of our daily lives, we shall lavish particular attention on our attempt to evaluate the effects of race on military obligation fulfillment.

Up to this point we have considered one variable at a time in relation to service entry and rejection for service. True, there were speculative references to the role past educational attainment might be playing in the apparent

TABLE III.3
MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY RACE^a
(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Race	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
White.	1.6	4.7	19.2	15.1	65.7	100.0	3,484	17.7 (2,978)
Negro.	0.5	7.6	18.8	31.1	50.0	99.9	347	35.0 (308)
Other.	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	- (33)
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	- (2)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34.	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

effects of father's education or occupation. There were a number of points where in lieu of answers we indicated that more complex questions would be pursued later. But with race, because of what is already known concerning racial characteristics of the labor force, and the cultural, educational, and other socio-economic deprivations and disadvantages of the Negro American, we can hardly begin our analysis without immediately turning to the interplay of other variables with race. Table III.3 is for these reasons only a point of departure.

To begin with, we note that the United States population is about 90 per cent white and 10 per cent Negro. Among the men aged 27 through 34 in 1964, our data indicate that only about 1 per cent (i.e., 43 out of 3,876 men) were of "other" racial origin, and this is too few to enter into our analysis here. We shall merely carry these "others" silently, for accounting purposes.

The data show that at the most gross level there is no apparent difference between whites and Negroes in rates of deferment; whites with 19.2 per cent and Negroes with 18.8 per cent are only 0.4 of 1 per cent apart. We deduce, however, that a slightly smaller part of these Negroes were allowed to reach age 26 without having preinduction procedures initiated for them. For the whites, by summing the 1.6 and the 4.7, and then subtracting the resultant 6.3 from the 19.2 per cent, we get the estimate that about 13 per cent of the whites were never evaluated for service. By the same process we arrive at the comparable estimate that perhaps less than 11 per cent of the Negroes were never evaluated. As a whole, the indications of these data are that differences found between whites and Negroes in rates of entering military service are likely to have much more to do with differing rates of rejection than with rates of deferment.

As for overall rates of disqualification, as we see them in the last column of the table, Negroes are being rejected at almost exactly twice the rate of whites--35 per cent as compared with 17.7 per cent. The other side of this difference is a 15.7 percentage point difference in the rates of entering service. The exactly 50 per cent of Negroes donning uniforms is only about three-fourths of the 65.7 per cent level of whites who serve.

Composite Index of Socio-economic Background

Of the several questions one might ask at this point, we shall begin with this: Does the disadvantage of Negroes in terms of father's occupation and

education play a major part in the racial differences in rates of military obligation fulfillments? To deal with this question we have contrived a composite index of the three factors of socio-economic background: race, father's education, and father's occupation.

Many of the details of the Index of Socio-economic Background are determined more by practical considerations than by ideal requirements. We expected that a relatively high number of Negroes would report no male household head, or father unemployed, so it was decided to include such men in whatever category we could contrive to represent the lowest socio-economic stratum in terms of father's education and occupation. A practical outcome of this decision, which may very well be unjustifiable on grounds other than pragmatic, was to do this for whites as well as Negroes. We shall see evidence suggesting that for whites the absence of a male head of household may be quite a heterogeneous condition with respect to socio-economic advantages, encompassing the full range from low to high life chances. We have no indication that this is true for Negroes.

Another artifact of operational consideration is that while this socio-economic index includes nine relatively detailed categories for whites, it contains only two general categories for Negroes. This is largely a function of the fact that of 3,876 men aged 27 through 34, 3,484 are white but only 347 are Negro (43 report "other race" and 2 did not report their race). With nearly 3,500 whites a great many occupation and education distinctions could be made in defining socio-economic categories without running so low on the number of cases in each category as to jeopardize meaningful percentages. This is of course not true with only 347 Negroes.

A farther complication that is very few Negroes report fathers with educational attainment beyond the eighth grade, and/or fathers who had managed to rise above the level of blue collar and farm occupations. In fact, as will be seen in our presentation of the data, of the 347 Negroes aged 27 through 34, only 98 could report fathers which had risen above such a modest socio-economic threshold. Of the remaining 249 Negroes, either the father had not gone beyond eighth grade and remained in the lower strata of the labor force (blue collar or farm) or there was no male head of household when our respondent was 15 years of age. This defines our "low SES Negro" category. For purposes of comparison we shall

also permit this definition to hold for "low SES whites," when we wish to use such a general category.

As one might anticipate, only a minority of the other 98 Negroes can be considered to approximate what we shall later think of as characterizing high SES for white respondents. We have therefore included them with the rest of the 98 Negroes who are above the "low SES" category to constitute a "medium SES Negro" category.

Concerning the socio-economic status for whites, the simplest part of the explanation is simply that low socio-economic status is defined the same for whites as for Negroes, and we have simply subdivided the "low SES whites" into these three subcategories:

Low SES whites

- a. No male head of household at age 15
- b. Father had a farm occupation
- c. Father had a blue collar occupation

Recall that for low socio-economic status the upper limit on father's education is completion of eighth grade.

For practical purposes the distinction we shall be making between "medium SES whites" and "high SES whites" rests on whether the fathers are reported to have had farm or blue collar versus white collar occupations, respectively. This may not seem entirely justifiable, when it is noted that by this definition the most picayune types of clerical work, for example, even when accompanied by something less than high school education, fall into the "high SES" category. On the other hand, white fathers of any farm or blue collar occupation, regardless of how high their education (as long as it is above eighth grade), will always locate their sons in the "medium SES whites" category.

There will be points at which, because of the grossness of the "medium SES" and "high SES" category distinction, it will be convenient to fall back upon the more detailed subcategory distinctions we have made in each case:

Medium SES whites (here all fathers exceed eighth grade education)

- a. Father had a farm occupation
- b. Father had a blue collar occupation but did not graduate high school

- c. Father had a blue collar occupation and at least a full high school education

High SES whites (here all fathers have white collar occupations)

- a. Father had a clerical or sales occupation and no education beyond high school
- b. Father had a PTOM occupation and no education beyond high school
- c. Father had a white collar occupation (PTOM or other) and at least some college education

Note that the high-medium-low socio-economic distinctions for whites preserve some of the detail with respect to both education and occupation of father. However, such gross categories fail to preserve what for our uses is the very important distinction between farm and nonfarm backgrounds. This importance rests of course on the workings of the "farm" deferment, plus our knowledge that virtually every son enjoying such a deferment will be of a farm family. When the importance of this distinction dominates our problem we will either utilize the full detail of the subcategories in the index of socio-economic background or revert to the father's occupation categories used earlier.

First, in order to deal most simply with our question concerning socio-economic background disadvantages of Negroes, we have used the more gross high-medium-low socio-economic categories in Table III.4. Let us first note that while both whites and Negroes find most of their agricultural population in the "low SES" category, for the Negroes perhaps more than one-half of the "low SES" category consists of men of farm background, while for whites only about one-fourth are from farm families. This is at least a partial explanation for the 20.3 per cent Negro and 18.7 per cent white of low socio-economic status who are deferred.

We began earlier by asking whether the much higher unfitness rates for Negroes could be fully accounted for by the greater extent of socio-economic disadvantages in their childhood homes. Now, if we accept the "low SES" and "medium SES" classifications of Negroes as fairly comparable to our corresponding classifications of whites, our data in Table III.4 move us to answer emphatically "No!" Low SES Negroes show very nearly twice the rate of unfitness (39.7 per cent)

TABLE III.4

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY RACE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND^a
 (High-Medium-Low SES Summary)
 (Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Race and SES Background	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
<u>Low SES</u>								
Negro. . .	0.4	8.4	20.3	35.0	44.7	100.0	249	39.7 (220)
White. . .	1.2	4.0	18.7	18.0	63.4	100.1	1,907	21.1 (1,627)
<u>Medium SES</u>								
Negro. . .	0.9	5.6	15.3	21.1	63.6	100.0	98	23.3 (88)
White. . .	1.3	4.3	18.0	11.1	70.9	100.0	827	12.9 (714)
High SES, White. . .	3.2	6.8	21.9	12.3	65.8	100.0	751	14.5 (636)
Other & NA on race. .	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	- (35)
All-American Sample, age, 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

that "low SES" whites experience (21.0 per cent). The same can be said of the "medium SES" Negro versus white comparison: the 23.3 per cent overall disqualification rate for "mid-SES" Negroes is nearly twice the 12.9 per cent for whites.

In fact, we have this table arranged to make it easy to see that even "medium SES" Negroes are quite similar--though still at somewhat of a disadvantage--in comparison with low SES whites. Actually, the emphasis should almost certainly be on the slight disadvantage we note in that comparison. As we have remarked earlier, we have no reason to suppose that absence of a male head of household is as strongly linked with poverty for whites as for Negroes. We noted earlier that absence of male head seemed to occur across the full range of socio-economic advantage, inasmuch as rates of unfitness are indicative of this. Thus, if we were to remove the "no male" category from the "low SES white" grouping, then the sets of rates for "low SES" whites and "mid-SES" Negroes would be nearly identical (this observation is derived from Table III.5, but a few more remarks are necessary concerning Table III.4).

Two paragraphs earlier, a key assumption was mentioned: We noted that the data of Table III.4 rule out the possibility that more extensive socio-economic disadvantages of Negroes' backgrounds explain their higher rates of unfitness, with one reservation. This is ruled out only if we can assume that the distribution of disadvantages is the same for "low SES" whites as for "low SES" Negroes, and the same for "mid-SES" whites as for "mid-SES" Negroes.

We suspect this is not so, especially given the gross occupation and education categories we have utilized. The Negro distribution will be heavier toward the levels of lesser education than will that of whites, and the same can be said for income, status, and other measures of the levels of advantage from occupations: the distribution of Negroes will be heavier at the low end and lighter at the high end, as compared with whites. But at this point we are no longer confronted so much by a problem of distortion of data as we are by the problem of recognizing the ramifications of the variety of costs directly associated with being a Negro, regardless of how many variables we hold constant. Just as another study (Siegel, 1965) has shown the cost of being a Negro in dollars and cents, so we suspect our data are revealing yet another kind of cost, the cost in the kinds of fitness considered basic for military service. This is not

the last look we shall take at interracial differences, but with the characteristics of the Index of Socio-economic Background still in mind we had best consider our Index data in greater detail before moving on.

Considering Table III.5, we soon discover we are already quite familiar with the rows of data representing Negroes, and whites reporting "no male head" or "head of household unemployed." We shall consider them no further here. This latter grouping of whites we shall usually treat simply as an average group, with no peculiar traits concerning us at the moment.

Perhaps the first observation to make in our analysis of Table III.5 concerns the array of overall disqualification rates in the last column. Among the whites, and excepting those from low SES farm and blue collar homes, the range of these rejection rates is less than four percentage points--from 11.6 to 15.4 per cent. Of course, with our exception of those two groups we are setting aside the more than 40 per cent portion of the white population which constitutes its lowest stratum, as far as socio-economic advantages are concerned. A weighted average of these two groups will yield slightly under one-fourth found unfit, as compared to about half that rate for the rest of the white population.

Concerning the two lowest strata, we note that the combination of rural upbringing and parental lack of high school education appears somewhat more incapacitating, at 28 per cent, than childhood in a blue collar (urban) home with the same parental lack of education. On the other hand, looking at the sons of farm and blue collar families in the "mid-SES" bracket (with fathers of at least some high school education), it would appear that added education makes at least as much difference--if not more--in the country than in the city. The unfitness rate changes from 28 to 11.6 per cent from the low to the "mid-SES" segments of the farm population, while changing from 20 to 13 per cent from the low to the "mid-SES" parts of the blue collar (urban) population.

In relation to our earlier observation of quite unvarying rates of unfitness we also note very little variability in rates of having served, for urban whites. What variability there is follows a pattern of decreasing rates of service from about 72 per cent for "mid-SES" blue collar populations diminishing steadily across a range of about ten points to 63.6 per cent for sons of white collar fathers with college training.

TABLE III.5

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY RACE AND DETAILS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND^a

(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Race and SES Background	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Other race . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	- (33)
<u>Negro</u>								
Low SES . . .	0.4	8.4	20.3	35.0	44.7	100.0	249	39.7 (220)
Medium SES . .	0.9	5.6	15.3	21.1	63.6	100.0	98	23.3 (88)
<u>White, low SES</u>								
No male, or unemployed	1.0	4.3	19.1	13.1	67.8	100.0	403	15.4 (344)
Farm, low education .	0.7	5.6	25.5	22.5	52.0	100.0	496	28.1 (398)
Blue collar, low education .	1.5	3.0	15.0	17.7	67.2	99.9	1,007	20.1 (886)
<u>White, medium SES</u>								
Farm, medium education .	2.1	6.5	26.9	9.2	63.9	100.0	160	11.6 (127)
Blue collar, medium education .	1.6	4.3	17.0	11.3	71.7	100.0	358	12.9 (313)
Blue collar, high education	0.5	3.2	14.5	12.0	73.5	100.0	309	13.5 (274)
<u>White, high SES</u>								
Other white collar, no college . .	2.0	3.4	17.3	13.2	69.6	100.1	148	15.3 (127)
PTOM, no college . .	5.2	6.0	21.8	12.3	65.9	100.0	342	14.7 (288)
Any white collar, any college	1.4	9.7	24.7	11.7	63.6	100.0	261	13.8 (222)
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	- (2)
All-American Sample, ages, 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

This trend of decreasing rates of military service going up the urban socio-economic ladder is to be understood in relation to a trend of rates of deferment involving a corresponding increase up the socio-economic ladder. It appears that this increasing rate trend comes primarily in the component of deferred men evaluated and declared fit for service. The proportion of this component among the urban socio-economic categories rises from 3.0 per cent among "low SES blue collar" offspring to 9.7 per cent among the offspring of college educated white collar workers. Because of the patterns looked at earlier, we suspect these trends are pretty much the products of increasing probabilities of higher education deferments of sons of families farther up the socio-economic ladder. Actually, we see this combination of trends coming to a head primarily only at the level of families whose heads are of professional, technical, official, or managerial accomplishment.

The problem of the extent to which advantages of socio-economic background accrue to new generations as a result of the higher levels of education they attain is obvious but complex. Therefore, rather than summarize findings concerning socio-economic background without taking account of education levels, we shall proceed immediately to deal with the problem of life chances and educational attainment.

CHAPTER IV

LIFE CHANCES AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Earlier we gave considerable attention to the ways in which educational attainment is related to disqualification for service and student deferment. After that the concepts of social class, of the "class situation," and of life chances were discussed. Data concerning the fulfillment of military obligation have been presented in connection with both those discussions.

At some points in our treatment of data concerning race and the other socio-economic factors we found it necessary to comment speculatively on the likelihood that differing distributions of educational attainment for different categories of socio-economic advantage might contribute to understanding differences related to socio-economic advantage in unfitness rates and rates of entering service. We shall explore these possibilities here.

Our point of departure involves three commonplaces of the contemporary scene in our society:

1. Historically, the offspring of families higher in socio-economic status have enjoyed favorable odds for continuing their education through every level, and they still retain some of this edge.
2. There has been a rising level of valuation and expectations concerning higher education and what is to be gained by it, which increasingly pervades the lower strata of our society in general.
3. This rising level of valuation and expectations concerning education has taken on a special meaning among Negroes, who feel this may be the most effective avenue for escaping a variety of costs specific to being Negro.

With the following data presentations we have occasion to assess in some ways how much difference education makes so far as differing rates of unfitness and military service are associated with subpopulations of differing

socio-economic advantage. We shall use our data especially to ask whether some of the differences found among sub-populations of differing socio-economic advantage can be accounted for when the educational attainments of our respondents are taken into account.

Race and Education

Table IV.1 introduces our strategy for dealing with such questions as these. We have simply taken the respondents one education level at a time, in order more properly to compare Negroes with whites in terms of unfitness rates and service rates. Before we proceed with the central question let us observe that the relatively high deferment rates for both whites and Negroes at the level of eighth grade and below (23.1 and 22.5 per cent, respectively) are because of the disproportionate representation of the farm population at that education level, coupled with the availability of agricultural deferments. This will be shown later.

The general pattern is clear: At each level of educational attainment except the college level the overall rejection rate for Negroes is more like that for whites one step lower in education than like the rate of whites with which they should be compared. For example, high school dropout Negroes, with a rate of 35.2 per cent rejection for service, are more nearly like the whites with eighth grade or less, at 40.6 rejection, than like the high school dropout whites, with a rate of only 13.2 per cent rejection. Negro high school graduates at 14.0 per cent have a rejection rate slightly higher than the 13.2 per cent for the white high school dropouts.

We still do not understand why there is a rise in rejection rates at the college and graduate study level both for whites and for Negroes (Chap. III, pp. 16-24). We have no way of determining precisely the extent to which these are medical rather than mental rejections, nor whether rejection for service permitted some of these civilians to extend their educations more easily than their uniformed counterparts.

Our next task is to relate these observations about unfitness to rates of military service. For one thing, we note that among the whites, except for the lowest and the highest levels of education, the rates of deferment, of unfitness, and of service entry are virtually unvarying, the latter remaining around 70 per cent. Actually, in the highest education category (as we shall find when

we look at Table IV.2) if we excluded graduate study attainment, the whites are at the 70 per cent level of military service with college diplomas as well.

Now when we turn to the Negroes, the arrangement of our table makes it easy to see that Negro military service rates at the lower education levels tend to begin by being comparable to those of whites one level below. But the Negro rate "catches up" with that of the whites at the high school graduate level and is reasonably comparable at the college level as well.

Now at precisely the education level where Negroes are most nearly comparable in rejection rates with whites of the same educational attainment the data show lower rates of deferment for Negroes than for comparable whites. At the high school graduate level 11.7 per cent are deferred among Negroes, about two-thirds the proportion of 16.5 per cent of whites at that level. At the college and graduate level the two categories of whites average about 24 per cent deferred, or nearly two-thirds again as high as the comparable Negroes at 14.4 per cent deferred.

We are unable to interpret this for the time being, although, depending on one's subjective inclination, a variety of hypotheses may present themselves. Those sympathetic to Negroes may suggest that draft boards refuse to allow Negroes to "get by" with deferments as easily as whites. A less biased kind of guess might be that more Negroes have volunteered, or that they have not taken on family responsibilities to an extent that would cause them to be deferred as much as whites. A biased unsympathetic view might suggest that a responsibility of draft boards is to seek out men who are "uselessly occupied," and that they find more Negroes in such a position than whites.

One could go on and on, but our emphatic point at this stage of analysis is that we have as yet found no evidence for any solution to the problem whatever. A much more elaborate analysis could be attempted on another occasion, taking into account such matters as age at marriage and age at first child. Until that effort is made we shall not propose any conclusions concerning the fact that Negroes of high school education or more have substantially lower rates of deferment than do whites of comparable education.

Before leaving off comparing rates of deferment, note that among high school dropouts, Negroes, with 23.5 per cent, have two-thirds again as much

TABLE IV.1

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY RACE, CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT^a

(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Race and Education	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Negro, eighth grade or less . .	1.0	8.8	22.5	53.1	24.4	100.0	96	61.5 (82)
White, eighth grade or less . .	1.3	2.4	23.1	32.2	44.7	100.0	544	40.6 (431)
Negro, ninth to eleventh grade . . .	0.0	11.2	23.5	30.8	45.6	99.9	108	35.2 (95)
White, ninth to eleventh grade . . .	0.8	2.8	15.4	11.5	73.1	100.0	789	13.2 (689)
Negro, high school graduate . .	1.0	2.0	11.7	13.4	74.8	99.9	89	14.9 (81)
White, high school graduate . .	1.6	4.0	16.5	9.8	73.6	99.9	1,205	11.3 (1,053)
White, part college . .	3.2	5.2	17.9	14.6	67.6	100.1	505	16.7 (441)
Negro, any college . .	0.0	8.2	14.4	21.0	64.7	100.1	52	22.4 (48)
White, B.A.-B.S. or graduate . .	1.7	12.0	29.6	15.5	54.9	100.0	436	18.8 (359)
Other race .	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	- (33)
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	- (8)
All-American Sample, ages, 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

deferment as whites, with only 15.4 per cent. Anticipating data which will be presented later, we shall suggest here that what is true of the Negro deferment rate is not applicable to the white rate: This group of Negroes has more than its share of men from rural homes, as we have already suggested is true of both whites and Negroes at the eighth grade level and less; thus, as in that comparison, we find agricultural deferments underlying an elevated deferment rate. Not so, however, with the whites who are high school dropouts. They are not so disproportionately rural that their deferment proportion should compare with the Negro high school dropouts. Much more attention will be given to rural versus urban and agricultural versus nonagricultural rate phenomena such as these, but later.

In leaving race versus education as depicted in Table IV.1, we may summarize with two observations:

1. Education is associated with much more of the variability in rates than is race in the sense of the range of this variability.
 - a. The range of the unfitness rates is from 40.6 to 11.3 per cent for whites and from 61.5 to 14.9 per cent for Negroes, varying across the levels of education in the one case by nearly thirty percentage points and in the other by nearly forty-seven points; by contrast, within the groupings by education we do find racial differences from 61.5 to 40.6 per cent, and from 35.2 to 13.2 per cent (or about twenty-one and twenty-two points' difference, respectively), but these race differences are less than the education differences and do not even apply to the race comparison at the level of high school graduates and above.
 - b. The picture is similar for rates of military service. By education, the Negro rate varies from 24.4 to 74.8 per cent, while the white rate varies from 44.7 to 73.6 per cent (ranges of 50.4 and 28.9 points respectively); within education groupings, the race differences do go as high as 20.3 points (44.7 minus 24.4) and 27.5 points (73.1 minus 45.6), but the latter is exaggerated by the Negroes having higher deferment rates than whites at the level of high school dropouts.

Thus one might conclude that for both rejection and service entry rates, with less than a completed high school education, race makes a considerable difference, but not as much as education.

2. With our second summarizing observation we hasten to add a qualification, or at least a caution to the first observation in both of its parts: While we are noting the alarming extremes of unfitness rates as high as 35.2, 40.6, and 61.5 per cent, and related service rates of as low as 45.6, 44.7, and 24.4 per cent, we have also been reminded of the role played by two characteristics of rural life:
 - a. Its participants make less use of education opportunities and/or have fewer such opportunities thrust upon them, resulting in higher unfitness rates.
 - b. Its participants sui generis have access to a form of deferment to which the rest of the population have no equivalent.

By the first of these two rural population characteristics one might say that the ranges of both unfitness and service rates are exaggerated across the levels of education, and education is greatly complicated by this rural life effect as well as by race. By the second characteristic we observe, first, that its relevance to the matter of unfitness rates in the sense of causing them to be exaggerated or attenuated is indeterminate; however, it is clear that this three-way correlation between rural life/lower education attainment/agricultural deferment certainly contributes to the range of rates of military service with respect to education. Some of this will be explored further, later on.

Education and Socio-economic Factors of Childhood

Our next task is to appraise the effects of childhood socio-economic factors on rates of unfitness and military service entry, taking into account whatever ways socio-economically differing subpopulations may also have differing distributions of educational attainment among our respondents. For this purpose we shall need a modest elaboration of Table IV.1, which we just used.

Earlier we became familiar with an index of childhood socio-economic factors which takes into account three such factors: race, father's education, and father's occupation. One summary version of that index used the following

categories:

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Negro, low SES | 4. White, mid SES |
| 2. Negro, mid SES | 5. White, high SES |
| 3. White, low SES | 6. Other race |

To construct Tables IV.2 and IV.3 we have taken Table IV.1 as a point of departure but elaborated the race distinction by using an abbreviated summary of these six socio-economic categories for each education attainment level. Because such an elaboration generates so many more groups for comparison, and consequently spreads the cases of our sample so thinly in some places, we have become concerned with more sampling variability in our percentaging. Retaining our rule of thumb that we will not present percentages based on less than fifty cases (by weighted count) it becomes necessary to combine the two Negro socio-economic groups, removing that distinction throughout the table. In consequence, all the entries for Negroes in Tables IV.2 and IV.3 are simply copied from Table IV.1.

With only two exceptions, the "white" data from Table IV.1 are simply elaborated to the three categories of high, medium, and low SES. One exception occurs in the "eighth grade or less" category of Table IV.2, where there are only eighteen white, high SES men, far too few for us to trust a percentage distribution. The second exception is in the "graduate study: whites" category of Table IV.3. There we found very few low and medium SES whites, so to compare them with high SES whites we have combined the low and medium groupings. (Actually, the percentage distributions of the thirty-four low SES and thirty-five medium SES cases combined here are as perfectly identical as it would be possible to make them.)

The pattern of Table IV.3 deviates from the form of Table IV.2 with respect to Negroes also. We find so few Negroes, in absolute numbers in our sample who achieved any college that the threat of sampling variability in percentage distributions forces us to ignore the distinctions of "B.A.-B.S. received" and "graduate study." Thus, differing from our presentation of data concerning white SES, where whites are first grouped into "college dropouts," "B.A.-B.S. degree," and "graduate study," there is only one data entry for Negroes in Table IV.3-- the first row, labeled "Negroes: any college." Thus the reader is permitted to make any comparisons he chooses between these Negroes and any grouping of

TABLE IV.2

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT^a

(Among Men Aged 27-34 in 1964 Who Never Entered College)

Race, SES, and Education	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
<u>Eighth Grade or Less</u>								
Negro . . .	1.0	8.8	22.4	53.0	24.5	99.9	96	61.4 (82)
White								
Low SES . .	1.2	2.5	24.1	34.1	41.8	100.0	454	43.5 (356)
Medium SES.	2.2	0.0	18.0	24.4	57.5	99.9	72	29.9 (59)
High SES. .	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	- (16)
<u>Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh Grade</u>								
Negro . . .	0.0	11.2	23.5	30.8	45.6	99.9	108	35.2 (95)
White								
Low SES . .	1.1	2.2	15.7	11.2	73.1	100.0	519	13.0 (449)
Medium SES.	0.4	4.7	17.2	12.1	70.6	99.9	184	13.9 (161)
High SES. .	0.0	2.3	9.9	11.8	78.3	100.0	86	12.8 (80)
<u>High School Graduate</u>								
Negro . . .	1.0	2.0	11.7	13.4	74.8	99.9	89	14.9 (81)
White								
Low SES . .	0.8	4.8	16.2	11.9	71.8	99.9	668	13.5 (592)
Medium SES.	1.2	2.9	16.8	7.0	76.2	100.0	337	8.1 (290)
High SES. .	5.0	3.2	17.2	7.6	75.2	100.0	199	8.9 (171)
Subtotal ^b	1.8	3.7	17.8	17.0	65.2	100.0	2,830	19.8 (2,432)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

^bFor a full description of N's see bottom of Table IV.3.

TABLE IV.3

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT^a

(Among Men Aged 27-34 in 1964 Who at Least Entered College)

Race, SES, and Education	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Negroes with any college	0.0	8.2	14.4	21.0	64.7	100.1	52	22.4 (48)
<u>White college dropouts</u>								
Low SES . .	2.5	4.8	17.3	20.1	62.6	100.0	159	23.0 (139)
Medium SES.	1.7	5.7	15.4	10.0	74.6	100.0	136	11.1 (123)
High SES. .	4.7	5.1	20.0	13.3	66.7	100.0	211	15.6 (180)
<u>White college graduates</u>								
Low SES . .	1.0	11.5	14.0	17.4	68.6	100.0	68	17.8 (67)
Medium SES.	0.0	7.7	11.2	17.6	71.2	100.0	63	18.2 (60)
High SES. .	0.5	6.8	16.4	11.4	72.1	99.9	139	12.6 (126)
<u>Whites with graduate study</u>								
Low and medium SES	3.5	14.7	53.8	12.0	34.4	100.1	69	19.6 (42)
High SES. .	3.8	20.8	54.5	21.3	24.3	100.1	96	32.1 (64)
Subtotal	2.4	8.3	22.9	15.3	61.8	100.0	993	17.9 (849)

Other race exclusions	43	Total, Table IV.2	2,830
Race and SES NA exclusions.	2	Total, Table IV.3	993
Educational attainment NA exclusions.	8	Exclusions,	53
Total exclusions, Tables IV.2 and IV.3	53	Total sample Aged 27-34.	3,876

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

whites, in Table IV.3.

Now we are prepared to seek answers to whether there are socio-economic differences among whites when we take into account their educational attainment. We can see the importance of this from a bit of doodling with the "totals" columns of Tables IV.2 and IV.3. For example, we find that for the Negroes and low SES whites, over half never finished high school, and only about 15 per cent even started college. In contrast, of medium SES whites only about one-third never finished high school, and only 15 per cent of high SES whites are that deficient in education. The second contrast is that medium SES whites include about 28 per cent who entered college, and high SES whites include fully 50 per cent who did so. In other words, Negroes and low SES whites entered college at about half the rate of the medium SES whites, who in turn entered college at a little less than half the rate of the high SES whites. We have been certain from the beginning that something like this would make a great difference in the unfitness and military service rates of our socio-economic groupings, but does it account for all the differences?

It is important here to remember, in connection with Table IV.3, that we do not understand how it happens that there tend to be higher rates of overall disqualification at the several levels of college education. Restricting ourselves for the moment to Table IV.2 we see a complex interaction of race, socio-economic status, and education effects on unfitness which is quite meaningful for us: With Negroes, education makes the most difference, the unfitness rates varying from about 60 per cent at eighth grade level or less to 35 per cent for high school dropouts, to 15 per cent for high school graduates (and at that point the Negroes have "caught up" with low SES whites).

With low SES whites education makes a great difference also, with 43 per cent unfit (compared with over 60 per cent for Negroes and about 30 per cent for mid SES whites) at the eighth grade or less level. But at the high school dropout level, the low SES whites have caught up with the medium and high SES whites, at about 13 per cent unfit, and high school graduation does not seem to be able to improve on this for low SES whites.

For medium SES whites the unfitness rate goes from about 30 to 14 to 8 per cent, education again being worth roughly a factor of one-half reduction

for each added education category, as we observed for Negroes. However, as between Negroes and mid SES whites, race seems to be worth a factor of roughly one-half: $61/30 \approx 35/14 \approx 15/8$. But then we observed earlier that mid SES Negroes show similarities to low SES whites, and here the mid- and low SES Negroes are taken together. Note also that at both the high school dropout and graduation levels the unfitness rates of medium SES whites remain identical to those of high SES whites.

For those from high SES homes who are high school dropouts, the unfitness rate begins at under 13 per cent, roughly the lowest level attained by Negroes and low SES whites even with high school diplomas. Then, as observed in our look at medium SES whites, the unfitness rate goes down to 8.9 per cent for high SES whites who are high school graduates.

Now let us concern ourselves with the rates of entering military service. Here we shall look at the entirety of Tables IV.2 and IV.3 at once. We will give no more attention to the enigmas of the unfitness rates in Table IV.3 than to note their "contribution," statistically, to the military service rates we find there. With one long glance we observe roughly four groupings of military entrance rates along the education dimension, and for the most part remarkable similarities within those groupings.

Eight or fewer grades of education.--One obvious group is comprised of those with an eighth grade education or less. This group has the greatest internal variation, with only one-fourth of the Negroes ever donning a uniform, compared with about 42 per cent of low SES whites and nearly 60 per cent of mid SES whites. This variability is primarily accounted for by variability in unfitness, though the medium SES whites, at 18 per cent deferred, have only about three-fourths the rate of deferment that Negroes and low SES whites have. This raises a question whether these low SES whites have more men of farm background than the medium SES whites, to whom we compare them here. We shall deal with that question shortly.

Education limited to high school.--The next Tables IV.2-IV.3 grouping consists of those who have been to high school, but not beyond; that is, we can combine the dropouts with the graduates. There are about three notable variations from the norm here. The norm here consists of a service entry rate

a bit above 70 per cent, coupled with rejection rates averaging about 12 per cent and deferment fairly steady at about 16 per cent. One notable deviation in this composite high school educated group is the Negroes, who as dropouts are high on unfitness and on deferment, yielding the low rate of 45.6 per cent entering service; however, as high school graduates they show an unusually low deferment rate, average unfitness rate, and a resulting high average military experience rate of nearly 75 per cent.

The second deviation occurs with the high SES whites who are high school dropouts, and it appears in the form of a 9.9 per cent deferment rate--only a little better than one-half of the average--and a resultant 78.3 per cent of military experience which is the highest service rate in Tables IV.2 and IV.3. While we cannot conclusively explain this deviation, more high SES whites might leave high school to enlist, while a lesser valuation, or even a general disregard on the part of medium and low SES whites for high school diplomas or high school in general might help to explain the differences involved. That is, enlistment may not be the only reason medium and low SES whites leave high school, whereas this may be more nearly the case with high SES whites.

The third deviation in the high school education grouping consists of the low unfitness rates among high and medium SES high school graduates which we discussed earlier. These 8.1 and 8.9 per cent rates of rejection are the lowest of all in Tables IV.2 and IV.3 and are coupled with military service rates of 76.2 and 75.2 per cent, second only to the high of 78.3 per cent (which is the deviation discussed in the preceding paragraph).

Men with some college education.--The third generalized grouping we make in Table IV.3 consists of all men who have entered college, excluding those who have gone on to graduate study. Here, alongside of what might appear to be moderate random fluctuations in unfitness rates, we observe a trend toward slight moderation of military entrance rates. We cannot speculate here about this moderation, partly because of our failure to understand the varying and moderately higher unfitness rates for men of college experience. Some might suppose that the slightly lower service rates here are related to disillusionment with the glamour of uniforms and military might which may come with intellectual growth. But we are certain that with aging come higher rates of

marriage and fatherhood, thus dependency deferments, and aging accompanies achievement of a college education. Actually, rather than extending ourselves by speculatively pecking at the difference, we might best marvel at how any amount of college education fails to seriously reduce rates of military service, barring the introduction of graduate study.

We must insist, then, that this shall remain a matter of speculation at least until an age/time analysis can be accomplished. Even then the conclusive answer may remain out of reach, for reasons we have already discussed (Chap. II, p. 13). Added education may come after rejection; on the other hand, a higher rejection rate may be associated with intentions for more education.

Finally, with this third general grouping we note that the Negroes having any college would nearly fit the average for the three white socio-economic groups. Only their slightly lower deferment and slightly elevated rejection rates mar such a fit.

Men with graduate study experience.--The fourth grouping of Tables IV.2 and IV.3 consists of those whites who carried their educational attainment beyond college into study for advanced degrees. There is virtually nothing to say here beyond what has already been said about graduate study much earlier. We do note that the perquisites of graduate study, in the sense of deferments, are overarching without socio-economic differentiation. There is again an enigmatic socio-economic difference in terms of unfitness, and this makes for a 10 per cent difference in military obligation fulfillment, between the 34.3 per cent of the combined low and medium SES whites grouping and the 24.3 per cent of the high SES whites.

Summary of Tables IV.2 and IV.3

Tables IV.2 and IV.3 can be summarized quite briefly. To begin with it appears necessary to consider our four groupings as basic qualitative distinctions of analysis to be retained and explored further:

1. Never entered high school
2. Any amount of high school, but no college
3. Any amount of college, but no graduate study
4. Graduate study

When the data are approached in this fashion the second, third, and fourth groupings contain within themselves no really alarming differences conditioned by socio-economic factors, with one exception. We consider the 35 per cent rejection rate of Negro high school dropouts, and the resulting greatly depressed service rate of 46 per cent, to be the alarming exception. But we think we understand this major deviation as we understand the major deviations which occur in the first grouping.

The first grouping one might suggest is on a level of educational attainment so low as to have been ineffective in reducing or eliminating fundamental socio-economic differences. We suspect that the alarming deviation of Negro high school dropouts is simply indicative of the extra task confronting secondary education in overcoming the cultural and educational deprivation Negroes have undergone in their earlier childhood.

It is necessary here to anticipate a notion the reader may have, that the high school and the college groupings are so similar that they might as well be combined. Such a combination would present two problems: first, the distinction will be basic in the attempt to gain understanding of the higher rejection rates in the college group; second, we anticipate the importance of the distinction for those attempts at analysis which attend to varieties of service entry (e.g., officer versus nonofficer entries) and motivations for entry (e.g., positive volunteer versus draft-motivated volunteer versus coerced draftee).

The Farm/Nonfarm Problem of Assessing Effects of Education

In the material we have covered so far there have been many points at which we stopped short of having reached a conclusive insight into the component conditions underlying certain differential rates. While it is not possible to delve farther into all these open-ended situations, the circumstances revolving about the interactions of agricultural family background, educational attainment, and combinations of unfitness, deferment, and military service rates can be illuminated further in a number of ways quite readily. One very simple sally into these circumstances follows immediately, with the data presented in Table IV.4. (In the next chapter the matter of rural background will be explored more as an aspect of geographic circumstances.)

TABLE IV.4

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES, COMPARING WHITES FROM FARM HOMES WITH WHITES FROM BLUE COLLAR HOMES, CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT^a

(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Education and Father's Occupation	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
<u>Eight grade or less</u>								
Farm. . . .	0.8	2.7	26.5	39.0	34.4	99.9	192	51.2 (146)
Blue collar	1.4	0.7	17.7	32.2	50.2	100.1	255	38.8 (212)
<u>High school dropouts</u>								
Farm. . . .	0.6	3.3	21.9	11.7	66.4	100.0	145	14.4 (118)
Blue collar	1.3	3.4	15.4	12.4	72.1	99.9	444	14.1 (391)
<u>High school graduate</u>								
Farm. . . .	1.1	8.5	27.4	8.5	64.0	99.9	234	10.5 (190)
Blue collar	0.9	2.9	12.5	10.7	86.8	100.0	644	11.8 (582)
<u>College dropouts</u>								
Farm. . . .	1.5	5.8	22.0	20.8	57.1	99.9	46	24.8 (39)
Blue collar	2.8	5.5	16.6	14.7	68.8	100.1	199	16.5 (177)
<u>College graduate, including graduate school</u>								
Farm. . . .	2.7	14.1	30.3	11.4	58.4	100.1	37	13.5 (31)
Blue collar	1.2	7.5	23.7	15.3	61.0	100.0	129	18.2 (108)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

The circumstances to be explored here can be suggested by the statement of two problems left unanswered earlier:

1. Could relatively elevated rates of deferment among those of lower educational attainment levels be accounted for by a greater preponderance of farm backgrounds--hence agricultural deferments--at these lower education levels? (The reader may wish to return to Table II.1, or may otherwise recall that while from high school dropouts up to college graduates, deferment rates averaged a little above 16 per cent with virtually no variability, the eighth grade and less than eighth grade groupings were both at 23 per cent deferment.)

2. Could the relatively high rates of unfitness occurring among men from farm homes be the result of such men on the average having less education, or is there more unfitness regardless of education attained? (The reader may wish to look at Table III.2 again. There, in exploring for effects of father's occupation, we found that while the average unfitness rate is 19.5 per cent, men in the "farm fathers" category yielded a rate of 28.5 per cent unfit, and all other categories were below the 19.5 average. In fact, the weighted average among all the nonfarm categories combined is about 17.6 per cent unfit, or only three-fifths the level of the 28.5 per cent for those of farm background.)

To deal with these questions in the simplest way possible and yet quite conclusively, we have sought to isolate several groupings according to educational attainment and rural/urban origin. As a result of this experiment, when we compare rates for men from farm families with rates for men from urban homes we will have fairly sound answers concerning the concomitants of rural life when education is accounted for.

Now by and large, farmers do not live in town, and sons of factory workers, teachers, lawyers, or businessmen do not live in the country. Hence, by rural/urban comparisons alone we are confronted with numerous kinds of incomparability between rural and urban families. For present purposes this is especially true with respect to father's occupation and father's education. We have chosen to reduce this incomparability of urban vis-à-vis rural families by limiting comparisons to farm versus blue collar categories of father's occupation. Our reasoning for this is that in many ways the circumstances of farm families will not be so different from urban blue collar families, except where those differences are rooted in the very nature of the rural/urban distinction. In other words,

by our reasoning, we propose that in Table IV.4 we are essentially comparing "rural blue collar" with "urban blue collar" in our farm versus blue collar comparisons. In this manner we have eliminated some of the incomparabilities that exist between rural and urban dwellers in gross groupings.

Table IV.4 of course presents only part of a much bigger table. Tables IV.2 and IV.3 present data for the entire sample, with socio-economic origin categories within educational attainment groupings. Table IV.4 is what one gets if only the whites of Tables IV.2 and IV.3 are counted, and counted only if their fathers had farm or blue collar jobs. Thus not only are Negroes and persons of "other races" excluded, but also whites who reported "no male head of household," or reported fathers unemployed, or reported fathers with any kind of white collar occupation (as we have previously defined white collar). (Caution must be exercised in what we make of rates for the two groupings of farm sons with college education, since these rates are based on less than fifty weighted cases.)

We note a consistent pattern of differences, with whites from farm families always more than five percentage points above those from blue collar families, in rates of deferment. Men of farm origin range from 22 to 30 per cent in the "deferred" column, while men of blue collar homes range from 12.5 to 23.7 per cent. The men of blue collar origin in fact do not range above 17.7 per cent deferred except in that education grouping which includes men attaining graduate study.

Thus we are fairly certain that our earlier speculation was correct as far as whites are concerned: The substantial deviation of up to 23 per cent deferred among men of eighth grade education and less can be accounted for in the relatively high rate of deferment among those who have access to agricultural deferments and who are disproportionately represented at the lower education levels. We might remark, before going on, that among those of farm background we see no particular trend in deferment rates with respect to education attained, except that the highest rate for them, as for those in other kinds of groupings, comes in the highest education category. Among those from blue collar homes we see this "highest education" phenomenon also, but otherwise--unless one wishes to make a point of the 17.7-15.4-12.5-16.6 progression of percentages from less than eighth grade to college dropouts--they show no particular education-related

pattern of deferment rates, either.

The other question Table IV.4 is intended to answer is whether relatively high unfitness rates among those of rural origin are related to lower average educational attainment in rural life. We focus on the percentages in the last column. Let us note again that for those of farm background at the two college education levels we have included rates only to assuage curiosity--we do not consider that the thirty-nine and thirty-one weighted cases of those two farm groups provide an adequate basis for reliable percentage distributions. In general we have insisted on fifty or more. Then with respect to educational attainment we have three comparisons to look at between farm and blue collar origins: eighth grade and less, high school dropouts, and high school graduates. Looking at the last two comparisons first, the 14.4 versus 14.1 per cent and the 10.5 versus 11.8 per cent comparisons of unfitness rates would seem to settle our question quite quickly; educational attainment accounts for rural/urban differences in unfitness rates.

But does it? At the eighth grade or less level the unfitness rate for men of blue collar origin is high--38.8 per cent--but that for men from the farm is more than twelve points higher--51.2 per cent. We propose several factors contributing to this difference.

First, we suspect that the lower tail of the education distribution for the rural population is substantially longer and heavier than for the urban blue collar population. In other words, a category of "eighth or less" is too gross a distinction here, having within it relatively more men from the farm than the town with less than sixth, and less than fifth, and less than fourth grade education and so on.

Second, we suspect that in the very nature of rural life, one of the big differences distinguishing it from the urban is the failure of elementary education to cope with a kind of socio-cultural deprivation that tends to occur in rural isolation. Of those of rural origin who did not progress beyond eighth grade there will be a large proportion who have attended only one- and two-room country schools, as compared with the urban consolidated high school experience available to those who go beyond eighth grade.

Our third point may be only an elaboration of the second: If rural

elementary education is as inadequate, vis-à-vis urban, as is suggested by the 51 to 39 per cent comparison of unfitness rates, look what a favorable difference it makes for sons of farm families to go somewhat beyond the eighth grade! Even among high school dropouts, those of farm extraction have unfitness rates essentially identical to those for men from blue collar homes, and slightly lower unfitness rates (the 10.5 versus 11.8 per cent) among those with high school diplomas.

Let us suggest, then, that perhaps rural life as such does not give rise to excessive unfitness rates as long as lack of secondary school education is not an intrinsic part of that rural life.

CHAPTER V

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND UNFITNESS RATES

Anyone with more than the most superficial information concerning rejection rates will have learned that the Deep South, as differentiated from any other part of the nation, has had exceedingly high rejection rates. This has been true regardless of race, although it has been most serious among Negroes. In fact, some sources have depicted the situation in the South as having reached proportions of social crisis. For example, in the October 1942 Senate hearings on Selective Service, Senator Theodore Bilbo (D, Mississippi) remarked, "In my State, with a population of one half Negro and one half whites . . . the system . . . has resulted in taking all the whites to meet the quota and leaving the great majority of the Negroes at home, or they are sent back [from the induction center] . . ." (United States Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 1942, pp. 31-32).

Our data will in some ways add and in some ways detract from or modulate the tones of this picture. It is our central intention, however, to illuminate the matter of South/non-South differences by statistical breakdowns within which it may be shown that, other things being equal, the South would not appear so generally dismal in the comparison with other regions of the country.

Because of what we have already learned, we would expect that regional comparisons such as North-Midwest-Far West-South should take into account regional variations in population composition with respect to rural population, race, and educational attainment.

The Rural Area--Small City--Metropolitan Area Dimension

For the rural population distinction we have yet to see whether our data will show "size of place"--or "urban/rural" residence--distinctions of variability in the rates to which we have been attending. Of course we already know about the basic rural/urban distinction as a result of our attention to father's occupation, but what of the small town-large city-metropolitan suburb distinctions? Are there such that must be taken into account because of their variability?

TABLE V.1
 MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY PRE-FIFTEEN URBAN/RURAL RESIDENCE^a
 (Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Urban/Rural Residence	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Farm-ranch .	1.0	5.5	24.0	20.9	55.1	100.0	944	25.6 (769)
Rural/ nonfarm . .	1.2	3.4	18.9	23.2	57.8	99.9	442	27.5 (373)
Urban, less than 25,000	1.9	4.3	18.2	13.8	68.1	100.1	976	16.0 (840)
25,000-99,999	1.9	4.3	17.8	15.6	66.6	100.0	502	18.1 (434)
Metropolitan suburb. . .	1.4	4.5	17.2	13.2	69.6	100.0	222	15.1 (194)
Metropolitan area, 100,000 or more . .	1.1	6.5	16.2	12.4	71.3	99.9	767	13.8 (692)
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	- (18)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

Respondents to this survey were given a list of categories corresponding to the stub of Table V.1 and were asked to indicate which best described where they lived most of the time before age 15. Their answers will be our data here. We will use these data as indicative of rural/urban origin, and they may even be partially construed as saying something about their draft board location, in spite of the obviously very loose linkage.

Table V.1 reiterates what we knew and suggests one thing more: The rural/urban distinction is as fundamental in this table as we found it in data based on father's occupation. And it suggests to us that none of the several "size of place" distinctions among those on the urban side of the picture make a substantial difference: Among these, the deferred rates vary only from 16.2 to 18.2 per cent, the service entry rates vary from 66.6 to 71.3 per cent, and the overall disqualification rates (last column) vary from 13.8 to 18.1 per cent. This is impressive uniformity among "size-of-place" urban categories.

Not under the general heading of "rural" there is a distinction not noted before in our data: that of farm versus nonfarm rural. We note that the non-farm subpopulation here apparently does not have access to agricultural deferments; in this respect they appear more like the urban folk of our sample. In any other respect, however, they appear more similar to those of rural farm background. Their unfitness rate, 27.5 per cent, is slightly above that of the rural farm population, and those of rural nonfarm background except for the farm population rate of 55.1 per cent have the lowest military experience rate of any in the array--57.8 per cent. At this point we have determined in further analysis plans to combine rural nonfarm with rural farm as one category.

The Military Experience of Geographic Areas

Our next step in the geography of military experience is to consider our data in terms of what the Bureau of the Census calls "geographic division." We are advised by the Bureau of the Census that the sort of sampling by which they provided our data, though it may be an impeccable national sample, should not be considered representative of the populations of individual states. The finest regional distinctions permissible, then, are those officially defined as constituting "geographic divisions." These fine distinctions and the more gross

official distinctions of North-South-Midwest-Far West may be best understood by the map (Figure V.1) designed to accompany Table V.2.

Ignoring those few not residents of the fifty states, or not reporting residence, we find a progression down Table V.2 from the relatively high military experience rates of 73.8 and 72.9 per cent of the North to the relatively low 57.5 and 57.9 per cent of the South. We find this progression of rates closely linked with an opposite progression of unfitness rates, from 13.3 per cent for New England to 27.7 and 27.4 per cent for East- and West South Central, respectively. An exception to this progression is the exceedingly low 12.4 per cent rejection rate of the Mountain division of the Far West.

All of this fits relatively well with what we were told to expect, although it certainly fails to have the tenor of crisis some may have expected. Two "Deep South" geographic divisions have unfitness rates more than twice those of New England and the Far West, while the Mid-Atlantic and the two Midwestern divisions are more similar to the rest of the nation than to the Deep South. The South Atlantic is about half-way in between.

We will defer comment or question about the deferment rates until we are able to take the rural/urban population composition into account. This is necessary because, while the Midwest population is evenly distributed by rural-small city-metropolis, in the North the largest category is "small city," with "metropolis" next; in the Far West "small city" is first and "rural" next; but in the South the progression in population size is rural-small city-metropolis (from large to small).

Regional Differences in Military Experience with
Rural/Urban Residence Taken into Account

Table V.3 helps us to understand deferment rates and tells us something more in regional comparisons of military experience and unfitness rates.

The general pattern of deferment rates for the urban populations is that they remain under the average of 19 per cent for the nation as a whole, with one notable exception. We know of no reason at this stage of the analysis for medium size cities of the Far West to be the location of the highest rate of deferments in the entire nation-- 26.3 per cent. We note that throughout Table V.3 the Far West is high in deferments and yet never deviates significantly in the sense of deficiency in its rates of military experience as compared with the national




Figure V.1.--Census divisions of the United States (based on Bureau of the Census map)

TABLE V.2

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY PRE-FIFTEEN GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION^a

(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Geographic Division	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Territories and U.S. Foreign Possessions	.6	7.9	48.4	26.8	24.8	100.0	140	45.1 (84)
<u>North</u>								
New England	.7	3.9	14.3	12.0	73.8	100.1	242	13.3 (217)
Middle Atlantic .	1.6	4.1	14.3	12.9	72.9	100.1	643	14.3 (578)
<u>Midwest</u>								
East North Central. .	1.4	4.4	17.2	13.0	69.8	100.0	690	14.9 (602)
West North Central. .	2.0	5.8	18.2	13.3	68.5	100.0	347	15.2 (304)
<u>Far West</u>								
Mountain	5.6	7.0	26.3	10.0	63.7	100.0	118	12.4 (95)
Pacific Coast	1.4	7.1	21.8	11.4	66.8	100.0	223	13.4 (190)
<u>South</u>								
South Atlantic .	1.2	4.7	17.4	17.7	64.9	100.0	504	20.3 (440)
East South Central. .	1.8	3.7	19.0	23.5	57.5	100.0	320	27.7 (271)
West South Central. .	0.4	4.8	18.4	23.7	57.9	100.0	387	27.4 (334)
NA	2.6	6.3	27.8	26.1	46.1	100.0	261	33.3 (205)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^a See map of geographic divisions, Figure V.1; see also methodological note, Table II.1.

TABLE V.3

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND^a

(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Region and Residence	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
<u>Metropolitan Area</u>								
North . . .	0.9	5.0	11.0	13.0	76.1	100.1	324	13.8 (304)
Midwest . .	1.1	5.2	13.3	13.7	73.1	100.1	321	14.9 (295)
Far West. .	0.9	6.0	18.3	10.5	71.2	100.0	79	12.0 (69)
South . . .	2.4	8.4	18.7	10.5	70.9	100.1	164	11.7 (147)
<u>Small City</u>								
North . . .	2.0	4.0	13.8	11.8	74.4	100.0	402	13.1 (362)
Midwest . .	1.9	3.7	15.5	13.6	70.8	99.9	365	15.5 (322)
Far West. .	5.0	7.4	26.3	9.1	64.7	100.1	150	11.2 (122)
South . . .	1.1	3.6	16.4	15.0	68.6	100.0	402	17.2 (350)
<u>Rural</u>								
North . . .	0.6	2.2	22.4	13.0	64.5	99.9	156	16.3 (125)
Midwest . .	1.7	5.7	23.1	12.1	64.7	99.9	350	14.7 (289)
Far West. .	1.6	6.2	23.9	13.9	62.2	100.0	100	16.8 (82)
South . . .	0.8	4.0	19.2	27.6	53.2	100.0	642	32.5 (544)
Other and NA.	2.0	7.2	34.3	26.1	39.6	100.0	422	35.8 (308)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

average of 64 per cent. We also note, in this regard, that this high 26.3 per cent deferred is associated with the overall rejection rate of 11.2 per cent, which by a slight margin is the lowest in the entire table. The possibility which baffles our analysis here is that we have a combination of factors at work here which includes what for our purposes may remain an unknown: we have in mind whatever data on manpower quotas and quota fulfillment might be relevant. A careful survey of the table seems to suggest that when the unfitness rates are relatively low the deferment rates are relatively high. However, to make the kind of comparison on which such an observation is based one must restrict oneself to one rural/urban residence category at a time, and had best look at the "deferred" and "unfit" columns in the main body of the table, rather than at the "overall rejection rate" column.

We shall not speculate further here.¹ For those who wish to do so, we should remind readers that the labeling of the "deferred" column may be misleading. That column represents a residual category including all who cannot be positively classified as "unfit" or as having "entered service." We have not developed firm positive but rather sound assumptive grounds for labeling that column "deferred."

Now the major reasons for this presentation in Table V.3, in the form it has taken, were (1) to take an additional look at South/non-South comparisons, doing so with rural and urban populations separately, and (2) at the same time to have a basis for deciding whether necessarily to retain the small city-metropolis distinction in subsequent analysis.

Taking the latter consideration first, as the reader can readily see, there is a fair amount of similarity among corresponding rates as between the small city and the metropolis sectors of each region. We have taken this as sufficient reason for the combining of these two sectors of the urban/rural dimension retaining only the basic rural/urban dichotomy for subsequent analytic use.

¹The first supposition we thought to explore here was that this high deferred rate might be associated with the widely publicized public college program of the state of California. However, a closer look reveals the high rate to have its source in the small city sector of the Mountain--rather than the Pacific--division of the Far West region.

But now for the fundamental use of Table V. 3. The array of overall rejection rates in the last column would have the relatively restricted range from 11.2 to 16.8 per cent if one were to consider all categories save those for the South. This is a range of hardly more than five percentage points, within which we may observe a slight tendency for rural sectors to have higher rates of unfitness than urban sectors, taking regions one at a time.

Having made these observations it is of interest to see how the South fits into this framework: At the metropolitan level we discover that the unfitness rate is the lowest for any of the four regions, at 11.7 per cent. At the small city level of urbanization the unfitness rate for the South, at 17.2 per cent, is only a little above the range we earlier noted for all the other regions, but only a little. Finally, it is at the southern rural level that we find the extreme deviation of 32.5 per cent unfit, virtually double any other rejection rate in the entire table. Recalling an earlier speculation concerning a sort of reciprocal interaction between unfitness and deferment rates in relation to fulfillment of assigned quotas, we note that the rural South is the one rural region where, in spite of agricultural deferment, the deferment rate of the rural population is under 20 per cent.

The Part Played by Race in the Geographic Differences
of Overall Rejection Rates

We have accounted for a great deal of geographic variation in rates by narrowing this down essentially to a matter of urbanization--or perhaps modernization--in the South. We could leave it at this, pointing to its meaningfulness in relation to the War on Poverty in the Appalachian area. However, from what we have wrung from earlier analysis we are confronted here with the question whether the problem lies primarily with the higher rejection rates of Negroes of the rural South, or whether whites are involved as well.

Table V.4 has been prepared for the question before us. Taken at the risk of ignoring important differences in the distributions of education among our groups, the comparisons are striking. Considered in this fashion, among whites, the urban South, with a 14.7 per cent rejection rate, is clearly not a significant deviation from the urban West and urban North at 14.0 and 13.1 per cent, respectively. Now with the Negroes we note that those of the urban South, at 19.5 per cent unfit, are only a little above all urban rates for whites and are right at

TABLE V.4

MILITARY OBLIGATION RATES BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN, CONTROLLING FOR RACE^a

(Men Aged 27-34 in 1964)

Race and Origin	Nonveterans		All-American Sample			Total		Overall Rejection Rate
	NA	Qual-ified	"Deferred"	Unfit	Served	Per Cent	N	
Other race .	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	- (33)
<u>Negro</u>								
Rural South	0	7.3	18.7	45.9	35.4	100.0	127	51.8 (112)
Urban South	0	7.9	18.5	17.4	64.1	100.0	92	19.5 (83)
Non-South .	1.5	7.7	19.4	26.2	54.4	100.0	128	29.7 (113)
<u>White</u>								
Rural South	1.0	3.2	19.5	22.4	58.1	100.0	510	26.7 (427)
Rural non-South. . .	1.4	5.0	22.6	12.6	64.8	100.0	590	15.3 (486)
Urban South	1.7	4.5	16.8	12.9	70.3	100.0	470	14.7 (412)
Urban West.	2.0	5.1	17.2	12.3	70.5	100.0	868	14.0 (763)
Urban North	1.5	4.2	12.4	12.1	75.5	100.0	702	13.1 (644)
Elsewhere .	2.1	6.2	34.7	25.4	39.9	100.0	343	35.5 (245)
NA and other	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	- (2)
All-American Sample, ages 27-34	1.5	5.0	19.3	16.7	64.0	100.0	3,876	19.5 (3,320)

^aSee methodological note, Table II.1.

the average for the entire nation. The remarkable reversal comes here in the discovery that nonsouthern Negroes--who are virtually all urban--have very nearly 30 per cent rejection rates. Here one might immediately wonder if these nonsouthern (i.e., urban northern and midwestern) Negroes are migrants from the rural South. But we must remember that they have told us they were nonsouthern (and nearly all urban) most of the time before age 15.

Concerning the rural rates of Table V.4, we find what we must have expected concerning the South in its exceptional unfitness rates. The rural whites of the South have an unfitness rate of 26.7 per cent (compared with the "below average" 15.3 per cent rejection of nonsouthern rural whites), and the rural southern Negro is at twice the disadvantage of the rural southern white, with 51.8 per cent rejection.

Looking at it differently, urban southern Negroes are less often rejected than rural southern whites, while essentially urban nonsouthern Negroes are rejected half again as often as their southern counterparts.

Focusing on the regional comparisons, the South comes off at a substantial disadvantage in the rural whites comparison, and appallingly so for the rural Negro regardless of the comparison, but in urban life the South seems in line with other regions as far as whites are concerned and shows a substantial advantage in the comparison of urban Negroes, in the South/non-South comparison.

We could leave the matter at this point. However, with a little contemplation of these findings we recall the strength of the education variable and the likelihood that in the groupings of race/geographic origin among which we have just drawn comparisons there are substantially different distributions of educational attainment. These facts prompt us to push the analysis one step further, to try to answer the question: Are regional differences in unfitness rates closely linked to regional differences in the distribution of education?

Race and Education in the Geographic Differences
of Overall Rejection Rates

Table V.5 has been prepared to deal with the question before us. Its format deviates considerably from that of the preceding tables. While complicating this with the addition of the education variable, we have simplified our task for the moment by eliminating everything from our concern except the overall rejection rates.

TABLE V.5

OVERALL REJECTION RATES OF REGIONS, CONTROLLING FOR RURAL/URBAN ORIGIN, RACE, AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT^a

Educational Attainment	Negroes				
	Rural		Urban		
	South	Non-South	South	Non-South	
				West	North
Less than high school graduation	63 (81)	0	29 (40)	38 (56)	
High school graduation or more	24 (30)	0	11 (43)	20 (56)	
Negro averages. . .	52 (112)	0 ^b	19 (83)	30 (113) ^b	
	Whites				
Less than ninth grade.	51 (133)	27 (82)	29 (57)	23 (37)	24 (46)
Ninth to eleventh grade.	16 (123)	12 (111)	13 (93)	11 (170)	11 (126)
High school graduation	12 (126)	13 (202)	6 (116)	11 (295)	11 (255)
Any college	23 (44)	14 (93)	17 (147)	19 (261)	14 (215)
White averages. . .	27 (427)	15 (486)	15 (412)	14 (763)	13 (644)

^aData given in this table are not presented here with an accounting scheme totaling the 3,876 men ages 27 through 34, but see Table V.6. The numbers given parenthetically here are the number evaluated, on which overall rejection rates are based.

^bIn fact, there are a small number of Negroes of rural nonsouthern origin; being so few they are simply counted among the nonsouthern Negroes in the "Urban" part of this table (see footnote to Table V.6 concerning this combination).

In other words, Table V. 5 is the result of taking only the last column of Table V. 4 and then dividing each cell into levels of educational attainment. A look at the numbers in parentheses (the weighted numbers of cases on which each rate is based) shows that at a few points we are violating our rule of thumb to ignore rates based on fewer than fifty cases. Even so, because of the small number of Negroes, it has been necessary to utilize much more gross education categories for them than for the more numerous whites. We urge caution in the degree of confidence rested on comparisons involving rates computed on less than fifty cases. Among other meanings such caution must have, it prompts us to greater reluctance in deciding to attribute meaning to differences in rates. The differences can too easily be due to sampling error when the bases of percentages are under fifty cases.

Proceeding with due caution, now, we consider Table V.5. Considering the regional comparisons among Negro education groupings first, we note that both education groupings follow the regional comparison pattern we observed in Table V.4, without attending to the education distributions; controlling grossly for education, rural southern Negroes are the highest in unfitness, with the nonsouthern (nearly all urban) Negroes running second in all-Negro comparisons, and with urban southern Negroes making the best showing with distinctly lower rejection rates.

At the same time we see education, in these gross groupings of less than high school graduation versus high school or more, having its powerful effect on unfitness rates. For southern Negroes of both rural and urban origin the difference between these two education categories involves a factor of over 2.5 in rejection rates (63/24, and 29/11, respectively), comparing high rates of those with lesser education to the lower rates of those with at least high school diplomas. For nonsouthern Negroes the corresponding factor of education effect on unfitness is a bit under 2.0 ($38/20 = 1.9$). Rather than attempt a general interpretive statement here, we shall go on to consider data concerning regional comparisons of whites, since they seem to have a similar pattern; then we shall consider the possibility of looking at these as similar patterns and assess the differences.

Table V.5 presents twenty different rates of unfitness for whites, but they are not all so different. When we restrict our attention only to those with education beyond the eighth grade, we are prompted to generalize with little reluctance that the rates of unfitness are undifferentiated with respect to region and urban/rural residence, as well as educational attainment. The "little reluctance" can be expressed in the following qualifications:

1. There again seems to be a definite general tendency toward some elevation of rejection rates among those with a college education, or more compared with other high school graduates.

2. Rejection rates for men of rural background have a definite tendency toward slight elevation as compared with the urban population, but only slight among those with more than eighth grade education.

3. There is uncertainty about the low of 6 per cent rejection among southern urban white high school graduates and the relatively high rate of 23 per cent among southern rural whites with any college education. Are these deviations from the grossly undifferentiated array of rates merely random fluctuations associated with sampling error, or are they true reflections of something different going on in these two sectors of the southern white population? For the time being, this question must go unanswered.

With these three qualifications we have said that rejection rates for whites with more than eighth grade education are undifferentiated as far as regional and urban/rural and added education distinctions are concerned. Now, what of those who never entered high school? It would appear that except for the rural South, for whites, such deficiency in educational attainment doubles the rejection rate. If the average for whites with more than eighth grade education is around 12 to 14 per cent rejected, for those with eighth grade or less it would appear to be around 24 to 28 per cent rejection.

But the rural South is the exception. What was said earlier of Negroes is now found true of whites as well: the rejection rate for the rural South is appallingly high by any comparison among whites. That rate of 51 per cent is roughly twice as high as the average rejection rate for all others with eight or fewer grades of schooling. It is between three and four times as high as the average for those with more than an eighth grade education.

At any earlier point we injected the idea of modernization into the context of a discussion revolving around urbanization. We suggest here that if there is one major sector of the American social order that still awaits modernity, it is the rural South, regardless of race. The data seem to suggest that throughout the social order education beyond eighth grade is sufficient to bring rejection rates down to rock bottom--between 10 and 15 per cent. However, in close

agreement with Department of Defense interpretations of mental test rejection level equivalents in educational attainment, failure to go beyond eighth grade is accompanied by greatly elevated rejection rates.

Now we suspect that two factors contribute to the exaggerated deviation in higher rejection rates for both whites and Negroes with eighth grade education or less in the rural South. First, let us look at the distribution for the white and Negro populations of the rural South with respect to education. (This can be done in a crude manner by looking at the numbers of cases given in parentheses in Table V.6 as the bases for the calculations of rates.) For the Negroes, first of all, we find the distribution to have much more weight in the lower education bracket in the instance of the rural South (94 less than high school but only 31 with high school or better). Compare this with the urban southern Negroes with a balance of only 44 with less but 49 with education of high school or better, while for the urban northern Negroes the balance is 66 less educated and 61 more educated. Since there may be persons with as little as three or only one year of formal education, or even none at all, we must imagine how this balance would look if we had the data to distribute these cases in detailed categories below eighth grade; e.g., seventh grade, sixth grade, and so on down to first grade and "no schooling."

Were it possible to do this across the board with both Negroes and whites (taken separately of course), we are certain from the patterns of our data that such a detailed education distribution would have a far heavier lower tail for the rural South than for the rural non-South or the urban population of any region. Then with more population on the extreme lower end of the educational distribution one would expect this to contribute to an elevation of rejection rates in a broad lowest education category which lumps together the extremely low detailed categories of education. Since we know this happens more often in the rural South, for both whites and Negroes, we believe this is a part of the explanation of the "appallingly high rejection rates"--51 per cent among whites and 63 per cent among Negroes--in the rural South.

The other factor we suspect is operating is in a way closely linked with the first. In a sector of the social order which constrains substantially fewer of its members to progress at least as far as the eighth grade minimum in education,

we expect to find in the elementary schools provided by that sector of the social order a somewhat lower quality of education for those who do come to get it. This is only an expectation here, as far as the data of our study are concerned, but this expectation fits the data and it fits our picture of the rural South still awaiting fulfillment of modernization. Note that we are not even talking about the entire population of the rural South. We are not talking of those who go on with some high school education or more, whether white or Negro. Rather we are speaking of those who have never glimpsed education beyond the eighth grade--or did not even get that far--in the country grade schools, Negro as well as white, of the rural South during the 1940's and early 1950's.

Thus we find these differences associated with the South: (1) Negroes of low education and their white counterparts show exceptionally high rates of rejection; and (2) urban northern Negro rejection rates tend to be high while urban southern Negroes tend to compare favorably with urban whites of any region. Except for these unique features we believe we have convincing evidence of the comparability of rejection rates of the South with those of any other region, when due consideration is given to regional differences in rural/urban, racial, and educational distributions of the population.

Race and Education in the Geographic Differences
of Rates of Military Service and Deferment

Our final task here is to assess the variations in rates of military experience, in the light of what Table V. 5 tells about rejection rates, with some attention to rates of "deferment." For this purpose we shall consider Table V. 6. Table V. 6 has the same breakdown into subpopulations as Table V. 5. The notations concerning the rejection rates of Table V.5 are entered in the upper left corner for each grouping and have the following meaning: Low: less than 10 per cent; Average: 10-19 per cent; Moderately high: 20-29 per cent; Very high: 30 per cent and higher.

Remember that the bases for the calculation of "overall rejection rates" are the number examined rather than the total number of men in the subpopulation. This means that the percentages of Table V. 5 when combined with the corresponding rates of military experience and of "deferment" in Table V. 6 will not generally total 100 per cent, nor should they, according to mathematical logic.

Except for the two rows presenting the Negro and white averages, each cell of the Table V. 6 represents subpopulations based on regional and rural/urban origin (across the top) and race and educational attainment (top to bottom).

TABLE V.6

RATES OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND OF "DEFERMENT," BY REGION, CONTROLLING FOR RURAL/URBAN ORIGIN, RACE, AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, WITH NOTATION OF RELATIVE MAGNITUDE OF OVERALL REJECTION RATES (FROM TABLE V.5)^a

Educational Attainment	Negroes				
	Rural		Urban		
	South	Non-South	South	Non-South	
				West	North
Less than high school graduation	Very high 23 23 (94)	0	Moderately high 50 23 (44)	Very high 44 24 (66)	
High school graduation or more	Moderately high 71 6 (31)	0	Average 76 14 (49)	Moderately high 67 15 (61)	
Negro averages ^b .	35 19 (127)	0 ^c	64 19 (92)	54 19 (128) ^c	
	Whites				
Less than ninth grade.	Very high 38 21 (167)	Moderately high 55 23 (101)	Moderately high 59 16 (66)	Moderately high 55 28 (51)	Moderately high 72 5 (47)
Ninth to eleventh grade.	Average 71 15 (141)	Average 70 21 (137)	Average 82 5 (97)	Average 75 15 (193)	Average 77 13 (139)
High school graduation . . .	Average 70 19 (148)	Average 67 23 (245)	Low 77 18 (136)	Average 78 13 (319)	Average 81 9 (275)
Any college . . .	Moderately high 54 27 (53)	Average 63 25 (107)	Average 63 23 (172)	Average 62 22 (305)	Average 69 18 (239)
White averages ^b .	58 19 (510)	65 23 (590)	70 17 (470)	71 17 (868)	75 12 (702)

^aLegend for notation of unfitness rates: Low is less than 10 per cent; Average is 10-19 per cent; Moderately high is 20-29 per cent; Very high is 30 per cent and higher (but see Table V.5). The central figure in each cell is Military Experience Rate; the lower left figure in each cell is the "Deferment" Rate; bases of rates are parenthetical.

^bThese averages and case bases are directly from Table V.4. In general, discrepancies in vertical addition are due to rounding of fractional case weights; these is slight loss due to education NA.

^cActually, there were twelve Negroes of rural nonsouthern origin, but being so few they are included as "Urban."

The central figure in each cell is the rate of military experience for that subpopulation, calculated on the basis of the total weighted number of sample cases for that subpopulation, the rate base being the number in parentheses.

The figure entered in the lower left-hand corner of each cell is the deferment rate for the subpopulation in question, based again on the number of weighted cases in parentheses. Recall that we use the label "deferment" presumptively, for a residual category comprised of all nonveterans who cannot be identified as rejectees. This includes nonveterans giving insufficient information concerning evaluation experience, as well as those with an indication of never being evaluated, and nonveterans claiming that evaluation found them qualified.

If properly recalculated, the data shown in Table V. 5 added to the combined central and lower left rates of the corresponding cells of Table V. 6 will always total 100 per cent, except for rounding error.

Taking the Negro portion of Table V. 6 as a start, note that the central figures for Negroes attaining less than high school graduation show military experience rates ranging from 23 per cent in the rural South to 50 per cent in the urban South, with the urban northern Negroes in between at 44 per cent. We also note virtually no variation whatever across the Negro subpopulations regarding deferment rates, which are relatively high at 23 and 24 per cent. This indicates that variations in military experience rates for these groupings of Negroes are to be understood entirely in relation to variations in unfitness. The cell that involved the extremely high rate of 63 per cent rejection also has the extremely low rate of 23 per cent entering active service, and so on.

Among Negroes who at least completed high school we find a modest amount of variation in military experience rates, from 67 per cent to 76 per cent, all three above the overall sample average of 64 per cent for men 27 through 34 years old. With caution due the few cases on which these rates are calculated, we note that the military experience rates seem to follow the fluctuations of the corresponding rejection rates of Table V. 5 in no consistent relation to the deferment rate variations of Table V.6.

Now recall that in earlier stages of analysis the higher rates of deferment were always associated with rural populations and/or with higher

education. In Table V. 6, however, the rural southern Negroes attaining the higher levels of education show only 6 per cent deferred, or less than one-third the average for Negroes generally. Since in the present analytic effort we are not attending to the volunteer/nonvolunteer distinction we cannot deal with the problem of why these Negroes do not show a higher deferment rate and lower service entry rate. It could be that their relationship to farm enterprise less frequently wins them deferment even when they seek it, but it could be that they prefer military service and less frequently seek farm deferment.

An additional problem here, calling for further analytic effort later, is the general pattern of deferment rates among the groupings of Negroes in Table V. 6. Hitherto we have generally seen deferment rates vary in two major ways, regarding rural/urban origin and education: higher deferment rates with rural origin, and higher deferment rates with education beyond high school. But with Negroes we see, if anything, a reversal of the rural origin relationship and consistently moderately high deferments with low educational attainment. There is clearly much more to be understood here. It seems possible that one condition which would exaggerate the deferment rates of Negroes never completing high school is our inability to detect persons informally screened by draft boards as insufficiently educated. Another possible condition which would locate higher rates of deferment among the less educated Negroes is the probability that discontinued education and migratory behavior are associated, and migratory behavior is probably accompanied frequently by disruption of communication between draft board and registrant. Such registrants, having escaped evaluation for service, would fall into our "deferred" category as never examined. There are perhaps other interesting possibilities for the explanation on which we speculate here, but all this must await other analytic investigations.

~~We turn now to the portion of Table V. 6 devoted to rates for the~~
whites of the sample. Among rural white populations we find a general tendency for the South to show slightly lower rates of deferment than the rural non-South. However, for the rural whites generally we see very little variation in rates of deferment, either by region or by education. Altogether, the eight rates given range from 15 to 27 per cent. Ignoring for the moment those of no high school experience, deferment rates increase from 15 to 19 to 27 per cent with increasing education attained in the rural South, but increase slightly, 21 to 23 to 25 per cent, for whites of nonsouthern rural origin.

A related but reversed and more widely ranging pattern is present in the rates of military experience. Rural whites of the non-South with more than eighth grade range only from 70 down to 63 per cent active service, with greater attainment of education. However, rural southern whites range seventeen percentage points, from 71 down to 54 per cent active service, and nearly all the difference here is made by entering into some college experience.

Having sufficiently ignored the rural whites who never entered high school, we now note that there is no appreciable regional difference among them as far as deferment rates are concerned. Rather, the big difference of seventeen percentage points--from 38 per cent rural southerners entering service to 55 per cent rural nonsoutherners--relates directly to the big difference in rejection rates (51 per cent in the rural South but only 27 per cent for the remainder of the rural whites with such restricted education).

If we were to sum up all that has been observed so far about rural whites in Table V. 6, it would go something like this: on the average there do not seem to be great South/non-South differences, but education makes a great deal more difference in the rural South than in the rural non-South at both extremes; in the South low education is accompanied by much more rejection and lower rates of military service, and education beyond high school is accompanied by greater increments in deferment and rejection, and greater reduction in service entry rates, as compared with the rural non-South.

Now we turn to the urban whites. Again we notice that on the average there would seem hardly enough regional differentiation to mention. For nearly every possible rural/urban comparison the rural deferment rates are higher than urban, while the urban active service rates are higher than the rural. The latter is of course directly related to the former, but it is also related to our observation, in Table V. 5, that rural rejection rates are virtually always higher than corresponding urban rejection rates (except when we restrict our comparison to farm versus urban blue collar).

Now we shall attempt more "summaries," but involving three-way comparisons this time: South, West, and North. With respect to education there seem to be no neat patterns of deferment rates. However, the variability and range of

deferment rates are differentiated by region. The range of rates by education decreases from South to West to North--eighteen, fifteen, and thirteen percentage points, respectively. Again we find the tendency for higher rates of deferment to accompany both extremes in education. An exception to this is the urban North, where one of the lowest rates (i.e., only 5 per cent deferment) occurs among those never entering high school. In no other subpopulation with this much educational handicap does the rate of active service reach 60 per cent, but with the urban North it reaches 72 per cent, with a rejection rate that is par for this education level, but a very low deferment rate.

Finally, with the military experience rates we note the following pattern: differentiated into educational attainment groupings, urban southerners and urban westerners both have rate ranges of twenty-three percentage points--from 59 to 82 per cent, and from 55 to 78 per cent, respectively--while the urban North has a range of only twelve percentage points--from 69 to 81 per cent. For the urban populations of all three regional categories the highest active service rates and the greatest clustering of rates occurs among those with at least some high school but no education beyond. However, in both the South and the West large differences in service entry rates occur to set off both extreme groupings in educational attainment from the high school but no more groupings. The same pattern is present with those of the urban North, but here the education-related differences in service entry rates are so modulated as to be considered negligible were it not for similarities to the urban South and West. In general we see service rates of 75 to 82 per cent among urban whites with some high school but no college, across the board regionally. Among those with college the rates are between 60 and 70 per cent. Among those never entering high school, while those of the urban North can nearly match their educational betters with a 72 per cent service rate, in the urban South and West men who never went to high school experienced depressed active service rates--59 and 55 per cent, respectively. The net result of these differences verifies a possibility noted in connection with Table V.4, that if one controls for the differing composition of white populations with respect to urban/rural residence and education, the regional comparisons will yield very little military service rate differential among white subpopulations.

Summary

Comparing Negroes with whites, among these with a completed high school education or more we find comparable rates of military service, around 70 per cent and higher regardless of region or rural/urban differences, in spite of moderately high rejection rates of rural southern and urban nonsouthern Negroes. Comparing less educated Negroes and whites, we find evidence of heavy disadvantage among Negroes in terms of high rejection rates, and their military service rates vary in close inverse relationship to these rejection rates.

Looking only at Negroes, those of urban background--both southern and nonsouthern--have military service rates varying in a tight inverse relationship to rejection rates which in turn show great inverse variation with education. This is also true for rural southern Negroes of low education, but for rural southern Negroes who have attained high school diplomas or better there is a military experience rate of 71 per cent, on a par with urban white averages, in spite of a moderately high rejection rate. While rural southern and urban nonsouthern Negroes show marked disadvantage in unfitness vis-à-vis white counterparts, urban southern Negroes are very much on a par with their white counterparts, taking education into account.

Among whites we might suggest that there are no notable differentials with respect to region and rural/urban background, when education is taken into account, except as the upper and lower extremes of the education dimension in the case of rural southern whites. There we find substantially depressed military experience rates--only 38 per cent among those never entering high school and only 54 per cent among those with any college education. This low rate among those with little education is closely linked to very high rejection rates, while the low service rate of those with college education is related to both relatively high rejection and deferment rates. This latter finding can be viewed as an exaggerated form of the finding which applies to all white groupings according to region and rural/urban background, when men with college and graduate study are lumped together.

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND REJECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II

If one problem more than any other pervades the array of concerns about military manpower procurement in the contemporary United States, surely it lies at the nexus of freedom of the individual and his society-determined prospects of military service. The customary terminology for this problem includes "equitability of Selective Service" and "draft fairness." The frame of reference of such considerations is that the United States is a society of democratic institutions and its military manpower procurement institutions had better be no exception. Highly responsible and widely respected voices have vented these concerns, now with a heated Vietnam backdrop as well as in 1964, antecedent of the Vietnam escalation.¹

Apropos of the setting in which this 1964 manpower study was designed, consider, as an example of equity concerns, two quotations from a speech on the Senate floor in June 1964 by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D., Wisconsin). He was proposing a Senate resolution not to renew the present Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1967. Furthermore, the Department of Defense was to be made responsible for providing Congress with two detailed workable alternatives--one a voluntary, the other an involuntary procurement plan--to be considered as replacement for the present UMTS provisions (Nelson, 1964):

Because the draft in its "pure" form supplies far more men than we need, we have corrupted the system to favor: Those who can afford to stay in college until they are twenty-six years old; those who

¹It will be evident immediately that our perspective here does not front on the entire expanse of the individual/society nexus. Granted, there are questions being raised all the way from the grand level of the morality and legality of foreign policy, and individual responsibility for policy in a democratic society, to policy for dealing with individuals conscientiously opposing the actions of their government. Furthermore, aside from the questions pertaining to manpower procurement, there are the questions of how military structure and authority are to be shaped to fit into a society of democratic institutions,

marry early; men with criminal records or moral shortcomings; those who are mentally or physically below standard--and the standards are increasingly arbitrary; those whose employers will claim that they are essential.

.....

This plan, Mr. President, aims at moving forward to end compulsion in the military service--to reinstate freedom in this vital branch of American life.

.....

For all citizens, it will remove a system which is inequitable in operation, which emphasizes class divisions, and which is not in accord with our democratic tradition.

At the time of study design this commentary on military manpower procurement might have been thought of as only one side of an argument involving varying kinds and degrees of political motive. But with the Montreal speech of Secretary of Defense McNamara on May 18, 1966, there would seem to be little room left for conjecture about the widespread existence of inequities (McNamara, 1966).

But what are the specifications of a "democratic institution"? How can we conceive of a complex of military manpower procurement institutions that could be called "democratic"? Avoiding the morass of extended analysis we suggest in brief sketch two abstract models of manpower procurement that might be considered democratic.

The voluntary procurement model makes one of two alternative assumptions.

Either 1. Manipulations of pay, allowances, fringe benefits, and any other

and the individual lives of its members. These questions are obviously not a part of our task here.

Rather, in this beginning of our summary chapter it has seemed necessary to recognize that one kind of question--that of "equitability"--will have been entertained by numerous readers all along our path, even though we have taken great care not to deal with it directly. Neither do we find it possible to deal with the question of equitability conclusively in this chapter. However, having taken upon ourselves the responsibility of presenting data which could be used by some to deal with the equitability question, we find ourselves responsible for suggesting ways in which our presentation may be related to the question of equitability. Furthermore, the experience of carrying out the foregoing analyses has yielded some insights about the ways in which one might become involved in questions of equitability.

Recognition of these facts finds its limited expression in the following section with references to what some may think of as considerations of equity, and by brief sketches of how "democratic" manpower procurement models might look.

sources of satisfaction which might be created for men in uniform, will be adequate in competition with the civilian job/career market to keep both quality and quantity of military manpower at the levels believed necessary.

- Or 2. To the extent that manipulations of incentives and rewards are inadequate to maintain specified levels of military manpower quality and quantity it would be necessary to find functional alternatives to military manpower such that lower levels of manpower would not prevent solution of problems.

In a nutshell, for the voluntary manpower procurement model to be acceptable, either it must always be possible to get enough of the right kinds of volunteers, or there must be alternative solutions which do not involve unavailable levels of military manpower quantity and quality. At least one of these conditions must be satisfied if an involuntary procurement scheme is to be avoided.

With the voluntary procurement model we like to assume that an institution which serves society through the behavior of voluntary participants is surely a democratic institution, or at least is permissible in a democratic society. Some might argue that such a "voluntary procurement system" discriminates unfairly with respect to the interests of those who consider military service a great opportunity but find themselves rejected as unfit for such service. Others may object that obviously the incentives and rewards manipulated in such fashion as to provide the specified quantity and quality of military manpower would involve the result of differential (hence unfair) access to these incentives and rewards. But if that is contrary to democratic values and therefore objectionable, then the larger part of the economic system of the United States might be found objectionable. This is not the occasion on which to settle that question.

Now we turn to the problems of conceptualizing a nonvoluntary military manpower procurement model which would be acceptable by criteria of a democratic value system. There is generally thought to be a principle of equity at work in laws of universal application. If the Universal Military Training and Service Act were what its name implies it would be an example of the kind of

equity we have in mind here. Several factors working together have prevented this kind of equity from being realized under the UMTS laws since World War II.² Salient among these factors are:

1. Since 1945 the Department of Defense has never needed two years of service from every man of an age cohort.

2. There has never been a cohort of which every member was fit for service by any realistic standard of evaluation. Thus approximation of universality has been in part a matter of definition of minimal fitness for service.

3. There have always been circumstances which were agreed to be good enough reason--presumably in the public interest--to exclude those to whom the circumstances applied. This agreement apparently has existed on the level of general public opinion, as well as among policy makers and legislators. In consequence there are agricultural and nonagricultural occupation deferments, student deferments, dependency and financial hardship deferments, to name some salient circumstances of exclusion.

Now the "pure" model of involuntary procurement--i.e., universal participation--can be considered equitable only as long as one insists that "no man is different from any other man." As soon as certain distinctions are proposed as representing circumstances under which service imposes a greater hardship on some persons than on others, then the equitability of the universal participation principle is called into question. It is not clear that there is a circumscribed set of principles that limits what circumstances are to be accepted as relevant to this kind of hardship/equitability consideration, other than the specific provisions by which deferments are currently defined. If there were no limiting principles one could interpolate the voluntary system of procurement as a unique derivative of the universal participation form of equity, in which unwillingness to serve is the circumstance under which military service

²There is a published discussion of the ideas of "equity" which were thought by the National Manpower Council to apply to the UMTS Act of 1948, and the successive acts, amendments, and implementations which followed, through the period of the Korean war (See National Manpower Council, 1952, pp. 92-102). In a later publication (1954, esp. pp. 21-23) the Council has sought to demonstrate its influence through the 1952 publication just cited.

becomes too much hardship to impose. This may seem absurd, but it is one of the logically possible end points to be reached when one begins to modify a universal participation system in the direction of "improving equity."

Taking a second look at the "universal service" approach to equitability, we should note that this is really only a special case of a more general model of involuntary procurement equity. If we translate our thinking into probability terms, the universal service model is "fair" because every man has full --therefore equal--probability (i.e., 1.000) of service. The more general model of equitable involuntary procurement, then, is to be realized under conditions by which every man's probability of entering service equals the risk of every other member of his cohort, whether the risk is 1 out of 1,000 or 95 out of 100 for every man. This is of course the general model which underlies the idea of a "lottery" system of involuntary military manpower procurement.

It may be no problem to us to accept this "equal risk" model of procurement in its pure form as a fair system--the statistician and our own logic assure us of this. There are problems, though. One problem is that we are not likely to see a system like this operate in anywhere near a "pure" form for reasons similar to the second and third factors (above) in which the UMTS legislation has not been realized in its pure form. But another problem is that if an equal risk system were operated in pure form--i.e., equal risks for every man--the actual experience of it would be increasingly unacceptable to those individuals affected, as the risks fell farther and farther toward 50 per cent and under. Under such circumstances "bad luck" becomes experienced as increasingly severe bad luck. And with the current trends in military strength levels and size of male population reaching age eighteen each year, such continued lowering of risks is very much a part of long-run prospects.

The foregoing section has developed a terminology and expanded the possibilities of conceptualizing the considerations pertaining to equity of manpower procurement systems. It has also suggested that some criteria of equity may be incompatible with each other. It is further suggested that the facts of the real world may cut across and operationally modify attempts to realize manpower procurement equity by any ideal standards. We are now

prepared to summarize the preceding analytic chapters, at the same time suggesting how the data may be related to considerations of equity.

Summary of Analytic Results

There is no question that the Universal Military Training and Service (UMTS) Act upon which the United States has depended for military manpower since about 1950 is an adaptation of the equal risk/nonvoluntary manpower procurement model. Just why the legislation should bear the title it has is not entirely clear. It has been far from "universal" in operation, but it does not necessarily follow that it has been inequitable in operation.

Of those cohorts young enough to have avoided the heavy manpower demands of World War II, available sources suggest that the highest overall rate of serving has been between 70 and 75 per cent. This happened to the cohort born in 1932 as the result of the high manpower demand of the Korean war. Of the more than one-fourth of the male population not serving in that period, it appears that about one-third enjoyed some form of deferment while the other two-thirds were rejected as unfit for service.

Since the Korean war, the military participation rates of cohorts have declined to less than 60 per cent. With this decline an increasing proportion of those never serving--one-half and perhaps more of the roughly 40 per cent--were deferred while the rejectees were an increasingly smaller proportion of those never serving. We should add, of course, that with these trends, there may have been an increase in the perceivable severity of the "bad luck" of those unwillingly called to service. (These trends are of course highly complex, involving for example size of cohort, changes in military manpower strength levels, increasingly sophisticated military technology related to changing requirements of military manpower "quality," and so on. An analysis of these complexities is not part of our task here.)

Throughout our analyses of military experience rates of men born in 1930-37 (Chaps. II-V) we have dealt with analytic questions along the lines of the equal risk/nonvoluntary manpower procurement model. However, we took care to use the model analytically, rather than in relation to democratic values and considerations of equity. In other words, we were raising sociological questions calling for some understanding of rate differentials rather

than raising questions about ways in which some groupings of men are more "advantaged" or "disadvantaged" than other groupings.


At this stage of research the understanding sought has necessarily been limited. For example, we have not sought a breakdown that will show whether service participation rates of some groupings are constituted entirely by voluntary entry while other groupings may be composed of men most of whom entered only under coercion. Nor have we sought to uncover whether some kinds of men found more or greater advantages in military service than other kinds of men. These are but a few of the limits we have set on the sociological understanding sought in these chapters, and it is within these limits that we shall now review our analyses.

Our entire analysis has taken educational attainment and rejection rates as the point of departure in understanding differentials of military service participation rates. We went to some lengths to show a number of ways in which education is intimately related to probabilities of military service. Proceeding from that point two analyses were developed, one focusing on a variety of aspects of socio-economic background, the other on aspects of regional and rural/urban childhood residence. In both analyses educational attainment and rejection rates continued to play central analytic roles.

For summary purposes we may consider the first of these--the analysis of aspects of socio-economic background--to be brought into final focus in the data presented in Tables IV.2 and IV.3. Chart VI.1 is adapted from those data and based on 3,823 cases representing the white and Negro populations of men aged 27 through 34 in 1964. (Some 53 cases of men in this age range, mostly of "other race," and have been omitted from this presentation.)

An important feature of this chart is that it represents the social groupings of Tables IV.2 and IV.3 defined by distinctions in education, race, and socio-economic background in such a manner as to show what part of the total male population falls into each grouping. The groupings are laid out along a horizontal scale from 0 to 100 per cent at the bottom of the chart, to show their relative size. The percentage of the total population which a given grouping constitutes is entered along the top of the chart. For example, we see that low SES white men with eighth grade or less are 11.9 per cent,

CHART VI.1--RATES OF MILITARY SERVICE, "DEFERMENT," AND UNFITNESS, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, RACE, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, AMONG MEN AGED 27-34 IN 1964 (ADAPTED FROM TABLES IV.2 AND IV.3, PP. 54 AND 55)



while whites with graduate study are 4.3 per cent (1.8 plus 2.5 per cent), of the total population.

As noted in the previous chapter, Negroes with any college are so few (only 1.4 per cent) that a breakdown in categories of "college dropout," "college degree," and "graduate student" is not feasible.

For slight easing of eye strain we have combined socio-economic categories of whites at the "college degree" level. This is justifiable because among the high-middle-low socio-economic groupings here there is only a range of about three percentage points in military service rates, from 69 to 72 per cent.

The overall rate of 64 per cent military service participation--in effect, the level of military manpower strength levels set for the Department of Defense--is represented in the chart by the bold horizontal line cross-cutting the chart at the 64 per cent level. This can be thought of as the average of all groupings. And if one were to use the equal risk/nonvoluntary procurement model as the sole criterion of "equity," deviations from this line would be indications of inequity.

Our summary of the overall picture with respect to socio-economic background consists of the following four observations:

1. There is no general pattern of differences in military participation rates with respect to socio-economic background, when educational attainment is taken into account. However, that 11.9 per cent of the population made up of low SES whites without any high school, and the 5.3 per cent (2.5 plus 2.8 per cent) who are Negroes without high school diplomas, show effects of distinct socio-economic disadvantage corresponding closely with greatly reduced risks of military service, when compared with the mid- and high SES whites who never entered high school. While the latter are close to the average at near 60 per cent serving, the more disadvantaged range from 46 per cent serving (Negro high school dropouts) down to 25 per cent serving (Negroes with no high school). Evidently it takes high school education or more to smooth out socio-economic differences in probabilities of service.

2. For the greater than 95 per cent of the population never engaging in graduate study there is a striking complementarity of fit across the entire

gamut of population groupings between proportion rejected and proportion entering service--another way of saying that the proportion "deferred" shows little variability. With the overall rate of "deferred" at 19.3 per cent, graduate students are the notable deviations at about 54 per cent "deferred." Aside from these major deviations involving only 4 per cent of the population, there are only two small groupings which involve deviations of more than 5 percentage points from the 19.3 average "deferred." White high SES high school dropouts and Negro high school graduates are uniquely below the 19.3 per cent average "deferred," at 9.9 per cent and 11.7 per cent "deferred" respectively. These two small groupings with very low deferment (involving 2.2 and 2.3, or less than 5 per cent of the population), and graduate students (4.3 per cent of the population) are the only flaw in the picture of apparently very equitable deferment rates. Enjoying a college student deferment does not contribute to substantially lower risks of military service in the long run, except for the few who go on to graduate study.

3. Educational attainment is a crucial discriminator of risks--or opportunities--of military service. But on the gross level of the overall military participation rates in the present analysis, this is true only at the extremes involving those never entering high school and those going beyond college to graduate study. At either extreme the participation rates tend to be well below 50 per cent, and range below 25 per cent. It is at this point that one is faced with severe problems of equity.

a. Rejection of the poorly educated.--There may be those, tending to view military service as a risk to be avoided, who consider lower service participation rates as fair compensation for social groupings which suffer excessive rejection--read "social deprivation"--rates. But it may be precisely these social groupings (poorly educated Negroes and low SES whites) that consider military service an opportunity to "get ahead," to be respected. On the other hand, there are those who deplore lower status groups that entertain high rejection rates, thereby getting the opportunity to "enjoy" low service participation rates. This is only a crude statement of opposing views concerning the equity problem as it pertains to the educationally disadvantaged.

b. The privilege of graduate study.--At the risk of oversimplification, let us suggest that there may be two types of graduate students, those for whom being a student is nearly a career and those for whom study is a step toward a career. Further, let us affirm that graduate study has great compensations for some and breath-taking costs for many. Graduate study is the major formally established avenue by which this society produces its literary, scientific, and professional intellectual elite. It is an empirical question whether or not loss in such a production process would occur if graduate study, instead of being a haven from military service, were to always involve a two-year interruption for service. An additional question, if loss there is, would be how costly might the adjustments be to compensate the loss.

As it now stands, if military service is to be viewed as a generally undersirable experience to be avoided if possible, then high SES whites have an advantage over whites of lesser SES, in the following complex fashion: Our data suggest that one out of eight of those with high socio-economic background go on to graduate study, where about 75 per cent of them "enjoy avoiding the service," while for whites of lesser socio-economic advantage only one out of forty attains graduate study status, and only about 65 per cent of these never enter service. While they enjoy equal chances of deferment, the high SES whites have a higher rate of rejection.

4. After our original presentation of the data in Chart VI.1, in Tables IV.2 and IV.3, we adapted them to explore the interaction of effects of education and rural life (Table IV.4). There it was possible to demonstrate that regardless of education attained, the men of rural background enjoy deferment rates averaging better than half again as high as men from urban blue collar homes. At the same time we were demonstrating that the rural environment has not been producing more unfitness than the urban blue collar home except among men never progressing beyond eighth grade in their education, and that holds true primarily in the rural South. The upshot of this, in terms of equity, conforms to the picture represented by the chart, but with one new ingredient of consistent inequity of service participation rates.

Single family farm enterprises have long commanded a unique kind of sacredness in the culture and economy of this nation, and military manpower procurement has been no exception. Of course, the issue, rationally argued, has been that agriculture is one major and indispensable sector of the economy whether for war or for peace, and the value of one farm enterprise is far more in the economy than the military value of the one man indispensable to that enterprise, were he to be utilized as a fighting man at the expense of his farm enterprise.

This would seem to be an empirical question amenable to some degree of testing and quantification. A large proportion of the single family farm enterprises are marginal now, and there continues to be a vast rural-to-urban shift. It is not at all clear where the public interest lies, nor what all the considerations of equity might be, in the matter of military utilization of rural manpower, but this would certainly seem to be an area of major questions and concerns.

Beyond this analysis of effects of socio-economic background, we proceeded through an analysis of effects of geographic origins in terms of region and rural/urban location. Perhaps it will be possible, in reviewing that second analysis, to arrive at the broadest possible overall perspective of manpower procurement equity problems (Table V.6 will provide the basic data for our reference here).

We visualize a map of the United States on which to etch the results of our analytic findings (see Fig. V.1). It is a commonplace that we live with the continuing processes of urbanization and industrialization, and the more vaguely conceived and generalized process of modernization, as these processes flow through the social life of this nation.

The geography of these processes shows individuals and families leaving rural life for urban life, leaving farms and small town situations for a variety of occupations situated nearer to or in the metropolitan area, and we see the burgeoning of a wide range of industries adding more drawing power to the urban centers.

These urban centers generate increasing modernization, among other things including better and more widespread provisions for health and welfare, improved

and more widely available education and more levels and kinds of education and technical training, and in general more familiarity with the entire modern world. (We have picked these features of modernity here in particular because of their obvious relevance to fitness for military service.) Our data suggest that if rates of rejection can be considered indicators of modernity in the population, there is little regional differentiation as far as the modernity of the urban population is concerned. The four regions--North, South, Midwest, Far West--all have rejection rates within the range of 11.2 to 17.2 per cent in their urban populations.

Only after comparing the rejection rates of the rural populations of these regions does the South draw special attention. On closer scrutiny we find several factors contributing to the uniqueness of the South. Of the men we have studied who report their childhood as mostly if not entirely southern, a few over half are from farm families. The Midwest, next highest in proportion of these men from rural origins, shows 34 per cent, or only two-thirds as high a rural proportion as the South. The overall average of rural origins among those not from the South is about one-fourth of their total population, or only one-half the 50 per cent rural of the South.

Next, Negroes generally have gotten last and least to the opportunities of modernity, as these opportunities were set forth above, and those of southern background include Negroes as nearly one-fifth of their total, with nearly 60 per cent of these Negroes coming from rural homes. The men of nonsouthern origin are only about 6 per cent Negroes, of whom less than one-tenth have rural backgrounds.

Furthermore, among rural whites from the South one-third report the education they attained included no high school, while of the rural whites of other than southern origin only one-sixth report such limited education.

Finally, we have noted that in general, among whites, the difference between having and not having any high school education involves a doubling of rejection rates. Among Negroes, even those with incomplete high school experience suffer such a disparity of rejection rates. However, in this connection we found that while the rural non-South conforms to these findings, the rural South has even higher rejection rates both for less educated Negroes and less educated

whites, within the limits of educational attainment we have just defined. Southern rural whites whose education never got beyond eighth grade have had a 51 per cent rejection rate, while rural Southern Negroes who have not completed high school have a 63 per cent rejection rate. (The only other grouping with a rejection rate exceeding 30 per cent is urban nonsouthern Negroes, at 38 per cent.)

With these observations in mind, we note a lag in the processes of modernization in rural areas, but especially the rural South, and a lag in the demographic aspects of urbanization and industrialization in the South as compared with the rest of the nation. Using rejection rates as indicators of modernity, we have shown what great correspondence there is between this set of features of the American social system as a whole and the workings of the military manpower procurement institutions in use since World War II.

These manpower procurement institutions are not antecedent to the conditions we have observed. Our observations have by their focus shown most of our concerns with inequities of manpower procurement to be rooted in the workings of the larger system in general and particularly in its socialization processes. That is to say, fitness for military service is not entirely unrelated to how well the individual copes with the conditions of modern life. In fact, as has been pointed out by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and by the authors of One-Third of a Nation, there is reason for great concern about inabilities to cope with modern life in the civilian sectors of society in the case of men found unable to meet the standards of life in the military sector.

This brings us back to the nature of these standards of military fitness. It is in the nature of the development of these standards and the way in which they are repeatedly modified that the military establishment might have any antecedent responsibility in the rejection rates we have used as an index of modernity.

There seem to be three points where there are major questions to be answered.

1. For what range of military occupations or activities can the behavioral sciences show sufficient sophistication in tests and measurements of the individual and in task analysis to provide objective grounds for selection and allocation of

military manpower? This can be a very difficult question. An answer of "no range at all" could mean that the present elaborate selection procedures are unwarranted. In fact, their use would raise questions of equity. But if some substantial range of military occupations or activities can be dealt with competently, we arrive at the next two questions:

2. Obviously, there are alternative economies of manpower utilization involved in the choice of standards by which to manage the "quality" of manpower being procured. Presumably, the higher the general level of fitness--or "quality"--maintained, the greater versatility and effectiveness of the Armed Forces one might expect. However, have "quality" standards been manipulated as sluice gates to regulate quantity, instead of quality per se, thereby introducing a bias or inequity not required by any particular economy of manpower utilization?
3. Finally, recognizing that the present structure of manpower utilization has built into it a vast rotation-of-manpower scheme which seems to require a sort of universal standard of fitness, we are faced with the question not only whether alternatives to this notion are possible but also whether a massive modification of manpower utilization policy away from the generalized rotation-of-manpower scheme is becoming unavoidable.

A part of the issue here is the possibility of an equity criterion which says it is not fair to take only those men capable of all military activities and reject all others. Another part of the problem concerns the manner in which such a massive change as a shift from general interchangeability to interchangeability within specialty areas may be feasible, desirable, and/or necessary.

It has been necessary to this extent to deal with questions of the validity and application of standards of military fitness because of the relevance of these questions to any conclusions one might reach on the basis of data we have presented. If the "standards of fitness" in use are invalid,

or if the manner of application of these standards has not been dictated by some demonstrable and objective "necessity" or "manpower requirement" of the Armed Forces, then to that extent differential rates of rejection are evidence of unfairness or unjustifiable discrimination. On the other hand, if the standards are valid and are applied in a justifiable manner, then differential rates of rejection are indicators of inequities in the manpower pool provided by society-at-large, rather than in the manpower procurement system. The data here presented do not answer the questions about validity of standards or the justifiable manner of application of those standards.

In order to proceed with our line of analysis concerning inequity, we shall make the following assumption for the time being: the application of valid military fitness standards is determined by objective requirements or necessities of the functioning of the military establishment.

If this assumption is true, then it should be clear that where differential rates of military participation are closely linked with differences in rejection rates, the problems of equity do not have their roots in the military manpower procurement system. Rather, these roots are in the greater social system which has produced the inequities discovered in terms of the rejection rates. Those who wish to ascribe responsibility for inequities of military service rates to the manpower procurement system, when the differences are linked with rejection rate differences, must first show our assumption to be in error.

There is a fourfold significance in arriving at this stage of our analysis:

1. Realization of the point we have just developed should contribute to the avoidance of hasty and unwarranted conclusions about the equitability of the military manpower procurement systems in use during the period covered by our data.
2. In the process of developing this point, we have raised empirical questions about the validity and application of fitness standards, comprehensive answers to which would have great bearing on questions of equity and on future development and application of such standards.

3. We have been troubled in earlier considerations of equity by the problem of how to assess the procurement system when it rejects men who consider military service a valuable opportunity and accepts more capable men who consider service a disadvantage to be avoided. We can now recast that problem in two parts:
 - a. Are the fitness standards valid and is their manner of application justifiable? If the answer is yes on these counts, the procurement system is absolved.
 - b. If the military manpower procurement system is absolved and one is still concerned with inequities indicated by rejection rates, attention is then turned to the social system at large and subsystems of it, such as the sectors of education, and provision for health and welfare, as well as the stratification system which perpetuates inequities of education and health.
4. Finally, this analysis has raised the useful question of how the equitability of the military manpower procurement system is to be realized optimally when it is a subsystem of a larger social system in which there are serious inequities.

Conclusions

Two analyses have been presented, the one dealing with effects of socio-economic background and the other with regional and rural/urban differences, as these pertain to rates of military service participation and rejection. Through-out both analyses it was found that education, race, socio-economic background, rural background in general, and southern rural background in particular have durable effects on the rates which concerned us. However, nearly all these effects are to be understood in the light of the many roles played by education and nearly all these effects are closely linked with rates of rejection. We may begin our review of these findings with remarking two kinds of effects on military participation rates which are not linked with rejection rates.

The first of these concern the somewhat higher rates of deferment which are found quite consistently with those coming from rural background. We find

deferment rates tending above 20 per cent for men from farm homes as compared with rates averaging a little above 15 per cent for the remainder of the population. We tend to interpret this in relation to the workings of agricultural occupation deferments. However, the possibility must not be ruled out that rural ages of first marriage and fatherhood may average younger than urban ages for these vital events. To the extent this is true it could modify our understanding of this finding. An analysis of this remains to be done.

The second kind of military service rate difference not primarily related to rejection rates occurs in the case of those who have gone beyond college work to graduate study. In contrast to the national average of deferment rates, slightly under 20 per cent, we find a deferment rate of a little better than 50 per cent for that small part of the population--4 to 5 per cent--which attains some graduate study. Correspondingly, while the overall national rate of military participation was at 64 per cent, that of men attaining graduate study was only 26.6 per cent, or little better than one in four. We should note here that this also constitutes an inequity with respect to socio-economic background since those of high socio-economic status have a graduate study probability of one in eight, while those of mid- and low socio-economic status have a one in forty probability. (We also found somewhat higher rejection rates among men with higher education, as compared with high school graduates, but this may be due in part to more informed use of medical information and services.)

We have presented these two findings concerning rates of deferment separately to emphasize their unique character as being quite certainly the results of administration of deferment policy. In other words, it is with these findings that questions of equitable manpower procurement can be raised, not complicated or blurred by any relationship with rates of rejection. The part of the population of rural origin which enjoys a modest advantage in deferment rates constitutes roughly one-third of the total, while the graduate study segment of the population enjoying some 50 per cent deferment constituted between 4 and 5 per cent of the men aged 27 through 34.

Beyond these observations we are confronted with the powerful and complex interactions of effects of race, region, socio-economic background, and rural origin, greatly modified by educational attainment, affecting rates

of military experience extensively through rejection rates. It is of course at this point, where rejection rates play an important part in probabilities of military service, that in matters of equitability we ask whether inequities are the fault of the procurement system's unfair discrimination or the product of inequities in the social system as a whole, or both.

By raising questions of inequity in relation to educational attainment we have courted a problem which must be handled with care. This problem is similar to the problem created if we were to inquire into manpower procurement discrimination with respect to bodily weight. Armed Forces examining stations will routinely accept men within a wide range of bodily weights. But depending on other conditions linked with weight, such as height, glandular imbalance, and so on, an enlistment applicant may be rejected, with his weight a criterion condition of the rejection. Under these circumstances, how does one properly ask questions of equity with respect to weight? And with education in some respects playing a similar role as a criterion in evaluation of fitness, how are questions of equity to be handled?

Our problem here is simplified by the fact that regarding rates both of military participation and of rejection we find precisely the patterns of participation and rejection we should logically expect. If the standards of fitness are valid and their manner of application justified, then it is gratifying to note that the rejection rates for all levels of educational attainment from high school dropouts (ninth grade or better) through college graduates have a modest range between 12 and 18 per cent, and military service rates range between 66 and 73 per cent (Table II.1). In fact, excluding those who get bogged down in the last two years of college, these ranges are between 12 and 17 per cent and between 70 and 73 per cent, respectively. Hence one can hardly conceive of any increase in the equity of the system for an extensive middle range of education attained. We have earlier made sufficient issue of the upper extreme exception--those having done graduate study. We now turn toward conclusions concerning rejection rates and military experience rates at the lower end of the attained education dimension.

On the average, men completing eighth grade--no more and no less--have twice the rejection rate, 33 per cent, as those with more education, and their military participation rate of 50 per cent is little more than two-thirds the

service rate of those with more education. But of those not even completing the eighth grade, rejection occurs at the rate of 59 per cent--about three out of five--and only 30 per cent serve.

Now for the moment it is useful to conceptualize education as a dichotomy involving those who have it and those who do not, with the cutting point, in agreement with the above findings, between those who have more than eighth grade education and those who do not. With this definition of the dichotomy, very little qualification is required for the generalization that regardless of race, urban/rural background, region, or socio-economic background, equities exist among the educated and inequities exist among the uneducated.

Perhaps the most important qualification here has to do with what the data suggest about the disadvantage of Negroes. The quality of education and of socio-economic conditions granted Negroes, as measured by rates of rejection, leave Negroes about one whole category below whites when compared on levels of educational attainment. That is to say, rejection rates for Negroes completing high school compare with those for white high school dropouts, and Negro high school dropouts compare with whites who never entered high school. However, as far as military service rates and rejection are concerned, the signs of severe interracial inequities are no longer evident at the level of high school graduates and above.

In a nutshell, this is how our findings looked at the beginning of analysis: (1) Negroes appeared generally to have higher rejection rates and lower service rates; (2) men of rural background had higher rejection and deferment rates and lower service rates; (3) men from the South had higher rejection rates and lower service rates; (4) men of lower socio-economic background (especially in the sense of having fathers with no high school education) had higher rejection rates and lower service rates.

Then we observed that in each of these instances that sector of the population deviating in the direction of higher rejection rates was also a sector of the population having, on the average, lower levels of educational attainment. Properly taking this into account, we have learned that for whites progressing beyond the eighth grade, and for Negroes getting as far as high school graduation, the above appearances of inequities are lost.

We are left with the suspicion that perhaps a good high school education for all would come close to being a panacea for all the above inequities. It is of course not as simple as all that. We believe that this matter of high school education has in part been a powerful correlate of a number of important features of relatively modern communities as well as indicative of relatively capable, healthy individuals. Communities having a good school system are likely also to have better facilities and programs for health and general welfare. Individuals with better education are not only more likely to pass mental standards for military fitness, but will have reduced their health and handicap problems nearer a minimum.

As we have noted, progress beyond the eighth grade in education seems to make the big difference. We have found this difference to be on the order of a factor of 2--our "uneducated" tend toward rejection rates just under 30 per cent, while the "educated" show rejection at just under 15 per cent. This is true for urban whites regardless of region, for nonsouthern rural whites, and for urban southern Negroes.

Our findings speak ill of the elementary education provided in the rural South both for whites and for Negroes, and for Negroes of the urban non-South. In addition, Negroes without complete high school education are consistently at greater disadvantage, in terms of rejection rates, than whites of comparable attributes, with the possible exception of urban southern Negroes.

Finally, our data show that, in terms of rejection rates, it is a substantial advantage, among those of no high school experience, to be from a mid- or high SES white home, that is, a white family of which the father has more than an eighth grade education and/or a white collar job. In contrast, low SES whites and Negroes with no high school education are severely set back in rejection rates--ranging from 43 to 61 per cent respectively, while whites of higher socio-economic status with no high school average 26.7 per cent rejection.

Inequities such as these are of course common features of the overall social system of the United States and those concerned with these inequities, revealed here in relation to military manpower procurement, are likely also to be concerned when these same inequities are manifested in studies of the labor force and unemployment, access to higher education, and so on. The

seriousness of these inequities is evidenced in part by the extent of the American population in the categories of the disadvantaged.

Negroes without complete high school education constitute over 5 per cent of the population and nearly three-fifths of the Negro population. The low SES white component of our population, as here defined, is fully 50 per cent of the total, and of these nearly one-fourth never get beyond eighth grade, while only about 5 per cent finish college. In contrast, among those of mid-SES background only about 9 per cent are without high school experience, and over 10 per cent have completed college. We earlier pointed out that over one-half of the southern population of our study was rural, in the context of evidence showing the socio-economic disadvantage of that region. We should note that this rural southern population constitutes roughly one-sixth of the total American population under study, thus warranting concern on the part of all, as not simply the responsibility of those locally involved. Under these circumstances, it should be difficult for anyone to argue that actions to alleviate the conditions of Sothern Appalachia are unneeded.

In this final analysis we have not said so much about equities and inequities of rates of military service. Rather, we have focused upon the inequities in rejection rates, which in general are found to be so closely linked to military participation rate differentials. Our reasoning has been that by this strategy our attention has been bent more in the direction of causal conditions. It seems apparent that while these causal conditions continue to exist in the social system as a whole, the equity and inequity questions concerning the military manpower procurement system will continue to be live issues.

This need not mean--indeed it has not meant heretofore--that those concerned with legislation, policy making, and administration of the many facets of the military manpower procurement system must throw up their hands in despair of dealing to a greater extent with issues about the equity of the system. In fact, over the past few years more and more consideration has been turned to the possibility of building into the military establishment and its manpower procurement institutions by careful planning a broad function which it has been serving latently and has served increasingly since the Depression.

Of course, the manifest function of the military establishment, in relation to the greater social system of which it is a part, has been the management of violence. The latent function of which we are speaking has in various degrees related to broad social conditions of manpower conservation and utilization, employment security, technical training, access to higher education, and increasing valuation of secondary school education. In addition, institutions of the military establishment have helped to blaze a trail in medical and vocational rehabilitation and across a broad spectrum of individual and familial welfare considerations, by way of services provided veterans. Finally, the military establishment has played and continues to play a powerful role in the elimination of socio-economic and racial discrimination.

There is the obvious possibility that the military establishment and its manpower procurement institutions are readily adaptable to playing a major role in the integration and coordination of the many manpower conservation and utilization investments that are currently being made in the social system at large. The implications are that we are confronted with a convergence of two sets of quite pressing circumstances: on the one hand, the concerns with adequate and equitable military manpower procurement, and on the other, the broader total society concerns of manpower conservation and utilization. In this case, the military establishment could be contributing to the elimination of those general social conditions which have generated the discomfiture, if not anguish, which is always found confronting inequities in a democratic society.

APPENDIX I

THE ANATOMY OF A SURVEY SAMPLE

Introduction

Never before has there been an opportunity comparable to the one at hand to view in scope and in detail the dimensions of military experience in the population of the United States. The uniqueness of this occasion springs from three sources. The first is a circumstance which is more and more common in contemporary survey research. The collected body of data contains such variety and detail of information for a substantial number of individuals that an exceedingly wide range of questions concerning military experience can be handled descriptively and analytically.

The second source of this uniqueness is in the nature of the population represented by the available body of data. The data were gathered in part by the Bureau of the Census, using self-administered questionnaires prepared for this study. A sample of 9,593 respondents represents the entire civilian noninstitutionalized population of United States males aged 16 through 34. The entire active male military population of the Department of Defense (except Reservists and general and flag officers) is represented by roughly 102,000 respondents of the three services and the Marine Corps. The questionnaires completed by members of this complex sample--roughly 10 per cent of officers, 5 per cent of enlisted men--are virtually identical to the questionnaires used with the civilian sample. Thus by appropriate subsampling it is possible to arrive at a survey sample which represents the entire non-institutionalized United States male population aged 16 through 34, both military and civilian (for more details and some relatively minor qualifications, see subsequent sections of this discussion of methodology). The important point is that here there is available a sample body of data providing for appropriate representation of military men as well as

nonveterans and veterans, making possible a full study of selection for and effects of military experience in the post-World War II United States.

The third source of the uniqueness of this research occasion lies in the qualities of the national sample for which the data are available. In the month-to-month grind of federal pulse-taking, the Population Surveys Division of the U. S. Bureau of the Census has blazed a trail in the realm of national survey sampling which few have had the wit or the resources to tread. For the present survey, because of its timeliness, it was possible to take fullest advantage of the Bureau of the Census facilities and competence in four major ways:

1. Their participation in the development of the questionnaires
2. Their provision of a high quality national sample of United States males aged 16 through 34
3. Their collection of data from this sample
4. Their adjustments to independent estimates, improving the representativeness of the sample to attain a practical maximum reduction of sampling error

The Monthly Current Population Survey

The key operation of the Bureau of the Census concerning us here is the little publicized but impressive monthly Current Population Survey (CPS).¹ This operation provides the Department of Labor with the basis for its series of monthly reports on employment and earnings. This yields, for example, estimates of unemployment in the United States labor force which enjoy the confidence of users who tolerate a margin of error of only 0.5 per cent. While technical developments have permitted minor deliberate deviations from a purely random sampling strategy, once the calculated

¹The materials presented at this point and throughout this research when they concern the work of the Bureau of the Census have their source almost without exception in the following documents: U. S. Bureau of the Census (1963, esp. pp. 53-55, Part VII, "Preparation of Estimates"); U. S. Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics (1964, esp. pp. 5-10, but see the entire document). In addition, there are two unpublished sources we have resorted to at points: intra-project memoranda from Robert B. Pearl, chief, Demographic Surveys Division, Bureau of the Census, January 28 and November 22, 1965.

adjustments for these techniques have been made, any of the monthly CPS samples may be regarded as among the finest in national random sampling.

However, the Population Surveys Division does not stop at this point. The Bureau of the Census, taking each decennial census as a critical point of departure, performs the task of continuously updating available information on the incidence of many of the more salient characteristics of individuals in the population of the United States. Among these characteristics are:

1. Geographic region (e.g., North, South, Midwest, Far West)
2. Residence (rural or urban)
3. Race (white or nonwhite)
4. Sex
5. Age (in appropriate groupings)

The updated information on these parameters is not maintained simply for each parameter separately. Rather, it is maintained so that it is possible to say that such and such a percentage of the population in the region standardly defined as "North" are whites in rural residence, or a certain number of the total United States population are nonwhite females aged 35 through 39. It is precisely such independent estimates, on these five particularly salient characteristics of the United States population, which are utilized monthly by the Population Surveys Division for reduction of sampling error, in the operation commonly known as the "weighting" of each CPS sample.

The Possibility of Reducing Sampling Error

The probability of a given level of sampling error, in the estimation of the incidence of a particular characteristic in a population, is a function of two things:

1. An inverse function of the size of the random sample to be used, in relation to the size of the population
2. A complex function of the characteristics (particularly the mean and variance, or range) of the distribution of that particular characteristic in the population

Now, when it is known that the distribution of some particular characteristic--such as unemployment--varies in relation to such other characteristics as region, residence, age, race, and sex, the availability of

information on the parameters of these characteristics in the population permits reduction of the probability of a given level of sampling error. The following simple example demonstrates how this could be.

Consider the problem of estimating the national rate of unemployment. Further, limit this consideration only to the fact that unemployment varies substantially with the characteristic race in the population at large. (Note that, as indicated above, several other characteristics--region, residence, age, and sex--are taken into account in actual practice.) It is known that unemployment rates are much higher for Negroes than for whites. If, then, one were to draw a random sample only to discover that, purely by chance, Negroes constituted 20 per cent of the sample (instead of the roughly 11 per cent that they do of the United States population) while whites constituted only 80 per cent, this would provide sound reason for expecting this hypothetical sample, as a whole, to overestimate the national unemployment rate. In fact, if the current national unemployment rate (unknown to the researcher) actually stands at 5 per cent, with 15 per cent among Negroes and a bit under 4 per cent for whites, one would expect this one-fifth Negro/four-fifths white sample to overestimate unemployment--at 6 per cent instead of 5 per cent.

Confronted with the chance possibility of drawing a random sample involving such sampling error, the great expense and the deadline might yet prohibit discarding the data collected from such a sample, with the intentions of drawing another sample. (We hasten to add that the monthly 35,000 household CPS sample of the Population Surveys Division is one of the least probable places one would expect a 9 per cent sampling error.) A simple alternative strategy presents itself.

Since it is known that of the total U. S. population of 190,000,000 the Negroes in the sample represent about 21,000,000 and the whites in the sample represent about 169,000,000, a rate of unemployment which is standardized for race should reduce sampling error. To do this it is calculated, if the hypothetical sample consists of 10,000 respondents, that each of the 2,000 Negroes bears a weight of 10,500 to the 21,000,000 Negro population they represent. On the other hand, each of the 8,000 whites bears a larger weight of 21,125 to the 169,000,000 whites they represent. Now, if this

hypothetical random sample accurately reflected unemployment rates within racial groupings, this weighting adjustment to independent estimates of race will result in an estimate of the national unemployment rate that is precisely in agreement with the previously suggested unknown parameter of the U. S. population--i.e., 5 per cent unemployment.

Weighting CPS Samples

It is exactly this sort of "adjustment to independent estimates"--in two phases, first within region for residence and race; then with the total population for race, age, and sex--that the Population Surveys Division utilizes to substantially minimize sampling error in their monthly Current Population Surveys. Note that this does leave room for sampling error in three obvious ways. (The above hypothetical case yields a complete elimination of sampling error only because of calculated perfection, "for example.")

1. If the sampling did not adequately reflect population features of research salience within the various categories (subpopulations) defined by the characteristics for which independent estimates were used.
2. If the independent estimates were seriously in error.
3. If the questions asked of sample respondents for the purpose of determining their labor force experience and/or their proper location in one of the subpopulations did not yield valid and reliable information for the survey.

(Of course, only the first may be termed "sampling error" in the strictest sense of the term.)

Of these three doorways by which sampling error might yet enter a weighted body of CPS sample data, the first is never dealt with in monthly CPS operations. The second may be considered generally unlikely to occur to a serious extent. The third is a matter of continuous research effort and supervisory control, for refinement and correction, in the Population Surveys Division. In part, the third problem is dealt with by seeking out inconsistencies between the respondent's answers to related questions and editing to the extent possible and desirable.²

²Those familiar with the mechanics of the survey and the problems of sampling error will be very much aware of the absence in this discussion

Before leaving this discussion of the standard weighting procedures applied to CPS samples, three observations seem called for. First, notice that, given some prior knowledge of facts (to the effect that what is to be estimated varies substantially with one or more characteristics for which the parameters--or good estimates of the parameters--in the population are known) it is possible and legitimate to attempt to reduce sampling error by "weighting," with no attention wasted on the estimate that would have resulted from the unweighted random sample.

Second, weighting a random sample in this manner in a very real sense falls in the same category as these other familiar procedures in research:

1. In the analysis of rates one often hears the logic of the necessity to "control for the relevant variables" in order to make a most meaningful comparison of rates between groupings of individuals.
2. In studies comparing vital rates between populations it is frequently necessary to arrive at age-standardized rates for comparison, due to differing age structures of the populations being studied by the demographer.
3. When studying the effects of experimentally induced conditions, the experimenter frequently "controls for variables" he suspects are relevant to these effects by matching his control group with his experimental ("treatment") group as much as he desires or finds feasible.

Viewed in this manner, one limitation on the value of a weighting procedure is brought into sharp relief. This limitation inheres in the fact that full reduction of error is achieved only to the extent that the adjustments are made to independent estimates of really relevant variables, and to estimates of all independently relevant variables. The implications here are at least two:

1. Complete reduction of sampling error is never achieved.

of any mention of low response rates as another source of possible sampling error. This too receives notable attention and adjustment at the hands of the Population Surveys Division (see U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1963, esp. p.53; U. S. Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1964, esp. p. 9; and below, "Adaptation of a Standard CPS Sample to the Military Manpower Survey").

2. When this strategy of error reduction is contemplated, prior assessment of its potential value must take into account:
 - a. What is known about how the characteristic to be estimated varies with other characteristics; and
 - b. the availability of good independent estimates of these other relevant characteristics.

In simple language, "don't be fooled, and don't be a fool" in the strategy of reducing sampling error by adjustment to independent estimates.

Finally, weighting of a random sample is a legitimate procedure even after the fact. There may be those who view the business of survey research as a religious calling and consider the willing dependence upon an unadjusted (read "unblemished") random sample as the paramount act of faith. Such as these (if they exist) may look with misgiving on the immediate weighting of a sample as soon as the data are in. To them, weighting or "reweighting" a sample when analysis of sample data raises serious question of sampling error might seem anathema! There is some precedence, some valid bit of rationale, to such caution. It would not be acceptable practice to attempt weighting a sample ten different ways and then proceed with analysis using one of the ten results because findings yielded there were most to the taste of the researcher. And it would be ridiculous to become obsessed with the possibility that "just one more" (and "just one more," etc.) adjustment to another independent estimate would save a given sample from sampling error. Yes, there are reasonable though vague restrictions to be imposed on the applications of adjusting samples to independent estimates.

But it is acceptable for the researcher to work out some substantial increment of salvation for his sample with due caution, when this is evidently possible. It is conceivable that after preliminary phases of adjustment to independent estimates, some stage of subsequent analysis may reveal that the sample fails in some manner to adequately reflect some positively known characteristic of the population that the sample was drawn to represent. It may be possible to ascertain that one or more of the previously used independent estimates was in error and/or that a different, more reliable set of independent estimates would yield adjustments more adequately reflecting the population sampled. If this is so, then additional appropriate

weighting adjustment is not only legitimate but called for, assuming the value of the research to be worth the cost of the added effort.

Adaptation of a Standard CPS Sample to the Military Manpower Survey

Understandings were developed for this survey, in late spring 1964, to the effect that the U. S. Bureau of the Census would be the collecting agency for civilian data. Furthermore, all men aged 16 through 34 in a CPS sample of 35,000 households would constitute the civilian sample. A number of emerging conditions contributed to the final shaping of the overall plan.

By midsummer the pretesting of questionnaires being developed made it clear that a somewhat different version of the survey questionnaire would be required for nonveterans than for veterans. This required a hard and simple definition of "veteran" and "nonveteran."

Concomitantly, the Population Surveys Division was making the decision that this sample should be adjusted to independent estimates of veteran status. While their "Control Card" form for each sample household carries information on "veteran status" of each household member, this is not considered a sufficiently reliable source. Hence a different, more trusted source of independent estimates of veteran status would be needed for relevant age groups of the U. S. population. The Veterans Administration became the source for these independent estimates. Thus, both for determining what kind of questionnaire to send to each man and for the weighting operation, there has been some question of adequate "fit" among three definitions of "veteran status": that of the survey, that of the Bureau of the Census "Control Card," and that of the Veterans Administration.

The definition of "men of veteran status" for this survey became "anyone having two or more continuous months of active military duty either for training as a Reservist or as a member of the Regular Armed Services." The Bureau of the Census used a statement of this definition on the front page of their two versions of the questionnaire to prompt their respondents to request the alternative version if they received the wrong one in the mailing. By this approach the problem of fit between survey and "Control

Card" definitions may have been virtually eliminated.

It may be that Veterans Administration figures do not perfectly fit the Bureau of the Census and Military Manpower Study definitions of "veteran status." As nearly as can be ascertained, the Veterans Administration figures include all men of the specified age groups who entered active duty for training as Reservists for two months or more, as well as all who entered on active service as Regulars or as draftees. This would include those who for one reason or another were separated prior to completing two continuous months of active military experience, while the survey definition excluded this type from "veteran status."

The original thinking was that the data for this survey would be gathered simply as an extension of the regular CPS, for either the week of October 12 or the week of November 12, 1964. Several conditions prohibited this. The questionnaire as it approached its final draft stage appeared too lengthy to add to the regular monthly inquiries of those respondents in any given CPS sample. In addition, "end the draft" had become a Presidential campaign issue by midsummer, with the survey scheduled for very near the time of the national election. Finally, after midsummer there were rumblings in some quarters concerning the possibility of a buildup of U. S. forces in Vietnam in connection with the political issues involving U. S./ Vietnam policy and the Gulf of Tonkin incidents. The possibility that these three conditions might "contaminate" the regular monthly survey, so important to the Department of Labor, resulted in the Population Surveys Division decision to "resurrect" an earlier CPS sample. For this they chose their May 1964 survey sample and thereby made this Military Manpower Survey independent of any of the regular surveys of fall 1964.

In this manner it developed that a standard CPS sample which had already been adjusted to the usual independent estimates and for nonresponse in the May 1964 survey would be utilized in the Military Manpower Survey. It was judged that deleterious effects of such a strategy, if any, certainly would be negligible. There seemed to be only two minor possibilities of such disadvantage. In this attempt to return to the respondents in a survey done six months earlier there was the negligible risk of having lost track

of a few, thereby having a minor effect of depressing the response rate for the survey.

The second negligible disadvantage had to do with the technique by which the Population Surveys Division deals with nonrespondent members of a survey sample. In order to appropriately represent in the data those who are not responding, a subsample is drawn of those who have not responded by a certain deadline. This subsample is likely to be one-third to one-half of all nonrespondents. Then when a satisfactory response rate is achieved among these nonrespondents this subsample is weighted up to represent all nonrespondents.

Thus, if 20 per cent were nonrespondents, 10 per cent (one-half of these) might be randomly drawn for the subsample. Now if a two-thirds response rate is achieved among these, this constitutes a one-third portion of all nonrespondents. This one-third of the nonrespondents is then weighted by a factor of 3 and added to those who were respondents as an adjustment of the entire sample that represents "nonrespondents" as well as "respondents." Since this is incorporated in the standard CPS weight, in the instance of the Military Manpower Survey the procedure will have been applied twice--once in May 1964 and once for the present survey. If there is some probability that a nonrespondent in May will again be a nonrespondent in November/December this sort of adjustment will have affected the individual weights of such sample members twice.

Evidence now available on this study indicates that the effects of this must have been negligible.³

Now we return to what is perhaps the most unusual feature of the manner in which the CPS sample was adapted to the needs of this survey: the adjustment of this sample to independent estimates of the veteran population. There are two main ways in which this is unusual:

³In a later section of this Appendix we shall present information that only about 200 cases were found to be weighted by a factor of three (3.0) or more above the average weight, and the highest weight is only about six (6.3) times the average weight. We consider this negligible.

1. It was necessary for the Bureau of the Census to go outside the bounds of their own universe of information to find adequate basis for adjusting this sample to properly reflect a key dependent variable. This involved the need of identifying an agency which could provide sufficiently reliable independent estimates and to communicate precisely to that agency what these estimates were to consist of.
2. The next unusual feature is that the relative balance, or distribution, of the sample with respect to a key dependent variable is being established independently of the usual sources of sampling error, being directly determined by these independent estimates.

The nature of this particular adjustment to Veterans Administration independent estimates can best be appreciated by considering Table A-I.1. We are here concerned only with the first three columns in the body of the table. Begin with the third column ("Subtotal" for "Civilian Men Aged 16-34"). These figures represent basic, continuously updated information on the noninstitutionalized population of the United States. This is one set of the independent estimates that have earlier entered into the weighting

TABLE A-I.1
NORC ALL-AMERICAN SAMPLE WITH FULL CPS WEIGHT

CPS Age Group	Standard CPS Sample: Civilian Men Aged 16-34			DOD 16-34 on Active Military Service	All-American Sample Total
	Nonveterans	Veterans	Subtotal		
16-17 .	3,532,834.91	0.00	3,532,834.91	65,843.92	3,598,678.83
18-19 .	2,428,228.64	46,251.29	2,474,479.93	345,112.94	2,819,592.87
20-24 .	4,424,111.58	1,196,788.55	5,620,900.13	1,076,207.47	6,697,107.60
25-29 .	2,318,027.49	2,740,421.13	5,058,448.62	408,686.40	5,467,135.02
30-34 .	1,708,489.85	3,385,560.53	5,094,050.38	292,891.92	5,386,942.30
Total .	14,411,692.47	7,369,021.50	21,780,713.97	2,188,742.65	23,969,456.62
Per cent	60.1	30.7	(90.9) ^a	9.1	100.0

^aDiscrepancy in summing of percentages due to rounding error.

of the sample, and it warrants about as much confidence as any set of figures, short of those coming directly from the Decennial Census. This tells us that the sample adapted to this survey, with its 9,593 respondents, represents a population of nearly 22,000,000 men aged 16 through 34. It also gives the distribution of these men for the standard age groupings.

The figures in the "Veterans" column are the independent estimates provided the Population Surveys Division by the Veterans Administration. Because of the confidence the Bureau of the Census placed in these figures and in those in the "Subtotal" column, they simply obtained the figures in the "Nonveterans" column by subtraction. These three columns of figures tell us two things:

1. The distribution of the U. S. population of noninstitutionalized men aged 16 through 34, as applied to this survey;
2. The relative weight that each of the age-by-veteran status groups will bear to the total of 9,593 civilian respondents in this survey.

The last two columns of the table will be discussed later.

NORC Modification of the CPS Weight
for Analysis of Military Manpower Survey Data

From what has been said above concerning the nature of the weighting scheme used with CPS samples, one could expect to find the numbers involved in presenting the civilian data of this survey ranging up to 21,780,713.97. Were this to be the case, such figures would be serving two purposes at the same time.

1. Each individual case of the sample would be represented in such figures by a value which we here call its "weight." This weight may be above or below the average for the sample, according to the characteristics of the individual case (in the categories of the six kinds of independent estimates used) and according to what the independent estimates indicated to be true about the population which the sample is intended to represent.
2. The tabulations of cases as produced for the analysis would constitute projections of the sample to total population figures.

The methodological bent and technical facilities of NORC suggested the desirability of the first of these uses of the CPS weight and the undesirability of the second.

1. The methodological inclination consists of the preference to present tables with figures that are a constant reminder of the size of the sample. The number of people, in any part of the sample under investigation, should be a part of the basis for judgment applied in drawing inferences. For example, we generally refuse to draw conclusions from a percentage based on less than twenty cases--and do so with reluctance when less than fifty cases are involved. In order to apply such a rule of thumb when the full CPS weight is being used it would be necessary to remember constantly that the average individual weight was $21,780,713.97/9,593 = 2,270.4799$ per case. Thus roughly 100,000 weighted would be the threshold for becoming "reluctant," and the "refusal" threshold would be roughly 45,000 weighted cases. Perhaps more bothersome, in the reporting the readers would need repeated reminders of this.
2. The consideration of technical facilities of NORC, particularly the array of computer programs available, indicated that there was a satisfactory range of programs for producing output running to eight digits when a maximum of four digits of weight was involved. (The maximum, with standard CPS weights, would require a capacity of output up to ten digits, including a two-decimal fraction, and involving weights ranging up to seven significant digits including a two-decimal fraction.)

The most simple-minded approach to data processing operations with sample cases is to count each case once to yield case frequencies in the cells of a cross-tabulation. Of course, such an approach to the 9,593 civilian respondents would bypass the advantage of weighting adjustments to independent estimates, which give each kind of case its representation in the sample proportional to its incidence in the population.

The data processing involved when the CPS kind of weight is used requires adding the weight of each case (instead of counting each case once) to arrive at cell frequencies in a cross-tabulation. Thus adding all the weights of our 9,593 cases totals the 21,780,713.97 which is the population figure for the civilian sample. Then the average weight is $21,780,713.97 / 9,593$ cases = 2,270.4799, and dividing the total weighted number of cases by the average weight yields a result of 9,593, the unweighted sample size.

Now, if one has a set of values--such as the weights of the 9,593 cases of our sample--and chooses a constant by which each of these values is to be divided, such a division of each value will result in a new set of values. This new set of values will have a sum that is equal to the quotient obtained by dividing the sum of the original set by the constant. Each value of the new set will retain the same relative magnitude in ratio to any of the other new values, as its original value is in proportion to the other corresponding original values. Finally, the characteristics of the distribution of the new set of values will differ from the distribution of the original set only by a factor equal to the constant used to generate the new set. Thus, for example, the mean of the new set is equal to the quotient of dividing the mean of the old set by the constant.

This tells us that a new set of weights can be generated from the standard CPS weights simply by dividing those standard weights by a constant we choose. We can choose as our constant the average standard weight of 2,270.4799. The new set of weights will have a sum--i.e., a "total weighted N"--of $21,780,713.97 / 2,270.4799 = 9,593$, equaling the unweighted number of cases. By these new weight values all cases will retain the same weight in ratio to each other as they had in the original weighting scheme. For example, when the original CPS weight value of 1,173.48 for the least weighted case is divided by the average, the new weight for that case becomes 0.517 while the maximum case weight of 14,408.48 when divided by 2,270.4799 becomes a 6.346 weight. The ratio of the least weight to the greatest weight is then $0.517 / 6.346 = 0.08147$, while with the original weights $1,173.48 / 14,408.48 = 0.08144$, showing the relative weights of individuals to remain identical (except for rounding error).

Furthermore, having used the average CPS weight as the constant,

the division of the average weight by this constant--that is, $2,270.4799/2,270.4799$ --has the quotient of unity (1.000). In other words, with the constant which we have chosen to generate this new set of weights for our sample, on the average each case will have a weight of 1 in this new weighting scheme. This comes as close as we can get to the desired result of tabulations which remind us of the sample size and at the same time take full advantage of the adjustment to independent estimates. In addition, choosing as sufficient decimal accuracy a three-digit decimal detail, computer output--if ten thousand cases are involved--will consist of eight digits based on a maximum of four-digit weighting--in each instance involving a three-digit decimal. This is of course the maximum limit we mentioned earlier, as far as the adequate array of computer programs is concerned, at NORC. We shall hereafter refer to the new weighting scheme as the "NORC modified weight."

In addition to the points already made about the desirability of the NORC modified weight, one more advantage, having to do with convenience, will become apparent in the following section.

Characteristics of the NORC/DOD All-American Sample

In the second paragraph of this Appendix the point was made that one big feature contributing to the uniqueness of this study is the availability of data representing the male military population comparable to data representing the civilian male population. Obviously, a sample representing only nonveterans and veterans in the civilian population fails to represent the part of the male population which has chosen military service as a career. In fact, it underrepresents those in the 16 through 34 age groups who have entered service at all, this being the more true for groupings of men serving longer or multiple "hitches" than for those serving relatively short terms of active duty.

Of course, there are other populations not represented in a CPS sample. We are constantly reminded that the institutionalized population is excluded as well. The 1960 Decennial Census informs us that as of that year the number institutionalized, for the male population age groups represented

by the adapted CPS sample, were as follows:

CPS Age Group	U.S. Male Institutionalized Population, 1960
16-17	39,851
18-19	36,411
20-24	88,102
25-29	84,224
30-34	85,770
Total	334,358

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963, Table 3, "Age of Inmates of Institutions, by Color and Sex, for the U.S." (p. 3).

If for the present purposes these figures are considered good enough estimates for the same population groupings in November 1964, the weight of 2,270.4799 for the present survey shows that it would take 147.26 additional cases to represent the institutionalized portion of the male population aged 16 through 34.

We have no way of knowing how many would have veteran's status and how many would be nonveterans. One might expect a relatively high rate of institutionalization among those nonveterans classified as unfit for service. On the other hand, as we may be able to demonstrate later, those nonveterans who escape service due to deferments may be an above average subpopulation, thereby having a relatively low rate of institutionalization. Thus it may be that veterans have an intermediate rate, not too far off from the general rate for men in these age groups. This will be of more interest later.

The universe of men in military uniforms is not entirely represented, either, by the military personnel samples made available for this survey. The Coast Guard (which is not under the authority of the Department of Defense except when war is declared), and those Reservists (members of any of the seven National Guard or Reserve components) who were on active duty status at the time of the survey, as well as the general and flag officers of the Regular Armed Forces, were deliberately not included in the sampling. This was for reasons peculiar to the Department of Defense. Such subpopulations

of course would not be included in a civilian sample either.

At the time of the survey we were told that the Coast Guard consisted roughly of 30,000 men on active duty. Not all of these men would be under 35. Hence to represent them in the sample for this survey would involve adding somewhat less than the 13 cases we calculate by dividing 30,000 by the average weight of 2,270.4799 for this survey sample.

While precise figures are not available to us on how many Reserve component members were on active duty at the time of this survey, there were 232,407 (a bit under a quarter-million) as of November 30, 1963 (this includes Coast Guard Reservists; U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1964, Table R13.0, "Ready Reserve Strength Compared to Statutory Limitation," p. 85). It would take an additional 102.36 cases in our sample to proportionately represent this subpopulation. This number would have to be reduced by a small fraction to adjust for those in this subpopulation aged 35 and over, hence not to be represented.

There are roughly one thousand general and flag officers in the military population. This subpopulation is largely age 35 and over and, even if it were entirely under 35, could be represented by less than one-half sample case (i.e., $1,000/2,270$).

Now, within the limits imposed by the above qualifications, it is possible to constitute a complex sample from the data made available by this survey that can be said to represent the entire U. S. male population, both civilian and military, aged 16 through 34. This has been done in the following manner, and the result will hereafter be called the "All-American Sample." (For the details of the necessary calculations and the resultant specifications of the subsampling involved, see Rivera, 1965.)

The end result to be realized here is the selection of a subsample of appropriate size of the roughly 102,000 respondents to the Military Personnel Surveys in this study. This military subsample must be randomly drawn from that part of the 102,000 under age 35. It is to be proportional to the size of the civilian sample (9,593 cases) as the total military male population aged 16 through 34 is proportional to the 21,780,713.97 civilian male population represented by the 9,593 cases.

The Department of Defense could not provide the parameter of the size of its total military male population under 35, as of the time of this survey. As the best available alternative NORC calculated the proportion of men under 35 in each of the nineteen pay grade groupings of the four Armed Services, from the data of the 102,000 cases surveyed. These proportions were then applied, as the best available estimates, to the population size of each of these pay grades (this set of figures on pay grade population size for the time of the survey was provided by the Department of Defense). This application of these proportions to the pay grade populations was considered to be the NORC estimate of the number of men under 35 in each pay grade. The summing of these estimates yielded a figure of 2,189,905 men under 35 out of the total military male population (excluding general and flag officers as well as Reservists on active duty) reported by the Department of Defense at 2,635,719 for October 31, 1964. The ratio of $2,189,905/2,635,719$, or 83.1 per cent, compares favorably with a corresponding ratio of 83.4 per cent, derived from a tabulation of an earlier survey done in a similar manner (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1964, Table P25.2, "Estimated Percentage Distribution by Age of Male Military Personnel on Active Duty," last col., p. 34).

Utilizing the earlier statement of an equation of ratios, where M symbolizes the size of the military subsample of men aged 16 through 34 to be added to the civilian sample, $M/9,593 = 2,189,905/21,780,713.97$. Then $M/9,593 = .100543$, and $M = 964.508999$ cases of military respondents needed.

Partly out of curiosity and partly for checking, an alternative set of calculations was made. Prior to this stage of data organization NORC had drawn three "all-DOD" subsamples. The maximum-size subsample is 57,000 cases; the intermediate-size subsample is every second one of the maximum-size one, hence 28,498; the small economy-size subsample is every third case of the intermediate subsample, hence 9,496 cases. It would be of basic sampling reliability concern to know whether an estimate derived from the smallest of these subsamples would be in fair agreement with the results from using the entire 102,000-odd cases. The agreement was reassuring: Of the 9,496 cases of the smallest all-DOD sample, 9,472 provided data on their current

age, and 7,890--or 83.3 per cent of the 9,472 with age data--were under 35 (compare the 83.1 per cent by the other method).

On the basis of these steps, specifications were provided to apply a sampling ratio of 0.122245 to the 7,890 cases of men under 35 in the smallest subsample. This would yield the 965 (rounded figure) cases of military respondents which, added to the civilian sample of 9,593 cases, would constitute the NORC "All-American Sample." The procedure in fact yielded 964 such cases, the discrepancy being a rounding error that can be expected from the form of computer program used here.

It was previously mentioned that there was an additional reason for the desirability of the results of the NORC modification of the standard CPS weighting scheme. It is this: Having accomplished a modification of weights such that the average of individual weights is unity (i.e., 1.000) it is a simple matter to add these 964 military cases to that sample, assigning a weight of 1.000 to each case. The end result, with a weighted civilian sample of 9,592.906 (slightly off from the 9,593 unweighted count, again because of rounding error) and a self-weighted subsample of 964.000 military cases, is an All-American Sample with a weighted size of 10,556.906 cases.

The age-grouped characteristics of the All-American Sample, using the NORC version of CPS weights, are presented in Table A-I.2. This table in fact presents the same data as those shown in Table A-I.1. The present section of course explains the last two columns of both tables. One need only multiply the average CPS weight of 2,270.4799 by a given number of military cases to find the size of population that number of military cases represents. That sort of calculation is the basis for the figures in the earlier table. More commonly this NORC research will present data in magnitudes on the order of those seen in this latter table, which utilizes the NORC version of CPS weight. On those occasions when the reader is curious to know the size of population a given number of cases represents, he need but multiply 2,270.4799 (or roughly 2,300) by the number of cases which have aroused his curiosity, to find the answer to his question.

TABLE A-I.2

NORC ALL-AMERICAN SAMPLE WITH NORC MODIFIED WEIGHT

(The NORC modification consists of reducing the full CPS weight by the factor of 2270.4799, which is the mean CPS weight)

Age	Nonveterans	Veterans	Subtotal	On AMS	Sample Total
16-17. . . .	1,556.0	0.0	1,556.0	29	1,585.0
18-19. . . .	1,069.5	20.4	1,089.9	152	1,241.9
20-24. . . .	1,948.5	527.1	2,475.6	474	2,949.6
25-29. . . .	1,020.9	1,207.0	2,227.9	180	2,407.9
30-34. . . .	752.5	1,491.1	2,243.6	129	2,372.6
Total. . . .	6,347.4	3,245.6	9,593.0	964	10,557.0
Per Cent . .	60.1	30.7	(90.9) ^a	9.1	100.0

^aDiscrepancy in summing of percentages, as well as the specific values of these percentages, are necessarily identical to those of Table A-I.1 due to the arithmetic relationship of the two tables.

APPENDIX II

THE MILITARY SERVICE QUALIFICATION INDEX: AN INDEX BASED ON AMBIGUOUS QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS

The Threat to Reliability of Data: The Intricacies of Evaluation for Service

Inherent in the problems to be dealt with in this Military Manpower Survey has been the necessity to deal extensively, much more than generally characterizes survey research, with a data reliability problem. Early in the development of a questionnaire, the results of which would be adequate to the task of achieving a comprehensive understanding of military experience, it was recognized that unfitness for service was a crucial consideration. From the very beginning of this recognition, evidence accumulated showing it would be necessary to lavish great caution in formulating the means by which reliable data could be collected to identify those rejected as unfit for military service. Take special note of the phrase "those rejected as unfit." From the start it was clear that, with the speed and size of this survey, it was out of the question to reliably deal with identifying men who might be found unfit or fit if they were to be evaluated for service at Armed Forces Examining Stations.

The accumulating evidence that gave cause for concern consisted largely of realizations about how many ways, taken singly or in multiples, one man might experience acceptance or rejection for service. This is complicated by the fact that a man's status of military service "liability" (for draft or other forms of entrance) involves other considerations--most notably a variety of kinds of deferment--besides fitness. And this status, whether defined in terms of his formally determined "draft classification" or other indicators, changes with his age in nearly all instances.

A man distinctly mentally retarded, or severely crippled, or blind (etc., etc.) may be rejected by his draft board without examination, at

the time when they learn of his condition. Before that time he is likely to have been classified "I-A, Available" (assumed fit for service). Not having been examined, his only knowledge of being rejected might depend on his understanding that such is the meaning of the "I-Y" or "IV-F" typed on the "Notice of Classification" card sent him by his local board.

On the other hand, there are those who in repeated attempts to enlist have been found below the threshold of acceptability on mental ability tests or in medical examination. However, by their own effort to modify their condition, or because of changing thresholds of acceptance, they may later be certified as enlistees or draftees fit for service.

If virtually all registrants with the Selective Service System in due time were evaluated as to fitness--and federal law requires that all civilian men register upon reaching age 18--the problem would be simplified. This simplification would be true especially if no men found qualified ever failed to enter the service. If that were the case, one could assume that all men who had not entered service were unqualified for service.

Both conditions are quite far from true, although in relative terms the incidence of men found qualified and then never entering is much less frequent than the incidence of men never being evaluated, by all available indicators. Our survey data indicate that under the heavy manpower demands of the Korean war, in the prime military service age groups (31-34 years old in 1964) the evaluated may have been slightly over 90 per cent of the total. Among those reaching prime service age after the Korean period (now ages 27-30) our data suggest that perhaps only slightly over 80 per cent were ever evaluated (the reliability of these figures will be questioned and dealt with hereafter). The indication that from 9 to 20 per cent of a given age group may go unevaluated for service is to be taken even more seriously when it is recognized that, depending on the age group, from 55 to 75 per cent will have seen service. This suggests that of those who never serve, a large proportion--ranging perhaps from one-fifth to as high as one-half--are never even evaluated for service.

There are of course good reasons why this is so. The Selective Service System has not customarily gone to the expense of having a man examined

when the nature of his deferment gave reason to believe he was not likely to be inducted into service within the next six months or so. The important point to be made rather concerns the necessity of distinguishing, for purposes of analysis, among men lacking military experience, those who have been evaluated from those who have not, as well as whether or not, if evaluated, they were rejected. If the unevaluated were as rare among nonveterans as hermaphrodites seem to be in the human population, questions about the reliability of data on evaluation for service might be as uncalled for as reliability questions concerning survey data on the biological sexual characteristics of respondents: "Male"? or "Female"? The unevaluated could be ignored. But this seems not to be the case with the unevaluated.

The Ambiguous Questionnaire Items

The net result of concerns about the need for reliable data on the incidence of unfitness, in the questionnaire-formulation phase of this survey, was the inclusion of four questions in the version of the questionnaire intended for nonveterans. There was no cause for concern about the prospect of treating all men with military experience as mentally and physically qualified. Such concern would be beside the point for this study. The four questions addressed to nonveterans are given in Figure A-II.1. Note that the questionnaire items were not all immediately adjacent--the respondent who wished to give a false picture of himself in most cases would have had to take some care to make it consistent.

The Rationale for Reducing Ambiguity

A rationale for the utilization of these questionnaire items goes somewhat as follows: We are informed by the Selective Service System that once a man is classified as unfit--barring a few exceptions where reevaluations result in qualification for service--the man retains this classification of I-Y or IV-F until age 35. Since our sample is limited to men under 35 it should not concern us that at 35 men designated I-Y or IV-F are reclassified as V-A, meaning "over age." What must concern us, then, in data from

Fig. A-II.1--Questions Addressed to Nonveterans

Question 27, page 5:

27. What is your draft classification NOW?

(If your draft board has classified you, then you have received the card "Selective Service Notice of Classification." On that card, your classification appears as a Roman numeral and a letter, for example I-A, II-S, IV-F, etc.)

I am classified and my present draft classification is _____.

6 I have registered, but have not been classified.

7 I have not yet registered for the draft.

Question 29, page 5:

29. Have you ever been called for examination by your draft board?

1 Never examined

5 Failed only the written test

2 Have been examined and found qualified for draft

6 Turned down by draft for other reasons

3 Failed both physical and written test

7 Do not know the results of my examination

4 Failed only the physical examination

Question 31, page 6:

31. Have you ever been turned down for enlistment?

1 No - NEVER ATTEMPTED to enter any military service

2 Yes - turned down WITHOUT being examined or tested

3 Yes - applied but failed BOTH physical and written tests

4 Yes - applied but could not meet PHYSICAL standards

5 Yes - applied but could not pass the WRITTEN test

6 Yes - applied but turned down FOR OTHER REASONS or DID NOT KNOW REASON why they turned me down

7 No - joined Reserve or National Guard^a

^aThis last pre-coded answer was in fact not included in the questionnaire; Data using this code are the result of several frustrated respondents who, since they had been found qualified for enlistment as Reservists, could not find an answer applicable to them and wrote an explanation of this into their questionnaires.

Fig. A-II.1--Continued

Question 33 (do you expect to enter?), part c, page 6:

IF "NO" -- c. Why do you expect you will not enter?

- 1 Deferment or exemption because of family responsibilities, job, religion, or school
 - 2 Already failed or passed physical or written test (or both)
 - 3 Expect to fail physical or written test (or both)
 - 4 Do not believe I will be called - the draft will stop before it reaches me
 - 5 Do not believe I will be called - even if the draft continues
 - 6 Over age 26 and not yet drafted
-

the draft classification question is that the respondent correctly reports what is typed on the draft card which law requires him to have on his person at all times, and that he does not refer to an out-of-date card. (Draft card burning was not in vogue at that time. With few exceptions, probability dictates that for a reject an out-of-date card would bear a I-A, Available, I-S or II-S, Student or III-A, Dependency deferment classification, if not a I-Y or IV-F reflecting his rejection.) Thus, if a respondent reports a draft classification of I-Y, "unfit for military service except in case of national emergency," or IV-F, "totally unfit for military service," it is reasonable to treat him as evaluated (either by formal examination or otherwise) and unfit for service.

On the other hand, if he does not report a I-Y or IV-F classification we cannot make a definite assumption about his being evaluated or found fit for service. He may have reported to us from an out-of-date card, whose contents we believe many do not understand. It is also possible that he has been rejected by a recruiting officer on the basis of an obvious defect or at an Armed Forces Examining Station in a attempt to enlist. Such instances do not all become a matter of record with local draft boards, though such rejections are relatively clear indications that if and when

ordered to report for a preinduction examination, a man will be rejected and hence classified as I-Y or IV-f.

We understand that since fall 1955 a combination of Armed Forces Examining Station regulations and Selective Service System directives require that enlistment applicants 18 years of age and older, if found unfit for service, be certified to their local draft boards as such, with documents showing the nature of their unfitness.¹ The local board is then required to reopen the cases of such men and classify them I-Y or IV-F according to the information received. While it is permissible for men to enlist with parental consent as young as 17, we are told that men under 18 are not reported to local boards upon rejection by Armed Forces Examining Stations because they will not become registrants with their local board by law until their eighteenth birthdays (there is conflicting information about this) (U.S. Selective Service System, 1958, pp. 33-34).

There are various implications to be inferred from this information. Statistics properly based upon local board recording of unfitness, since 1955, should be among the more comprehensive and reliable for men beyond their eighteenth birthdays, if they were examined at an Examination Station since that age. More important, for our purposes, is the fact that a true reporting by survey respondents on the question of being turned down in attempts to enlist will deal with some inadequacies of the draft classification item discussed above. Reference to data from the "ever examined for the draft" question will deal with additional inadequacies of draft class data.

Both the "turned down for enlistment" and the "draft exam" items help to deal with the problem of out-of-date draft cards. Both also give promise of differentiating men by whether it was on the basis of mental ability, medical (physical or psychiatric) conditions, or both, or other perhaps "administrative" or "moral" reason, that they were rejected. Our anticipation that this was indeed a slim promise has been fairly borne out in the data: as expected (and as reported by other researchers), an alarming

¹See, for example, U.S. Selective Service System (1958, pp. 33-34). This is the most recent mention known of draft board files containing AFES rejectee reports even for men under the age 18 restriction on registration. This may have been discontinued since 1957.

number of men knowing themselves to be rejected seemingly don't know why. More will be said of this later, and what use can be made of such data will be reported.²

The "turned down for enlistment" item serves to bridge the gap for those rejected before age 18 and therefore not reported to local boards for reclassification. It also provides for identification of those turned away by recruiting officers without examination. However, not all of these will be rejectees due to obvious mental or medical inadequacies. Some will be high school dropouts instructed to return later when they have earned diplomas. Others may be men with criminal records, or a miscellany of other problems.

Finally, both items--an enlistment rejection and draft examination--used together presumably will yield a maximum reliability of data on whether or not a nonveteran has been examined at an Armed Forces Examining Station. The argument here is that at least a respondent will be prompted to remember a fairly unforgettable experience, if he has had it and understood it as an examination for enlistment or for being drafted. Both popular and technical descriptions of experience at Armed Forces Examining Stations--and especially the medical part of this experience--attest to its fairly unforgettable features. Viewed from the perspectives of common modesty about nudity, the frankness of questions asked, and a rapid impersonal handling of individuals in some of the most intimate of personal matters, there are few comparable contemporary occasions. The suggestion is that if a respondent has experienced an Examining Station evaluation he should be able to recall it. For those who have been rejected without such experience--such as on the basis of a report from the family doctor to the draft board, or because a fairly obvious inadequacy was brought to the board's attention by other means--the questionnaire item concerning draft classification can be utilized.

²Perhaps the best known source for reporting the prevalence of "rejection reason unknown" is the report to the President entitled One-Third of a Nation (U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964).

One additional strategy presents itself, in the problem of identifying nonveterans by whether or not they have been evaluated for military service and, if so, rejected or not. This involves the item on reason for expecting no entry into military service (presented as the fourth item, above). Only those who said they did not expect to enter were asked this question. Note also that even if they had been rejected, they were free to choose some other reason as more salient to them, if so it seemed.

There are really two strategies here--first, that this item be thought of as a reliability check against the use of the other three questions; and second, that this question be used to sift out additional men to be identified as rejects for service. We have applied both strategies, but the latter has negligible results, for reasons that are obvious and reassuring. These strategies will be presented in their appropriate place below.

The First Stage in Development of an Indicator of
Military Service Qualification

Because of their similarity and the interrelatedness of their meaning, the two questionnaire items on rejected attempts to enlist and examination for the draft have been dealt with together in this first step toward a "Military Service Qualification Index" (MSQI).

Consideration of the variety of combinations of answers one might get from respondents to these two questions suggested the following meaningful categories:

1. Examined and qualified (no inconsistent information)
2. Examined and qualified for draft, rejected for enlistment
- 3, 4, 5. Qualified (entered) as Reservist, rejected in draft examination
6. Examined and rejected for draft and/or enlistment (reason unknown or unspecified)
7. Examined and rejected for draft and/or enlistment on mental test but not medical examination
8. Examined and rejected for draft and/or enlistment on both mental test and medical examination
9. Examined and rejected for draft and/or enlistment on medical examination but not mental test

Figure A-II.2

RESULTS OF FIRST STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF NORC MILITARY SERVICE
QUALIFICATION INDEX (NONVETERANS AGED 24-34)

Ever Rejected for Enlistment?	Ever Examined for the Draft?								
	(2) Qualified in Exam	NA (y)	(1) Never Ex- amined for Draft	(7) Exam- No Re- sults Yet	(6) Failed- Other or D.K. Reason	(4) Failed Medi- cal	(5) Failed Mental	(3) Failed Mental and Medical	Total
In Reserves/National Guard (7)	①	--	2.5	--	⑤	③	⑤	④	2.5
No answer (y)	25.1	⑧	62.9	2.4	8.2	5.2	⑦	2.0	115.0
Never attempted enlistment (1)	244.1	14.2	804.2	⑩	72.0	292.1	29.8	47.3	1,635.0
Rejected without exam (2)	②	--	23.8	4.2	⑥	2.7	6.8	--	40.9
Rejected for other reason or D.K. (6)	15.1	--	25.7	23.5	11.5	1.5	--	--	77.3
Failed medical (4)	8.4	--	26.5	--	4.0	⑨	87.0	--	126.9
Failed mental (5)	2.6	.8	8.6	5.4	⑦	11.2	4.1	⑦	9.9
Failed both mental and medical (3)	--	--	--	.9	--	--	--	⑧	10.1
Total	298.7	24.2	954.2	167.6	109.5	396.7	39.7	61.2	2,051.8

Codes (see text for detailed development). --(y) insufficient information; (x) never evaluated; (0) de facto qualified, i.e., veterans and active men--not in figure; (1) examined and qualified; (2) qualified for draft but rejected for enlistment; (3-5) qualified Reservist but rejected for draft; (6-9) rejected for draft and/or enlistment due to: (6) reason unknown or unspecified, (7) mental test but not medical, (8) both mental test and medical, (9) medical but not mental test.

The numbers given here constitute a new set of codes to be used in identifying these types.

Among the nonveterans of the All-American Sample there are of course two other general types to be distinguished. These two types, and the codes used in identifying them hereafter, are as follows:

- x. Never examined for enlistment or draft (includes those who claimed to have been examined but not yet informed of the results).
- y. Insufficient information (this includes those giving no answer on either question, and those saying they were not examined for draft, or not examined for enlistment, and at the same time failing to answer the other of the two questions).

Figure A-II.2 illustrates the derivation of the above categories by use of the two questionnaire items. The encircled figures and letters are the new codes assigned to the above defined categories, located in the general areas of the diagram where such combination types are to be found. Note that this scheme permits the distinctive identification of any man reporting experience of rejection, it recognizes those whose combined answers may involve an inconsistency, and it classifies respondents as "never examined" only on the basis of positive evidence (hence **involving** no assumption about being examined, in the absence of positive information).

One additional use of Figure A-II.2 has been made. The figures to one decimal accuracy represent the weighted counts of cases for each possible combination of answers to the two questions. No entry of such a figure means there were no respondents who gave the indicated combination of answers. Thus we observe that no nonveterans reported themselves in the Reserves and at the same time said they had been rejected at draft examination (new codes 3, 4, 5, along the top row). As another example, there are $804.2 + 131.3 = 935.5$ respondents identified by the new code "x" as having never been examined for the draft (or not knowing the results yet) and having never attempted enlistment. To assess how Figure A-II.2 represents a first move toward an adequate MSQI, two things must be noted:

1. The figures here represent only nonveterans aged 24 through 34. To make sense of a rate of rejection it has seemed important to restrict

our view of the data to those of an age at which most of the liability of being evaluated for service has been exhausted. Relatively speaking, most of those of a given age group who will ever be evaluated and will ever enter active service will have had these experiences by age 24. There will be the addition of a few more after ages 24 and 25, and exceedingly few beyond age 26. Thus by limiting the figures to be entered in the diagram to the age groups 24 through 34 we have provided ourselves with a view of what we might call "total accumulated experience" for the age group in question.

2. Note also that no account is given in the diagram of those of the same age group who have been or are on active duty as of the survey date. In fact, an additional code "0" has been reserved in the MSQI for such men in the All-American Sample, to have the meaning of "de facto qualification for service." Of the weighted number of 5,326.1 respondents aged 24 through 34 in the All-American Sample, the diagram accounts for the 2,051.8 who are nonveterans. The other 3,274.3 men of this age group consist of 387 currently on active service and 2,887.3 veterans.

With this information in mind it becomes possible to present the above data to show what, in preliminary exploration, was a source of concern for reliability of the data involved. By accumulating the cases entered in each of the general areas of the diagram we get the percentage distribution in Table A-II.1 for the age group in question.

TABLE A-II.1

FIRST STAGE OF THE MSQI, FOR MEN OF THE ALL-AMERICAN SAMPLE AGED 24-34

Code	First Stage MSQI Category	No. of Cases	Per Cent
0	De facto fit (serving or have served) . . .	3,274.3	61.5
1	Examined, fit for draft (nonveterans) . . .	271.7	5.1
2	Examined, fit for draft, not for enlistment	29.5	.6
3,4,5	Categories of inconsistent answers	0.0	--
	Total examined and fit for service .	(3,575.5)	(67.2)
6	Examined, unfit (reason not specified)	171.6	3.2
7	Examined, failed mental tests but not medical	65.7	1.2
8	Examined, failed both mental and medical tests	66.2	1.2
9	Examined, failed medical but not mental tests	423.1	7.9
	Total examined, found unfit for service . .	(726.6)	(13.5)
	Total examined	(4,302.1)	(80.7)
x	Never examined (or no results yet)	935.5	17.6
y	Insufficient information for indexing . . .	88.7	1.7
	Total weighted sample aged 24-34 ^a .	5,326.1	100.0

^aDiscrepancy in sums due to rounding error.

Of this age group we see about two-thirds (67 per cent) found fit for service, slightly over one-eighth (13.5 per cent) unfit, and about one-sixth never examined. As expected, a relatively large portion (about one-fourth) of those reporting disqualification for service do not specify the grounds for their rejection.

The cause for concern about the reliability of these data lies with the overall rate of rejection for service, at 13.5 per cent of the total. Even when taken as a percentage only of those who have undergone examination (4,302.1 cases), these 726.6 constitute a relatively low 16.9 per cent rejection rate. Admittedly, this is but the first of two major stages in the development of our index, and we expected that some number who are classified as I-Y or IV-F to have been so without formal examination. However, various sources of information would lead us to expect ultimately to find a rejection rate above 20 per cent, and this stage of the MSQI seems seriously below that.

Throughout the past decade there has been talk of rejection rates above 30 per cent. As early as October 1950, President Truman "called for universal military training to end the 'disgrace' of 34 per cent of the nation's youth being rejected by the Armed Forces preinduction examination. . . ." (U.S. Selective Service System, 1953, p. 9). Concerns about continuing rates such as this and higher have not failed to be publicized since then. The annual reports of the Selective Service System for this period document this steady flow of alarm. The pinnacle of these concerns was perhaps reached under President Kennedy.

During the Kennedy administration there were perhaps two major developments in this connection. In January 1962 the President approved a new "unfitness" classification of I-Y, by which not all men found unfit would be thought of as totally so. The new distinction would identify men rejected but sufficiently fit in case of war or national emergency.

More important than this, for our purposes, was the Presidential announcement of September 30, 1963, establishing a "Task Force on Manpower Conservation." In this announcement the President noted the expectation that "one out of every three young men in this country does not meet the

minimum standard for peace time military service" (U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964; "Statement by the President," Appendix A, p. A-1). A major product of this task force is the published report just cited, with its striking title, One-Third of a Nation. That report briefly documents a study by the Department of Defense, done between August 1958 and June 1960, yielding the finding of an "overall" rejection rate of 31.7 per cent. It further suggests that with an upward shift in test score criteria effective May 1963, this rate increased to an estimated 35 or 36 per cent.

The question is of course whether the present survey data, when adjusted to identify as unfit those who report a I-Y or IV-F classification without experiencing formal examination, will reflect such rates.

Refinement of the MSQI

The major refinement possibility here can best be shown and explored by a cross-tabulation. This must relate the first stage categories of the MSQI to nonveterans' reported draft classifications, for the same age group--24 through 34 years. This is done with as much simplification as possible in Table A-II.2.

TABLE A-II.2

FIRST STAGE MSQI BY DRAFT CLASSIFICATION, FOR MEN AGED 24-34

Code	First Stage MSQI Category	Draft Classification			Total	No. of "Unfit" To Be Gained
		I-Y	IV-F	Other		
0	"De facto" qualified.	--	--	3,274.3	3,274.3	--
1	Examined, found "fit"	6.5	10.7	254.5	271.7	17.2
2	Examined, "fit" for draft but not for enlistment.	1.7	--	27.8	29.5	1.7
x	Never examined.	37.1	120.4	778.0	935.5	157.5
y	Insufficient information.	1.1	6.0	81.6	88.7	7.1
6-9	Examined, found "unfit"	(140.8)	(354.3)	(231.3)	726.4	0.0
	Total no. of cases aged 24-34	187.2	491.4	4,647.5	5,326.1	--
	No. of cases "unfit" to be gained	46.4	137.1	0.0	--	183.5

Decisions concerning the use of this information for refinement of the MSQI have developed as follows. Remember that we have had reason to believe that some do not understand the results of their examinations and perhaps many do not understand the combination of Roman numeral and alphabetic notations used to symbolize draft class. On the other hand we have expressed more confidence in the reliability of the respondent to simply copy onto his questionnaire the symbol typed on his draft classification card, regardless of its meaning or lack of meaning to him. On these grounds we have made the somewhat "soft" decision to recategorize from code 1, "examined and found fit," to an "unfit" category those whose reported classifications are I-Y or IV-F. Of the 271.7 weighted cases of the code 1 category, 17.2 could be reclassified, as shown in the last column of Table A-II.2.

Of the handful of men (29.5) in category 2, "examined, fit for draft, but not for enlistment," a bit of checking has shown that, aside from the 1.7 weighted cases in the I-Y class, they are for the most part telling us something that is entirely possible and acceptable information when only a few are concerned. Qualification for draft after being found unfit for enlistment does happen. Only if a relatively large number were in this category should we begin to doubt their veracity. For purposes of simplicity the 1.7 have been recategorized as unfit on the basis of the I-Y, while the other 27.9 are being combined under category 1, "examined and found fit."

The extent of the problem of men being classified as unfit--I-Y or IV-F--by their draft boards without having a formal examination experience to report is suggested by the figures in the table for row x, "never examined." Here there are 935.5 weighted cases, of which 37.1 report a I-Y on their draft card and 120.4 report a IV-F. These two groups are now recategorized as unfit, and the other 778.0 remain as "never examined."

It may be of interest that of the 88.7 with "insufficient information" (code y), there are only 1.1 with a I-Y, and 6.0 with a IV-F, classification. Of the remaining 81.6 we find no means of determining whether they have been examined and, if so, found qualified. These remain coded as "insufficient information," while the other 7.1 can be recoded I-Y and IV-F.

The net result of this exploration and the decisions just described, can be presented in the following simple table. The 3,274.3 veterans and servicemen are not included here, since the assumption of "de facto qualification" makes them irrelevant for the time being.

First Stage MSQI	Draft Class		Total
	I-Y or IV-F	Other	
Rejected in examination. . .	495.1	231.3	726.4
Not rejected in examination.	183.5	1,141.9	1,325.4
Total nonveterans aged 24-34	678.6	1,373.2	2,051.8

The essence of previous discussion is evident here. Of the 678.6 with a I-Y or IV-F classification, 495.1 report rejection in formal examination while 183.5 do not indicate such rejection. On the other hand, of the 726.4 reporting experience of rejection in formal examinations, while 495.1 also report a I-Y or IV-F classification, the other 231.3 report other draft classes (such as III-A, II-S, I-A, etc., representing the variety of deferment and availability classifications used). These 231.3 may represent largely men who looked at out-of-date draft cards. However, there is the possibility that some of these represent instances of "slippage" between Armed Forces Examining Stations' rejections of enlistment applicants and local draft board reclassification of such as I-Y or IV-F. In addition, some of those in the "other draft class" category have a V-A, "overage" classification, the workings of which are exceedingly complicated, and the meaning quite ambiguous. It is possible practically for rejectees to have been reclassified at a later date as V-A though this is not supposed to happen, by Selective Service statute, until reaching age 35.

One might be tempted to look at the above table for some indication of reliability. But because of the not entirely airtight logical and empirical relationship of the categories involved that would be risky, if not entirely unprofitable endeavor.

The possibility was mentioned earlier of one partial check on the reliability of the indexing, as it has now progressed to the point shown

in the fourfold table we have just presented. This involves the use of the fourth relevant questionnaire item, reason given for not expecting entry into military service, among those not expecting such entry. We say "partial check," since the respondent was free to pick any of the major types of reason suggested to him in the questionnaire. However, if he chose as his most salient reason for not entering the answer "Already failed to pass physical or written tests (or both)," we should expect a high probability that this person will have been categorized as unfit in the refined MSQI.

We shall look into this by arranging the four cells of the fourfold table vertically in Table A-II.3. The "Total" column of this new table simply presents the four cell entries from the table on page 147. Then in the first, third, and fourth columns the cases entered in the "Total" column are accounted for by whether they gave "Already Failed" as their salient reason, or gave some "Other" reason, or reported a positive expectation of entering the service. It also identifies a total of 130.7 weighted cases of those expecting to enter active military service (or already in a Reserve Forces component, though there are only 2.5 of these). Since those giving "Other" reasons are considered to have an indeterminate status, in this reliability check, the percentage distribution is not given for the third column.

TABLE A-II.3

EXPECTATION OF ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE, BY FIRST STAGE MSQI AND DRAFT CLASSIFICATION

First Stage MSQI Groups	Draft Classification	Do Not Expect AMS Entry Because			Do Expect to Enter AMS		Total
		Already Failed		Other	Number	Per Cent	
		Number	Per Cent				
Rejected in examination	I-Y or IV-F	245.6	74.5	223.6	26.0	19.9	495.1
	Other	53.7	16.3	169.0	8.4	6.4	231.3
Not rejected in examination	I-Y or IV-F	21.3	6.4	148.0	14.3	10.9	183.5
	Other	9.2	2.8	1,050.7	82.0	62.7	1,141.9
Total nonveterans aged 24-34		329.8	100.0	1,591.3	130.7	99.9	2,051.8

Remember that up to this point in the refinement of the MSQI it is only the cases in the lower left cell of the earlier table, here represented by the total of 1,141.9 of the last row in Table A-II.3, which are not categorized in the MSQI as unfit.

We find that of the 329.8 respondents giving "already failed" as reason for not entering service, only 9.2 cases, or 2.8 per cent, have not yet been classified by this stage of the MSQI as "unfit" for service. This suggests a substantial degree of inter-item reliability.

Even in the somewhat anomalous category of men aged 24-34 who still expect to enter military service--of which there are 130.7 weighted cases--we find over 60 per cent of these in the bottom row of the table, among the ones not coded as "unfit" at this stage of the MSQI development. The 14.3 cases, or about 11 per cent "not rejected in examination but I-Y or IV-F" are perhaps understandable as men not realizing their rejectee status with their local draft boards. The 26.0 and 8.4 cases of men reporting having been "rejected in examination," yet expecting military service, may represent the possible experience of having been rejected in attempts to enlist in high prestige recruiting programs, and expecting that now the Draft Board will induct the rejectee into the Army of the United States. Our concern is relieved by the fact that such a small number of cases is involved.

If the two columns here considered to provide a meaningful basis for internal--or "inter-item"--reliability judgment are considered together, it would go something like this. Take the combined total number of cases of the two columns ($329.8 + 130.7 = 460.5$) as a base for computing a percentage. Take the 9.2 cases of the first column as the extent of clear discrepancy in the data. This 9.2 cases constitute slightly less than 2 per cent of the 460.5 cases in the two columns.

The final step in the refinement of the MSQI has consisted of including such men as these 9.2 cases who answered "already failed" in a category of "unfitness" in the MSQI. The final form of the MSQI, as applicable to the entire All-American Sample, has the following appearance. (Note that

the earlier meaning of code 2 has been resolved, and the initial use of codes 3, 4, and 5 resulted in finding no such cases in the sample.)

Final Form of NORC Military Service Qualification Index

Code	Definition of Category
y	Nonveteran with insufficient information to index
x	Nonveteran, never evaluated
0	Veteran or currently in service--de facto qualification
1	Nonveteran with clear indication of being found qualified
3	I-Y men not in categories 6-9 of first stage of MSQI
4	IV-F men not in categories 6-9 of first stage of MSQI
5	"Already failed" is reason will not enter AMS (applies only to those not in categories 3 or 4 above, nor 6-9 below)
6	Unfit according to first stage of MSQI, with type of unfitness unspecified
7	Failed mental but not medical exam according to first stage of MSQI
8	Failed both mental and medical exam according to first stage of MSQI
9	Failed medical but not mental exam according to first stage of MSQI

It will be convenient to use various groupings of these categories in subsequent methodological exploration and analysis. For example, code 0 identifies virtually all who have two or more continuous months of active duty experience, so that--when focusing on that variable--all other codes can be lumped together, subsuming all nonveterans. If "all men found qualified" is the important distinction of the moment, then codes 0 and 1 can be taken together. When "all men ever evaluated" represents the universe of our interests, those men coded y and x may be excluded while various combinations of the remaining codes may be used. When the nature of disqualifying conditions are of prime concern the groups coded 3, 4, 5, and 6 may be combined under the rubric "unfit, type of unfitness unspecified." Other combinations are obviously possible. However, if the concern is with the I-Y and IV-F distinctions it will be necessary to use the draft classification item in combination with this final form of the MSQI. In

that manner one is able to make the important distinction of severity of unfitness for all who reported I-Y or IV-F classifications, and at the same time give due attention to those not reporting such classification yet giving reason to believe them evaluated and found unfit for service.

At various points in the following treatment of data a full variety of these schemes will find their place.

APPENDIX III

ONE-THIRD OF A NATION? ONE-FIFTH OF A NATION?

Introduction

"A generation ago President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke of seeing 'one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.'" So begins the second paragraph of the Letter of Transmittal for the report One-Third of a Nation (U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964).

The report itself gives a new meaning to the phrase "one-third of a nation." A Department of Defense study of 1958-60 is touched on briefly. Its central finding is an estimation that "if the entire male population of draft age were examined, about one-third would be disqualified [for military service]" (U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964, p. 11). The precise rate given is 31.7 per cent, with the suggestion that a May 1963 boost in the threshold of mental ability requirements would raise this rate to 35 or 36 per cent. From that point on, this "one-third of a nation" finding has been treated virtually as a known parameter. To our knowledge this Department of Defense estimation of the parameter of disqualification for service has never been seriously questioned.

The report includes basic information on the nature of evaluation procedures used by the Selective Service System and Armed Forces Examining Stations. Then extended attention is given, using a 2,500 case sample of rejectees, to demonstrate the disadvantageous socio-economic conditions found to be associated with the disqualified, as compared with the general population of the United States. But the point of departure for the entire report is the "one-third disqualified" rate, with

an elaborate pattern of information developed around it.

Concerning the rejection experience of the period covered by One-Third of a Nation, and of periods of time between 1950 and 1960, other materials have come to our attention (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1954, 1955, 1959; Karpinos, 1960, 1962). We shall consider these and other sources individually in some detail later on. Here we shall only note that this combination of sources yields a picture of overall rejection rates estimated to have been around 22 per cent in 1950-53, 27 per cent in 1954-58, and 32 per cent since 1958.

The title for the present appendix grows out of the fact that we have found it necessary to question these findings. It has become necessary to evaluate the sources of rejection rate estimates in order to evaluate in turn the reliability of the NORC/DOD All-American Sample data, as formulated in the Military Service Qualification Index (MSQI). According to the MSQI, the men of our sample aged 24 through 34 have a rate of disqualification of 20.5 per cent of those evaluated, while men aged 16 through 23 show an overall rate of 32.2 per cent of those evaluated.

In order to evaluate these different rates one must look at their respective sources and at the statistical context into which these rates must properly fit. Relatively much has been said in two preceding appendices about the source of the "one-fifth disqualified" rate of this survey. We shall summarily show some distributions of the MSQI for the All-American Sample. Then we shall hasten to reduce our information vacuum about government sources.

This appendix will stop short of detailed treatment of the sources, not to mention any attempt to reach the stage of summarizing and the formulation of conclusions. These tasks are of magnitudes which call for two separate appendices beyond the present discussion. Those who wish are free to proceed to the summary and conclusions of Appendix V, with the possibility of then returning to look at the details on which these conclusions have been based.

The Application of the MSQI to the Entire
All-American Sample

In the preceding appendix the main concern was with the development of an index of qualification for service and with the internal validity of the index being developed. We take the position at this point that, given our knowledge of how the system of selection actually operates and how the questionnaire items of this survey work together, there is a sound rationale for the development of the MSQI to its final form. There remains the matter of what this index can tell us about the universe which the All-American Sample represents.

To this point the data we have presented consisted only of men aged 24 through 34. The reason given for the exclusion of men under 24 was that in that younger age group it would be difficult to evaluate the reasonableness of rate levels (especially of "unfitness") to be derived at any stage in the development of the MSQI. It was pointed out that this is so because age groups under 24 are increasingly far from having run the full gamut of liability to evaluation and entry into military service. This concern about "full" or "completed" exposure to liability will continue to harrass us in what follows. For such younger age groups we shall call rates of unfitness "incomplete," or "premature."

Specifically, in addition to retaining the 16 through 23 age groups as a separate category, we shall introduce a distinction between age groups 24 through 26, 27 through 30, and 31 through 34. Our reason is that, with our own data as well as from information on the chronology of military manpower, the men aged 31 through 34 at survey time can be identified as representing those cohorts which bore the brunt of manpower requirements for the Korean war (1950-53). Those cohorts aged 27 through 30 were "too young for Korea" but old enough that apparently they did not catch the weight of the "Berlin crisis" manpower build-up (fall, 1961). The age group 24 through 26 at survey time is unique in two major ways: apparently it was a prime target for the Berlin crisis manpower build-up; furthermore, except for most of the 26-year-olds, this age group has come close but has not entirely exhausted its liability for military service.

These four age groups are distributed across the categories of the MSQI in the manner shown in Table A-III.1 on the following page. Every percentage in the table, in any given row, is computed on the basis of the "Total Weighted N" for that row. If one wishes to look, in a given row, at a set of percentages which presents the greatest possible detail, such a set is constituted of all the figures in the columns with code numbers (O), (X), etc. The most gross set of percentages of interest to us here consists of the entries in the columns labeled "Total Qualified," "Total Unfit," and "Never Evaluated" (which together with the small residual of "Non-veterans with Insufficient Information" account for the full 100 per cent).

Ignoring the age group 16 through 23, we see percentage "Unfit," of all in a given age group, ranging from 16.2 to 18.8 per cent. However, we also note that rate of men qualified ranges from 60.8 to 74.0 per cent, and the number never evaluated ranges from 8.6 to 18.8 per cent. If one were to consider the percentages "Unfit," of the total, to be the appropriate rates to compare with the 31.7 per cent unfit reported in One-Third of a Nation from a Department of Defense study, the discrepancy would be striking. However, that report states "if the entire male population of draft age were examined, about one-third would be disqualified" (U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964, p. 11). Clearly, the reported rate must have been based only on those evaluated and then projected to the total population. Hence our comparable figure should be computed as the percentage "Unfit" of the "Total Evaluated." A set of such computations for each of the rows in the table results in the following percentages:

Military Service Qualification	Age Group					Total Sample
	Subtotal 16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34	Subtotal 24-34	
Qualified	67.8	76.4	78.9	82.0	79.5	76.2
Unfit	32.2	23.6	21.1	18.0	20.5	23.8
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total evaluated	1,735	1,154	1,614	1,707	4,475	6,210
Never evaluated + NA	3,495	295	369	187	851	4,346
Total Weighted N	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893	5,326	10,557

TABLE A-III.1
MILITARY SERVICE QUALIFICATION FOR THE ENTIRE ALL-AMERICAN SAMPLE, BY AGE GROUP

Age Group	Sufficient Information											Total Per Cent	Total Weighted N	
	Evaluated						Total Evaluated	Never Evaluated (X)	Total with Sufficient Information	Non-veterans with Insufficient Information (Y)				
	Qualified			Unfit										
	Total with AMS (0)	Qualified Non-veterans (1)	Total Qualified	Rejects (Type Unspecified) (3-6)	Failed Test (7)	Failed Physical and Test (8)					Failed Physical (9)			Total Unfit
Total Sample	39.9	4.9	44.8	5.8	1.6	.8	5.8	14.0	58.8	39.5	98.3	1.7	100.0	10,557
16-23 ^a	17.9	4.6	22.5	4.8	2.0	.3	3.6	10.7	33.2	65.0	98.2	1.8	100.0	5,231
24-34	61.5	5.3	66.8	6.8	1.2	1.3	8.0	17.3	84.0	14.5	98.5	1.5	100.0	5,326
24-26 ^a	54.7	6.1	60.8	7.3	1.9	1.0	8.6	18.8	79.6	18.8	98.5	1.5	100.0	1,450
27-30	58.1	6.1	64.2	7.3	1.1	1.2	7.6	17.2	81.4	16.8	98.2	1.8	100.0	1,983
31-34	70.2	3.8	74.0	6.0	.9	1.5	7.8	16.2	90.2	8.6	98.8	1.2	100.0	1,893

^aExposure to liability is incomplete.

Now we find, in the 27-30 and the 31-24 age groups whose liability may be considered completed, that rates of unfitness among those evaluated range from 18 to 21 per cent. The 24 to 26-year-olds, with some remaining liability, have a rate just under 24 per cent and the 16 to 23-year-olds, far from having exhausted their liability to evaluation and service entry, have an unfitness rate of 32.2 per cent. The entire All-American Sample, looked at in this manner, shows an unfitness rate of about 24 per cent. Hereafter, it will be this set of unfitness rates that will be assumed to be the appropriate grounds for comparison with the various government sources. Furthermore, to conform to the Department of Defense terminology, these rates will always be called rejection rates.

Other Sources of Military Manpower Information

The problems concerning civilian and military manpower which threatened throughout the 1950's came increasingly to a head in the manpower policy developments of the early 1960's. One-Third of a Nation and the research that lies behind it are only a part of those developments. It is in this context that we attempt in a highly selective fashion to reconstruct the story of developments most relevant to a solution of our military manpower information problems here.

The main sources for the kinds of data which concern us are the Bureau of the Census, the Department of Labor, the Department of Defense, and the Selective Service System. The Bureau of the Census provides the broad base of highly reliable population figures which can be used as a framework or context within which other figures are to be located and understood. The Department of Defense is the primary location of statistics concerning how many men were members of the Armed Forces at a given point in time, and how many entered or left during a given period. The Selective Service System contributes from its reservoir of information concerning all registrants of the nation, their shifts in status of availability, rates of evaluation and rejection for service, and so on. Finally, the Department of Labor, along with the Bureau of the Census, stands ready to contribute in the matter of what kinds of information are needed, how the data are to be organized, and once organized, how they are to be interpreted.

We find several occasions on which various combinations of these agencies have worked together on matters of immediate interest to us. The earliest we have found is a Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1954; see esp. pp. 36-38 for derivation of rejection rates; see also the supplement to this Bulletin [Pettengill and Garfinkle, 1955]). The Bulletin is an impressive assault on the total picture of military manpower supply and projection in all its complexity, our interest here is focused on the three pages allotted to the derivation of a "rejection rate."

The rate estimate computed there was derived to represent the entire male population aged 22 through 24 in April 1953, including those never examined (at that time). The estimate of 22 per cent of the population unfit is based on a Bureau of Labor Statistics adaptation of the Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory of April 1953 (more attention will be given to that source later in this appendix). For practical purposes we need not concern ourselves that this 22 per cent unfitness rate involves an array of assumptions and estimating for men not examined, since the breakdown between those examined and those unexamined yields 22 and 21 per cent, respectively. What does concern us is the set of assumptions and estimates necessary simply to derive the 22 per cent rate of those who had been examined.

Two major problems must have concerned the Bureau much as they concern us now (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1954, pp. 36-38):

1. The adaptation of the Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory involved estimating how many should be added to the sample (their Table C shows 1,484, or 3.7 per cent of 40,289) as enlistees unregistered--therefore technically unknown--to the Selective Service System.
2. Because of the ambiguities of the V-A, "Over age," classification which becomes operative with registrants beyond age 25, the Bureau of Labor Statistics chose to use as basis for their rate derivation the part of the sample representing three age cohorts that had not yet lived out their liability to military service (ages 22, 23, and 24 in 1953).

In this appendix and in Appendix II we have commented at some length on the serious implications of these two problems, and more details will be added before this appendix is completed. On grounds yet to be fully elaborated we fully concur with the suggestions of the Bureau of Labor

Statistics to the effect that a final and definitive measurement of unfitness is yet to be accomplished: "The estimates may contain a considerable margin of error. However, assumptions and methods leading to conservative estimates of availability generally have been used (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1954, p. 7; see also p. 10). With the uncertainties of the estimates involved they included Table 5 of the Bulletin, which demonstrates how different the projections to 1960 would look depending on whether actual unfitness rates were 23, or 25, or 27 per cent. There they give their best estimate as 25 per cent for the total population, instead of the 22 per cent described in their technical appendix. Of course, inclinations in the direction of "conservative estimates of availability" imply tendencies to overestimate unfitness. While this can be considered obviously acceptable in light of the underlying concerns of the policy making involved, it can lead to serious biases overestimating the actual levels of unfitness in the population.

Taken in chronological order, the next authoritative attempt, to our knowledge, to deal with the problems of measuring unfitness is Karpinos (1960; see pp. 240-45, esp. p. 244). This article on the "Unfitness of American Youth" was produced in the Medical Statistics Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, applying an entirely different strategy to the task of estimating the rejection rate.

Though published in 1960, the Karpinos article deals with the period July 1950 through July 1953, the time of the Korean war. In so doing it deals in a sense with rejection rates of the same time as the March 1954 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. However, instead of taking certain key cohorts of men as its frame of reference, Karpinos' research takes all men processed in initial evaluation for service during the specified period. And instead of using a sample, Karpinos is dealing with national statistics, from the Selective Service System and from the Department of Defense.

Karpinos' strategy can be conceptualized somewhat as follows: The military manpower procurement spectrum can be dichotomized into Selective Service System procurement and "Other" procurement. Of the two sectors of procurement, the Selective Service sector is unique in maintaining records of essentially every United States male beyond age 18 (unless he enlists before age of registration at 18). That record

will show whether or not the registrant has been evaluated by Selective Service procedure and the outcome of that evaluation. There are national statistics available summarizing such records.

The statistics of accessions of manpower in the "Other Procurement" sector are to be gotten from Department of Defense records of gain and loss. However, by Karpinos' strategy the matter of evaluation and rejection in this sector is irrelevant for our practical purposes, because those who enter service are by that fact known to be fit, while men who become rejects in this sector will become a matter of record as rejects in the Selective Service procurement sector and thereby enter into our analysis.

In the logic of this framework, Karpinos was able to present the following figures:

- a. The combined disqualification rate, D, equals 382.5 per thousand of all men processed for induction (i.e., 38.25 per cent are unfit, of those evaluated in the Selective Service sector); thus rate qualified, Q, equals 617.5 per thousand;
- b. The 2,514,779 men procured through Selective Service for the time period are the qualified, i.e., the 617.5 per thousand of those processed for induction (61.75 per cent fit of those evaluated in the Selective Service sector of procurement);
- c. There were 2,521,949 men procured through the "Other Procurement" sector.

Beyond this it is not necessary to go into the intricate logical and algebraic manipulations of the Karpinos article. With the information of (b), if we let $x = \underline{\text{all}}$ men processed in the Selective Service sector, then

$$.6175x = 2,514,779 \quad \text{and} \quad x = 4,072,516.6.$$

Getting the number disqualified as the difference between the total processed by Selective Service (x) and the number qualified through Selective Service procedure, we get the following overall distribution of the total processed in both sectors:

Qualified through "Other Procurement"	2,521,949	38.24%
Qualified through Selective Service	2,514,779	38.13
Disqualified through Selective Service	1,557,737.6	23.62
Total processed/evaluated fiscal years 1951-53	6,594,465.6	99.99%

Thus we have arrived at the overall rejection rate reported by Karpinos: 23.62 per cent of the total of men evaluated during July 1950 through July 1953. This is in very close agreement with the rate derived by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as reported above, though it is based upon different statistics and has a slightly different meaning, because of the different strategy.

Actually, Karpinos used a somewhat different algebraic treatment of the same logical relationships we treated above to arrive at the 23.62 rate, and it is fortunate for us that he did. In so doing he has called our attention to the comparative sizes of the procurement by Selective Service and by "Other Procurement"--i.e., the 38.13 and the 38.24 per cents, respectively. We cannot duplicate Karpinos' strategy, since there are six cohorts involving men not yet age 26 in July 1950 who are too old to have been included in the 1964 Military Manpower Survey. However, there are four cohorts in the All-American Sample that were of prime age for the Korean war. Here we find the ratio of "Other Procurement" entrants to Selective Service procurement to be 59.5 per cent/40.5 per cent, or with the arithmetic a ratio value of 1.4691, instead of the nearly 50/50 ratio of Karpinos' data. (We have included all reporting initial entry as draftees and volunteers for induction as Selective Service procurement, and the remainder are the 59.5 per cent "Other" for the four cohorts in question.)

The questions this raises are not so much concerning error in the usual sense. One question is whether there are kinds of accessions to the military--e.g., enlistments in reserve programs, the National Guard and Air National Guard, the Coast Guard, and so on--which the All-American Sample includes but which Karpinos' data may exclude. (And it may not be a matter of these lesser programs of the 1950-53 period involving so few men as to be negligible, since every increment of procurement left out of the "Other" sector has the direct effect of bringing up the rejection rate.)

On the other hand, the accessions of fiscal years 1951, 1952, and 1953 (the period covered by Karpinos) which come from the cohorts too old for the All-American Sample involve men who were entering service at ages mostly beyond the average age of induction. This would suggest that the accession experience of fiscal years 1951-53 would be underrepresented in the All-American Sample data more in the Selective Service sector than in the "Other Procurement" sector. Of course, for the four All-American Sample cohorts we are talking about, the rates we are discussing are completed rates. In other words, for these cohorts we are taking into account all their experience with any kind of procurement; the problem is that a considerable portion of their Selective Service procurement experience occurred after the Korean period, during reduced draft calls.

This serious difference between the cross-sectional strategy of Karpinos and the cohort strategy of our own analysis leaves it an open question whether some sort of adjustment would be possible by which to more appropriately compare the "Other Procurement"/Selective Service procurement ratios of the two studies. Short of such an adjustment, we must live with the gap between the approximately 1.47 and the 1.00 ratios with the knowledge that if appropriate adjustment were feasible it would narrow the gap, and to the extent that gap is narrowed it would bring the rejection rates of the two studies into closer agreement. If the 1.47 ratio of the All-American Sample were applied to Karpinos' problem, his rejection rate calculation would be brought down to 20.06 per cent.

A third question about the comparability of the All-American Sample data and Karpinos' article involves the incidence of men being found qualified for service, but for some reason never entering service. In the survey data of the All-American Sample we find 3.8 per cent, or nearly one in every twenty-five of our 31- to 34-year-olds (the Korea cohorts) reporting "qualified but never entered." It is unclear whether Karpinos' analysis takes account of such men in any way. Exclusion of men found qualified but never entering, in the process of calculating a rejection rate, would result in overestimating the rejection rate.

It should also be noted that Karpinos' treatment may miss some rejections which the Military Manpower Survey takes into account. We

have in mind those who made voluntary attempts to enter which resulted in rejection, without the knowledge of Selective Service, and then due to marriage, fatherhood, or other deferments never became known to Selective Service as rejectees. The survey data would treat these as rejectees, if such rejectees there are, while Karpinos' logic would completely exclude them from the "Total Processed/Evaluated" population.

Our final position concerning Karpinos' work, given our present understanding of it, is this: It does not appear to be sufficiently comparable to the All-American Sample data to justify our expectations that rejection rates of these two sources should conform any more than they do, i.e., 23.6 per cent versus 18.0 per cent respectively.

The next and perhaps most important sources for our methodological needs were developed in 1962. This is important for several reasons, chiefly because:

1. It now becomes possible to deal with rates of both the time of the Korean war and of the turn of the decade (late 1950's, early 1960's).
2. This involves cohort data which are certainly more comparable to the data with which we are working.
3. The sources we shall now discuss are the sources from which the "one-third of a nation" finding emerged.

For our purposes, the most significant of the 1962 sources to be considered here is the Karpinos (1962) report entitled Qualification of American Youth for Military Service--probably the most sophisticated and comprehensive available treatment of evaluation procedures and rates of rejection and accession for the period July 1950 through June 1960. (For July 1950 through July 1953 this report simply recapitulates the contents of the 1960 article we assessed in the preceding paragraphs. Added to that are the details of comparable figures for the subsequent periods August 1953 through July 1958 and August 1958 through June 1960.)

We cannot begin to convey to the reader here the elaborate system of the logic of probabilities which Karpinos has utilized or the vast body of statistical and other information on which he brought to bear this logic of probabilities. Our assessment of his work has turned up

only one definite problem, adjustment for which could result only in minor reductions of perhaps 1 per cent in the estimates of overall rejection rates he arrives at, and ends with some unanswerable questions.

The problem for which an adjustment can be readily developed goes something like this: Built into Karpinos' exhaustive system of probabilities is the proposition that all those who pass preinduction evaluations under draft board orders later will appear in final procedures for induction, to be evaluated again. If the time lapse at this final reappearance has been negligible--generally less than 180 days (before 1959, less than 120 days)--they are subjected to routine physical inspection. His statistics show the rejection rate in this process to be 2.81 and 5.49 per cent for the 1953-58 and 1958-60 periods, respectively. If the time lapse has been greater than the limits specified, the inductees undergo a complete physical reexamination. Karpinos shows statistics of 10.89 and 13.66 per cent rejection in this process for the two periods in question.

Now, Karpinos has applied these rates, in his system of probabilities, to all who passed preinduction evaluation, but the statistics he gives indicate that this does not occur in actual experience. His Table 1 (p. 15) gives 1,042,216 and 233,355 as the number of men accepted at preinduction in 1953-58 and 1958-60, respectively. However, from his Table 2 (pp. 17-18), for the first period only 479,599 (or 46.02 per cent of 1,042,216) were inspected at induction and only 306,593 (or 29.42 per cent) got complete physicals again. For the second period, 51,928 (or 22.25 per cent of 233,355) were inspected and 102,912 (or 44.10 per cent) were completely reexamined. He is thus not acknowledging the other 25 per cent of those men who passed preinduction in the 1953-58 period and who did not return for induction, and some 34 per cent in the 1958-60 period who did not return. Yet he applies the 10.89 and 13.66 per cent rejection rates of the complete reexamination process to these very men which his figures indicate never returned. We believe that these men who never returned for induction correspond to those in our All-American Sample who report being found qualified but who remained nonveterans. The following scheme summarizes the figures we have discussed.

Category Description	1953-58		1958-60	
	Men	Per Cent	Men	Per Cent
(1) Inspected for induction	479,599	46.02	51,928	22.25
(2) Reexamined for induction	306,593	29.42	102,912	44.10
(3) Total reevaluated	786,192	75.44	154,840	66.35
(4) Total accepted at pre-induction	1,042,216	100.00	233,355	100.00
Difference between rows 3 and 4	256,024	24.56	78,515	33.65

If it is safe to assume the correspondence between the men represented in the differences entered in the bottom row of this scheme as having not returned for induction after preinduction acceptance and the qualified nonveterans of the All-American Sample, then no further rejection probability should be applied to them. An appropriate arithmetic adjustment of Karpinos' overall rejection rate estimates reduces his 26.81 per cent for 1953-58 to 25.82 per cent, and his 31.68 per cent for 1958-60 to 30.44 per cent.

We consider these to be negligible reductions of Karpinos' estimates, their only significance being that they raise the possibility of the actual parameters being somewhat less than the published estimates. We are confronted with a possible anomaly if the All-American Sample rejection rates of 23.6 per cent for the 24 to 26-year-olds in 1964, and the 32.2 per cent for the 16 to 23-year-olds should correspond to Karpinos' rates of 26.8 and 31.7 per cent respectively. For with our proposed adjustments resulting in reduction of both of these we have a 25.8 per cent approaching our 23.6 per cent, but a 30.4 per cent moving away from our 32.2 per cent. A moment's thought will give us at least two good reasons why this correspondence is not supported by an airtight justification for the comparison. First, our All-American Sample rates are based on a cohort strategy while Karpinos is continuing to use a temporal cross-section approach, and there is no way for us to apply his approach to our data.

Second, though there is obvious overlap between times during which our cohort rejection experience occurred and the time periods of Karpinos' analysis, the fit is far from perfect. Men 26 years old in 1964 were only 15 years old in 1953, and 23-year-olds of 1964 were becoming 17 in 1958. Furthermore, in 1964 the All-American Sample respondents obviously were reporting some rejection experience which had not even occurred by July of 1960. In fact, if rising thresholds of acceptability indicated by One-Third of a Nation to be scheduled for May 1963 had already begun to take their toll by November 1964 (the time of the Military Manpower Surveys), this could serve to explain our 32.2 per cent being higher than Karpinos' 31.7 per cent rate, which we propose to adjust downward to 30.4 per cent.

As we noted to begin with, we have only been able to detect one minor hitch in Karpinos' analysis, for which we have proposed an adjustment of negligible reduction in his estimates. If there are any serious defects in his analysis we have failed to uncover them. We are left with unanswerable questions as to how closely his rate estimates should correspond to All-American Sample rate estimates. We must again ask whether Karpinos has included by his strategy all the types of qualification for service--i.e., qualified nonveterans but also Coast Guard and all other types of accessions--which have been counted as qualified in the All-American Sample strategy. In sum, we might marvel at how remarkably close the rejection rate estimates turn out to be, when all grounds for expecting discrepancy are taken into account.

We now turn to another important 1962 source. We find a full combination of federal departments and agencies working together in an unpublished report of the Department of Defense entitled "Project 61: Extension of Selective Service Act." This report commands interest here because the "one-third disqualified" rate traces back through it, to Karpinos' reports and other sources: "Our current estimates indicate that the 'over-all' rejection rate for the entire military-age population, under current standards, is about 33 per cent, as contrasted to an average of 22 per cent prior to 1958 (Table 10)."¹ The table to which this quota-

¹Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense--Manpower (1962; cf. p. 23 and Table 10). This report, dated October, 1962, was developed to define the Department of Defense position concerning the renewal or revision of the 1951-1955-1959 UMTS Act which would expire July 1, 1963.

tion refers adds that the 33.0 per cent estimated overall disqualification rate applies to the years 1958-61, while the 22.0 per cent applies to the years 1950-57. Of equal importance is footnote 1 of Table 10:

Overall Disqualification Rate--Disqualifications for service, as percentage of total examinees, including volunteers and draftees. Estimated on basis of Selective Service sample inventories and related statistics.

This tells us how to understand the rates being reported and where to go to evaluate the sampling and data collection on which the rates are based.

Concerning the sampling and data collection we know the following: A partial "One Per Cent Sample Inventory" was developed by the Research and Statistics Division, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, as of April 30, 1953. This was "partial" as of that date only in the sense that it did not include registrants who were in the V-A, "Over age," class at that time. It thus excluded a large proportion of men of a number of age groups, men whose important classification and evaluation experience in this way would be left indeterminate for research of these age groups. (This source was used, and this problem noted, in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1954, as we described earlier.)

This limitation of incompleteness was subsequently overcome when the One Per Cent Sample Inventory of 1953 was updated and completed as of January 31, 1959. At that more recent date all registrants new since April 1953 were sampled, as were those classified as V-A in April 1953. If one were concerned only with the sampling of registrants we find no serious objection to the pronouncement of the Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget (Statist. Reporter, 1953):

The sample was selected on the basis of the eleven-digit Selective Service numbers, every hundredth number being included.... Since [the last four digits are] originally assigned to men ... in similar sequence for each year of birth, the sample is stratified by age; otherwise it is believed to be random.

We are suggesting that while it may as a random sample adequately represent a sample frame of all registrants, the Selective Service sample is not drawn from a sampling frame that includes all service-age men. It is important to remember that men who enter service before age 18 usually

do not get registered with Selective Service until after separation from service, if they register at all. (This problem also was noted and dealt with in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1954.) We also know that the Selective Service sample will provide no basis for estimating the number of men who never enter service and never register with Selective Service. This may of course be a small, perhaps negligible number. Thus the Selective Service Inventory will fail to represent that part of the population consisting of nonregistrants and will underrepresent those who by entering service early and voluntarily may often remain nonregistrants. Where this latter condition exists, calculation of unfitness rates will be based on a sample which does not include all men qualified and therefore will tend to overestimate rates of unfitness. The All-American Sample of the Military Manpower Survey lacks these shortcomings.

We have now described and given general evaluative discussion of the five major sources on the incidence of unfitness which have come to our attention: The 1954 Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1161; the 1960 Karpinos article from the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army; the 1962 Karpinos report; the Department of Defense "Project 61" report; and the release on aspects of the 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory. In the chapter immediately following we shall return to the latter two sources for detailed comparisons and appropriate adjustments in an attempt to find firm ground on which to arrive at conclusions.

APPENDIX IV

ADJUSTMENTS AND DETAILED COMPARISONS WITH RATES FROM
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SELECTIVE SERVICE SOURCES

Comparisons of Cohort Rates of Active Military Service Experience

We are confronted with information which suggests that All-American Sample data may underestimate and other estimates may overestimate the overall rates of unfitness. Within the general proposition that the Military Service Qualification Index (MSQI) may underestimate the unfitness rates there are logical implications of some use to us. These implications stem from the nature of an exhaustive array of categories such as those of the MSQI. For convenience we shall repeat this array in summary form here.

Outline Summary

Stated More Simply

- I. Evaluated for military service
 - A. Evaluated and found qualified
 - 1. Entered military service. Qualified/entered
 - 2. Did not yet enter military service. . . Qualified/never entered
 - B. Evaluated and found unfit--disqualified . . Disqualified
- II. Never evaluated Never evaluated
- III. Nonveteran with insufficient information (since this is essentially a methodological category, and since so few men fall in this category, little if any mention will be made of it hereafter)

With a set of exhaustive categories such as these, if it is thought the misclassification of some sample respondents (or certain types of over or under-representation of the population) is resulting in underestimation of the proportion of the population in a given category, then some other category must be involved in a problem of overestimation of a proportion. This suggests that, to deal with the possibility of underestimation of rejection rates, we consider the proportions of the All-American Sample in

each of the four summary categories of the MSQI, in our comparisons with other sources. We shall frequently call this procedure of taking an exhaustive set of rates into account "considering a rate in its statistical context."

Thus, when one is concerned with what might be a reasonable estimate of a proportion unfit of a given age group, some other statistics will be of considerable use. For example, if it is known that 70 per cent actually entered active service, and that 8 per cent were never evaluated, then it follows that not more than 22 per cent could have been found unfit. This is the sort of "statistical context" we have in mind, to be taken into account in comparing rates from different sources.

For these purposes some comparisons can be made quite readily, while other important comparisons are virtually impossible with the data at hand. For example, we have a great deal of confidence in some of the rates of experience of active service as found in "Project 61" (U.S. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower], 1962)--in fact we believe the rates of active service experience for the cohorts born in 1932, 1935, and 1936 may be exceedingly close estimates of the parameters. That is, we understand that the "actual total population" figures and the "actual number entering service" figures may be precisely what they are labeled in the tables, and rates based on them would be virtually the parameters which other sources may approximate by sampling estimation (Tables B-4 and B-5 of Appendix III in "Project 61" are thought to provide such data for the cohorts mentioned). Thus we are fairly confident that of men born in 1932 (age 32 in 1964), 70 per cent have seen active military service, while of 1,100,000 born in 1935, 58 per cent saw service.

Now, with the idea of the statistical context in mind, we shall consider the information gathered together in Table A-IV.1. These rates are of primary interest to us at the moment because of the important part they play in the statistical contexts of the unfitness rates which concern us and because we feel more confidence in some of these than in any other rates; they may be quasi-parameters.

Each horizontal row of figures in this presentation pertains to a

specific age group of the U.S. male population. Hence, each horizontal row is identified for convenience in three different ways according to which age group it represents:

1. The calendar year (or years) of birth of the age group
2. The cohort age in 1964--the year of the Military Manpower Survey
3. The cohort age in 1959--the year of the Selective Service Sample updating

The main body of the table is divided into three parts of two columns each, corresponding to our three sources (the NORC All-American Sample, "Project 61," and the 1959 updated Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory). The two columns of each part contain rates and the base figures on which the respective rates were calculated. The blank spots in the sets of figures are due to absence of information or irrelevance of available data in the sense of "premature rates."

For example, for cohorts born in 1930 and 1931, and 1933 and 1934, "Project 61" provides no data for the kind of rates sought here. As another example, the 1959 Selective Service data do include material for the cohorts born in 1938, 1939, and 1940. However, since in 1959 these cohorts enjoyed the tender ages of 21, 20, and 19, respectively, their active service rates are so far from completion at that age as to be judged irrelevant for our use here.

The parentheses have been used with the intention of eliciting caution when it seemed that a serious degree of estimation, or anticipatory projection, or "incompleteness of liability" pertained to the rate made parenthetical. Closely related to our use of the parentheses is the use of double horizontal rulings which lend the appearance of three steps--one for each source--going up the table to the right. This has been done in the instance of each of the three sources, at the level below which the age groups had not reached age 26, as of the date of the source. Thus the step effect derives from the dates of the sources: 1964, 1962, and 1959 (from left to right).

The rates given for each of the individual cohorts and two subtotal groupings (27-30, and 31-34 years of age) for the All-American Sample are

TABLE A-IV.1
COHORT RATES OF ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE EXPERIENCE

Cohort Identification		1964 NORC/DOD All-American Sample		1962 DOD Report "Project 61"		1959 Selective Service 1 Per Cent Sample Inventory		Age in 1959
Year of Birth	Age in 1964	Rate	Wtd. No. of Cases	Rate	Actual Population	Rate	No. of Cases	
1930	34	65.8%	441.8			65.1%	12,613	29
1931	33	64.9	505.1			67.7	11,964	28
1932	32	74.1	505.1	70%	1,100,000	66.3	12,187	27
1933	31	72.8	441.5			63.4	11,520	26
1930-33	(31-34)	70.2%	1,893.5			65.7%	48,284	(26-29)
1934	30	60.6%	479.1	58%	1,100,000	(43.6%)	11,612	25
1935	29	56.3	527.7	58	1,110,000	(51.2)	11,729	24
1936	28	59.9	500.8	(57)	1,130,000	(44.3)	12,071	23
1937	27	55.6	475.5	(58%)	(3,340,000)	(37.9)	11,907	22
1934-37	(27-30)	58.1%	1,938.1	(54%)	1,160,000			(22-25)
1938	26	59.1%	469.5	(53)	1,170,000			21
1939	25	(57.1)	434.4	(51)	1,220,000			20
1940	24	(49.0)	545.6					19

Sources: The 1964 NORC/DOD All-American Sample data as presented here actually reflect some of the non-sample features of the composite All-American Sample about as much as they involve sampling fluctuation. As a basis for the calculation of percentages we have simply taken the weighted total number of men, to one-digit decimal accuracy, in each single-year age group of the All-American Sample, using the NORC Modified Weight Scheme. Using these totals as the bases, we have calculated as our rates the percentage constituted by the sum of the "veterans" and the "active military personnel," for each single-year age group. (The latter consists of those 964 in the small subsample drawn from the Military Personnel Survey, which totals over 100,000 cases. See Appendix I for a description of this.)

The data of "Project 61" presented here are, with but one exception, entirely from Appendix III, Table B-5. Specifically, counting from the left, the first six columns of the bottom half of that table are used here for age groups born 1935-40. The same data are given for the 1936 cohort in the second column of the upper half of Table B-4 and the far right column of Table B-1 (in the same appendix). The rate of 58 per cent for this age group (which reached age 26 during 1962) is also given as "actual" in Table 6, which follows page 17 in the main text of the report. In this Table 6, as in Table B-4 mentioned earlier, we have our source for the 1932 birth cohort with its "actual" rate of 70 per cent with military experience.

The 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory data are taken from Selective Service Headquarters "Release No. 4C ('59): Classification and Age," Table 3, page 8. Here we have simply summed the number of men in classes I-C (both "inducted" and "enlisted or commissioned"), I-D, IV-A, and V-A and taken our rate as the percentage constituted by this sum, of the total age group in question. This may be criticized for the assumption involved when the class V-A, "Over age," is treated as consisting entirely of men who have served. However, as faulty as that assumption may be, the rates calculated in this fashion nevertheless underestimate the known--i.e., "actual"--rates reported by "Project 61."

based simply on the total weighted number of sample cases in each age group. If the second column for this source were extended downward to a 1964 age of 16 years it would total the full weighted All-American Sample size of 10,556.9 cases. The rates are only a matter of the percentage which the veterans and active military personnel constitute of their age group.

With "Project 61" as the source, there are only two sets of figures for which we enjoy high confidence--those for the cohorts with years of birth 1932 and 1936. The Appendix III, Table B-4, together with comments in the text of the report lead us to believe that these--and perhaps the figures for those age 29 in 1964--are quasi-parameters. If this is true, then we note that the All-American Sample overestimates rates of active service experience for men born in 1932 and 1936 while the Selective Service data underestimate these rates, and both sources underestimate the rate for men born in 1935. (However, with men born in 1935-36, their "immaturity" in 1959 is grounds for discounting this comparison.)

The Selective Service rates given here have been calculated from figures given by the Selective Service Sample Inventory Release No. 4C (1959), "Classification and Age" (p. 8, Table 3). Taking all sample respondents of a selected year of birth as rate base, for each cohort we summed the number of men in both I-C classes and the I-D, IV-A, and V-A classes, to find the percentage of the base constituted by this sum. We have assumed that all V-A men have military experience. (As a rule, deferred and rejected men are not to be reclassified as V-A, "Over age" until reaching their thirty-fifth birthday).

Comparing All-American Sample rates in this presentation with three DOD quasi-parameters we are led to believe that we have a moderate margin of error in this regard without a consistent bias (two overestimates and one underestimate). We have earlier anticipated a Selective Service underestimate in these rates, with our observation that a sampling frame restricted to registrants may be seriously short of representing men who enlisted at early ages without first registering. Whatever the explanation, the discrepancies between the DOD "Project 61" rate and Selective Service and All-American Sample rates for the 1932 cohort constitute serious gaps.

As a measure of this seriousness, consider what it would take to

bridge the DOD/Selective Service gap. If we assumed the 70 per cent DOD rate to be the parameter, and the 66.3 per cent to be an erring estimate, one way to close the gap would be to add men with military experience to the Selective Service 1932 age group until their addition would yield a 70 per cent rate. To do this, it would take for this age group the registration of an additional 1,486 men in the Selective Service One Per Cent Sample with service experience--this implies that at least 11 per cent of this age group had entered military service without registration and at age 27 were still not registered with the Selective Service. And there would be very slight chance of this much sampling error, assuming a random sample size of over 12,000. (Note that such addition to the 1953 Selective Service Sample is precisely what was done in the BLS Bulletin, as we described in Appendix III.)

Now, one would expect some fair amount of sampling error to accompany operations involving the cutting of a sample as finely as single-year-of-age groups. By this token, it seems desirable to consider a comparison of the rates of an age grouping of the 1930-33 year-of-birth cohorts. While DOD affords no grounds for comparing rates of military experience, a comparison is possible between the All-American Sample (1964) rate of 70.2 per cent and the 1959 Selective Service Sample Inventory rate of 65.7 per cent. The 4.5 difference between these two averages is much less alarming than the 7.8 percentage point difference for the 1932 cohort taken by itself.

The comparison of the All-American Sample averages of 70.2 per cent and 58.1 per cent (for those aged 31-34 and 27-30 in 1964) with the single-year cohort rates of 70 per cent and 58 per cent reported in "Project 61" may seem strikingly close. However, caution is necessary here, particularly in the case of the older age group, with only one of four cohorts represented in the "Project 61" data. If we consider the All-American Sample rates for the four cohorts born in 1930-33 as indicative of parameter fluctuations for these single-year-of-age cohorts, the parametric average may turn out to be closer to the Selective Service average of 65.7 per cent than to the All-American Sample average of 70.2 per cent.

We have less reason to distrust the All-American Sample rate for

the cohorts born in 1934-37. For these cohorts the All-American Sample yields an average rate of 58 per cent entered service, to be compared with the corresponding Department of Defense rate, which we have interpolated to be 58 per cent.

Comparison of "Overall Disqualifications Rates"

In the preceding appendix we made reference to One-Third of a Nation as the published source and "Project 61" as an earlier unpublished source of the 33 per cent disqualification estimate. We also noted that "Project 61," with its October 1962 date, cites the Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory as the source both for this 33 per cent estimate for the period 1958-62 and for an estimate of 22 per cent unfit for the period 1950-57. In addition, "Project 61" gives an operational definition of the "Overall Disqualification Rate": It is the percentage found disqualified of the total number examined.

Following the guidelines suggested by such information as this, Table A-IV.2 has been prepared. Again, the table looks spotty--"Project 61" gives no data for specific cohorts older than those born in 1935.

Table B-5, in Appendix III of "Project 61," presents a series of actual population figures apparently in combination with various estimates. As our table shows, it seems that our assumptions about Table B-5 are borne out, in rates from 31.2 to 33.3 per cent for cohorts born in 1935, 1936, and 1937. For two of these cohorts (born in 1935-36) the exceedingly close correspondence between "Project 61" rates and 1959 Selective Service Sample rates may seem striking, because of the possibility that the latter are not the direct sources of the former. (The Karpinos report of 1962 very likely played a part here.)

Now, note that in Table A-IV.2 we have again used the double-ruled line, horizontally. This is to indicate the cohort level below which rates must be thought of as "premature" or "incomplete," relative to the age of the cohort at data collection time. Note that it is necessary here, for "Project 61" rates, to draw the line three cohorts higher than we did in Table A-IV.1. In that table the "Project 61" rates of serving were not

dependent upon the 1959 updating of the Selective Service Sample Inventory. Rather, they had their sources in Bureau of the Census figures and military personnel rosters (the "actual figures" mentioned earlier) as of 1962, the date of "Project 61."

On the other hand, the disqualification rates presented here may very well depend upon the 1959 updated Sample Inventory. We cannot consider as final the 1959 rates for men born as recently as 1934 and later--such rates as these are approximately final only after the cohort has reached age 26. That this is important is suggested by the fact that in instances of comparison of "overall disqualification rates," when one of the rates represents cohorts of "completed" liability to service and the other rate involves cohorts of uncompleted liability, the completed rate is likely to be around 25 per cent or lower, and the incomplete rate is generally above 30 per cent. We will further explore this phenomenon later on. Now we simply point with interest to the similar pattern of "overall disqualification rates" between the 1964 and the 1959 data: the "completed" rates--i.e., rates for cohorts aged 26 or more at the time of data collection--tend to be under 30 per cent, but the "incomplete" rates tend to be over 30 per cent.

Finally, there is one more problem to be described in Table A-IV.2. Earlier, the point was made that Selective Service data seem likely to underestimate the rate of military service experience. One meaning of this is that the number found qualified and hence the number examined will be underestimated by Selective Service data.

As we have indicated previously, our calculations of "overall disqualification rates" from the 1959 Sample Inventory data are based on the number given as examined. If that number is underestimated, then the number found unfit will be disproportionately large and the resulting "overall disqualification rate" will be somewhat of an overestimate.

Our table shows the unfitness rates based on the 1959 Sample Inventory, for cohorts born in 1927-33--hence "completed" rates in 1959--to range from 21 to 28 per cent. If it became necessary to judge these as overestimates of unfitness, and to find a basis for a substantial downward adjustment, such an adjustment would come increasingly close to the 18 per

TABLE A-IV.2
COMPARISON OF "OVERALL DISQUALIFICATION RATES"

Year of Birth	Identity of Cohort Age in 1964	1964 NORC/DOD All-American Sample		1962 DOD Report "Project 61"		1959 Selective Service I Per Cent Sample Inventory		Cohort 1959 Age
		Rate	Number Evaluated	Rate	Number Examined	Rate	Number Examined	
1927-29	(35-37)					21.9%	31,792	(30-32)
1930	34			22% during 1950-57		25.2	10,971	29
1931	33					23.7	10,626	28
1932	32					26.5	11,004	27
1933	31					28.0	10,163	26
1930-33	(31-34)	18.0%	1,706.8			25.8%	42,764	(26-29)
1934	30			33% during 1958-62		(31.4%)	(9,243)	25
1935	29			(31.2)	930,000	(31.4)	(8,893)	24
1936	28			(31.9)	940,000	(30.2)	(8,816)	23
1937	27			(33.3)	960,000	(22.9)	(6,343)	22
1934-37	(27-30)	21.1%	1,613.8			(29.5%)	(33,295)	(22-25)
1938-40	(24-26)	(23.6%)	1,154.0	(37.7)	3,000,000	(24.1%)	(8,594)	(19-21)
1941-48	(16-23)	(32.2%)	1,735.6					(11-18)

Sources: The 1964 NORC/DOD All-American Sample rates given here are taken directly from the table on page 156.

The 1962 DOD Report "Project 61" rates are developed from Appendix III, Table B-5, of that report, with the exception of the 22 and 33 per cent rates presented here in the boxes. Except for those two, we have calculated all these rates by summing the number estimated to be "unfit" with the number reported to have "entered service" and gotten the percentage "unfit" of this sum, for each of three single-year age groups, with years of birth 1935, 1936, 1937. The same was then done combining figures for men with years of birth 1938-40. The two boxed rates are the exceptions to this procedure. They are taken directly from Table 10, "Military Service Disqualification Rates" (follows p. 23 of "Project 61").

The 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory data come from Selective Service Headquarters "Release No. 4C ('59): Classification and Age," Table 3, page 8. In that table, there are four different points in the detailed listing under "I-A & I-A-0, available" at which the phrase "examined and accepted" is used. (The only other use of this phrase is under I-0, "Nonfather," and the few men involved there have been ignored in our calculations.)

For each age group of concern to us, years of birth 1927-40, we have summed the number appearing at any of the four "examined and accepted" points of the list, along with all men classed I-C, I-D, IV-A, IV-F, and V-A. This sum has been considered the "number examined" of a given age group. The "rate" is then calculated as the percentage constituted by IV-F, "Rejected" of this number examined."

cent overall disqualification rate of the 1964 NORC/DOD survey, for the 1930-33 cohorts.

Perhaps the major point to be made here is this: the 22 per cent overall disqualification rate estimated for the time before 1958, in "Project 61" Table 10 (and based on the 1959 Selective Service Sample) is not seriously discrepant from the 1964 NORC/DOD estimate of 18 per cent for roughly the same age groups. However, contrasted with the lesser gap between 18 and 22 per cent for the 1930-33 cohorts, we cannot ignore the larger discrepancy between the 21 and 31 per cent rates for the 1934-37 cohorts. The higher rate is an "incomplete rate" for the same age group having the low "complete rate."

Comparison of Draft Classification Distributions
To Evaluate Reliability of Unfitness Data

Another strategy for comparison has been suggested to us by the possibility that the 1959 Sample Inventory may underestimate the rate of military experience. Table 3 of Selective Service Headquarters Release No. 4C ('59) has been the source of Sample Inventory figures we have presented so far and will serve our purposes here as well.

The problem of adapting the data of Release No. 4C ('59) is indeed complex. We shall continue to restrict the "testing" of the 1964 data to comparisons with data of the same year-of-birth cohorts, as of the 1959 Release. This comparison will be further restricted to men who in 1959 were sufficiently old that most of the Selective Service classifying and evaluating would be over with by 1959. Fortunately, the cohorts aged 26-29 in 1959 are the same cohorts who were aged 31-34 in 1964. Thus it becomes possible appropriately to compare the oldest available 1964 NORC/DOD survey age-group with the Selective Service 1959 age-group, which was the youngest group past age 25 in 1959.

Much effort has been lost in attempting to determine how information published in Release No. 4C would be translated into rates of "never evaluated," "unqualified," "qualified," etc. The major difficulty here is the V-A, "over age," draft class. We earlier mentioned the kind of assumption

we felt forced to make about this. Glossing over the complexities, we note to begin with that once a man has survived his period of liability--i.e., is no longer liable to compulsory service--he can be classed as "over age."

This is done with veterans classed IV-A after they have gotten their final discharge papers, having served years as "standby" or "ready" Reservists after separation from active service. On the other hand, this reclassification is received also by a nonveteran who by chance has passed the age of liability without deferment, as well as by the nonveteran who by deferment has passed even the age of extended liability which accompanies his deferment. Finally, even the I-Y and the IV-F is to be reclassified as V-A, "over age," though technically this is not to happen until the thirty-fifth birthday.

Thus, when we discover in the 26-29 age group of the Selective Service Sample that over 18,000 (or about 38 per cent of the 48,284) are classed I-A, "over age," it is not possible to determine which are veterans, which escaped their service obligation, and which were rejectees. However, if rejectees under 35 are seldom reclassified as "over age" (and the regulations say they are not to be so reclassified), a new strategy presents itself. We find the possibility, with a minimum of contrivance, of comparing draft classification data between two samples representing the same age group. We are speaking of men born in the years 1930-33. In the Selective Service Sample the classification will be as of age 26-29, whereas our data will be as of age 31-34, but if we properly contrive to deal with the "over age" draft class the comparison may be considered an acceptable reliability check.

Note that with our survey there are no draft class data for veterans or for the men still in service. However, we know that their draft classes must be among the following: I-C, I-D, IV-A, V-A ("in Regular service," in Reserve service," "veteran with unfulfilled obligation," and "over age--no more liability"). What problems are there in considering these four draft classes as equivalent to the statuses of the veterans and servicemen of our sample? We are fairly certain that men classed V-A at ages 26 through 29 could not include many rejectees. They may include a few who have completed their exposure to liability without ever serving, but these will likely

be a small group. (As reported earlier, "Project 61" indicates that no more than 0.5 per cent are in this category.)

Taking Table 3 of the Selective Service Sample Inventory Release No. 4C ('59) as our source, we are concerned first of all with these broad draft class distinctions:

1. All the detail from I-A at the top, down to I-S, "college" (inclusive), plus the I-W (both "at work" and "released"), plus the detail II-A down to III-A (inclusive) and IV-B down to IV-D (inclusive)--all of these particular detail entries will be lumped together into what we shall call "total classified nonveterans, excluding unfit and over age."

2. "Nonveterans rejected for service" will consist simply of those classified as IV-F in Table 3 of the Release. (Later, in developing All-American Sample data to compare with those of this Release, we will lump together with IV-F cases in this same category those reporting I-Y classifications or giving other indications of rejection.)

3. The third broad class will consist of those listed in the Release as I-C (inducted, enlisted, or commissioned), as I-D (ROTC, National Guard, or other Reserve service), and as IV-A (veteran or sole surviving son). We shall think of this category as consisting of men with "obligation fulfilled or in process."

4. Finally, we will establish a separate category for men of the Selective Service Sample in the V-A, "over age" draft class, and we shall think of these--based on our assessment of Table 3 and information from Selective Service Headquarters--as consisting virtually entirely of veterans with fulfilled obligations.

Now we can present Table A-IV.3 and proceed to explain the deviations from the four simple categories suggested above. Note that the first rows of the table correspond perfectly with the first two groupings defined above, the third row being simply the subtotal "all classified nonveterans except V-A, 'over age.'"

One of the key comparisons to be developed in this table is "proportion fulfilling obligation," which involves the dichotomy "nonveteran" versus

TABLE A-IV.3

EXTENT OF REJECTION FOR AND FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY SERVICE
OBLIGATION AMONG MEN BORN 1930-'31-'32-'33, AS
REFLECTED IN THE 1959 SELECTIVE SERVICE SAMPLE INVENTORY
AND THE 1964 MILITARY MANPOWER SURVEY^a

Military Service Obligation and Classification Groupings	1959 Selective Service Sample		1964 Military Manpower Survey	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total classified nonveterans (excluding unfit and over age).	5,533	(11.4)	140.4	(7.7)
Nonveterans rejected for service.	11,050	(22.9)	305.5	(16.7)
Subtotal: All classified nonveterans except V-A "over age"	16,583	(34.3)	445.9	(23.3)
V-A, "over age," known nonveterans	0	--	48.9	(2.7)
All known and classified nonveterans.	16,583	34.3	494.8	27.0
Obligation fulfilled or in process: draft class is I-C, I-D, IV-A	13,277	(27.5)	9.5	(.5)
Known by survey to be veterans or in service.	0	--	1,329.9	(72.5)
Selective Service Sample V-A, "over age" (virtually all veterans).	18,424	(38.2)	0.0	--
Subtotal: obligation fulfilled or in process.	31,701	65.7	1,339.4	73.0
Total: All "classified" men.	48,284	100.0	1,834.2	100.0
Insufficient survey data.	--	--	35.2	--
Survey data indicated unclassified registrant.	--	--	11.2	--
Survey data indicate nonregistrant.	--	--	13.0	--
Total number of cases.	48,284	--	1,893.6	--

^aNote: Occasional discrepancies are due to rounding error.

"serving or have served." We have arrived at the limits of the "nonveteran" category, for the Selective Service Sample, with the first three rows of the table. However, there are several other groupings of nonveterans to be considered in the All-American Sample. While with the Selective Service Sample we believe all V-A men to be veterans, with the All-American Sample we are quite certain that cases reporting a V-A class are nonveterans. Thus the weighted count of 48.9 nonveterans reporting a V-A classification completes the All-American Sample "classified nonveteran" part of the dichotomy. The other three small groupings of nonveterans in the All-American Sample have no equivalence in the Selective Service Sample: While Selective Service presents data only for men whose draft class is known (i.e., "classified"

men), the All-American Sample in this 31 to 34-year age group includes 11.2 cases reported registered but not classified, 35.2 cases of nonveterans with insufficient information on the MSQI, and 13.0 cases of nonveterans claiming to be nonregistrants. Being types for which the Selective Service Sample does not account, we will account for these nonveterans at the bottom of the table and note especially when adjustment in rates takes this number of nonveterans into account.

The table as now explained accounts for all nonveterans, the figures comparable between the two samples being 16,583 and 494.8 men, or 34.3 per cent as compared with 27.0 per cent, respectively. This 7.3 percentage points of discrepancy seems substantial, and we shall discuss this later.

The other side of the coin consists of accounting for men, in both samples, who have fulfilled or are in process of fulfilling their service obligation. For the Selective Service Sample the remainder of the table fulfills this task with two simple groupings: 13,277 are in draft classes I-C, I-D, and IV-A pertaining to fulfillment of obligation; 18,424 are in class V-A, "over age," and we can say with certainty that they are virtually all veterans. This results in a total of 31,701 men, or 65.7 per cent of the 48,284, who are serving or have served to fulfill their obligation.

With the All-American Sample, 101 men in this 31 to 34-year age group are on active service, and 1,228.9 weighted cases are veterans. This totals the 1,329.9 entry in the table. In addition, there are 9.5 cases among the "nonveterans" of this age group who claim some form of obligation fulfillment. Since there is a variety of ways in which this is possible, and would be counted as such in the Selective Service Sample, for the All-American Sample we simply add these 9.5 to the 1,329.9 for a total of 1,339.4 with obligation fulfilled or in process. These are 73.0 per cent of the 1,834.2 weighted All-American Sample cases to be compared with the 65.7 per cent of the Selective Service total of 48,284.

The important thing about having reached this point in exploring our reliability problems is that it suggests the possibility of the entirely new kind of question raised a bit earlier: Could the root of the discrepancy have to do with the different rates yielded by Selective Service data

as compared with Veterans Administration records? As shown before, (Appendix I), the proportional part taken by veterans in the All-American Sample is determined by figures from the Veterans Administration and not by sampling. If the Veterans Administration figures have yielded sufficient overestimation, or Selective Service figures sufficient underestimation, of rates of serving out the military obligation this would shed light on the discrepancy of 7.3 percentage points.

We have already noted that the Veterans Administration figures included all veterans regardless of being institutionalized and/or being beyond the geographic bounds of the CPS sample. If we ignore the geographic bounds problem and assume that veterans have the same rate of institutionalization as nonveterans, the adjustment would work like this: At a rate of institutionalization of about $85,770/5,846,000 = .01467$,¹ we find about 18.0 of the 1,228.9 weighted veterans to be the undesired result of including inmates in the independent estimates of veterans. Taking these 18 away from the 1,339.4 serving or having served, and adding 18 to the 494.8 "classified" and 59.4 "unclassified" nonveterans aged 31-34, we get 1,321.7 with military experience and 571.9 nonveterans, and there is still a total of 1,893.6 weighted cases for the 31- to 34-year age group. The 1,321.7 are 69.8 per cent of this total, as compared with the 70.7 per cent which 1,339.4 cases are of the same total. So this adjustment, for institutionalized veterans who should not have been included in the independent estimates provided by the Veterans Administration, only makes roughly one percentage point difference.

We do not know what other possibilities there are of the Veterans Administration estimates involving overestimation. It is known that the Selective Service data involve underestimations of both nonveterans and of men serving or having served. Underestimating nonveterans occurs when non-registrants and unclassified registrants do not get counted. Underestimation of men with military experience results from the fact that men entering service

¹This ratio is taken from the Bureau of the Census source cited on p. 114 of Appendix I.

under age 18 cannot have registered yet and may actually never register, quite certainly never if they elect a lifetime military career. If these two tendencies toward underestimation fairly balance each other, then we might compare the 65.7 per cent of the Selective Service Sample with the 69.8 per cent adjusted rate of the All-American Sample (as we developed it above). If they do not balance each other it is necessary to compute the rate that 1,321.7 cases are of the 1,893.6 total less the (newly reweighted) number of 61.3 cases unclassified or nonregistrants. The rate of 1,321.7 to 1,832.3 is 72.1 per cent, still 6.4 per cent away from the 65.7 rate of the Selective Service Sample.

Now it may appear that all this has taken us far afield of our concern with the rates at which men are disqualified for service. However, if the problem lies with the matter of overestimating men found qualified (e.g., veterans) then the way to compare rates of unfitness between the two samples is to exclude "qualified men" from the percentage computation. Table A-IV.4 presents the data of the Selective Service and All-American Samples in this fashion.

Again we find a striking similarity of percentage distributions. Perhaps of greatest interest to us is that, when taken this way, the rate of unfitness in the All-American Sample data is 68.5 per cent, or nearly two percentage points above the 66.6 per cent of the Selective Service Sample. This suggests that if most of the discrepancy between the two samples can be ascribed to the matter of over- or underestimating men with military experience, the All-American Sample data on unfitness may be exceedingly reliable.

TABLE A-IV.4

DRAFT CLASSIFICATION DISTRIBUTION, EXCLUDING VETERANS, SERVICEMEN, AND UNCLASSIFIED, FOR MEN BORN 1930-33 (AGES 26-29 IN 1959, 31-34 IN 1964)

Draft Classification Group	1959 Selective Service Sample		1964 Military Manpower Survey	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Availables: I-A, I-A-0. . . .	680	4.1	27.4	6.1
Student deferment: I-S, II-S.	112	.7	2.8	.6
Dependency deferment: III-A .	4,290	25.9	103.3	23.2
Miscellaneous deferments: I-0, I-W, II-A, II-C, IV-B, IV-C, IV-D	451	2.7	6.9	1.5
Unqualified for service: I-Y, IV-F, and unspecified unfit.	11,050	66.6	305.5	68.5
Total (Third row of Table A-IV.3)	16,583	100.0	445.9	99.9

Comparison of Rates of Noninvolvement

As we developed our ideas about "statistical contexts" in an earlier section, we presented an exhaustive set of categories to summarize experience--or lack of it--concerning evaluation for and entry into military service:

Qualified/entered	Disqualified
Qualified/never entered	Bever evaluated

We have so far compared rates of men having entered, and rates of men being disqualified, for sources available to us. In terms of the "statistical context" strategy for evaluating the reliability of rates, we have yet to make comparisons which involve rates of "qualified/never entered" and "never evaluated" types of experience. These comparisons are to be developed in two different ways: First, we shall want to compare the same kind of rates, across the several sources of information available to us, seeking agreement among these sources. Second, we need to see what implications there may be for each source as a whole, in the way these rates fit into the statistical contexts--i.e., into sets of rates--provided by each of the available sources.

From virtually all quarters of military manpower concern there is considerable sensitivity about these two kinds of rates, presumably because this has to do with "letting some get away" (without serving). We believe that it is generally assumed, or hoped, that the type "qualified but never entered" never occurs (or occurs so seldom as to be negligible). When it does occur it is of course a simple matter to explain such instances as consisting of men who should never have been examined, since obviously they must have properly claimed deferments, thereby making evaluation uncalled for. By this line of reasoning it is convenient to include those "qualified/never entered" among those "never evaluated," but one is then toying with the assumption that those "qualified/never entered" had legitimate grounds for deferment and hence were unnecessarily evaluated for service. Even more serious, for the task before us, we are fairly certain that such cases should not be left out of calculations of rejection rates, as such rates are defined in "Project 61."

Aside from our concern with getting an accurate reading on the rate of rejection--in which case it becomes necessary to have "examined and qualified" represented as well as those "rejected"--aside from that concern we do well to simply combine the two categories, "qualified/never entered" and "never evaluated," for calculating a rate of "noninvolvement." Thus in what follows we will first give attention to some data in which we retain the distinction between those "qualified/never entered" and those "never evaluated." Then we will go on to information where it was not possible to make that distinction consistently--hence in this latter case we will speak of rates of "noninvolvement."

Comparison of "Straw in the Wind" Selective Service Data with NORC/DOD Data

In the original groping for suitable checking of reliability, the Selective Service System seemed the obvious source of information. One of the important requisites for an adequate check would be the restriction of comparisons to data which could be considered representative of the entire United States male population. Next, the data should permit classifying by age groups to justify appropriate comparison. Finally, the data must be recent enough, or represent an age group old enough, that very little reclassification could have taken place between the time the Selective Service data were gathered and November 1964, the time of the present survey.

At first it seemed that little could be done. None of the annual reports of the Selective Service System give a sound basis for such checking. We were reminded by the National Headquarters that the Selective Service System is an extremely decentralized organization. We were told that they themselves have only two avenues generally available by which to get answers to questions such as ours, from the millions of registrant files of the several thousand local draft boards.

The most obvious avenue is the use of monthly reports sent in from local draft boards via state headquarters. But those reports seemingly do not permit unambiguous distinction of how many have and how many have not been evaluated. (The term "evaluated" as used here refers to any of the procedures by which a man is determined qualified or not qualified for service.

This is not to be confused with the term "classified," which may take place with or without "evaluation." A man may be classified I-A, or II-S, or III-A, or a variety of other ways without being evaluated. He cannot be classified I-Y or IV-F without being evaluated, in our use of the term here.) Furthermore, the monthly reports are not analyzed by age of registrant.

The second possibility seemed to be the use of the One Per Cent Sample Inventory of 1953, which was updated by Selective Service in 1959 and is updated again, as of late 1964 or 1965. Again, we found it would not be possible to unambiguously distinguish the unevaluated from the evaluated. However, several releases resulting from the 1959 Sample Inventory updating, as well as an unusual set of August 1964 percentage distributions were sent for what use could be made of them at NORC.

The set of August 1964 distributions were of greatest initial interest since they do permit unambiguous distinction of the never evaluated. This is one of the ways in which they were unusual. The second unusual feature is that each of the age-group distributions came from different draft boards, generally two local boards per single year age group. (The various state headquarters had been requested to pick out for this "straw in the wind" sampling procedure only draft boards which could be considered "typical." We were advised, in the transmission of these statistics to NORC, that they should be taken only as indicators of what distributions are possible, not necessarily probable.)

Table A-IV.5 presents the unusual Selective Service data and the comparable data from our survey. It must be understood that we do not know the number of cases which serve as basis for any of the Selective Service percentage distributions. We know that for the age group 27-30 years in 1964 eight "randomly" selected local boards provided the statistics. For the age group 31-34 years nine local boards provided the statistics. Two draft boards are the source for each of the eight single years of age involved, except that three boards provided the figures on men aged 32. To arrive at the percentage distributions for the Selective Service columns in our table, we make the assumption that each of the single-year age group distributions of the source document should be weighted equally with each of the others. Thus for each of our two columns representing four-year age

groups we have gotten each percentage as an average of four percentages given in the original document. We have then repercentaged the figures to exclude "deceased" from our percentaging (we did include "cancelled" as "no information").

TABLE A-IV.5
COMPARATIVE DATA INDICATIVE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH
MEN ARE NEVER EVALUATED

(Percentage Distributions of Age Groups)

Military Qualification Evaluation Status	Age in 1964			
	27-30		31-34	
	Sel. Serv. Aug. 1964 Sample	NORC/DOD Nov. 1964 Sample	Sel. Serv. Aug. 1964 Sample	NORC/DOD Nov. 1964 Sample
Qualified and served	(66.0)	(58.1)	(67.5)	(70.2)
Qualified, did not serve	(3.7)	(6.1)	(3.3)	(3.8)
Total qualified	69.7	64.2	70.8	74.0
Total unqualified	14.7	21.1	17.0	18.0
Total evaluated	(84.3)	(81.4)	(87.8)	(90.2)
Never evaluated	14.6	16.8	10.1	8.6
No information	1.1	1.8	2.1	1.2
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number of cases	() ^a	1,983.0	() ^a	1,893.5

^aTotal numbers of cases for the August 31, 1964, Selective Service System sample are unknown. We do know as indicated in the text above, that data for each of the single year age cohorts in the eight year span have their origin with two "randomly chosen" local draft boards (with the exception of the age 32 cohort data which originated with three local boards). Source of the Selective Service System data is a one-page statistical document entitled "Percentages of Selective Service Registrants by Examination, Qualification, Service, Etc., Status and by Year or Age, August 31, 1964."

The reassuring discovery, with this table, is the striking degree of similarity of corresponding rates the length of the table, for both the 27-30 and the 31-34 year age groups. The irony of the situation is that we were well advised in the first place, on grounds of random sampling principles, not to consider this particular body of Selective Service data

properly representative of the universe. In fact, if there had proven to be enormous discrepancies in the comparisons just made we would have insisted it was inconclusive. We must now also insist that these comparisons are inconclusive, though it is reassuring to see the agreements. Our data do not seem to be seriously overestimating or underestimating any rates, judging by these comparisons.

The Use of Rates of Noninvolvement

Beyond the above material, we are forced to fall back upon "rates of noninvolvement" four our "statistical context" strategy. The simplest operational definition of "noninvolvement rate" is the residual percentage unaccounted for when the sum of the percentage entering service and the percentage of the age group found to be unfit does not total 100 per cent. This is not to say that all the "noninvolvement rates presented Table A-IV.6 involve such a basically negative strategy, but many of them do. Certainly the reverse is never the case--i.e., at no point in this presentation do we arrive at either a "per cent unfit" or a "per cent serving" on the basis of some data concerning the "noninvolved."

The most extreme instance of the strategy of a calculated residual in Table A-IV.6 is with the "Project 61" Table B-4 data for the 1932 cohort. As we have discussed before, we believe the 70 per cent rate of serving to be a very close estimate of the parameter for that cohort. If we are willing to accept the 22 per cent overall disqualification rate reported in "Project 61" as the average for the period 1950-57, we can then use it (the 22 per cent) as an unbiased estimate for the 1932 cohort. We can now find "per cent unfit," using the information given, and by subtraction find the "rate of noninvolvement."² Such are the dynamics of the statistical context strategy and the usefulness of the "rate of noninvolvement."

²Simple algebra, and one assumption, will fairly accomplish this task.

Given: 1. Number of men in 1932 cohort = 1,100,000;

2. 70 per cent, or 770,000 of these men served;

3. Of an unknown number of men who were examined, 22 per cent were disqualified, while 78 per cent were qualified (.22 + .78) = 1.00.

Assume that the 78 per cent qualified are constituted by the 770,000 who served.

Let S = number who served; D = number disqualified; then

$$\frac{D}{S + D} = .22,$$

Some general comment on Table A-IV.6 is necessary. First, notice that we have inserted parenthetically in the "Selective Service Sources" columns the rates derived from the August 1964 statistical document provided by the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System. We have earlier explained the basis for the restricted usefulness of these 1964 Selective Service data, and this is the reason for entering them here parenthetically. All the other data on the right-hand side of the table are from the 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory.

Second, in this final summary and comparison of available sets of rates we are excluding any materials from "Project 61" except for the 1932 cohort, and from the Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory of 1959, for cohorts born after 1933. The discretion involved here, concerning the inclusion of the "Project 61" data for the 1932 cohort, was spelled out in the preceding footnote. The discretion involved in excluding all the rest of the "Project 61" material reviewed in earlier sections is based on one central point:

While we believe that we are given a quasi-parameter of 58 per cent served, for the 1936 cohort, this leaves a "degree of freedom" to be filled by another estimate--either of the rate of unfitness, or the rate of noninvolvement--which is accompanied by some independent grounds for our confidence. We have not found such a second estimate with independent grounds for confidence. (The August 1964 statistical

$$\begin{aligned} D &= .22D + .22S, \\ .78D &= .22S, \\ .78D &= 169,400, && (\text{since } S = 770,000) \\ D &= 217,179.4. && (\text{number of men disqualified}) \end{aligned}$$

This 217,179.4 is 19.7 per cent of the total 1,100,000 cohort. Sum this rate (rounded to 20 per cent) with the 70 per cent who served, and we deduce that with 90 per cent evaluated, 10 per cent must be our "noninvolvement rate."

There may be skeptics concerning our assumption. However, if we agree that of a given cohort those found qualified but never serving might rise as high as 8 per cent (and it could not be over 8 per cent if 70 per cent served and 22 per cent of those evaluated were disqualified) we are not allowing for the substantial number who are never evaluated due to deferment. Even allowing an assumption of 4 or 5 per cent qualified but not serving, the nature of the "noninvolvement rate" is such that it would remain at about 9 per cent and the unfitness rate would still be as low as 20 or 21 per cent.

TABLE A-IV.6

COMPARISONS OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE RATE SETS

Data Source	Year of Birth	Age in 1964	NORC and DOD Sources				Selective Service Sources				Age in 1959
			Per Cent Rejected	Per Cent Serving	Per Cent Noninvolved	No. of Cases	Per Cent Rejected	Per Cent Serving	Per Cent Noninvolved	No. of Cases	
S.S.S. 1959	1927-1929	(35-37)					18.5	65.9	15.7	37,693	(30-32)
S.S.S. 1964	1927-1929	(35-37)					(12.7)	(59.4)	(27.9)	?	(30-32)
S.S.S. 1959	1930	34					21.9	65.1	13.0	12,613	29
S.S.S. 1959	1931	33					21.1	67.7	11.2	11,964	28
Proj. Table B-4	1932	32	20	70	10	1,100,000	24.0	66.3	9.7	12,187	27
S.S.S. 1959	1933	31					24.7	63.4	11.9	11,520	26
DOD/NORC	1930-1933	(31-34)	16.2	70.2	13.5	1,893.5	22.9	65.7	11.4	48,284	(26-29)
S.S.S. 1964	1930-1933	(31-34)					(17.0)	(67.5)	(15.5)	?	(26-29)
DOD/NORC	1934-1937	(27-30)	17.2	58.1	24.7	1,983.0	(1959 data are premature)				(22-25)
S.S.S. 1964	1934-1937	(27-30)					(14.7)	(66.0)	(19.4)	?	(22-25)

Sources: This table has a format nearly identical to that of the two tabular presentations of rates made in earlier sections of this appendix. However, here there are generally two horizontal rows of rates for each age group, and full sets of rates are given such that the three rates of any set will total 100 per cent except for rounding error.

The three sets of rates in the left-hand half of this table are simply appropriate adaptations of the "Project 61" data on the 1932 cohort, and the DOD/NORC 1964 All-American Sample data on the 1930-33 and the 1934-37 age groups, as these were presented in our earlier sections. (Footnote 2 in the main text of this appendix, pages 191-92, explains the algebraic derivation of the 20 per cent, 70 per cent, 10 per cent set of "Project 61" rates.)

In the right-hand half of the table the rates in parentheses associated with a Selective Service System (S.S.S.) August 1964 statistical document are the same rates as those given in the preceding section of this text (p. 191), for the age groups of 1930-33 and 1934-37, and for the 1927-29 cohorts we have gotten rates from the same document in the same way the other rates were gotten. All of the nonparentetic rate sets come from the data of the 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory, as presented in our earlier sections. Again, these are simply appropriate adaptations of the earlier figures.

document was provided us by Selective Service Headquarters with the insistence that this in no way be thought of as national sample data, and we have shown the "Project 61"/1959 Selective Service sample rate for the 1936 cohort to be a "premature" cohort rate of unfitness.)

One of the most general ways of taking all the appropriate comparisons into account here is to adapt some concepts from plane geometry for comparing triangles: congruence and similarity. Let the three sets of rates pertaining to the age group with years of birth 1930-33 serve for an example.

The 1964 DOD/NORC survey yields the set of rates 16.2--70.2--13.5; the 1959 Selective Service Sample rates are 22.9--65.7--11.4; the August 1964 Selective Service source provides the set of rates 17.0--67.5--15.5 (the rates in parentheses for the 1930-33 cohort group).

Since none of the corresponding rates are equal we shall say that there is no perfect congruence among the three sets. However, since within each set the three rates have the same rank order as in each of the other sets we can say that there is perfect similarity among the three sets. That is, the "per cent serving" is consistently greater than the "per cent rejected" which in turn is consistently greater than "per cent noninvolved," for the three sets of rates pertaining to the 1930-33 age group. The matter of congruence will never be perfect, in all likelihood, so we will speak of it in relative terms. In our example there is more congruence between the 1964 Selective Service and 1964 DOD/NORC sets of rates than between either of the other two pairings possible among the three sets. Note that the presence of relatively high congruence will generally include similarity between two sets of rates.

As an opener, we note a substantial disjuncture between the 1959 and 1964 sets of rates for the cohorts 1927-29--by our terms these sets are not even "similar," far short of "congruent." We have better reasons for confidence in the 1959 than the 1964 data, as we indicated in an earlier section.

Now, for the age groups born in 1930-33 we see "similarity" in every possible comparison--across the 1959 single-year cohort comparisons as well

as among the possible comparisons for the 1930-33 cohorts taken as a whole. Recall that for the 1932 cohort we consider the 70 per cent serving to be a quasi-parameter, and that the three 1959 Selective Service rates for the 1932 cohort are very nearly congruent when adjusted to this 70 per cent. That is, by such adjustment the 24--66--10 set becomes 21--70--9 to be compared with the 20--70--10-- set of "Project 61" rates for this cohort.

Thus we have added evidence of what we anticipated would be a problem with the 1959 Selective Service sample: It tends to underrepresent those serving, hence it tends to overestimate the proportion found unfit. But the 20 per cent unfit we are presenting here from the "Project 61" report for this cohort may come from the same 1959 Selective Service data, as an average for Armed Forces Examining Stations experience during the years 1950-57. It is of course possible that it comes instead from BLS Bulletin No. 1161, or from one of the Karpinos analyses. We are faced with the question of whether the 20 per cent we show here representing "Project 61" somehow misrepresents the 1950-57 experience reflected in the 1959 Selective Service Sample. It is to check this that we brought into our array of rate sets the 1959 Selective Service data for the older cohorts (years of birth 1927, 1928 and 1929). With 18.5 per cent unfitness of those three cohorts to be averaged with the rates ranging from 21.1 per cent to 24.7 per cent, the result would not be far from the 20 per cent, though a little above it.

Now, if underrepresentation of men serving is a constant bias in the 1959 Selective Service sample, then even the 22 per cent overall disqualification rate which is represented in our present discussion by the 20 per cent unfit would turn out to be an overestimate. Certainly not a very alarming overestimate, it is nevertheless an overestimate of a parameter which would be even closer than 20 per cent unfit to the 16 per cent unfit found in the 1964 NORC/DOD data for men born in 1930-33.

As further evaluation of the 1959 Selective Service sample data for this 1930-33 cohort group we have run through calculations "adjusting" it to the 70 per cent served rate. From the now familiar 1959 Release No. 4C, Table 3, we find a total of 48,284 registrants born in 1930-33 in the One Per Cent Sample Inventory. Of these there is a total of 31,701 in the "entered service" draft classes (I-C, I-D, IV-A, V-A; again, we are assuming the V-A,

"over age," draft class at ages 26-29 consists largely of veterans). This is the basis for our 65.7 per cent. There are 11,050 or 22.9 per cent IV-F, "Unfit," while 5,533 or 11.4 per cent are "Noninvolved."

Our "adjustment to 70 per cent served" begins with solving the answer to the question "How many who have served must be added to the 48,284 for these age groups, so that the number having served will be 70 per cent (instead of 65.7 per cent) of the 48,284 plus the number added?" The algebra of the equation $31,701 + x/48,284 + x = .70$ results in the finding that about 6,993 men who have entered service must be added to the 48,284 total. This of course implies that the 1959 Selective Service sample for these age groups "should have had" nearly 7,000 additional "men serving"-- i.e., the sample for these ages should have been 55,277 instead of 48,284, the latter being only 87.4 per cent of what it "should be" when those entering service are fully represented. It is somewhat hard to believe that the 1959 Selective Service sample could have a bias this serious, but this is precisely the area in which we must expect this particular sample to have an underestimating bias.³ The results of this adjustment, in terms of a new set of rates, looks like this.

1959 SELECTIVE SERVICE SAMPLE, MEN BORN 1930-33

Military Service Status	Unadjusted		Adjusted	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Entered service. . .	31,701	65.7	38,694	70.0
IV-F, unfit. . .	11,050	22.9	11,050	20.0
Other.	5,533	11.4	5,533	10.0
Total	48,284	100.0	55,277	100.0

³Having belabored the matter to this degree perhaps we should be a bit more elaborate about the kind of sample bias we suggest. This is not "random sampling error." In fact, in a very real sense it is not "sampling error" but a matter of overlooking that the Selective Service 1959 sample design leaves out nonregistrants many of which have been accepted for service and entered, thereby remaining nonregistrants. This is error in design, if it is error at all.

We believe that this is a legitimate kind of adjustment to contemplate. Now suppose we had been called upon to evaluate a comparison between this set of rates (20--70--10) and the corresponding set of rates from the DOD/NORC 1964 data (for this age group 16.2--70.2--13.6). If we could have assured ourselves that nothing but random sampling error entered into the discrepancies, we would have found it possible to believe that such lack of congruence could be due to sampling error.

The "if" is of course patently not acceptable--both on the part of the 1959 Selective Service sample and on the part of the 1964 NORC/DOD All-American Sample we know that conditions other than random sample error enter into the determination of the respective sets of rates. We have in fact made a massive adjustment to an independent estimate to arrive at the modified 1959 Selective Service set of rates. In the appendix describing the constitution of the 1964 NORC/DOD All-American Sample we tried to explain comprehensively the manner of adjustments involved in the nonrandom determinants of that body of data.

With this appendix we have introduced a problem--the need to understand the possibilities of appropriate comparisons between rate estimates from various government sources and rate estimates from the 1964 Military Manpower Survey. At no point should it be supposed, given the mass of information being organized and integrated in this chapter, that we find conclusive explanation for the discrepancies among rates of unfitness simply in the realm of sampling error. On the other hand, we do not propose that we have uncovered a definitive explanation of the discrepancy in any other form of error.

Among the readers of this report there are very likely some so cynical about the reliability of the Selective Service data and the "Project 61" analyses and projections that they are prepared to pounce upon alternative sources as immediate grounds for criticism of the "in-house" research. Some even insist publicly that as many as one-half of a generation of young men may be unfit.

On the other hand, there will be those who have almost literally lived and breathed the essences of the Selective Service and Department of

Defense data, as we have come to know those data here, to the extent that for them attempts to conceptualize the structure and flow of service-age manpower in other terms now would seem incredible. In either case the present appendix may have generated some substantial level of dissonance or uncertainty. The following appendix is intended to alleviate that dissonance as far as possible and to suggest the general direction in which its reduction might be quite fully achieved.

APPENDIX V

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY CONCERNING RATES OF UNFITNESS

Summary

In the first four appendices a great deal of detailed material has been presented in an effort to provide a total perspective on the problems of data reliability relevant to unfitness rates. It is now time to take stock of this material, set forth what propositions may be plausible, and formulate as firmly as may be possible some concluding judgments.

The first appendix presents material on the characteristics of the NORC/DOD All-American Sample. It shows in what way this sample can be considered a representative sample of the noninstitutionalized male population of the United States, both military and civilian, aged 16 through 34. Random and nonrandom features of the sample were presented, with special attention devoted to Bureau of the Census weighting of the sample--that is, their adjustments to independent population estimates. Particular note was made of the fact that Veterans Administration estimates of the number of veterans in appropriate age groups were used as one basis for such adjustment. Thus the relative number of veterans in the civilian portion of the All-American Sample is set by Veterans Administration figures rather than by random sampling. Finally, an operation was described by which an appropriately sized active service personnel subsample was added to our especially adapted Current Population Survey sample in order that the All-American Sample might properly represent both the military and civilian sectors of the population, aged 16 through 34.

The second appendix elaborated how evaluation for military service takes place in the experience of American men and the resulting problems of collecting data about this experience. The emphasis was on developing a strategy of collecting and utilizing data which would reliably reflect

respondents' experiences of evaluation procedure. This strategy must distinguish experiences according to whether or not evaluated and, if so, the outcome of the evaluation. Adequate reliability must be sought in the resulting data regardless of the respondent's age now or age when evaluated, regardless of draft classification changes, and regardless of the manner--formal or informal--in which evaluation took place. A large part of that appendix was then spent in the construction of the Military Service Qualification Index (MSQI). The MSQI was constructed in such a manner that--given the characteristics of the survey data collected--the number of nonveteran respondents who could be identified as evaluated and found unfit for service would be maximized.

The key part of the report One-Third of a Nation relevant to estimating extent of unfitness in the male population was introduced at the beginning of Appendix III. Then we presented distributions of the All-American Sample across the categories of the MSQI by age groups. This raised the problem of how appropriate comparisons could be made between the All-American Sample data on unfitness and the central "fact" of One-Third of a Nation.

We then traced the research underlying the "one-third" estimate through the report "Project 61" (U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower], 1962) to a number of government sources. A combination of Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Defense (Karpinos) reports indicated overall rejection rates ranging from 22 per cent in 1950 to 32 per cent in 1960. We found "Project 61" to provide two cohort rates of service entry--70 per cent for the 1932 cohort and 58 per cent for the 1936 cohort--which have served as important quasi-parametric anchorage points in evaluation of all the other data before us. This gave us some certainty that the 1959 Selective Service Inventory Sample underestimates the cohort rate of entering service. This aroused major concern, for then the 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample, if unadjusted, would seriously overestimate unfitness rates. This proved of greater concern because of our anticipated dependence on it in evaluating the reliability of the All-American Sample data.

This concern prompted some experimentation with adjustments and comparisons of rates. We have learned a number of things:

1. The 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample Inventory probably consistently underestimates the rate of serving, thus tending to overestimate the overall disqualification rate (probably as a result of substantial numbers of men never becoming registrants because they entered service before registering with their local draft boards.)
2. The discrepancy between All-American Sample and Selective Service Sample rates of unfitness when based on an age group which was 26 years of age or older in 1959 is much less than discrepancies appearing in comparison of rates when one of the rates is "premature" (i.e., involves groups of men below age 26) and the other is "mature" (i.e., involves no men under 26 years of age).
3. Using the "Project 61" quasi-parameter (for the 1932 cohort) of 70 per cent entering service, and applying the 22 per cent overall disqualification rate to that cohort we found that this particular cohort would consist of 70 per cent served, 19.7 per cent found unfit, and therefore 10.3 per cent noninvolved.
4. Another 1932 cohort adjustment experiment used the quasi-parameter of 70 per cent entering service, and the 1959 Selective Service sample data. Those of the 1932 cohort in the 1959 sample who had entered service were weighted up from 66.3 to 70 per cent. The concomitant changes of unfitness and noninvolvement rates yield 21.3 and 8.7 per cent, respectively.
5. These adjusted sets of rates--and similar sets which could be generated by the same kind of adjustment--point to a set of rates for the 1964 group aged 31-34 consisting of 70 per cent served, 20 per cent unfit, and 10 per cent noninvolved, based on "Project 61" and 1959 Selective Service data, to be compared with the All-American Sample data for that age group with rates of 70.2 per cent entered service, 16.2 per cent found unfit, and 13.5 per cent noninvolved.

At various points throughout our efforts with unfitness data we have touched on the question of usefulness of such data when they involve men younger than age 26. We have referred to rates based on such data as "immature" and have tended to discount their value when comparisons of rates were called for.

The overall rejection rate, based as it is upon the number evaluated, is uniquely not like the other rates we have dealt with. Service entrance rates for cohorts must inherently have a cumulative character as the cohort matures--they cannot get lower as years of age pass. But the overall rejection rate is subject to both upward and downward fluctuations with the aging of

a cohort, depending on whether the "quality" of men evaluated in the early liability years of a given cohort is worse or better than the quality of those evaluated in the later liability years, just preceding age 26. We have found some evidence that there may not be a great deal of such fluctuation, but other evidence such as the generally higher rejection rates among draftees suggests that one might expect substantial upward trends with aging of a cohort. We have been reluctant, therefore, to draw conclusions about comparisons where "immature" overall rejection rates were involved.

For example, it was noted that the "Project 61" rates for the two periods 1950-57 and 1958-62 show about the same range in the comparison of 22 per cent and 33 per cent as does the comparison among age groups of the All-American Sample. If we look at the All-American Sample rates for different age groups, the age groups having "matured" beyond age 26 have rates of 18 and 21 per cent; the age group almost "matured" (ages 24-26) has a rate of nearly 24 per cent, and the entirely "immature" age group (ages 16-23) has a "premature" rate of 32.2 per cent. But because immature rates are involved here we have been reluctant to draw firm conclusions about the apparent agreement.

We understand that those involved in the analyses and interpretations of "Project 61" see the difference between the 22 per cent pre-1958 rate and the 33 per cent post-1957 rate almost entirely in relation to constantly heightening standards of acceptance. In fact, to some this may seem so obvious that it requires no discussion. "Project 61" speaks of raised mental standards especially as of early fiscal 1958 and August 1958, but this is not discussed in relation to the shift from the 22 per cent to the 33 per cent (cf. U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower], 1962, pp. 5-6). We find no attempt to relate this directly to the 22-33 per cent rate shift.

It is striking to us that with All-American Sample data a "premature" rate is above 30 per cent as compared with a "mature" rate of around 20 per cent and that the same is true of the 1959 Selective Service data, even when the combinations of cohorts involved in these comparisons are different due to the different time orientation. This has combined with other questions

to motivate an exploration of the comparison between those not yet evaluated and those who have been evaluated.

Comparisons of Those Never Evaluated with Those Evaluated,
among Men Aged 16 through 23

First we need some indication of what segments of the population yield relatively high rates of unfitness and what segments relatively low rates. For a very cursory and nonanalytic view of this we shall consider only the rate of unfitness, among those evaluated, among men aged 16 through 23. Furthermore, we shall look at such rates only in relations to one variable, for the time being: father's socio-economic status.

Men Aged 16-23	Father's Socio-economic Status			
	Negro	White SES		
		Low	Medium	High
Per cent unfit. . . .	58.5	33.8	25.8	22.8
No. of men evaluated. .	222.8	644.6	505.0	340.6

This set of rates simply verifies what one might have expected about the differing rates of unfitness for different levels of socio-economic background. Lower socio-economic levels yield higher rates of unfitness. Accepting for the time being the common-sense validity of this finding, the question to be answered is whether those never evaluated include higher proportions of men with higher socio-economic background than do those who have been evaluated. (While the introduction of this table and the following one leads one to a variety of conjectures about race and socio-economic advantage and disadvantage in relation to military service, these matters were dealt with in Chapters III and IV; we are only considering one issue here.)

We have now illustrated the point that unfitness rates vary inversely with socio-economic background. Similar demonstrations could be made with other variables, but for the sake of brevity here we will not press this further. The key point to be considered is whether there will be higher portions of men with higher socio-economic background among those never evaluated than among those evaluated.

The next table makes this clear. In fact, it shows that, as far as socio-economic background is concerned, those never evaluated are even more select than those found qualified, who in turn are a markedly more select group than those found unfit. If we split the table down the middle, on the left-hand side we find that 40 per cent of those never evaluated are either whites of low socio-economic background or Negroes, while the qualified include about 45 per cent, and the unfit include nearly 63 per cent with such low socio-economic background. Looking at the last column of the table, of those never evaluated 30 per cent are of high socio-economic background, but of the qualified only about 23 per cent, and of the unfit only 14 per cent, are of high socio-economic background.

Evaluation Group Among Men Aged 16-23	Negroes	White SES			Total Per Cent	Total No. of Cases
		Low	Medium	High		
Never evaluated.	10.2 (344.9)	29.8 (1,004.0)	30.0 (1,010.2)	30.0 (1,009.9)	100.0	3,369.0
Evaluated and qualified.	8.0 (92.4)	36.9 (426.9)	32.4 (374.8)	22.7 (263.0)	100.0	1,157.1
Evaluated and found unfit	23.5 (130.4)	39.2 (217.7)	23.4 (130.2)	14.0 (77.6)	100.1	555.9

Another question remains. One might wonder whether this state of affairs is overcome, after the Selective Service System "catches up" with men at ages 24 and 25 who consist disproportionately of college and graduate school students whose studies are completed. A look at the 24 through 26 age group would not lend closure to this problem, but the two older groups, ages 27 through 30, and 31 through 34, should deal with the question.

Among the 27- through 30-year-olds (those "too young for Korea") we find the distribution of background among those never evaluated to be quite identical with that of those found qualified, and both much different than the background distribution of those evaluated and found unfit. While a little over 40 per cent, of the never evaluated and of the qualified, are middle and higher socio-economic background whites, only about 25 per cent of the

unfit are of similar background. On the other hand, Negroes (virtually all of the lowest socio-economic advantage) constitute about 20 per cent of the unfit but only about 8 per cent of the qualified and of the never evaluated. Low background whites are 54 per cent of the unfit but about 47 per cent of the qualified and of those never evaluated.

Finally, the picture for the age cohorts of prime service age for the Korean war suggests a trend which can be encapsulated in the statement "war is the great equalizer." The picture for these men seems to reflect mainly that men of farm background or with premature family responsibility (no father at age 15) are the only ones with relatively pronounced rates of never being evaluated. This age group for this reason cannot bear out the point being made.

The proposition for which we have now rallied support is to the effect that a study of unfitness rates which includes age groups whose liability to evaluation for military service has not been exhausted can be expected to overestimate the ultimate unfitness rates of those particular age groups. In addition, if the study were to combine such age groups (with their "incomplete" unfitness rates) with age groups having relatively "complete" unfitness rates, the effect would be to find a somewhat elevated overall unfitness rate (overestimating the ultimate rate of the entire group studied).

It may have occurred to the reader that a word of caution is in order in drawing any conclusions about this proposition, on the basis of this one analytic foray. This analysis is in the nature of what is usually called "ecological correlation." It has in it the assumption that the rejection rate of those evaluated, for given socio-economic groupings, can be considered representative of men of these socio-economic groupings who have yet to be evaluated, should that ever occur. The possible seriousness of this assumption becomes apparent when we note that in its peculiar way it is contrary to, or is at least jeopardized by, the proposition which is supported by this analysis. That is, this exploration has suggested to us that those not evaluated may have a different rate of rejection than those already evaluated, while the assumption says that the unevaluated will have the same rejection rate, if and when they are evaluated, as those already processed.

Our excuse for going ahead with this tactic lies in our expectation that perhaps within socio-economic groupings the rejection rate fluctuations across years of maturation will be greatly reduced or even negligible. Furthermore if the self-selection processes, about which we shall concern ourselves in the next section, operate to bring about downward trends in all socio-economic groupings, this should serve to reduce distortions growing from a somewhat shaky assumption. We insist that no firm conclusions are warranted here, but the evidence points to the possibility that as a cohort ages beyond average draft age and its rates "mature," its overall rejection rate may decline.

Two Alternatives toward Reaching Conclusions in the
Comparisons Involving Immature Rejection Rates

In a nutshell, we find reason for reluctance in accepting "immature" rejection rates as satisfactory for comparisons, but there is conflicting evidence as to the soundness of this reason for reluctance. In this quarantous situation we have felt constrained to provide two alternative solutions to reaching conclusions about the rejection rates for which so many efforts at estimation have been reviewed and compared.

The first of these alternatives starts from the position that since the All-American Sample rejection rate of 32.2 per cent for men aged 16 through 23 in 1964 is patently an "immature" rate, and since some evidence suggests immature rates may be overestimates of the mature rates of cohort groups, the apparent agreement of Karpinos' 1958-60 finding of 31.7 per cent and the All-American Sample immature rate of 32.2 per cent may be seriously misleading. And, as the Karpinos strategy is a "cross-section in time" while the All-American Sample rate uses a cohort strategy, we cannot insist that the estimates derived should be in close agreement, especially when that derived from the All-American Sample is patently an immature rate. For this alternative solution we have tried to derive a "plausible rationale" for anticipating fluctuations of the rejection rate for a cohort group, involving a complex but generally downward trend from the group's first liability to evaluation through to the end of the liability period and a matured rejection rate.

The second alternative starts from the position that there is no great fluctuation of rejection rate of cohort groups across their periods of liability to evaluation, and that it is therefore not a matter of great concern when both mature and immature rates of rejection are involved in comparisons.

Rationale for Discounting Agreement between the "One-Third of a Nation" Rate and the All-American Sample Rate

The foregoing analysis of the characteristics of the subpopulation never evaluated could lead to hasty and oversimplified conclusions. Perhaps the most obvious conclusion would go something like this.

Given a particular age group of the general population, those of its members who volunteered shortly after reaching age 17 would experience fairly high rates of rejection--perhaps 30 to 40 per cent or more. Then as the group ages its volunteers and perhaps its draftees might be found to have increasingly lower rates of rejection, consisting more and more of men with generally higher educational attainment. Thus a premature reading of the "overall" rejection rate--say, when the cohort is only 20 or 21 years of age--would yield an overestimation of what the ultimate rate for the entire cohort would be. As more and more men with high education become evaluated they would gradually bring the overall rate of unfitness down.

Here there is a serious problem, though. This has to do with the apparent outright contradiction of this point of view by the annually observed and published experience of the Selective Service System. We have found no exceptions to their evidence that the men inducted under Selective Service orders rather than volunteer for military service have rejection rates consistently higher--frequently above 50 per cent--as compared with the 33 per cent rate reported as the "overall disqualification rate." We have found no basis for seriously questioning these pre-induction and induction rejection rates. But the official interpretation of these higher draftee rejection rates appears in nearly direct opposition to the suggestion advanced briefly above, with the support of the Military Manpower Survey data.

In "Project 61" the explanation is given: "The 'draftee disqualification rate' for registrants referred by draft boards for preinduction examinations is much higher--currently 44 per cent--[than the overall rate of 33 per cent] since men who volunteer for service, and are accepted, normally enlist before they are reached for such examinations" (U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower], 1962, p. 23).

One-Third of a Nation states the proposition more clearly. It says of draftee preinduction rejection rates that they are "clearly not representative of the entire military-service age population, mainly because large numbers of young men are examined and accepted for voluntary enlistment or officer training programs at younger ages, before reaching the age of referral for draftee examinations. As a result, the residual group remaining in the draft board manpower pool tends to include a smaller proportion of men who meet military service standards, and a higher proportion of rejectees" (U.S. President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964, p. 11. Another source for this argument is Karpinos, 1962, pp. 4-7, esp. p. 6).

It is possible to fit this explanation to the proposition suggested with the support of the Military Manpower Survey data, but this involves an intricate and delicate hypothesis which it may not be possible to test with the survey data immediately available. For the development of this hypothesis it is useful to think of the ways in which men enter service, along the lines of three very broad categories. Our basic differentiation of these three categories is in terms of motivation. The first of these consists of men with positive and primary motivation to enter military service. These are the ones who for the most part will have committed themselves to service relatively early. We anticipate that most such commitments are made before age 20, almost entirely by men who never were interested or who lost what immediate interest they had in college degrees.

For the second broad category of service entry we shall borrow the phrase "draft-motivated entry." Here we include any who voluntarily enter

but would not have entered if there had been no draft law. Operationally, this would be a most difficult category to define. Probably it could be defined best in peacetime experience, in relation to age at entry. When average age of conscription is relatively high--say 23 or 24--we expect the draft-motivated entrants to be emerging at ages 21, 22, and 23, under the pressures of imminent coercion. This, of course, may be in connection with failure or completion of college work or failure to find work.

The third important category consists simply of those who made no voluntary move toward service entry. Presumably for the most part these men would avoid military service if they were given a choice. We will not complicate matters here with questions of "draft-dodging," seeking deferment conditions for the sake of deferment, the failure of attempts to gain a deferment classification, and so on.

The first part of our complex hypothesis: The subpopulation of men with positive and primary motivation for entering service is characterized by a relatively high rate of unfitness as a result of which anywhere from 25 to 40 per cent may be rejected when they attempt entry. The older their age the more likely a higher level of educational attainment and hence a considerable lowering of rejection rates for this subpopulation, as it passes on to age 20 and beyond. But we expect relatively few of these to occur beyond age 20. (We will be concerned to see whether the positive and primary motivation occurs more among those subpopulations which produce high rates of unfitness.)

The next part of the hypothesis involves a sort of "in the meantime" perspective, in relation to the first part of the hypothesis: Here we have in mind that subpopulation of men without positive and primary motivation for entering military service. One could elaborate this matter with propositions about preoccupations--rational or otherwise--with developments in civilian life, such as continuing for higher education, finding or planning a lifetime career, formation of a family, and so on. But the important point here is the lack of the positive and primary motive to enter service.

There is a widespread figure of speech concerning liability to conscription, which has to do with one's name "nearing the top of the list." It is supposed that the experience represented by this figure of speech plays an important part in the draft-motivated entry. Of course, it may be that some 16-year-olds--with aversions to service but convinced of its inevitability--became draft-motivated enlistees at age 17, "to get it out of the way." But regardless of these considerations the point is that only those who felt a high degree of certainty of being drafted would feel draft motivated toward voluntary entry. We do not mean to imply that only fit men will feel draft motivated, but it seems fairly certain that men patently unfit for service--men who are illiterate or physically disabled--will be fairly scarce among the draft motivated.¹

This suggests that Armed Forces Examining Station experience with draft-motivated men should involve relatively high rates of fitness, and "Project 61" contributes some support to this view. It is reported that under accelerated draft-motivation conditions (the Berlin "build-up," fall 1961) rates of entry of the most fit subpopulations increase the most. "Mental Groups I and II" (the highest quality levels) constitute a larger percentage of the total for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (pp. 10 and 11 and Tables 2 and 3 of "Project 61"). We are told that non-prior enlistments of the Army went up nearly 18 per cent among men with at least high school education, from fiscal 1961 to 1962, while they actually decreased 3 per cent among men with less than high school, for the same two years (see Table 3 of "Project 61"). We cite these figures only as tentative support for the proposition that draft-motivation occurs primarily among

¹Since the writing of this section we have discovered a similar kind of "self-selection" argument used by Karpinos (1962, pp. 4-7 and esp. p. 6). In contrast to our present application of the "self-selection" proposition, he was attending to the problem of draftee rejection rates being higher than enlistment rejection rates.

men with high probability of being found fit for service. Thus, and inasmuch as draft-motivated men tend to enter at later ages than those with primary motives, we expect a given total population age group to show substantial lowering of rates of unfitness among all volunteers examined for service as that particular age group approaches and passes the mean age of conscription.

We have supposed that the men who remain civilians beyond this point do so because they cannot or will not volunteer. At least one of three things must be true of these men (these are not intended as entirely exclusive types):

1. "Engaged civilians": There are those who will have gained deferment or exemption on grounds other than unfitness, hence are likely never to be evaluated as to fitness.

2. "Rejectees": There will be those who are unqualified for service, some knowingly while others unknowingly are unfit--those knowingly unfit if averse to service entry need not seek to avoid evaluation which will certify their being unfit; those unknowingly unfit may seek to avoid evaluation for fear of induction or may take a fatalistic or indifferent attitude.

3. "Waiters": There will be those who while not volunteering are not arranging avoidance of service either--these (who may be fatalistic or indifferent or ambivalent about service and the draft) constitute the total of those who are drawn upon by draft boards to fill the quotas of the Department of Defense.

Now, of course, the draft boards are drawing on the second group as well as the third (by definition they cannot draw on the first, who have deferments or exemptions). Therefore, the rate of unfitness among those undergoing preinduction and induction evaluations will be a function of the ratio of the second group to the sum of the second and the third groups. There is no basis or reason for our venturing a guess about the magnitude of this ratio. We are told that in 1962 it averaged 44 per cent and ranged above 50 per cent, and in some southern states above 80 per cent.

The problem, however, about the significance of such a rate as this (i.e., group two/group two plus group three) has to do with the size of its denominator in relation to how many were evaluated as volunteers, as well as the comparison between this induction reject rate and the reject rate of volunteers. We know that the number inducted (or conscripted or drafted) has been generally a minority of the total number entering service, during the post-Korean war period.

The All-American Sample data for age groups 24 through 30 indicates that, of those who entered active service, from 11 to 16 per cent were involuntary draftees. Among those prime for Korea, aged 31 through 34, of those who entered service 35 per cent were involuntarily drafted. Actually, to provide for an appropriate comparison with Selective Service draftee rejection rates, one should include with the involuntary draftees those who asked to be drafted early: the "volunteers for induction."

Taking the 24 through 34 age groups together, the All-American Sample shows 1,034 inductees (both voluntary and involuntary draftees), 299 qualified but not inducted, and 607 examined for the draft and rejected. The 607 are about 31 per cent of these 1,940 men. In the same age groups 24 through 34, 2,243 men entered as other than draftees, and 300 had been rejected in an attempt to enlist. (About one-half of these 300 rejectees also report rejection in evaluation for the draft and hence are among the 607 we mentioned earlier in this paragraph. We are also including in this 300 some 30 who report qualification as draftees.) The 300 rejections here constitute about 12 per cent of the 2,543 men. Note that of the 3,277 who entered, 1,034, or only about one-third, were draftees.

Inasmuch as this discussion is strictly for the exploration of plausibility we shall press details no further. We began with several "givens":

1. It would appear that among those men volunteering for service (both draft motivated and positively motivated) moderately high rejection rates (30 per cent or more) occur at the younger ages.
2. Selective Service consistently finds remarkably high rejection rates (50 per cent and higher) among draftees.

3. The All-American Sample data and a careful reappraisal of "Project 61" and 1959 Selective Service One Per Cent Sample data suggest that perhaps the "matured overall disqualification rates" have been running closer to one-fourth than the much publicized one-third.

Around these "givens" we have attempted to show that there is a fairly simple-minded plausible rationale for understanding any apparent discrepancies among the "givens." One point is very important here: We believe an important problem has been discovered and perhaps illuminated in such a manner that better informed research could reach definitive closure on the questions which have confronted us here.

If Agreement between the "One-Third of a Nation" Rate and the All-American Sample Rate Is Not To Be Discounted

We see the possibility that apparent agreement between the three Karpinos rejection rate estimates and the four All-American Sample estimates might be valid grounds for judging the MSQI of All-American Sample data a reliable indicator. This alternative view seems to have greater merits than the alternative expressed in the preceding section. However, that such a judgment for the reliability of the All-American Sample estimates has the aspect of a very favorable and reassuring outcome of our research effort has prompted a great deal of caution.

The agreement between the two sets of rates can be seen in the following presentation:

Karpinos' Rejection Rates for Given Time Periods		All-American Sample Rejection Rates for Given Cohort Groups	
Time Periods	Rejection Rates	Rejection Rates	1964 Cohort Ages
1950-53	23.6	18.0	31-34
1953-58	26.8	21.1	27-30
1958-60	31.7	23.6	24-26
		32.2	16-23

We have proposed an adjustment for the two more recent Karpinos rates which--if the adjustments are as legitimate as we believe them to be--result in estimates of 25.8 per cent for the 1953-58 period and 30.4 per cent for 1958-60. Assuming these adjustments to be acceptable it would appear that the agreement for the comparison of 1953-58 and men aged 24-26 is fairly good, while rejection for men aged 27-30 is slightly more underestimated by the All-American Sample. That men aged 16-23 are slightly higher in rejection than Karpinos' estimate for 1958-60 may be due to the All-American Sample encompassing the 1960-64 period in which slightly higher standards of qualification were set. The Karpinos estimate for 1950-53 provides more evidence that All-American Sample estimates may be somewhat under the mark. However, we have shown that that Karpinos estimate is based on a period that includes a sizable number of men from cohorts older than those of the All-American Sample, and this results in a different balance of inductees versus "other procurement" accessions. We have shown that an adjustment for that difference should bring the rates into much closer proximity. The 1950-53 Karpinos rate, given our adjustment, would be 20.1 per cent, compared to the All-American Sample rate of 18.0 per cent that we reported above.

Agreement as close as this, with a source as reliable as Karpinos seems to be, bears a great deal of weight in favor of the alternative judgment that the indicator of rejection developed in the All-American Sample is adequately reliable for our purposes. Against this weight we have shown some evidence that perhaps the 32.2 per cent rejection rate of the All-American Sample should be discounted because it is an immature rate. Some of the "Project 61" material about shifting quality of accessions in the 1961 Berlin Crisis buildup suggested that men "ordinarily" never evaluated might be of generally better quality than those "ordinarily" evaluated. Our study of comparisons of cohort rates involving Selective Service sample cohorts as well as the All-American Sample cohorts suggested that immature rejection rates might generally be higher than matured rates. Finally, an analysis of All-American Sample data using an ecological correlation

strategy with rejection rates of different socio-economic groupings supported the possibility of a rate of unfitness lower among those never evaluated than among those evaluated, when the population considered is 16-30.

While these findings lead in the direction of distrust for comparisons involving immature rejection rates, there is conflicting evidence in this regard. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1161 made a careful study estimating unfitness in the not yet evaluated portion of the male population aged 22-24 in 1953, using education in a manner similar to our ecological correlation use of socio-economic groupings. They arrived at a projected rejection rate for the never evaluated of 21 per cent, or only about 1 per cent below their estimate based on those already evaluated. This evidence, combined with our understanding of the comparison between Karpinos' 1958-60 rate of 31.7 per cent and the All-American Sample rate of 32.2 per cent for 16 to 23-year-olds, leads toward less distrust of immature rejection rates. This in turn leads to reassurance that the All-American Sample indicator of rejection experience is reasonably reliable. If it is not absolutely reliable in the sense of providing new independent estimates of overall rejection rate levels for selected cohort groups, it does appear sufficiently reliable for its intended use, as exemplified in the analyses of Chapters II, III, IV, and V.

As for the problems that have been covered in Appendices I through IV, our conclusions are simple. We take the position of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 1161: As far as cohort rates of overall rejection are concerned, definitive research has yet to be done. Karpinos' report on rejection rates for periods of time is probably without serious defect. However, the pitfalls involved in attempting to relate those estimates to analyses based on a cohort strategy are not entirely clear. They seem to involve variations across time in the relative and absolute sizes of accessions by different modes of procurement, complicated by shifts in the extent of draft-motivated volunteering, and by changing levels of fitness standards applied in evaluation for service. We like to think that these appendices will be a contribution in the direction of making more exhaustive and definitive research of rejection rates possible.

APPENDIX VI

SELECTED RATES BY SELECTED VARIABLES, FOR THE ENTIRE ALL-AMERICAN SAMPLE

This appendix covers rates (1) of active military service and (2) of "deferment," as percentages of entire age groups; (3) rejection rate as a percentage of those evaluated; and rates (4) of regular enlisted; (5) of drafted; and (6) of those entering as officers or officer candidates, as percentages of those entering active military service for two months or more. For each of these six kinds of rates we have provided five separate breakdowns: (a) respondent's education; (b) father's education; (c) father's occupation (in summary categories); (d) race and socio-economic background; (e) geographic origin.

We have chosen to present these materials by 1964 age groups 16-23, 24-26, 27-30, and 31-34. These age groups are already familiar and meaningful to the reader of the main body of this report. We have identified the cohorts 31-34 as those of our sample significantly involved in manpower requirements of the 1950-53 Korean War. Those 27-30 experienced the major part of their service liability in the period between the Korean action and the "Berlin Crisis" buildup (fall 1961). Men 24-26 in 1964 will have experienced the demands of the Berlin Crisis and will show some perhaps negligible degree of premature rates, in the sense of not having run the full age gamut of liability to service, up to age 26. Men aged 16-23 we shall continue to treat as patently immature in the various rates presented in this appendix. The significance of this immaturity varies indeterminately with the rate under consideration and the kind of breakdown--i.e., the independent variable one wishes to assess. In general, in the commentary of this appendix we will ignore the rates of the two younger age groups because of the problems we have just mentioned.

The reader will note that throughout our commentary on rates of serving, of "deferment," and of rejection, the general and analytic meaning of the arrays of rates given here has already been dealt with at great length in the main body of the report, for men aged 27-34 as group (technical

questions concerning rejection rates have been dealt with extensively in Appendices I-V). Because of this the only points of interest we touch upon here concerning these three kinds of rates--of serving, of "deferment," and of rejection--have to do with comparisons of cohorts aged 27-30 with those aged 31-34, and this treatment is brief. Our analytic suggestions must be considered tentative, subject to more elaborate analysis.

Comparing the service rates of men aged 31-34, the Korea-involved cohorts, with those of men aged 27-30, the general effects of 1950-53 military manpower requirements seem evident. One must recognize here that aside from a brisk downward trend in military manpower requirements after Korea there is another component underlying the downward trend in percentage serving, namely increasing size of cohorts of men reaching age 18. This trend in cohort size is not as marked, however, as the trends in the two indicators of military manpower requirements we have chosen to cite. Total Department of Defense Active Duty Personnel strength levels trended quite steadily downward from 3,635,912 on June 30, 1952, to 2,483,771 (two-thirds the earlier figure) as of June 30, 1961. Department of Defense totals for enlisted rank procurements per fiscal year also show a fairly steady downward trend from 2,100,598 in fiscal 1951 to only 591,244 (less than one-third the 1951 figure) in fiscal 1960 (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1964, pp. 19 and 45, respectively).

In this connection we make a general observation, based on Tables A-VI.1a--A-VI.3e in this appendix: On the average, the twelve percentage point reduction in service rates concomitant with reduced manpower demands reflects increasingly permissive deferment policy, hence an average deferment rate higher by eleven points. There is only a very small contribution to reduced service rates (if it can be called that) coming from slightly higher rejection rates, with an average increase of only three percentage points.

Our treatment of rates of drafted, of Regular enlisted, and entry for officer service is very brief, restricted to a general discussion of how the information presented in Tables A-VI.4a--A-VI.6e is to be understood.

The characteristics of the variable categories for which rate breakdowns

are given are covered in the main body of the analysis, Chapters II-V, with one exception. Where a combined race and socio-economic breakdown is given, what we previously defined as "white medium SES" and "white high SES" have been lumped together here as "white high SES." This means that here the abstract definition of high socio-economic status is the same for whites as for Negroes, even though nearly all of the Negroes classified as high SES here are of homes with characteristics comparable to what was previously defined as medium SES for whites. (The definition of high SES here is identical to what, for the reasons just given, was set forth as medium SES for Negroes, in the analysis of Chap. III.)

Military Service Rates

In Table A-VI.1a, in every category of respondent's education the service rates of men aged 31-34 are higher than those of the 27 to 30-year-olds. The average difference is twelve percentage points, from 70 down to 58 per cent, and only two categories are below this average difference. The rate for high school graduates declined nine percentage points, and those with graduate study declined only four points, suggesting that in these two groupings Korean war requirements were making the least difference. Of course, we would expect different reasons for such deviations. The minor deviation among those who finish high school without immediately going farther hardly warrants comment. Table A-VI.3a shows that those oriented to graduate study constitute the only education category in which Korea-involved men had a higher rejection rate than younger men of the same education attainment. This can be thought of as attenuating the reduction in service rate in this education category.

In Table A-VI.1b, with the breakdown by father's education, comparing 27-30 with 31-34-year-olds, we find a set of differences with very little variation. The reductions range mainly from twelve to fifteen percentage points, though men whose fathers got college degrees show a nineteen-point reduction and those whose fathers experienced college without realising a degree show only a five-point reduction. A glance at other tables in this appendix shows that among 27-30-year-olds the latter are below average in deferment rate and the former are unusually high in deferment

rate. Without elaborating analysis here we suggest that in the younger age group those with college-degree fathers may show disproportionate increase over the Korea-involved age group in going on to graduate study, compared to sons of fathers with other levels of educational attainment.

With the breakdown by father's occupation in Table A-VI.c, the differences in service rates between the Korea-involved 31-34 and the 27-30-year-olds show the least reductions in the two areas associated with highest availability of deferments. Those of farm background have the agricultural occupation deferment uniquely available to them, and sons of the more select sector of the white collar fathers more frequently continue into graduate study, so generally associated with high deferment rates. However, slightly reduced rejection among those of farm origin, contrary to the general trend of increased rejection, underlies the attenuation of their shift in service rate. But it may be that under some circumstances where deferment is uniquely available in both war- and peacetime the effects on service rates of wartime manpower requirements will be attenuated. This seems to apply to men whose fathers were in the more select part of the white collar occupations.

In Table A-VI.d, giving service rates with a breakdown by race and gross socio-economic background distinctions, the only deviations in differences between Korea-involved and non-Korea-involved men occur among Negroes as a group and with respect to Negro socio-economic distinctions. We must recall our preliminary observation that, of the overall average reduction of twelve points in service rate, the largest component of this overall shift is the increase of eleven percentage points in overall deferment. With this in mind, our look at the change in Negro service rates, from Korea-involved men to younger men, becomes more illuminated. The contrast between the shifts in Negro service rates and shifts in white service rates is the result of large shifts in rejection rates of Negroes in general, plus a large shift in deferment of high SES Negroes. The data suggest that under the pressures of manpower demand for Korea the lower "quality" standards resulted in the accession of a disproportionate number of Negroes who would not have been accepted under higher, post-Korea standards. In addition, among Korea-involved men, high SES Negroes got virtually no deferment, but among men too

young for Korea high SES Negroes enjoyed average deferment chances. (Later we shall see that, among men of the Korea-involved cohorts who did enter service, 50 per cent or more of the Negroes, both of low and high SES, were drafted, but the overall average rate of men drafted for those cohorts is only 35 per cent.) In consequence of these two observations--one about rejection rates of low and high SES Negroes and one about deferment rates of only high SES Negroes--we understand better why service rates of Negroes in general and especially high SES Negroes shifted downward after Korea much more so than those of whites.

In considering geographic origin related to percentage serving, in Table A-VI.1e, there are four regional distinctions within each of the three "size-of-place" categories, and with this amount of differentiation we expect a bit more sampling fluctuation in the resulting arrays of rates. Consequently we suggest that with nine of the twelve geographic origin categories showing reductions in rate from seven to fifteen percentage points there may be little meaningful variation to speak of. The three categories with rate shifts outside of this range of service rate reductions draw our attention. Those of rural background from the Far West actually have an increase of seven points, from 59 to 66 per cent, while the rural North and the small town population of the South show exceptionally great reductions of 28 and 22 points in service rates, respectively. Though without elaboration of our analysis the question "why?" cannot be answered conclusively, Tables A-VI.2e and A-VI.3e help to understand this in terms of shifts in rejection and deferment rates. The Far West actually shows a decline in rejection rates from Korea-involved cohorts to younger men, across all three size-of-place categories, in contrast to the overall average increase of three percentage points, and the biggest decrease is seven points for those of rural origin. While the far westerners of both small and large city background show exceptional increases in deferment which balance out with decreased rejection to result in average service rates, those of rural far western background show no increased deferment, and with notably reduced rejection show an actual increase in service rate after Korea. (During Korea their deferment rate was nearly double the overall average of 14 per

cent; thus one might say that after Korea, deferment rates of most of the other geographic origin categories came into line with the rural Far West.)

The two exceptionally large decreases in service rates, involving the rural North and small town South, are to be understood largely with greatly increased rejection rates, although exceptional increases in deferment rates especially in the rural North also played a part.

Deferment Rates

The term "deferment" as used here bears the same meaning given it in the main body of this report. There we gave reason for lumping together all nonveterans not rejected for military service in a residual category which we have labeled "deferred." Here we concern ourselves only with differential shifts in deferment rate occurring in the comparison of the younger 27 to 30-year-old cohorts with the Korea-involved 31 to 34-year-olds. In line with the fact that we are not launching a full-scale analytic effort in this appendix it is also true that the salient analytic interest we have followed in this appendix has already been realized in the comparison between service rates of the Korea-involved and younger cohorts. In what follows, concerning rates of deferment and rejection, we shall make more brief summary statements concerning what we see in the tables, pausing only at those deviations which are eyecatchers.

Table A-VI.2a, with the breakdown by respondent's education, shows very little rate shift variation, all in the direction of increased deferment after the Korean war period. The changes, with but two exceptions, fall in the range from ten to fifteen percentage points of increased deferment, to be compared with the overall average increase of eleven points, from 14 to 25 per cent. The two exceptions are the six points of increased deferment among those with over two years of college but no degree, and only seven points' increase among those of less than eighth-grade education.

We find the breakdown by father's education of Table A-VI.2b showing all shifts in deferment rate to be increases after Korea, with all but two in the range of seven to fifteen percentage points. Respondents with fathers having completed college (including those with graduate study) have a disproportionately high incidence of going on to graduate study themselves,

but this has been more true, where fathers have only baccalaureate degrees, after rather than during the Korean action. This seems to underlie the large shift of twenty-one percentage points increased deferment for these men. Men of fathers with graduate study show an exceedingly small shift of only three points' increased deferment, having been especially high in deferment among the 31- to 34-year-olds, and remaining comparatively high among the 27- to 30-year-old men.

What has just been said concerning father's education seems to apply with minor modification to post-Korea shifts in terms of father's occupation as shown in Table A-VI.2c. Men from the more select of the white collar homes were highest in deferment during the Korean conflict and then made a minor upward shift of six points to remain on a par with the rest of the population after Korea. On the other hand, men of less select white collar background were among the lowest in deferment during Korea but made a major shift of eighteen percentage points' increase in deferment to become among the highest in post-Korea deferment rates.

In Table A-VI.2d, with a breakdown by race and socio-economic background, there would be no deferment shift variations to speak of but for the high SES Negroes. In our weighted sample data only one high SES Negro enjoyed deferment during Korea (the 3 per cent of thirty-nine cases) but after Korea high SES Negroes are found very much on a par with 24 per cent deferred, where the full range of deferment rate by race and socio-economic status in only 23 to 26 per cent, and the average is 25 per cent.

For our convenience, and without obscuring a significant amount of geographic variation in deferment rates shown in Table A-VI.2e, we can rearrange and summarize the part of the table which interests us, in the manner shown on page 224.

DEFERMENT RATES FOR MEN AGED 27-30 AND 31-34 IN 1964,
BY REGIONAL AND URBAN/RURAL DISTINCTIONS

Region	Residence	Age in 1964		Post-Korea Shift
		27-30	31-34	
North	Urban	16	10	6
	Rural	32	14	18
Midwest	Urban	22	8	14
	Rural	33	15	18
Far West	Urban	31	13	18
	Rural	24	24	0
South	Urban	22	10	12
	Rural	23	15	8
Overall average rates		25	14	11

Source: Table A-VI.2e.

Now we see that the North and the Midwest have quite similar appearances, in the comparison of urban with rural deferment rates both during and after Korea, and in the pattern of magnitude of increased deferment after Korea. Both during and after Korea, in these two regions the rural deferment rate has been substantially higher than the urban rate, and while the shifts of urban rates after Korea were quite moderate (six and fourteen percentage points) the increases in rural rates of deferment were exceptionally large (both eighteen percentage points). But the patterns of the Far West and the South look similar to those of the North and Midwest only during Korea, although even here the Far West has somewhat higher deferment, especially in the rural sector. Then as we look to the shifts after Korea, for the South we find a combination of greater increase in the urban than in the rural sector, resulting in the elimination of difference between urban and rural rates, which then stand at 22 and 23 per cent deferment, respectively. And in the Far West we find the anomaly of a relatively enormous increase of deferment in the urban sector, eighteen points (from 13 to 31 per cent), but no change in the rural, with the net result of post-Korea deferment being higher for the urban than for the rural sector, in the Far West. We know of no offhand explanation of these observations, and it would appear that a fairly elaborate analysis might be required if one were to attempt to shed more useful light on this.

Rejection Rates

Throughout the preceding appendices (especially II-V) we have developed an indicator of rejection experience, and ways of thinking about rejection rates and problems related to them. Of primary importance has been the decision to consider the rejected as a percentage of those evaluated, rather than basing our rate on some other figure such as the total number in a given age group. In consequence of this decision, the case bases of Tables A-VI.3a-e represent the number evaluated, of the specified groups for which rejection rates are given.

It may be of interest to the reader to know he can construct various other sets of tables by the use of the figures in this set and the two preceding sets of tables, for any or all of the five breakdowns (independent variables) we have included. For example, the difference between the case bases in this third set and corresponding case bases used in the first and second sets will provide the data for rates of men never evaluated. As another example, one could calculate the number of cases serving from the first set (base multiplied by rate) and similarly the number rejected from the third set; with such numbers calculated, the difference between the sum of a corresponding pair of them (number rejected plus number serving) and the corresponding number evaluated (subtract the sum from the corresponding case base in the third set) will yield the number evaluated and found qualified, but deferred from service. Then with the use of case bases entered in the first or second set of tables it is possible to calculate a set of tables giving the rates of men evaluated and qualified but never serving.

In Table A-VI.3a we have rejection rates by respondent's education. The reader will recall that in Chapter II we went to some lengths to understand the moderate elevation of rejection rates of those beyond high school in educational attainment. Here we see that nearly all of that elevation came by way of increased rejection in those higher education groupings after Korea. We also note that while the overall average shift following Korea was three points (from 18 to 21 per cent), high school graduates show no

change in rejection, and those with graduate study experience actually show a four-point decrease in rejection. Most substantial increases in rejection occur at the lower extreme of the education dimension, where those with less than eight completed years experienced as much as twelve percentage points of increased rejection. This would seem to substantiate what we might expect, that rising standards of fitness would cut most deeply into those of greatest educational disadvantage.

In the breakdown of rejection rate by father's education, in Table A-VI.3b we see relatively little variation in rejection rate shifts after Korea, and virtually no shift for men with fathers whose education ranged from any high school up to and including a college degree, short of graduate study. There are above-average increases in rejection among those with no male head of household at age 15, and also among those with fathers at both ends of the education continuum. This is quite certainly due to the combination of what we have already observed about rejection rate shifts in relation to respondent's education, and the way respondent's education is correlated with father's education.

When this is viewed in terms of father's occupation (Table A-VI.3c), nearly all of the variation of shifting rejection occurs with the range of -4 to +5 percentage points. The one exception is concerning men who at age 15 had fathers who were unemployed or who had no head of household at that age. This is of course a grouping very nearly identical to the similar category of the preceding table, with nearly identical rejection rates involved. This general picture lends evidence to the proposition that once respondent's education is taken into account, father's education is more of a factor than father's occupation, in understanding rejection experience.

In Table A-VI.3d (race and socio-economic background) we see the rates which played an important part in understanding the deviations involving service rates and service rate shifts of Negroes. There is minor variation in the shifting rejection experience of whites, with high SES whites four points below the average shift of three points, and actually decreasing by one point in rejection rate, while low SES whites have an increase of four percentage points. But Negroes, on the average and in

both socio-economic categories, show major increases in rejection rates after Korea. Inasmuch as we are quite certain that the Negroes of the older cohorts were no more fit than the younger ones, we get the impression of extra leniency in application of fitness standards to Negroes during the Korean period, with more leniency among low SES than high SES Negroes, and then the resumption of more stringent screening as well as some across-the-board raising of standards, after Korea.

Finally, with respect to geographic origin (Table A-VI.3e) we are again confronted with considerable variation in post-Korean war shifts, this time regarding rejection rates. We suspect, as indicated previously, that a fair share of the variation is due to sampling. Three tentative generalizations will be advanced. The Far West has a post-Korea decline in rejection rate regardless of urban/rural distinctions. This is greatest, involving a decrease of seven points, in the rural sector of the Far West. Second, the small town sector of the South has a considerable increase of rejection, and the earlier observation concerning Negro increases--low SES more than high SES--may be the important underlying factor here. Third, the rural North has the highest of any rejection rate increases, taken by geographic origin, with a seventeen-percentage-point rise. This could hardly have to do with the earlier observation about Negroes, since there are virtually no Negroes in the rural sector of the North.

Rates of Enlisted, Drafted, and Officer Service Entrants

In Tables A-VI.4a--A-VI.6e we have presented rates of involuntary drafted, of Regular enlisted, and of entry for officer service, as percentages of those entering for two or more months. These are of course not the only ways in which it has been possible for men to enter military service; hence if one takes any three corresponding rates from the three sets of tables they will not add to 100 per cent. For example, looking at Tables A-VI.4a, A-VI.5a, and A-VI.6a, we would find that the rates for high school graduates of the 31-34 age cohorts are those shown in the tabulation at the top of the next page. The 10 per cent "miscellaneous other"

<u>Service Entrants</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Regular enlisted	51
Involuntary drafted	39
Officer or officer candidate	*
Accounted for	90
Miscellaneous other	10
Total entering service (506) cases	100

*Less than 0.5 per cent.

will consist of some combination of volunteer inductions, Reserve and National Guard enlistments, and/or unreported or unspecified other forms of enlisted rank entrance.

It is important to understand that very shortly after the cessation of hostilities in Korea there were major developments in military manpower procurement policy provisions. The most notable feature of these developments consisted of the provision of a larger variety of ways of entering into the fulfillment of the military service obligation, especially in the area of service as a Reservist or as a member of the National or Air National Guard. We can see some of the effects of this, especially in the sense of the popularity won by some of these new modes of participation, by comparing the "miscellaneous other" percentages in the overall average rates across the three sets of tables, for each age group. For convenience we present them here for the age groups beyond age 23:

MODE OF ENTRY, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THOSE ENTERING, BY 1964 AGE GROUPS

Mode of Entry	Age in 1964		
	24-26	27-30	31-34
Regular enlisted	46	46	47
Involuntary drafted	11	16	35
Officer or officer candidate	5	6	5
Accounted for	62	68	87
Miscellaneous other	38	32	13
Total per cent	100	100	100
Total cases entering service	793	1,152	1,330

While the Korea-involved cohorts, representing the earlier era of manpower procurement, show only 13 per cent in the "miscellaneous other" categories, the two younger cohort groups show 32 and 38 per cent in the "miscellaneous other" categories. This is an important feature of the recent history of military manpower procurement to keep in mind for any use to be made of the last three sets of tables of this appendix.

By this point our discussion must have raised some speculation about the reasoning underlying the selection of the three kinds of rates we have chosen to present in these last three sets of tables. The major concern has been to approach as nearly as possible, in this simple-minded fashion, the answers to questions about which subpopulations are exceptionally high or low as sources of:

1. Men who make relatively unreserved and purely voluntary commitments to military service (Regular enlistees are the only ones on the level of nonofficer procurement for whom this can be true, though certainly this cannot be said of all Regular enlistees).
2. Men who take no initiative whatever in fulfilling their military obligation (because of this formulation of the question we have not included the "volunteers for induction" as draftees, though they are treated as draftees in the induction process and in the Armed Forces, as well as in many statistical reports).
3. Men who from the beginning of their commitment to military service enjoy the prospect of elite military status as officers (primarily as commissioned officers, although any who entered through warrant officer recruitment programs are also included here).

It should now be clear that for socio-psychological purposes the "miscellaneous other" categories, consisting as they do of modes of enlisted rank entry involving no men who made unreserved initial commitments and yet none who were completely lacking in initiative, represent a kind of middle ground between the all-out positively motivated and the all-out negatively motivated service entrants; i.e., the Regular enlisted versus

the purely involuntary entrants, respectively. It has been for the possibility of realizing such an interpretation that we selected the rates to be represented in these last three sets of tables.

TABLE A-VI.1a
PER CENT SERVING, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Respondent's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Less than eighth grade	4	21	23	35
Eighth grade	15	37	43	58
Ninth-eleventh grade	13	58	61	79
High school graduate	34	67	69	78
College, under two years	13	62	62	78
College, two years or more	8	43	60	73
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	20	43	64	79
Graduate study	4	14	25	29
Overall per cent	18	55	58	70
	Case Bases			
Less than eighth grade	166	58	116	176
Eighth grade	252	80	173	179
Ninth-eleventh grade	2,259	337	473	433
High school graduate	1,313	548	658	646
College, under two years	631	134	173	157
College, two years or more	427	89	117	100
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	116	122	165	120
Graduate study	53	76	104	79
NA on education	13	5	4	4
Total weighted sample.	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

Note: Throughout the thirty tables (six sets of five tables) in this appendix, three special notations have been used in the percentage part of the tables:

1. The notation ... is entered instead of a percentage when the case base is less than thirty cases.
2. If the per cent is absolute zero the notation "none" is used for whatever theoretical value that may be.
3. An asterisk (*) denotes less than 0.5 per cent but not absolute zero.

TABLE A-VI.1b

PER CENT SERVING, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Eighth grade or less.	19	53	55	67
Ninth-eleventh grade.	22	58	62	74
High school graduate.	18	64	62	77
Some college, no degree	13	61	67	72
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	14	58	61	80
Graduate study.	9	44	49	63
No male head of household when 15	18	47	59	74
Overall per cent	18	55	58	70
	Case Bases			
Eighth grade or less.	1,625	571	945	925
Ninth-eleventh grade.	1,019	259	354	291
High school graduate.	1,053	271	234	236
Some college, no degree	503	99	95	110
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	216	46	53	37
Graduate study.	196	35	49	39
No male head of household when 15	499	127	200	204
NA on father's education.	119	41	53	51
Total weighted sample	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.1c

PER CENT SERVING, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Father's Occupation	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	21	50	57	73
Farm	15	41	47	56
Blue collar and military	19	59	61	76
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	16	55	62	75
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., managers, and prop.	13	60	61	67
Overall per cent.	18	55	58	70
	Case Bases			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	585	151	240	231
Farm	548	237	350	385
Blue collar and military	2,522	684	911	841
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	410	90	92	111
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., managers, and prop.	986	248	305	264
NA on father's occupation.	179	50	86	62
Total weighted sample.	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.1d

PER CENT SERVING, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY RACE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Race and SES	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Total, white and Negro. . .	18	55	58	71
White, subtotal	19	57	60	72
Low SES	21	53	57	70
High SES.	17	60	63	74
Negro, subtotal	11	31	41	61
Low SES	9	25	35	54
High SES.	17	48	53	79
Other race.	21
Overall per cent. . .	18	55	58	70
	Case Bases			
Total, white and Negro. . .	(5,174)	(1,429)	(1,960)	(1,869)
White, subtotal	(4,596)	(1,305)	(1,774)	(1,707)
Low SES	1,682	570	959	945
High SES.	2,914	735	815	762
Negro, subtotal	(578)	(124)	(186)	(161)
Low SES	395	93	127	122
High SES.	183	31	59	39
Other race.	52	17	22	21
Race and SES NA . . .	5	4	1	1
Total weighted sample	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.1e

PER CENT SERVING, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Geographic Origin		Age in 1964			
		16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
		Per Cent			
Metropolitan area (100,000+)	North. . .	21	61	71	81
	Midwest. . .	15	65	65	80
	Far West . .	17	60	64	77
	South. . . .	18	64	68	75
Small city (under 100,000)	North. . .	20	60	71	78
	Midwest. . .	22	55	64	77
	Far West . .	22	68	60	73
	South. . . .	21	53	60	82
Rural residence	North. . .	22	55	50	78
	Midwest. . .	18	52	57	71
	Far West . .	14	43	66	59
	South. . . .	15	44	50	58
Overall per cent		18	55	58	70
		Case Bases			
Metropolitan area (100,000+)	North. . .	443	133	160	164
	Midwest. . .	437	117	145	175
	Far West . .	233	60	39	41
	South. . . .	377	83	98	66
Small city (under 100,000)	North. . .	496	129	190	212
	Midwest. . .	510	154	184	181
	Far West . .	289	84	95	55
	South. . . .	575	129	239	162
Rural residence	North. . .	194	53	74	83
	Midwest. . .	413	143	157	192
	Far West . .	123	31	46	54
	South. . . .	608	196	334	308
Other and NA		532	138	222	200
Total weighted sample. . .		5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.2a

PER CENT DEFERRED, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Respondent's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Less than eighth grade.	64	38	27	20
Eighth grade.	65	26	30	17
Ninth-eleventh grade.	78	19	22	10
High school graduate.	54	19	21	11
College, under two years.	77	27	24	9
College, two years or more.	85	35	21	15
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	73	39	18	8
Graduate study.	90	74	62	51
Overall per cent	71	26	25	14
	Case Bases			
Less than eighth grade.	166	58	116	176
Eighth grade.	252	80	173	179
Ninth-eleventh grade.	2,259	337	473	433
High school graduate.	1,313	548	658	646
College, under two years.	631	134	173	157
College, two years or more.	427	89	117	100
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	116	122	165	120
Graduate study.	53	76	104	79
NA on education.	13	5	4	4
Total weighted sample.	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.2b

PER CENT DEFERRED, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Eighth grade or less.	66	27	24	15
Ninth-eleventh grade.	69	26	27	12
High school graduate.	75	21	27	12
Some college, no degree	80	24	23	16
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	81	33	34	13
Graduate study.	89	43	30	27
No male head of household at 15 .	67	26	20	13
Overall per cent	71	26	25	14
	Case Bases			
Eighth grade or less.	1,625	571	945	925
Ninth-eleventh grade.	1,019	259	354	291
High school graduate.	1,053	271	234	236
Some college, no degree	503	99	95	110
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	216	46	53	37
Graduate study.	196	35	49	39
No male head of household at 15 .	499	127	200	204
NA on father's education	119	41	53	51
Total weighted sample.	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.2c

PER CENT DEFERRED, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Father's Occupation	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
Per Cent				
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	64	25	24	15
Farm	67	39	32	19
Blue collar and military	70	23	22	9
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	77	33	29	11
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., managers, and prop.	82	24	26	20
Overall per cent.	71	26	25	14
Case Bases				
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	585	141	240	231
Farm	548	237	350	385
Blue collar and military	2,522	684	911	841
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	410	90	92	111
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., managers, and prop.	986	248	305	264
NA on father's occupation	179	50	86	62
Total weighted sample	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.2d

PER CENT DEFERRED, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY RACE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Race and SES	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Total, white and Negro.	71	27	25	13
White, subtotal	72	26	25	14
Low SES	66	28	23	14
High SES.	76	25	26	13
Negro, subtotal	66	28	24	12
Low SES	65	30	24	16
High SES.	68	26	24	3
Other race.	69
Overall per cent	71	27	25	14
	Case Bases			
Total, white and Negro.	(5,174)	(1,429)	(1,960)	(1,869)
White, subtotal	(4,596)	(1,305)	(1,774)	(1,707)
Low SES	1,682	570	959	945
High SES.	2,914	735	815	762
Negro, subtotal	(578)	(124)	(186)	(161)
Low SES	395	93	127	122
High SES.	183	31	59	39
Other race.	52	17	22	21
Race and SES NA.	5	4	1	1
Total weighted sample.	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893

TABLE A-VI.2e

PER CENT DEFERRED, OF ENTIRE AGE GROUP, BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Geographic Origin		Age in 1964			
		16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
		Per Cent			
Metropolitan area (100,000+)	North.	70	18	13	9
	Midwest.	78	25	21	7
	Far West	75	26	27	10
	South.	73	14	21	15
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	71	19	18	10
	Midwest.	70	31	22	9
	Far West	73	22	32	16
	South.	69	25	22	8
Rural residence	North.	71	24	32	14
	Midwest.	72	33	33	15
	Far West	78	47	24	24
	South.	67	31	23	15
Overall per cent	71	26	25	14	
		Case Bases			
Metropolitan area (100,000+)	North.	443	133	160	164
	Midwest.	437	117	145	175
	Far West	233	60	39	41
	South.	377	83	98	66
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	496	129	190	212
	Midwest.	510	154	184	181
	Far West	289	84	95	55
	South.	575	129	239	162
Rural residence	North.	194	53	74	83
	Midwest.	413	143	157	192
	Far West	123	31	46	54
	South.	608	196	334	308
Other and NA	532	138	222	200	
Total weighted sample.	5,231	1,450	1,983	1,893	

TABLE A-VI.3a

PER CENT REJECTED, OF THOSE EVALUATED, BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Respondent's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Less than eighth grade. . . .	87	61	66	54
Eighth grade.	51	48	37	29
Ninth-eleventh grade.	37	27	20	11
High school graduate.	23	17	12	12
College, under two years. . . .	32	14	18	14
College, two years or more. . .	27	28	22	14
College graduate, B.A.-B.S. . .	22	23	19	13
Graduate study.	25	25	29
Overall per cent	32	23	21	18
	Case Bases			
Less than eighth grade. . . .	62	39	88	146
Eighth grade.	101	61	127	156
Ninth-eleventh grade.	529	285	391	400
High school graduate.	700	463	551	593
College, under two years. . . .	187	108	138	149
College, two years or more. . .	105	68	104	91
College graduate, B.A.-B.S. . .	36	91	153	114
Graduate study.	12	37	59	55
NA on education.	3	3	3	4
Total evaluated.	1,735	1,154	1,614	1,707

TABLE A-VI.3b

PER CENT REJECTED, OF THOSE EVALUATED, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Eighth grade or less.	39	25	26	21
Ninth-eleventh grade.	26	22	14	16
High school graduate.	24	17	14	13
Some college, no degree	28	19	13	13
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	23	11	6	8
Graduate study.	10	...	30	12
No male head of household at 15	40	34	24	14
Overall per cent	32	23	21	18
	Case Bases			
Eighth grade or less.	622	454	772	824
Ninth-eleventh grade.	365	207	281	264
High school graduate.	321	225	187	219
Some college, no degree	119	80	78	101
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	52	37	43	35
Graduate study.	35	25	37	32
No male head of household at 15	189	102	173	185
NA on father's education	32	24	43	47
Total evaluated.	1,735	1,154	1,614	1,707

TABLE A-VI.3c

PER CENT REJECTED, OF THOSE EVALUATED, BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Father's Occupation	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	37	31	23	13
Farm	49	29	28	29
Blue collar and military	30	22	21	16
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	24	15	11	15
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., mana- gers, and prop.	22	20	16	15
Overall per cent.	32	23	21	18
	Case Bases			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	232	114	201	203
Farm	207	166	267	327
Blue collar and military	873	557	756	789
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	120	68	71	101
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., mana- gers, and prop.	224	203	250	231
NA on father's occupation	80	46	69	57
Total evaluated	1,735	1,154	1,614	1,707

TABLE A-VI.3d

PER CENT REJECTED, OF THOSE EVALUATED, BY RACE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Race and SES	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-31	31-34
Per Cent				
Total, white and Negro.	32	24	21	18
White, subtotal	29	21	19	17
Low SES	34	24	23	19
High SES.	24	19	13	14
Negro, subtotal	59	49	42	28
Low SES	66	57	49	31
High SES.	41	...	28	16
Other race.
Overall per cent	32	23	21	18
Case Bases				
Total, white and Negro.	(1,713)	(1,138)	(1,595)	(1,691)
White, subtotal	(1,490)	(1,036)	(1,440)	(1,538)
Low SES	645	443	788	839
High SES.	845	593	652	699
Negro, subtotal	(223)	(102)	(155)	(153)
Low SES	157	74	105	115
High SES.	66	27	50	38
Other race.	18	12	18	15
Race and SES NA.	5	4	1	1
Total evaluated.	1,735	1,154	1,614	1,707

TABLE A-VI.3e

PER CENT REJECTED, OF THOSE EVALUATED, BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Geographic Origin		Age in 1964			
		16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
		Per Cent			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	27	24	17	11
	Midwest.	24	14	16	14
	Far West	26	17	11	13
	South.	30	25	12	11
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	27	24	13	13
	Midwest.	21	17	17	14
	Far West	19	12	10	13
	South.	29	28	22	11
Rural residence	North.	22	27	26	9
	Midwest.	29	20	14	15
	Far West	29	...	13	20
	South.	48	33	34	31
Overall per cent		32	23	21	18
		Case Bases			
Metropolitan area (100,00 +)	North.	153	119	147	158
	Midwest.	124	93	127	168
	Far West	70	49	33	36
	South.	113	72	86	61
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	173	111	165	197
	Midwest.	185	119	152	169
	Far West	87	71	72	51
	South.	201	101	199	152
Rural residence	North.	64	42	52	73
	Midwest.	133	107	118	170
	Far West	36	21	36	46
	South.	229	148	271	273
Other and NA		168	102	156	102
Total evaluated.		1,735	1,154	1,614	1,707

TABLE A-VI.4a

PER CENT REGULAR ENLISTED OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Respondent's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Less than eighth grade.	38
Eighth grade.	69	53	59	49
Ninth-eleventh grade.	77	58	66	59
High school graduate.	69	49	47	51
College, under two years.	59	47	40	47
College, two years or more.	35	28	30	30
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	4	2	9
Graduate study.
Overall per cent	68	46	46	47
	Case Bases			
Less than eighth grade.	6	12	27	62
Eighth grade.	37	30	74	104
Ninth-eleventh grade.	298	197	290	343
High school graduate.	447	368	452	506
College, under two years.	85	83	107	122
College, two years or more.	35	38	70	73
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	23	53	106	95
Graduate study.	2	11	25	23
NA on education.	3	1	1	2
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.4b

PER CENT REGULAR ENLISTED OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Eighth grade or less.	65	47	43	47
Ninth-eleventh grade.	75	50	51	52
High school graduate.	70	49	50	48
Some college, no degree	69	42	40	42
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	44	...	26	32
Graduate study.
No male head of household at 15 .	67	40	53	47
Overall per cent	68	46	46	47
	Case Bases			
Eighth grade or less.	313	303	521	615
Ninth-eleventh grade.	221	149	220	215
High school graduate.	187	174	145	181
Some college, no degree	68	60	63	79
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	30	27	32	30
Graduate study.	17	16	24	25
No male head of household at 15 .	91	59	119	151
NA on father's education	7	5	27	34
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.4c

PER CENT REGULAR ENLISTED OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Father's Occupation	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	73	49	52	50
Farm	60	47	40	40
Blue collar and military	70	49	50	50
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	70	47	46	37
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., mana- gers, and prop.	63	37	33	44
Overall per cent.	68	46	46	47
	Case Bases			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	123	70	137	169
Farm	80	97	164	217
Blue collar and military	490	400	554	639
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	66	50	57	83
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., mana- gers, and prop.	130	149	186	176
NA on father's occupation	46	27	54	45
Total entering service.	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.4d

PER CENT REGULAR ENLISTED OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY RACE
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Race and SES	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Total, white and Negro.	68	47	46	47
White, subtotal	68	46	45	48
Low SES	67	45	46	48
High SES.	69	47	44	48
Negro, subtotal	73	57	54	39
Low SES	69	...	53	38
High SES.	77	...	56	42
Other race.
Overall per cent	68	46	46	47
	Case Bases			
Total, white and Negro.	(919)	(781)	(1,141)	(1,321)
White, subtotal	(854)	(742)	(1,065)	(1,223)
Low SES	358	302	551	658
High SES.	496	441	515	565
Negro, subtotal	(65)	(38)	(76)	(98)
Low SES	34	23	45	66
High SES.	32	15	31	31
Other race.	11	8	9	8
Race and SES NA.	5	4	1	1
Total entering service . . .	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-41-4e

PER CENT REGULAR ENLISTED OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Geographic Origin		Age in 1964			
		16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
		Per Cent			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	60	31	31	44
	Midwest.	65	39	37	48
	Far West	63	42	...	42
	South.	70	34	39	47
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	76	56	42	52
	Midwest.	70	54	48	47
	Far West	72	66	72	43
	South.	60	48	52	49
Rural residence	North.	84	57	70	45
	Midwest.	68	43	37	50
	Far West	54	55
	South.	73	51	47	44
Overall per cent		68	46	46	47
		Case Bases			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	92	80	113	133
	Midwest.	67	76	94	140
	Far West	41	36	25	31
	South.	69	53	66	50
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	100	77	134	165
	Midwest.	114	85	119	140
	Far West	63	57	57	40
	South.	122	68	143	132
Rural residence	North.	43	31	37	64
	Midwest.	75	74	90	137
	Far West	17	13	30	32
	South.	91	87	164	177
Other and NA		41	54	79	88
Total entering service		935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI-5a

PER CENT DRAFTED OF THOSE ENTERING ACTIVE SERVICE, BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Respondent's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
Per Cent				
Less than eighth grade.	none	56
Eighth grade.	8	18	15	40
Ninth-eleventh grade.	3	12	15	30
High school graduate.	5	11	16	39
College, under two years.	7	6	20	30
College, two years or more.	26	20	25	36
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	5	9	23
Graduate study.	none	none
Overall per cent	6	11	16	35
Case Bases				
Less than eighth grade.	6	12	27	62
Eighth grade.	37	30	74	104
Ninth-eleventh grade.	298	197	290	343
High school graduate.	447	368	452	506
College, under two years.	85	83	107	122
College, two years or more.	35	38	70	73
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	23	53	106	95
Graduate study.	2	11	25	23
NA on education.	3	1	1	2
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.5b

PER CENT DRAFTED OF THOSE ENTERING ACTIVE SERVICE, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Eighth grade or less.	7	14	18	40
Ninth-eleventh grade.	3	9	9	33
High school graduate.	9	4	13	32
Some college, no degree	3	9	12	24
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	3	...	16	14
Graduate study.	none
No male head of household at 15 . .	4	21	23	37
Overall per cent	6	11	16	35
	Case Bases			
Eighth grade or less.	313	303	521	615
Ninth-eleventh grade.	221	149	220	215
High school graduate.	187	174	145	181
Some college, no degree	68	60	63	79
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	30	27	32	30
Graduate study.	17	16	24	25
No male head of household at 15 . .	91	59	119	151
NA on father's education	7	5	27	34
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.5c

PER CENT DRAFTED OF THOSE ENTERING ACTIVE SERVICE, BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Father's Occupation	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	5	16	22	35
Farm	9	16	29	48
Blue collar and military	5	12	13	36
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	6	8	10	30
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., manager, and Prop.	5	5	13	21
Overall per cent.	6	11	16	35
	Case Bases			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	123	70	137	169
Farm	80	97	164	217
Blue collar and military	490	400	554	639
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	66	50	57	83
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., manager, and prop.	130	149	186	176
NA on father's occupation.	46	27	54	45
Total entering service.	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.5d

PER CENT DRAFTED OF THOSE ENTERING ACTIVE SERVICE, BY RACE
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Race and SES	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Total, white and Negro. . . .	5	11	16	35
White, subtotal	5	10	16	34
Low SES	5	16	20	40
High SES.	5	6	11	27
Negro, subtotal	9	28	25	51
Low SES	12	...	33	50
High SES.	6	...	14	53
Other race.	none	...
Overall per cent	6	11	16	35
	Case Bases			
Total, white and Negro. . . .	(919)	(781)	(1,141)	(1,321)
White, subtotal	(854)	(742)	(1,065)	(1,223)
Low SES	358	302	551	658
High SES.	496	441	515	565
Negro, subtotal	(65)	(38)	(76)	(98)
Low SES	34	23	45	66
High SES.	32	15	31	31
Other race.	11	8	9	8
Race and SES NA.	5	4	1	1
Total entering service .	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.5e

PER CENT DRAFTED OF THOSE ENTERING ACTIVE SERVICE, BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Geographic Origin		Age in 1964			
		16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
		Per Cent			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	8	10	10	37
	Midwest.	6	16	19	37
	Far West	7	6	...	23
	South.	3	7	5	22
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	4	9	11	29
	Midwest.	6	7	12	34
	Far West	5	5	11	38
	South.	5	8	14	27
Rural residence	North.	2	6	16	43
	Midwest.	5	9	34	37
	Far West	11	33
	South.	8	23	26	44
Overall per cent		6	11	16	35
		Case Bases			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	92	80	113	133
	Midwest.	67	76	94	140
	Far West	41	36	25	31
	South.	69	53	66	50
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	100	77	134	165
	Midwest.	114	85	119	140
	Far West	63	57	57	40
	South.	122	68	143	132
Rural residence	North.	43	31	37	64
	Midwest.	75	74	90	137
	Far West	17	13	30	32
	South.	91	87	164	177
Other and NA		41	54	79	88
Total entering service		935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.6a

PER CENT OFFICER OR CANDIDATE OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Respondent's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Less than eighth grade.	none	none	none
Eighth grade.	none	none	none	none
Ninth-eleventh grade.	*	none	*	none
High school graduate.	none	*	*	*
College, under two years.	9	5	2	2
College, two years or more.	11	2	4	9
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	45	55	55
Graduate study.
Overall per cent	3	5	6	5
	Case Bases			
Less than eighth grade.	6	12	27	62
Eighth grade.	37	30	74	104
Ninth-eleventh grade.	298	197	290	343
High school graduate.	447	368	452	506
College, under two years.	85	83	107	122
College, two years or more.	35	38	70	73
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	23	53	106	95
Graduate study.	2	11	25	23
NA on education.	3	1	1	2
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.6b

PER CENT OFFICER OR CANDIDATE OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY FATHER'S EDUCATION

Father's Education	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Eighth grade or less.	1	3	4	2
Ninth-eleventh grade.	*	5	6	4
High school graduate.	3	7	8	6
Some college, no degree	4	3	14	16
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	32	...	28	23
Graduate study.
No male head of household at 15 . . .	1	none	2	11
Overall per cent	3	5	6	5
	Case Bases			
Eighth grade or less.	313	303	521	615
Ninth-eleventh grade.	221	149	220	215
High school graduate.	187	174	145	181
Some college, no degree	68	60	63	79
College graduate, B.A.-B.S.	30	27	32	30
Graduate study.	17	16	24	25
No male head of household at 15 . . .	91	59	119	151
NA on father's education	7	5	27	34
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.6c

PER CENT OFFICER OR CANDIDATE OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Father's Occupation	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	1	none	4	1
Farm	1	2	6	4
Blue collar and military	1	4	3	2
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	14	4	6	13
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., mana- ger, and prop.	9	10	17	20
Overall per cent.	3	5	6	5
	Case Bases			
No male head, or male head unemployed, at 15.	123	70	137	169
Farm	80	97	164	217
Blue collar and military	490	400	554	639
Clerical and kindred, and sales workers.	66	50	57	83
Prof., tech., and kindred, and off., mana- ger, and prop.	130	149	186	176
NA on father's occupation	46	27	54	45
Total entering service.	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.6d

PER CENT OFFICER OR CANDIDATE OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY RACE
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Race and SES	Age in 1964			
	16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
	Per Cent			
Total, white and Negro.	3	4	6	5
White, subtotal	3	4	6	6
Low SES	1	2	2	2
High SES.	5	6	11	10
Negro, subtotal	none	none	none	1
Low SES	none	none	none	2
High SES.	none	none	none	none
Other race.	none	none
Overall per cent	3	5	6	5
	Case Bases			
Total, white and Negro.	(919)	(781)	(1,141)	(1,321)
White, subtotal	(854)	(742)	(1,065)	(1,223)
Low SES	358	302	551	658
High SES.	496	441	515	565
Negro, subtotal	(65)	(38)	(76)	(98)
Low SES	34	23	45	66
High SES.	32	15	31	31
Other race.	11	8	9	8
Race and SES NA.	5	4	1	1
Total entering service	935	793	1,152	1,330

TABLE A-VI.6e

PER CENT OFFICER OR CANDIDATE OF THOSE ENTERING SERVICE, BY GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Geographic Origin		Age in 1964			
		16-23	24-26	27-30	31-34
		Per Cent			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	6	6	9	6
	Midwest.	1	5	8	4
	Far West	2	6	...	8
	South.	3	9	14	15
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	1	4	13	4
	Midwest.	5	8	5	9
	Far West	2	2	3	4
	South.	6	7	5	7
Rural residence	North.	none	none	none	2
	Midwest.	5	3	3	3
	Far West	3	none
	South.	2	1	2	5
Overall per cent		3	5	6	5
		Case Bases			
Metropolitan area (100,000 +)	North.	92	80	113	133
	Midwest.	67	76	94	140
	Far West	41	36	25	31
	South.	69	53	66	50
Small city (under 100,000)	North.	100	77	134	165
	Midwest.	114	85	119	140
	Far West	63	57	57	40
	South.	122	68	143	132
Rural residence	North.	43	31	37	64
	Midwest.	75	74	90	137
	Far West	17	13	30	32
	South.	91	87	164	177
Other and NA		41	54	79	88
Total entering service		935	793	1,152	1,330

APPENDIX VII

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

For this appendix we have fully reproduced only two of five questionnaires whose development involved NORC participation in the Department of Defense Military Manpower Policy Study. The original idea for the survey design for this study was to write one questionnaire which would provide the desired data from all of the populations to be sampled: the civilian male draft-age population (both veterans and nonveterans), the population of non-reserve active military service personnel (both officers and enlisted men), and the reserve-forces population currently on active duty (those not on active duty are included in the civilian population).

In the early drafts of such a questionnaire it became evident that, while many fairly standard dimensions of data would be gathered from all the populations, the analytically relevant characteristics that distinguished each population from the others would call for special questionnaire sections. For example, with nonveterans a basic concern is to understand the facts of their remaining nonveteran and to assess the possibility of subsequent entry into service. On the other hand, with veterans and those now on active service it is important to know something of how they entered service and something of the basic dimensions of their military experience. With veterans, of course, there is an additional concern with basic aspects of their separation from active service and their civilian lives after separation.

Such complications, combined with the fact that the questionnaires were to be self-administered mailback instruments, prompted a move toward simplicity. Five different versions of the questionnaire resulted: two for civilians (one for nonveterans and one for veterans), one for reservists, and two for men on active service (one for enlisted men and one for officers). (The development of a version for officers differing from that for enlisted

men came at the insistence of military survey administrators that officers would take exception to being asked certain questions in the same way necessary for enlisted men. The actual consequence involved about a dozen items of somewhat variant wording.) Obviously, the questionnaire for veterans will be nearly identical to a composite of the two for enlisted men and officers, but with an added section relevant only to veterans.

We have thus chosen to include in this appendix full reproductions only of the two questionnaires used for nonveteran and veteran civilians. The questionnaire for reservists is omitted because we did not receive the data resulting from its use; therefore it does not enter into the sphere of this report. Excerpts from the two questionnaires for enlisted men and officers present the few features unique to each of those questionnaires. (For readers who might need copies of any of these other three questionnaires, there is a limited supply from which copies can be had for the asking.)

Concerning the veteran and nonveteran versions of the questionnaires, the Bureau of the Census determined which CPS sample members should receive which of the two versions, on the basis of the CPS sample Control Card item indicating past membership in the armed forces. The statement appearing on the front page of each version allowed nonveteran sample respondents to indicate that they had erroneously received the veteran version, and vice versa. Such errors were then corrected by immediate mailout of the appropriate version.

CONFIDENTIAL - This inquiry is authorized by Act of Congress (10 U.S.C., Sec. 133). The report you submit to the Census Bureau is confidential and may be seen only by authorized employees. It may not be used for purposes of taxation, investigation, or regulation.

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
FORM 5-31
(9-30-64)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20233
ACTING AS COLLECTING AGENT FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Budget Bureau No. 22-6402.1
Approval Expires December 31, 1964

(NONVETERAN QUESTIONNAIRE)

*Please correct this address
if it is not the one where
you are currently staying.*

Dear Friend:

The Census Bureau has been asked by the Department of Defense to obtain information from both veterans and non-veterans on their experiences with, and attitudes toward, military service. This information will be used as part of a study of the various ways of meeting the Nation's military manpower needs. You are one of several thousand persons without active military service selected for inclusion in the survey.

Your answers to the questions will be treated as confidential by the Bureau of the Census and the Department of Defense and will be used for statistical purposes only. We are prohibited by law from revealing your name or anything about you as an individual to any unauthorized agency, organization, or person.

Since this study is based on a sample of the population, it is important that everyone fill in and return his questionnaire. Please complete this form and mail it within five days in the enclosed envelope, which does not require postage.

If you have ever been on active military service in the Armed Forces or have spent at least two months on active duty for training in the Reserves or National Guard, please check the box below and return this questionnaire in the enclosed envelope; we will then send you the form which applies to veterans.

Your cooperation in this survey will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Richard M. Scammon
Director
Bureau of the Census

Enclosure

I have been on active service in the Armed Forces or spent at least two months on active duty for training in the Reserves or National Guard.

FOR CENSUS USE ONLY	CC 9	CC 15	CC 33		
--------------------------------	------	-------	-------	--	--

1. What is the highest grade of regular school you have completed?

- 1 Less than 8th grade
- 2 8th grade
- 3 9th, 10th, or 11th grade, but not a high school graduate
- 4 High school graduate
- 5 Some college, but less than 2 years
- 6 2 or more years of college, but no college bachelor's degree
- 7 College bachelor's degree
- 8 Graduate study, beyond the bachelor's degree

2. How old were you when you stopped going to school full time?

-- DO NOT COUNT summertime between school years as stopping full-time school --

_____ (age)

OR Never stopped full-time school

3. What best describes your study program during the last year you were in high school?

- 1 Never entered high school
- 2 College preparatory
- 3 Commercial
- 4 General
- 5 Vocational

4. Are you attending or enrolled in school now?

- 1 No
- 2 Yes -- High school or less (part- or full-time)
- 3 Yes -- College or graduate study (part-time only)
- 4 Yes -- College or graduate study (full-time only)

5. What is the highest level of regular school you PLAN TO COMPLETE?

- 1 No more regular schooling
- 2 Some, but less than high school graduation
- 3 Complete high school (get a diploma)
- 4 Some college, but not a bachelor's degree
- 5 Complete college (get a bachelor's degree)
- 6 Graduate study beyond the bachelor's degree

6. How old are you?

(Give your age at your last birthday.)

_____ (age)

7. Are you married now?

Never married (SKIP TO QUESTION 10)

- 1 Married -- no children
- 2 Married -- one child
- 3 Married -- two children
- 4 Married -- three or more children
- 5 Widowed, divorced, or separated -- no children
- 6 Widowed, divorced, or separated -- one or more children

NOTE -- When answering this question, include all children regardless of age or dependency status.

8. How old were you when you were FIRST married?

_____ (age)

9. How old were you when your FIRST child was born?

_____ (age)

OR No children

10. In what kind of place did you live MOST of the time UP TO AGE 15 YEARS?

- 1 On a FARM or RANCH
- 2 In the COUNTRY, but NOT on a farm or ranch
- 3 In a TOWN or SMALL CITY (less than 25,000 people)
- 4 In a CITY (25,000 or more people, but less than 100,000 people)
- 5 In a LARGE CITY (100,000 or more people)
- 6 In the SUBURB of a large city

11. In what State or territory of the United States or in what foreign country did you live most of the time before you were 15 years old?

12. With whom were you living when you were 15 years old?

- 1 Father and mother
 - 2 Father and step-mother
 - 3 Mother and step-father
 - 4 Father
 - 5 Mother
 - 6 Some other adult MALE relative (Specify)
- _____

7 Some other arrangement (Describe)

8 On my own

13. Describe your father's usual kind of work DURING THE TIME YOU WERE 15 YEARS OLD.

-- If you did not live with him at that age, describe the work of the male head of the household (not yourself) where you lived at age 15 --

x Did not live with father at age 15 and there was no male head of the household (SKIP TO QUESTION 15)

a. What kind of work was he doing?

(Include name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

b. What kind of business or industry was this?

(For example, county junior high school, auto assembly plant, TV and radio service, retail supermarket, road construction, farm, etc.)

14. What was the highest grade of school completed by your father (or male head of the household referred to in question 13)?

-- If you are not sure, give your best guess --

- 1 8th grade or less
- 2 9th, 10th, or 11th grade, but not a high school graduate
- 3 High school graduate
- 4 Some college, but no bachelor's degree
- 5 College graduate (bachelor's degree)
- 6 Graduate study beyond the bachelor's degree

15. Which THREE items below would be MOST important to you in choosing a job or career, ASIDE FROM ANY OTHER THINGS important to you?

- 1. Chances for further training and learning job skills
- 2. Retirement plans, medical plans, fringe benefits
- 3. Chances for advancement
- 4. Steady, secure work
- 5. Interesting work
- 6. Pay
- 7. Highly respected job
- 8. Freedom to do the job the way I think best
- 9. Chances to be a leader

(Enter the item number of the statement in the appropriate box to show "Most important", "2nd most important", and "3rd most important".)

Most important	2nd most important	3rd most important

16. If you were looking for a NEW, FULL-TIME, CIVILIAN JOB TODAY, how good a job do you think you could get?

- 1 I could get a very good job
- 2 I could get a satisfactory job
- 3 I would have trouble finding a satisfactory job
- 4 I do not know

17. How many different civilian employers have you ever worked for, counting only full-time jobs?

-- DO NOT COUNT military service, part-time jobs, or summer jobs between school years --

- 1 None -- Never had a full-time, civilian job
- 2 One employer
- 3 Two or three employers
- 4 Four or five employers
- 5 Six or more employers

18. Have you ever been out of work and **LOOKING FOR WORK** for a **MONTH OR MORE**, since you stopped going to school full time?

- 1 Still going to school full time
- 2 Never
- 3 One time
- 4 Two times
- 5 Three or more times

19. Do you have a job or business at the present time (including part-time work)?

x Never had a job (SKIP TO QUESTION 20)

1 Yes (Describe this job below)

2 No - Looking for work or on layoff

3 No - Not looking for work

} (Describe the last job you had)

a. What kind of work are you doing?

(Include name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

b. What kind of business or industry is this?

(For example, county junior high school, auto assembly plant, TV and radio service, retail supermarket, road construction, farm, etc.)

c. Do you usually work part time or full time on this job?

- 1 Part time
- 2 Full time or more

d. Give your usual **WEEKLY** earnings on this job, before taxes and other deductions.

\$ _____ .00 (weekly earnings)

e. Give the length of time you worked on this job.

- 1 Less than six months
- 2 Six months or more, but less than one year
- 3 One year or more, but less than three years
- 4 Three years or more, but less than five years
- 5 Five or more years

f. Describe your feelings about this job.

- 1 Extremely satisfied
- 2 Somewhat satisfied
- 3 Somewhat dissatisfied
- 4 Extremely dissatisfied

20. What do you expect to earn from work at all jobs, businesses, or professions during 1964, before taxes and other deductions?

- 1 Nothing
- 2 Less than \$1,000
- 3 \$1,000 to \$2,999
- 4 \$3,000 to \$4,999
- 5 \$5,000 to \$7,499
- 6 \$7,500 to \$9,999
- 7 \$10,000 to \$14,999
- 8 \$15,000 or more

21. Describe the **FIRST, FULL-TIME** job you had **AFTER** you stopped going to school.

-- DO NOT COUNT summer jobs between school years --

x Never had a full-time job

1 Same as job in question 19

} (SKIP TO QUESTION 22)

a. What kind of work were you doing?

(Include name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

b. What kind of business or industry was this?

(For example, county junior high school, auto assembly plant, TV and radio service, retail supermarket, road construction, farm, etc.)

c. Give your usual **WEEKLY** earnings on this job before taxes and other deductions.

\$ _____ .00 (weekly earnings)

d. How many months was it from the time you stopped full-time school until you got this job?

_____ (months)

22. Do you have a pretty good idea what sort of work you will be doing when you are about 40 years old?

- 1 Yes
- x No (SKIP TO QUESTION 23)

IF "YES" --

a. What kind of work would this be?

(Try to include name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

23. Up to 26 years of age, many young men do not know whether they will be drafted or not. Has this **UNCERTAINTY** ever caused any difficulties for you?

- 1 No difficulties
- 2 Yes - minor difficulties
- 3 Yes - serious difficulties

24. Have you ever been told by an employer or an employment office that you could not be hired because you might be drafted?

- 1 No
- 2 Yes - once
- 3 Yes - more than one time

25. In your opinion, is the present system of Selective Service (the draft) --

- 1 Very fair?
- 2 Reasonably fair?
- 3 Somewhat unfair?
- 4 Very unfair?
- 5 Have no opinion

26. If there were no draft and you did not have any military obligation at all, do you think you would want to enter active military service?

- 1 Yes - definitely would want to enter service
- 2 Yes - probably would want to enter service
- 3 No - probably would never want to enter service
- 4 No - definitely would never want to enter service
- 5 I have no idea

27. What is your draft classification **NOW**?

(If your draft board has classified you, then you have received the card "Selective Service Notice of Classification". On that card, your classification appears as a Roman numeral and a letter, for example I-A, II-S, IV-F, I-Y, etc.)

I am classified and my present draft classification is _____.

- 6 I have registered, but have not been classified.
- 7 I have not yet registered for the draft.

28. a. If there were no draft now, and you had no military obligation at all, would you want to volunteer for active military service **IF** --

-- Consider EACH statement separately --

Mark ONE box for EACH statement		
Yes	Maybe	No
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

1. If military pay were the SAME as you could make in civilian life? .

2. If military pay were CONSIDERABLY HIGHER than you could make in civilian life?

3. If you were given a \$1,000 ENLISTMENT BONUS?

4. If the minimum tour of duty for the service you prefer were ONE YEAR SHORTER than it is now?

5. If you were GUARANTEED TRAINING in a job or skill useful in civilian life?

6. If you were sent to civilian school or college AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE BEFORE or DURING ACTIVE SERVICE? . .

7. If you were given an opportunity to go to civilian school or college AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE AFTER ACTIVE SERVICE? . . .

8. If you could QUALIFY for officer's training or an officer's commission?

b. Which one of the conditions listed above would be **MOST** likely to get you to volunteer?

(Enter the item number of the statement.)

_____ (item number)

29. Have you ever been called for examination by your draft board?

- 1 Never examined
- 2 Have been examined and found qualified for draft
- 3 Failed both physical and written test
- 4 Failed only the physical examination
- 5 Failed only the written test
- 6 Turned down by draft for other reasons
- 7 Do not know the results of my examination

30. Did you ever try to enter active military service or a Reserve or National Guard organization?

- 1 Never tried to enter ANY military service
- 2 Tried to enlist in active military service as a Regular
- 3 Tried to enlist in a Reserve or National Guard organization
- 4 Tried both - to enlist as a Regular and to join a Reserve or National Guard organization

31. Have you ever been turned down for enlistment?

- 1 No - NEVER ATTEMPTED to enter any military service
- 2 Yes - turned down WITHOUT being examined or tested
- 3 Yes - applied but failed BOTH physical and written test
- 4 Yes - applied but could not meet PHYSICAL standards
- 5 Yes - applied but could not pass the WRITTEN test
- 6 Yes - applied but turned down FOR OTHER REASONS or DID NOT KNOW REASON why they turned me down

32. Have you ever made any efforts to get an officer's commission?

- 1 Yes (CONTINUE BELOW)
- x No (SKIP TO QUESTION 33)

-- Consider EACH statement separately --

Mark "Yes" or "No" for EACH statement below

	Yes	No
1. Applied for Reserve officer training in a college or university	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Applied for officer training at a service academy (West Point, Annapolis, etc.) . . .	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Applied for aviation cadet training	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Applied for Officer Candidate School or Officer Training School	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Made other attempts not listed here to get a commission	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

33. If the draft law and world conditions stay the same, do you expect to enter any military service in the future (including Reserves, National Guard, and Active Service)?

-- If you are not sure, give your best guess --

- 1 Yes (Answer questions "a" and "b" below)
- 2 No (Answer question "c" below)

IF "YES" --

a. How do you expect to enter?

- 1 Enlist for Active Service as a Regular
- 2 Expect to be drafted
- 3 Volunteer for induction (ask to be drafted) into Active Service
- 4 Enlist in a Reserve, the National Guard or the Air National Guard
- 5 Enter Active Service in officer's training or with an officer's commission

b. Which branch of Active Service are you likely to enter?

(Mark in column (a) the branch you are MOST likely to enter, and in column (b) the one you are NEXT MOST likely to enter.)

	MOST likely (a)	NEXT MOST likely (b)
Army	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
Air Force	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
Navy	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Marine Corps	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
Coast Guard	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

IF "NO" --

c. Why do you expect you will not enter?

- 1 Deferment or exemption because of family responsibilities, job, religion, or school
- 2 Already failed to pass physical or written test (or both)
- 3 Expect to fail physical or written test (or both)
- 4 Do not believe I will be called - the draft will stop before it reaches me
- 5 Do not believe I will be called - even if the draft continues
- 6 Over age 26 and not yet drafted

34. Think for a moment about the kind of work you would probably do if you volunteered for active military service in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. How would it compare with your **PRESENT, FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB?**

-- If you do not have a full-time civilian job right now, answer in terms of the next one you plan to get --

-- Consider EACH statement separately --

		Mark ONE box for EACH statement		
		Military better	No difference	Civilian better
1. Pay	1	2	3	
2. Chances for advancement	1	2	3	
3. Steady, secure work	1	2	3	
4. Interesting work	1	2	3	
5. Retirement plan, medical plan, and fringe benefits	1	2	3	
6. Chances for further training and learning job skills	1	2	3	
7. Highly respected job	1	2	3	
8. Freedom to do the job the way I think is best	1	2	3	
9. Chance to be a leader	1	2	3	

35. Aside from pay and retirement benefits, how would you probably feel about **SERVICE LIFE**, that is, the way a person lives and works in the Armed Forces?

I would probably --

- 1 Like it very much.
- 2 Like it somewhat.
- 3 Dislike it somewhat.
- 4 Dislike it very much.
- 5 I have no opinion about this.

36. Have you ever joined a Reserve or National Guard organization (even for a short time)?

-- If you have been in more than one of these, mark the **FIRST ONE** you joined --

- x Never joined a Reserve or National Guard organization -- (SKIP TO QUESTION 43)
- 1 Army Reserve
- 2 Army National Guard
- 3 Air Force Reserve
- 4 Air National Guard
- 5 Navy Reserve
- 6 Marine Corps Reserve
- 7 Coast Guard Reserve

37. How old were you when you **FIRST** joined the Reserve or Guard organization you marked in question 36?

_____ (age)

38. Are you now in the same Reserve or Guard organization you marked in question 36?

- 1 Yes -- in the same organization
- 2 No -- in a **DIFFERENT** Reserve or Guard organization now
- 3 No -- **NOT IN ANY** Reserve or Guard organization now

39. Were you **EVER** on Active Duty for Training for a period of two or more **MONTHS?**

- 1 Yes -- GO TO QUESTION 40
- 2 No -- SKIP TO QUESTION 41

40. How many months of such Active Duty for Training did you serve?

_____ (months)

41. Has an employer ever told you he could not keep you or promote you because of your Reserve obligations?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

42. a. What is your Serial Number for your latest Reserve or National Guard service?

_____ (Serial Number)

b. What Reserve or National Guard organization gave you this number?

c. What was the date of your last separation from this Reserve or National Guard organization?

_____ (month and year)

OR x Now in a Reserve or Guard organization

IF YOU ARE NOW IN A
RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION,
SKIP QUESTIONS 43 AND 44



THIS COMPLETES THE QUESTIONNAIRE

43. Which statement below best explains why you are NOT NOW IN a Reserve or National Guard organization?

- 1 My community does not have the kind of unit I should be in
- 2 It would interfere with my family responsibilities
- 3 Applied but was not accepted
- 4 Not interested or never considered it
- 5 Completed my military service on Reserve or National Guard duty
- 6 Not yet 17 years old

Please look over your answers to be sure you have not omitted any questions that applied to you. Then mail the questionnaire in the enclosed, postage-free envelope.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

44. a. Would you apply to a Reserve or National Guard unit in your community IF --

-- Consider EACH statement separately --

Mark ONE box for EACH statement		
Yes	Maybe	No
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	2	3
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- 1. If drill status pay was AS MUCH AS YOUR DAILY EARNINGS in civilian work? . .
- 2. If drill status pay was QUITE A BIT MORE than your daily earnings in civilian work? . . .
- 3. If you would get a \$100 BONUS PER YEAR for each year of Reserve or Guard service? . . .
- 4. If you were promised TRAINING IN A SKILL useful in civilian work?
- 5. If you could be COMMISSIONED AS AN OFFICER? . .

b. Which one of the conditions listed above would be MOST likely to get you to apply?

(Enter the item number of the statement.)

_____ (item number)

CONFIDENTIAL - This inquiry is authorized by Act of Congress (10 U.S.C., Sec. 133). The report you submit to the Census Bureau is confidential and may be seen only by authorized employees. It may not be used for purposes of taxation, investigation, or regulation.

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
FORM 5-30
(10-9-64)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20233
ACTING AS COLLECTING AGENT FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Budget Bureau No. 22-6402.1
Approval Expires December 31, 1964

(VETERAN QUESTIONNAIRE)

*Please correct this address
if it is not the one where you
are currently staying.*

Dear Friend:

The Census Bureau has been asked by the Department of Defense to obtain information from both veterans and non-veterans on their experiences with, and attitudes toward, military service. This information will be used as part of a study of the various ways of meeting the Nation's military manpower needs. You are one of several thousand veterans of the Armed Forces selected for inclusion in the survey.


Your answers to the questions on this form will be treated as confidential by the Bureau of the Census and the Department of Defense and will be used for statistical purposes only. We are prohibited by law from revealing your name or anything about you as an individual to any unauthorized agency, organization, or person.

Since this study is based on a sample of the population, it is important that everyone fill in and return his questionnaire. Please complete this form and mail it within five days in the enclosed envelope, which does not require postage.

If you have never been on active military service in the Armed Forces, or have not spent at least two months on active duty for training in the Reserves or National Guard, please check the box below and return this questionnaire in the enclosed envelope; we will then send you the form which applies to non-veterans.

Your cooperation in this survey will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,



Richard M. Scammon
Director
Bureau of the Census

Enclosure

I have never been on active service in the Armed Forces or spent two months on active duty for training in the Reserves or National Guard.

FOR CENSUS USE ONLY	CC 9	CC 15	CC 33		
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USCOMM-DC

1. What is the highest grade of regular school you had completed BEFORE YOU FIRST ENTERED Active Military Service?

- 1 Less than 8th grade
- 2 8th grade
- 3 9th, 10th, or 11th grade, but not a high school graduate
- 4 High school graduate
- 5 Some college, but less than two years
- 6 Two or more years of college, but no bachelor's degree
- 7 College bachelor's degree
- 8 Graduate study beyond the college bachelor's degree

2. How old were you when you STOPPED GOING TO SCHOOL FULL-TIME?

--DO NOT COUNT summertime between school years as stopping full-time school--

_____ (age)

3. What is the highest grade of regular school you have NOW COMPLETED?

--Include General Educational Development (GED) credits, as well as course work--

- 1 Less than 8th grade
- 2 8th grade
- 3 9th, 10th, or 11th grade, but not a high school graduate
- 4 High school graduate
- 5 Some college, but less than two years
- 6 Two or more years of college, but no bachelor's degree
- 7 College bachelor's degree
- 8 Graduate study beyond the college bachelor's degree

4. What best describes your study program during the last year you were in high school?

- 1 Never entered high school
- 2 College preparatory
- 3 Commercial
- 4 General
- 5 Vocational

5. Are you attending or enrolled in school now?

- 1 No
- 2 Yes - high school or less (part-time or full-time)
- 3 Yes - college or graduate study (part-time only)
- 4 Yes - college or graduate study (full-time only)

6. What is the highest level of regular school you PLAN TO COMPLETE?

- 1 No more regular schooling
- 2 Some, but less than high school graduation
- 3 Complete high school (get a diploma)
- 4 Some college, but not a bachelor's degree
- 5 Complete college (get a bachelor's degree)
- 6 Graduate study beyond the bachelor's degree

7. How old are you?

(Give your age at your last birthday.)

_____ (age)

8. Are you married now?

- x Never married (SKIP TO QUESTION 11)
- 1 Married - no children
- 2 Married - one child
- 3 Married - two children
- 4 Married - three or more children
- 5 Widowed, divorced, or separated - no children
- 6 Widowed, divorced, or separated - one or more children

NOTE: When answering this question, include all children regardless of age or dependency status.

9. How old were you when you were FIRST married?

_____ (age)

10. How old were you when your FIRST child was born?

_____ (age)

OR No children

11. In what kind of place did you live MOST of the time UP TO AGE 15 YEARS?

(Mark one box)

- 1 On a FARM or RANCH
- 2 In the COUNTRY, but NOT on a farm or ranch
- 3 In a TOWN or SMALL CITY
(less than 25,000 people)
- 4 In a CITY (25,000 or more people,
but less than 100,000)
- 5 In a LARGE CITY (100,000 or more people)
- 6 In a SUBURB of a large city

12. In what State or territory of the United States or what foreign country did you live most of the time before you were 15 years old?

13. With whom were you living when you were 15 years old?

- 1 Father and mother
- 2 Father and step-mother
- 3 Mother and step-father
- 4 Father
- 5 Mother
- 6 Some other adult MALE relative (Specify)

7 Some other arrangement (Describe)

8 On my own

14. Describe your father's usual kind of work DURING THE TIME YOU WERE 15 YEARS OLD.

--If you did not live with him at that age, describe the work of the male head of the household (not yourself) where you lived at age 15--

x Did not live with father at age 15 and there was no male head of the household. } (SKIP TO QUESTION 16)

a. What kind of work was he doing?

(Include name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

b. What kind of business or industry was this?

(For example, county junior high school, auto assembly plant, TV and radio service, retail supermarket, road construction, farm, etc.)

15. What was the highest grade of school completed by your father (or male head of the household referred to in question 14)?

--If you are not sure, give your best guess--

- 1 8th grade or less
- 2 9th, 10th, or 11th grade, but not a high school graduate
- 3 High school graduate
- 4 Some college, but no bachelor's degree
- 5 College graduate (bachelor's degree)
- 6 Graduate study beyond the bachelor's degree

16. Which THREE items below would be MOST important to you in choosing a job or career, ASIDE FROM ANY OTHER THINGS important to you?

- 1. Chances for further training and learning job skills
- 2. Retirement plans, medical plans, fringe benefits
- 3. Chances for advancement
- 4. Steady, secure work
- 5. Interesting work
- 6. Pay
- 7. Highly respected job
- 8. Freedom to do the job the way I think best
- 9. Chances to be a leader

(Enter the item number of the statement in the appropriate box to show "Most important," "2nd most important," and "3rd most important.")

Most important	2nd most important	3rd most important

17. If you were looking for a NEW, FULL-TIME, CIVILIAN JOB TODAY, how good a job do you think you could get?

- 1 I could get a very good job
- 2 I could get a satisfactory job
- 3 I would have trouble finding a satisfactory job
- 4 I do not know

18. How many different civilian employers have you ever worked for, counting only full-time jobs?

--DO NOT COUNT military service, part-time jobs, or summer jobs between school years--

- 1 None - never had a full-time, civilian job
- 2 One employer
- 3 Two or three employers
- 4 Four or five employers
- 5 Six or more employers

19. Have you ever been out of work and **LOOKING FOR WORK** for a **MONTH OR MORE**, since you stopped going to school full time?

- 1 Never
- 2 One time
- 3 Two times
- 4 Three times or more

20. Do you have a job or business at the present time (including part-time work)?

- x Never had a job (SKIP TO QUESTION 21)
 - 1 Yes (Describe this job below)
 - 2 No - looking for work or on layoff
 - 3 No - not looking for work
- } (Describe the last job you had)

a. What kind of work are you doing?

(Include the name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

b. What kind of business or industry is this?

(For example, county junior high school, auto assembly plant, TV and radio service, retail super-market, road construction, farm, etc.)

c. Do you usually work part time or full time on this job?

- 1 Part time
- 2 Full time or more

d. Give your usual **WEEKLY** earnings on this job before taxes and other deductions.

\$ _____ .00 (weekly earnings)

e. Give the length of time you worked on this job.

- 1 Less than six months
- 2 Six months or more, but less than one year
- 3 One year or more, but less than three years
- 4 Three years or more, but less than five years
- 5 Five years or more

f. Describe your feelings about this job.

- 1 Extremely satisfied
- 2 Somewhat satisfied
- 3 Somewhat dissatisfied
- 4 Extremely dissatisfied

21. What do you expect to earn from work at all jobs, businesses, or professions during 1964, before taxes and other deductions?

--Include any military service pay and allowances--

- 1 Nothing
- 2 Less than \$1,000
- 3 \$1,000 to \$2,999
- 4 \$3,000 to \$4,999
- 5 \$5,000 to \$7,499
- 6 \$7,500 to \$9,999
- 7 \$10,000 to \$14,999
- 8 \$15,000 or more

22. After you stopped going to school full time, WHICH **CAME FIRST**, Active Military Service or a full-time, civilian job?

- 1 Active Military Service first
- 2 Full-time, civilian job first

23. How many months after you **STOPPED FULL-TIME SCHOOL** did you enter Active Service or get a full-time, civilian job (whichever came first)?

_____ (months)

24. Describe the **FIRST, FULL-TIME, CIVILIAN JOB** you had **AFTER** you stopped going to school.

--DO NOT COUNT summer jobs between school years--

- x Went on Active duty before having a full-time job
 - 1 Same as job in question 20
- } (SKIP TO QUESTION 25)

OR

a. What kind of work were you doing?

(Include the name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

b. What kind of business or industry was this?

(For example, county junior high school, auto assembly plant, TV and radio service, retail super-market, road construction, farm, etc.)

c. Give your usual **WEEKLY** earnings on this job before taxes and other deductions.

\$ _____ .00 (weekly earnings)

25. Do you have a pretty good idea what sort of work you will be doing when you are about 40 years old?

- 1 Yes
- x No (SKIP TO QUESTION 26)

IF "YES" --

a. What kind of work would this be?

(Try to include name of job, such as 8th grade English teacher, paint sprayer, TV repair, grocery checker, civil engineer, farm hand, etc.)

30. Aside from pay and retirement benefits, how do you feel about SERVICE LIFE, that is, the way a person lives and works in the Armed Forces?

- 1 I like it very much
- 2 I like it somewhat
- 3 I dislike it somewhat
- 4 I dislike it very much

26. Up to 26 years of age, many young men do not know whether they will be drafted or not. Has this UNCERTAINTY ever caused any difficulties for you?

- 1 No difficulties
- 2 Yes -- minor difficulties
- 3 Yes -- serious difficulties

31. Have you ever seriously considered going back into Active Service?

- 1 Yes -- often
- 2 Yes -- sometimes
- 3 No

27. Have you ever been told by an employer or an employment office that you could not be hired because you might be drafted?

- 1 No
- 2 Yes -- once
- 3 Yes -- more than one time

28. In your opinion, is the present system of Selective Service (the Draft) --

- 1 Very fair?
- 2 Reasonably fair?
- 3 Somewhat unfair?
- 4 Very unfair?
- 5 I have no opinion.

29. If there had been no draft and you had not had any military obligation at the time you first entered Active Military Service, do you think you would have entered the service?

- 1 Yes -- definitely would have entered service
- 2 Yes -- probably would have entered service
- 3 No -- probably would not have entered service
- 4 No -- definitely would not have entered service
- 5 I have no idea what I would have done

32. Based on the Military Service you have seen, how does military work compare with your PRESENT, FULL-TIME, CIVILIAN JOB?

--If you do not have a full-time, civilian job now, answer in terms of the next one you plan to get--

--Consider EACH statement separately--

	Mark ONE box for EACH statement		
	Military Better	No Difference	Civilian Better
	1	2	3
1. Pay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Chances for advancement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Steady, secure work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Interesting work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Retirement plan, medical plan, and fringe benefits	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Chances for further training and learning job skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Highly respected job	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Freedom to do the job the way I think best	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Chances to be a leader	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

33. When did you **FIRST** enter Active Military Service?

_____ (month and year)

34. How old were you when you **FIRST** entered Active Military Service?

_____ (age)

35. How did you make your **FIRST** entry into Active Military Service?

- 1 Enlisted for Active Service as a Regular
- 2 Entered as a draftee
- 3 Volunteered for induction (asked to be drafted)
- 4 Entered after enlisting for two years of Active Duty as a Reservist
- 5 Enlisted in Reserve or National Guard for a few months of Active Duty for Training
- 6 Involuntarily called to Active Duty from Reserve or National Guard by Presidential Order or Act of Congress
- 7 Entered as a Commissioned Officer after completing a Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC, PLC, etc.)
- 8 Entered as an Officer Candidate (OCS, OTS, Aviation Cadet, etc.)
- 9 Entered under other Commissioned Officer Programs (Service Academy, direct appointment, etc.)

36. As best as you can remember, what was the **MOST** important reason for your first entry into Active Military Service?

(Mark ONE box)

- 1 Career opportunities looked better than in civilian life
 - 2 For the travel, excitement, new experiences
 - 3 To become more mature and self-reliant
 - 4 To learn a trade or skill that would be valuable in civilian life
 - 5 Such things as aircraft, guns, ships, rockets interested me
 - 6 Wanted my choice of service rather than to be drafted
 - 7 To serve my country
 - 8 To fulfill my military obligation at a time of my choice
 - 9 Opportunity for advanced education, professional training
 - 10 Wanted to leave some personal problems behind me
 - 11 Had a chance at Officer's Commission instead of being drafted
 - 12 I was drafted or called, and had no choice
 - 13 None of the above (Specify)
- _____

37. When you **FIRST** entered Active Military Service, which service did you enter?

- 1 Army
- 2 Navy
- 3 Air Force (includes Army Air Corps before 1948)
- 4 Marine Corps
- 5 Coast Guard

38. How long were you obligated to serve during your **FIRST** tour of Active Military Service?

(Mark ONE box)

- 2 1 year or less
- 3 2 years
- 4 3 years
- 5 4 years
- 6 5 years or longer
- 7 Indefinite tour

39. Did you ever re-enlist, or contract for a period of Active Military Service **BEYOND** your original obligation?

--Exclude brief extensions of tour--

- 1 No - served only one tour of duty
- 2 Yes - agreed to serve beyond my original obligation

40. What is the total number of months of Active Military Service you have served?

--If less than one month, write "1"--

_____ (months)

41. In which grades have you served on Active Service?

- 1 Commissioned or Warrant Officer grades ONLY
- 2 Enlisted grades ONLY
- 3 BOTH Enlisted AND Commissioned or Warrant Officer grades

42. Compared with most men who were in your branch of the service as long as you were, did you reach --

- 1 a higher rank than most?
- 2 about the same rank as most?
- 3 a lower rank than most?

43. a. What was your pay grade at the time of your last separation from Active Military Service (for example, O-3, W-2, E-4, etc.)?

b. What was your rank title at that time (for example, Major, Chief Warrant Officer, Petty Officer, 3rd Class, etc.)?

44. Listed below are some conditions of military service life which some servicemen find to be hardships. Indicate to what extent each bothered you while on Active Military Service or Duty.

--Consider EACH statement separately--

	Mark ONE box for EACH statement		
	Bothered me a lot	Bothered me a little	Didn't bother me at all
1. Being away from my family so much	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Strict discipline	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Having to live in unpleasant places	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Lack of free choice in assignments	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Frequent moves	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

45. How much use is your military work experience or skill training on your current job?

- 1 Considerable use
 2 Some use
 3 No use at all

46. a. While you were on Active Military Service or Duty, what military occupation did you have for the longest time?
 (Enter specialty title, or rating, or officer designator.)

b. What was the specialty code number of this occupation?

47. How old were you when you last separated from Active Military Service or Duty?

--DO NOT COUNT Reserves, National Guard, etc., after Active Service--

_____(age)

48. What was the date of this last separation from Active Service?

_____(month and year)

49. a. Enter your Military Service Serial Number.

--If you have had more than one Serial Number, give the number you had at the time of the separation reported in question 48--

_____(serial number)

b. Enter the name of the service which assigned this number to you; such as, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or one of the Reserve or National Guard organizations.

50. When you left Active Military Service or Duty, did you have a reserve obligation outstanding?

- 1 Yes - 1 year
 2 Yes - 2 years
 3 Yes - 3 years
 4 Yes - 4 years or more
 5 No
 6 I do not remember

51. Did you ever join a Reserve or National Guard organization (even for a short time) BEFORE you entered Active Military Service?

--DO NOT include college ROTC--

(Mark the FIRST ONE you joined)

- 1 Army Reserve
 2 Army National Guard
 3 Air Force Reserve
 4 Air National Guard
 5 Navy Reserve
 6 Marine Corps Reserve
 7 Coast Guard Reserve
 8 I never joined a Reserve or National Guard organization BEFORE I entered Active Military Service

52. AFTER you left Active Military Service, were you ever a member of the Reserves or National Guard?

(Mark the FIRST ONE in which you were a member)

- 1 Army Reserve
 2 Army National Guard
 3 Air Force Reserve
 4 Air National Guard
 5 Navy Reserve
 6 Marine Corps Reserve
 7 Coast Guard Reserve
 8 I never joined a Reserve or National Guard unit AFTER I left Active Military Service

NOTE - If you were NEVER a member of a Reserve or Guard organization, either before or after Active Military Service, skip to question 60.

52. At what age did you **FIRST** join a Reserve or Guard organization?
 _____ (years)

54. After you left Active Military Service, did you participate in paid drill or in paid active duty training in any of the Reserves or National Guard?
 1 Yes
 2 No (SKIP TO QUESTION 55)
IF "YES"
 a. How many years?
 _____ (years)

55. Indicate the total number of years of both Active and Reserve service you have had.
 --Include all periods when you were enrolled in a Reserve or National Guard organization, as well as active duty periods--
 _____ (years)

56. Are you **NOW** in the same Reserve or National Guard organization which you **FIRST** entered?
 1 Yes - the **SAME** Reserve or Guard organization
 2 No - a **DIFFERENT** Reserve or Guard organization now
 3 No - **NOT IN ANY** Reserve or Guard organization now

57. Were you ever on Active Duty for Training for a continuous period of two or more months?
 1 Yes
 2 No

58. How many months of such Active Duty for Training did you **SERVE**?
 --If none, enter "0"--
 _____ (months)

59. Has an employer ever told you that he could not keep you or promote you because of your Reserve obligations?
 1 Yes
 2 No

IF YOU ARE NOW IN A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, SKIP QUESTIONS 60 AND 61 

60. Which statement below best explains why you are **NOT NOW IN** a Reserve or National Guard organization?
 1 My community does not have the kind of unit I should be in
 2 It would conflict with my civilian job hours
 3 It would interfere with family or job responsibilities
 4 Applied but was not accepted
 5 Not interested or never considered it
 6 Completed my military service obligation

61. a. Would you apply to a Reserve or National Guard unit in your community **IF --**
 --Consider EACH statement separately--

	Mark ONE box for EACH statement		
	Yes	Maybe	No
1. If drill status pay was AS MUCH AS YOUR DAILY EARNINGS in civilian work?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. If drill status pay was QUITE A BIT MORE than your daily earnings in civilian work?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. If you would get a \$100 BONUS PER YEAR for each year of Reserve or Guard service?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. If you were promised TRAINING IN A SKILL useful in civilian work?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. If you could get COMMISSIONED AS AN OFFICER ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

b. Which one of the conditions listed above would be **MOST** likely to get you to apply?
 (Enter the item number of the statement)
 _____ (item number)

THIS COMPLETES THE QUESTIONNAIRE
 Please look over your answers to be sure you have not omitted any questions that applied to you. Then mail the questionnaire in the enclosed, postage-free envelope.
 Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

**ITEM EXCERPTS OF TWO QUESTIONNAIRES FOR ACTIVE SERVICE
OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN**

These items have no equivalent in the questionnaire for veterans. Items excerpted are identical for officers and enlisted men, unless otherwise indicated.

35. Do you intend to remain in service until you are eligible to retire with pay? Mark one box

Yes..... 1
 No..... 2
 Undecided..... 3

37. Do you know what kind of job you could get if you left military service? Mark one box

Yes, I know exactly what sort of work I could get..... 1
 Yes, I have a rough idea..... 2
 No, I don't have any idea what kind of work I could get..... 3

38. A. Where is your current assignment? Mark one box

In the continental United States..... 1
 "Short Tour Area," not in the continental United States..... 2
 "Normal Tour Area," not in the continental United States..... 3

B. If you are in the Navy or Marine Corps, are you on sea duty? Mark one box

I am not in the Navy or Marine Corps..... 1
 I am not on Sea Duty, but I am in the Navy or Marine Corps..... 2
 I am on Sea Duty with the Navy or Marine Corps..... 3

51. Have you completed service school training of four weeks or more to qualify you for your principal military occupation? Mark one box

No (none, or less than four weeks)..... 1
 Yes, four weeks or more, but less than sixteen weeks..... 2
 Yes, sixteen weeks or more, but less than six months..... 3
 Yes, six months or more, but less than twelve months..... 4
 Yes, twelve months or more..... 5

52. Are you currently attending a Service School? Mark one box

Yes..... 1
 No..... 2

53. What is the DOD Military Occupational Group which best describes your present duty position (or the duty position for which you are currently being trained)? From the list on page 10 of this questionnaire, write in the box below the DOD code of the most appropriate Military Occupational Group.

54. Have you completed Service School training of four weeks or more to qualify you for your present duty position?

Mark one box

- Doesn't apply, I am currently in training at a Service School..... 1
- No (none, or less than four weeks)..... 2
- Yes, four weeks or more, but less than sixteen weeks..... 3
- Yes, sixteen weeks or more, but less than six months..... 4
- Yes, six months or more, but less than twelve months..... 5
- Yes, twelve months or more..... 6

55. On the whole, how do you feel about your present duty position (or the duty position for which you are currently being trained)?

Mark one box

- Extremely satisfied..... 1
- Somewhat satisfied..... 2
- Somewhat dissatisfied..... 3
- Extremely dissatisfied..... 4

56. Have you changed your duty position within the last twelve months?

- No.....
- Yes.....

If NO, enter 9A.

If YES, enter from page 10 the DOD code of the military occupational group which best describes the duty position you held before your last change.

--	--

58. If you were to leave the Service in the next few months, how much money do you think you could earn in your first year of civilian work?

Mark one box

- Less than \$1,000..... 1
- \$1,000-\$2,999..... 2
- \$3,000-\$4,999..... 3
- \$5,000-\$7,499..... 4
- \$7,500-\$9,999..... 5
- \$10,000-\$14,999..... 6
- \$15,000-\$24,999..... 7
- \$25,000 or more..... 8
- I have no idea what I could earn..... 9

59. A. What is your present active duty pay grade? ENLISTED MEN:

Mark one box

OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE

Warrant Officers

- W-4..... A
- W-3..... B
- W-2..... C
- W-1..... D

Commissioned Officers

- O-6..... 6
- O-5..... 5
- O-4..... 4
- O-3..... 3
- O-2..... 2
- O-1..... 1

- E-9..... 9
- E-8..... 8
- E-7..... 7
- E-6..... 6
- E-5..... 5
- E-4..... 4
- E-3..... 3
- E-2..... 2
- E-1..... 1

59. B. If you were in the service on 31 October 1963 what was your active duty pay grade?

Mark one box

- I was not on Active Duty 31 October 63. A
 I was a commissioned or warrant officer on 31 October 63. B
 My grade at that time was: (ENLISTED MEN)

OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE

Warrant Officers

Commissioned Officers

- | | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------|----------------------------|----------|----------------------------|
| W-4..... | <input type="checkbox"/> A | O-6..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 | E-9..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 9 |
| W-3..... | <input type="checkbox"/> B | O-5..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 | E-8..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 8 |
| W-2..... | <input type="checkbox"/> C | O-4..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | E-7..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 7 |
| W-1..... | <input type="checkbox"/> D | O-3..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | E-6..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 |
| An Enlisted Grade..... | <input type="checkbox"/> E | O-2..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | E-5..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| | | O-1..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | E-4..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 |
| | | | | E-3..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 |
| | | | | E-2..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 |
| | | | | E-1..... | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 |

60. How many months do you have remaining until the end of your present tour of active duty?
 Write the number of months in the box. If you have agreed to serve indefinitely, write number of months until you plan to retire, resign, or request relief from active duty.

	months
--	--------

OFFICERS

61. After you finish your present tour of Active Duty, do you intend to sign up for additional Active Military Service?

Mark one box

- Yes, I am on indefinite tour now, and intend to remain on Active Duty until retired or involuntarily relieved. 1
 Yes, I am on an obligated tour and I intend to remain on active duty. 2
IF YOU MARKED ONE OF THE ABOVE ANSWERS, GO ON TO QUESTION 63
 No, I intend to resign my commission. 3
 No, I intend to leave Active Duty at the end of my obligated tour. 4
 I am undecided. 5

IF YOU MARKED ONE OF THE LAST THREE ANSWERS, PLEASE CONTINUE WITH THE NEXT QUESTION.

ENLISTED MEN

61. After you finish your present tour of Active Military Service do you intend to sign up for additional Active Military Service?

Mark one box

- Yes, I intend to enlist or reenlist for another tour of duty. 1
IF YOU MARKED THE ABOVE ANSWER, GO ON TO QUESTION 63
 No, I intend to retire after my present tour of duty. 2
 No, I intend to separate at the end of my present tour of duty. 3
 I am undecided. 4

IF YOU MARKED ONE OF THE LAST THREE ANSWERS PLEASE CONTINUE WITH THE NEXT QUESTION.

Enlisted Personnel
Use Most Appropriate DOD Code Below for Responses to
Questions 50, 53, and 56

DOD
CODE

Military Occupational Group

Infantry, Gun Crews and Allied Specialists

- 01 **Infantry** (Includes light and heavy weapons infantrymen, related weapons specialists, ground reconnaissance men and basic military training instructors.)
- 02 **Armor and Amphibious** (Includes land and amphibious tank crews and leaders; Boatswain's Mate CB (Amphibious))
- 03 **Combat Engineering** (Includes hasty and temporary construction of forward area airfields, roads and bridges, demolition, field illumination and chemical warfare.)
- 04 **Artillery, Gunnery and Rockets** (Includes conventional field, anti-air and shipboard guns and artillery, rockets and small missiles.)
- 05 **Combat Air Crew** (Includes enlisted pilots and navigators, flight engineers, and flight crew ordnancemen.)

Electronic Equipment Repairmen

- 10 **Radio/Radar** (Includes fixed and mobile radio, electronic communication gear, navigation and countermeasure equipment and surveillance, air traffic and tracking radar.)
- 11 **Fire Control Electronic Systems (Non-Missile)** (Includes maintenance and repair of electronic fire control and bomb navigation equipment, excluding missile and underwater fire control equipment.)
- 12 **Missile Guidance, Control and Checkout** (Includes electronic and electrical missile and torpedo systems and components, including guidance, control and checkout equipment for both guided and ballistic missiles.)
- 13 **Sonar Equipment** (Includes underwater detection and fire control systems, oceanographic and mine detection equipment, and related anti-submarine electronic gear.)
- 14 **Nuclear Weapons Equipment** (Includes nuclear weapons control and test equipment.)
- 15 **ADP Computers**
- 16 **Teletype and Cryptographic Equipment**
- 19 **Other Electronic Equipment** (Includes electronic instruments, training devices, medical equipment, television, electronic photographic controls, infra-red devices, and other electronic sensing and control equipment.)

Communications and Intelligence Specialists

- 20 **Radio and Radio Code** (Includes operation of radio, CW equipment, radio teletype and visual communication equipment.)
- 21 **Sonar** (Includes operation of sonar and related detection equipment.)
- 22 **Radar and Air Traffic Control** (Includes operation of surveillance, target acquisition and tracking radars, fire distribution devices, and air traffic control visual and electronic navigational aids.)
- 23 **Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare** (Includes intercept, translation and analysis of foreign communications, and electronic countermeasure equipment operation.)
- 24 **Military Intelligence** (Includes gathering, receipt and analysis of intelligence data, prisoner interrogation, image interpretation, and counterintelligence and investigational activities.)
- 25 **Combat Operations Control** (Includes forward area tactical operations and intelligence, combat information center and command post control activities.)

Medical and Dental Specialists

- 30 **Medical Care** (Includes all medical care and treatment excluding dental.)
- 31 **Technical Medical Services** (Includes pharmaceutical, laboratory, X-ray and diagnostic test services.)
- 32 **Related Medical Services** (Includes sanitation, health preservation and veterinary services, and preventive medicine services.)
- 33 **Dental Care** (Includes dental care and treatment and related technical and laboratory services.)

Other Technical and Allied Specialists

- 40 **Photography** (Includes still, motion and television cameramen, precision photographic processing, editing and sound synchronization.)
- 41 **Drafting, Surveying and Mapping** (Includes drafting, illustrating, photomapping, map compiling, and construction and topographic surveying and computing.)
- 42 **Weather** (Includes observation, recording, reporting and collection of weather and sea condition data and weather forecasting.)
- 43 **Ordnance Disposal and Diving** (Includes excavation and rendering safe of explosive ordnance, chemical and nuclear agents, underwater demolition and diving.)
- 44 **Scientific and Engineering Aides** (Includes professional, college-graduate level assistance to physical and biological scientists and engineers.)
- 45 **Musicians**
- 49 **Technical Specialists, NEC** (Includes physical laboratory analysts; nuclear, biological and chemical warfare specialists; safety specialists; and memorial activities.)

Administrative Specialists and Clerks

- 50 **Personnel** (Includes personnel administration, personnel and manpower management, recruiting and personnel testing.)
- 51 **Administration** (Includes stenography; legal, and medical records; transportation; postal; aviation maintenance; flight operations; and administrative personnel and clerks, N.E.C.)
- 52 **Clerical Personnel** (Includes non-technical First Sergeants and Sergeants Major and a combined personnel management and administrative clerk in Marine Corps units.)
- 53 **Data Processing** (Includes EAM and ADP equipment operators and programmers.)
- 54 **Accounting, Finance and Disbursing**
- 55 **Supply and Logistics** (Includes supply accounting, stock control, requisitioning and related activities.)
- 56 **Religious, Morale and Welfare**
- 57 **Information and Education**
- 58 **Communications Center Operations** (Includes receipt and distribution of messages, the operation of communications center equipment, and setting up and administering of major field communications systems.)

Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen

- 60 **Aircraft** (Includes aircraft powerplants, electrical systems, structural components and surfaces, and related instruments and accessories.)
- 61 **Automotive** (Includes wheel and track vehicles and components and related construction equipment.)
- 62 **Wire Communications** (Includes installation and maintenance of telephones, switchboards, and central office and related interior communications equipment.)
- 63 **Missile Mechanical and Electrical** (Includes missile propulsion and structures, and missile mechanical, electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic systems and components.)
- 64 **Armament and Munitions** (Includes small arms, artillery, mines, bombs and associated mountings, and ammunition renovation.)
- 65 **Shipboard Propulsion** (Includes marine and rail main engines, boilers and auxiliary equipment.)
- 66 **Power Generating Equipment** (Includes nuclear power reactors and primary electric generating plants.)
- 67 **Precision Equipment** (Includes optical, mechanical and electrical instruments, office machines, and non-electronic photographic, dental and topographic equipment.)
- 68 **Aircraft Launch Equipment** (Includes operation, maintenance and repair of aircraft catapult and arresting gear and related equipment.)
- 69 **Other Mechanical and Electrical Equipment** (Includes materials, handling, reproduction, chemical warfare and other mechanical and electrical equipment maintenance, N.E.C.)

Craftsmen

- 70 **Metalworking** (Includes machining, shaping and forming of metal and fabrication of metal parts.)
- 71 **Construction** (Includes construction trades and pipeline construction and operation.)
- 72 **Utilities** (Includes plumbing, heating, air conditioning, water supply and sanitation, electric wiring, power distribution and related trades.)
- 73 **Construction Equipment Operation** (Includes construction machines, power tools, cranes, quarry equipment, and asphalt and concrete equipment operators.)
- 74 **Lithography** (Includes making of printing plates, composing, and operation of offset and letter presses.)
- 75 **Industrial Gas and Fuel Production** (Includes production of liquid oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and carbon dioxide.)
- 76 **Fabric, Leather and Rubber Repair**
- 77 **Marine Operating Crafts** (Includes Boatswain's Mates, Quartermasters and related ship operating crafts.)
- 78 **Firefighting and Damage Control** (Includes firefighting, damage control and rescue and survival activities.)
- 79 **Other Craftsmen, NEC** (Includes modelmaking, molding, camouflage, and other crafts not elsewhere classified.)

Service and Supply Handlers

- 80 **Food Service** (Includes handling, preparation and serving of food.)
- 81 **Motor Transport** (Includes operation of wheel and track vehicles, railway equipment and small boats for general transport purposes; aerial and parachute delivery operations.)
- 82 **Material Receipt, Storage and Issue** (Includes receipt, storage, issue and shipment of both general and specialized classes of supplies, excluding ammunition.)
- 83 **Military Police** (Includes protective and custodial services, military police and criminal investigation.)
- 84 **Personal Service** (Includes laundry, dry cleaning, and related services.)
- 85 **Auxiliary Labor** (Includes unskilled labor and unskilled labor supervisors.)
- 86 **Forward Area Equipment Support** (Includes parachute packing and repair, aerial delivery operations and flight equipment fitting and maintenance.)

Not Applicable

- 99 Individuals not, as yet, assigned a primary MOS/Rating/AFSC.

Commissioned and Warrant Officers
Use Most Appropriate DOD Code Below for Responses to
Questions 50, 53, and 56

DOD
CODE

Military Occupational Group

General Officers and Executives, N.E.C.: Includes commanders, directors, and planners not elsewhere classified.

1A General and Flag

1B Executives, N.E.C.

Tactical Operations Officers: Includes pilots and crews and operations staff officers.

2A Fixed-Wing Fighter and Bomber Pilots

2B Other Fixed-Wing Pilots

2C Helicopter Pilots

2D Aircraft Crews

2E Ground and Naval Arms

2F Missiles

2G Operations Staff

Intelligence Officers: Includes strategic, general, communications and counterintelligence officers.

3A Military Intelligence

3B Communications Intelligence

3C Counterintelligence

Engineering and Maintenance Officers: Includes design, development, production and maintenance engineering officers.

4A Construction and Utilities

4B Electrical/Electronic

4C Communications and Radar

4D Aviation Maintenance and Allied

4E Ordnance

4F Missile Maintenance

4G Ship Construction and Maintenance

4H Ship Machinery

4K Chemical

4L Automotive and Allied

4M Surveying and Mapping

4N Other Engineering and Maintenance

Scientists and professionals: Includes physical, biological and social scientists, and lawyers, chaplains and other professionals, N.E.C.

5A Physical and Mathematical Scientists

5B Meteorologists

5C Biological Scientists

5D Social Scientists

5E Psychologists

5F Lawyers

5G Chaplains

5H Social Workers

5K Educators and Instructors

5L Research and Development Coordinators

Medical Officers: Includes medical doctors, dentists, nurses, veterinarians and closely allied professional medical service officers.

- 6A General Medical
- 6B Medical Specialists
- 6C General Dental
- 6D Dental Specialists
- 6E General Nurses
- 6F Nursing Specialists
- 6G Veterinarians
- 6H Allied Medical

Administrators: Includes general and specialized administration and management officers.

- 7A Administrators, General
- 7B Training Administrators
- 7C Manpower and Personnel
- 7D Comptrollers and Fiscal
- 7E Data Processing and Statistics
- 7F Pictorial
- 7G Information
- 7H Police
- 7K Safety
- 7L Medical Administrators
- 7N Other Administrators

Supply, Procurement and Allied Officers: Includes officers in supply, procurement and production, transportation, food service, and related logistic activities not elsewhere classified.

- 8A Logistics, General
- 8B Supply
- 8C Transportation
- 8D Procurement and Production
- 8E Food Service
- 8F Exchange
- 8G Other Supply or Procurement

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