A CASE STUDY OF FAILURE IN ATTEMPTED METROPOLITAN INTEGRATION: Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

by

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PREFACE

This report arises out of a research program being conducted by the National Opinion Research Center and the Social Sciences Division of the University of Chicago on "Problems of Metropolitan Living." The program is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, and is under the study direction of Donald J. Bogue.

The problem of metropolitan political reorganization is one of the major tasks facing our growing urbanized areas today. Few of our major cities have changed their political boundaries significantly since early in this century despite the tremendous growth in urban population and the spread of city life into their surrounding hinterlands. The integration of local government within metropolitan areas is resisted by officials and voters both within and outside our central cities. Hence one of the major concerns of this joint research program at the University of Chicago has been with the sources of resistance in citizens and officials. Professors Morton Grodzins and Donald Bogue have been developing a study of this topic to be conducted in the Chicago metropolitan area.

To enter upon a new area of research often requires some preliminary excursions. To this end, it was decided to do a post mortem on a campaign for metropolitan integration which had failed. We were fortunate in being able to have as our research worker Daniel J. Elazar, then an advanced graduate student in the department of Political Science.

Mr. Elazar spent several weeks in Nashville picking up the threads of the story and then some time back in Chicago analyzing his materials. Mr. Elazar's report has accomplished two objectives: first, it presents a moving picture of the campaign along with its many currents, cross currents and undercurrents; secondly, it provides leads to future researchers.

The Center is releasing this report to stimulate discussion and thinking in this important area of metropolitan life. A researcher working on his own for a

short period of time can not make as many checks on the accuracy of his materials as might be desired. If there are errors of fact or interpretation in Mr. Elazar's report, they did not arise out of a lack of research effort or from a biased viewpoint.

Much insight into the political processes surrounding metropolitan integration can be derived from Mr. Elazar's report. This is the major reason for its release. We hope also that it may help other scholars, as it has helped those working in our program, to build more definitive research designs on this important problem.

Peter H. Rossi, Director
National Opinion Research Center

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE VOTE FOR METROPOLITAN CONSOLIDATION

On June 17, 1958, the voters of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, rejected a proposed consolidation of the two governmental units into a single metropolitan government. This study analytically reviews that campaign in order to determine the reasons behind the rejection of a consolidated metropolitan government; the groups who opposed it; the reasons, both overt and covert, for their opposition; and the methods the opposition groups used in their effort to defeat it. From this case study of failure in attempted metropolitan integration, it is hoped to extract some generalizations concerning the resistances to integration which can be submitted to more formal test by later research.

The proposed charter provided for the amalgamation of the city and county under one government with a strong mayor, a system like that which had been in effect in Nashville for some time.[1] Though the proposed charter received a favorable vote in Nashville proper, it was rejected in the remainder of the county.

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[1]It called for the establishment of a council of twenty-one members, about one-third of the total number of representatives on the existing city and county legislative bodies combined. Six of the councilmen were to be elected at large to satisfy one element of the population, and, to satisfy another, fifteen were to be elected from roughly equal districts which were drawn up to allow for future suburban growth and to enable the Negro community to fill the two seats it already controlled on the city council. The new metropolitan government was to be divided into a metropolitan services district, consisting of the former central city and the urban areas around it that would be added as it became possible to extend urban services to them; and a general services district, embracing the remainder of the old county. Since the area of the county was so large and most of it was still rural in character, only a small portion would receive city-type services. Under the two-district arrangement, only the residents of that portion receiving urban services would have to pay for them. In addition, the four incorporated communities in the county, outside of Nashville, would have been allowed to continue their existence as corporations until each should decide to merge with the general metropolitan government, with the latter serving in place of the county until that time.

The patterns of the vote in the city and county provide an important starting point for the analysis of the charter's defeat. As shown in Table I, slightly more than one-third of the registered voters in the county as a whole participated in the referendum, defeating the charter by a margin of approximately 53 percent to 47 percent. Though the populations of the city and the remainder of the county were approximately equal, the proportion of registered voters who voted on the issue was about twice as great outside the city as within it. The voters outside the city rejected the charter by almost a three to two margin, while the city voters approved it by a slightly better margin in reverse. Since it had to be approved by the voters in both divisions counted separately, this meant that it was defeated for the area as a whole.

TABLE I

THE VOTE FOR THE METROPOLITAN CHARTER

Vote	Nashville	County Outside	Total
For	7,797	13,794	21,591
Against	4,808	19,235	24,043
Total	12,605	33,029	45,634
Percent For	61.9	41.8	47.3
Percent Against	38.5	58.2	52.7
Percent Voting	22.2	43.8	34.5

A superficial examination of these figures would seem to indicate that the defeat of the charter was a result of a division between Nashville and its suburban fringe. While it is true that the residents of the suburbs were more concerned with the issue as a group, closer study of the voting patterns reveals that support or opposition to the proposed charter was not divided along city-suburban lines, but cut across that division by neighborhoods (See Table

TABLE II

Vote in Metropolitan Government Election
by Davidson County Districts and Nashville Wards

(Circled wards and districts were carried for the charter.)

County District	For	Against	Total Vote	% For	% Against	Registered Voters	% Registered Voters Voting
1	Nashville						
2	241	890	1131	21.3	78.7	2485	45.5
3	961	2052	3013	31.9	68.1	6852	44.0
4	330	1561	1891	17.5	82.5	4009	47.2
5	117	422	539	21.7	78.3	1275	42.3
6	1354	2482	3836	35.3	64.7	9502	40.4
7	3314	1271	4585	72.3	27.7	9095	50.4
8	1394	1206	2600	53.6	46.4	6375	40.8
9	40	292	332	12.0	88.0	699	47.5
10	112	1098	1210	9.3	90.7	2381	50.8
11	563	1592	2155	26.1	73.9	5339	40.4
12	436	1312	1748	24.9	75.1	5018	34.8
13	152	576	728	20.9	79.1	1923	37.6
14	41	555	596	6.9	93.1	1299	45.9
15	2107	2635	4742	44.4	55.6	10597	44.7
16	2632	1291	3923	67.1	32.9	8550	45.9
Total	13794	19235	33029	41.8	58.2	75397	43.8

Nashville Ward	For	Against	Total Vote	% For	% Against	Registered Voters	% Registered Voters Voting
1	404	583	987	40.9	59.1	6501	15.2
2	334	412	746	44.8	55.2	5307	14.1
3	1167	608	1775	65.7	34.3	7976	22.3
4	2969	829	3798	78.2	21.8	11140	34.1
5	1088	1056	2144	50.7	49.3	11511	18.6
6	624	562	1186	52.6	47.4	5984	19.8
7	1211	758	1969	61.5	38.5	8303	23.7
Total	7797	4808	12605	61.9	38.1	56722	22.2

II). Districts and wards in both city and county were carried by both the proponents of the proposed charter and its opponents. A geographic division in the voting results can be observed. Districts 7, 8, and 16 and Wards 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, where the proposed charter carried, are all contiguous. The explanation for this geographical division can be found in the character of the wards and districts which supported or opposed metropolitan consolidation. In the process of identifying the reasons behind this geographic division, the key to the results of the election can be found. In order to do that, it would be well to examine the background of the Nashville community and the metropolitan government plan.

The Metropolitan Community[1]

To understand the whole issue, its consequences, and its outcome, it is necessary to understand something of the physical, cultural, and political environment in which it was fought out. Physically, Davidson County consists of heavily rolling terrain, structured somewhat in the fashion of an off-center bowl, with Nashville in the middle, surrounded by hills, some of which rise 500 feet above the valley floor, and bisected by the Cumberland River. The area is set on bedrock often found only inches below the surface. On one hand, this makes the hills appear formidable and divides the county into distinct and country-like sections. On the other hand, the rock hinders drainage and percolation of wastes, while raising the cost of sewer construction. The necessity for a sewer system to relieve the burden placed on the cesspools in the suburban areas was one of the major stimu-

[1]Parts of the contents of this section are to some extent speculative, based on the interviews, conversations, and documents used to prepare this study, rather than on "hard" data. The writer believes them to be accurate descriptions of Nashville and its people, nonetheless. The sociological material is based on educated estimations by people whose business it is to know their community, its various subdivisions, and trends affecting them.

lants in the attempt to establish one government for the entire urbanized area.

At the time of the campaign, Davidson County's 533 square miles and total population of 370,000 could be divided into three parts. Nashville proper covered 22.7 square miles, with a population of approximately 178,000. The urban fringe around the central city covered 130 square miles, with a population of approximately 174,000. The remaining 380 square miles of the county were rural in character and contained only about 16,000 people. The U.S. Bureau of the Census defines the entire county as the Nashville Standard Metropolitan Area.

Nashville was founded in 1784, became capital of Tennessee early in the nineteenth century, and developed into an educational center that now boasts fifteen colleges, white and Negro, within its boundaries. Nashvillians proudly call their city "the Athena of the South" and have built a full-scale replica of the Parthenon in one of their major parks to "prove" their point. It is primarily a commercial city rather than an industrial one, specializing in insurance and banking, though there is some "old" industry and some new industry coming in. Much money passes through the city, which contains the headquarters or district offices of a number of large insurance companies and other commercial firms. Union Street is the financial heart of Nashville, and "Union Street" has some of the connotations of big wealth among many Nashvillians. The city is supported by the activities of these commercial interests, which reach into a large part of the South. Industrialization as a significant force is a relatively new phenomenon in the Nashville area, though industry can be traced back to the textile mills of the late nineteenth century, and the DuPont Corporation has a good-sized establishment in the county that dates from World War I.

Local students of Nashville and its politics say that Nashville has been a very conservative community until quite recently. Nashvillians, for the most part, have felt that their way of life has been a good one and needs to be preserved rather than changed. They have not sought industry because of their fears that it would change the present order of things. Nashville has a good deal of wealth, with a great part of it concentrated in old families who have had a tradition of providing leadership in Nashville for several generations. These old families have tended to be conservative, though their intellectual and commercial orientation have kept them sufficiently alert to be able to rise to the new needs of the community.

The community as a whole is in the midst of a transition in outlook. In recent years the old conservatism has softened considerably--not because the people of Nashville suddenly became dissatisfied with their way of life, but because many of them discovered that if a community does not go forward, it goes backward. Progress in Nashville is essentially an attempt to maintain the old way of life as much as possible by giving it necessary new transfusions. In this, Nashville differs from the United States as a whole only in degree, not in kind. This acceptance of progress has continued to meet some resistance within the community and there has been a definite conflict of interest and aspirations between some of the older and newer commercial and industrial groups, whose ramifications were felt in the attempted metropolitan consolidation.

Twelve roads lead out from Nashville. For the most part, the smaller communities in Davidson County have been located along these roads in a series of accidentally concentric circles fanning out from the central city. Each road serves as the main street for one or more

of these communities and provides its major link with Nashville. These communities were founded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as commercial centers for the immediately adjacent agricultural population. The only exceptions to this pattern are the small communities that arose in the Old Hickory area northeast of Nashville as a result of the location of industry there, and a few of the very newest dormitory suburbs which have been developed in recent years to house the business and professional groups of the central city. Al except the latter group of communities had existed independently for many years before being engulfed by growing metropolitan Nashville.

These communities did not bother to incorporate. Their residents did not feel the need for municipal government since the relatively simple governmental services they demanded could be provided by the county. At the same time, many of them developed a sense of community that has persisted and even been reinforced, despite all the changes that have come about. Leaders of these communities insist that the newcomers have often carried the local community spirit even further, in their pleasure at escaping from the city.

In one part of the county, there had been virtually no such communities. South and west of Nashville the land had been divided into rather large plantations or estates, which precluded the development of communities in the early days (in contrast to the existence of yeoman farmers adjacent to, and served by, the communities in the rest of the county). When an urban fringe began to develop, these plantations were divided into smaller estates and formed the nucleus for the wealthier migrations from the city. Though these were truly new communities, they were the ones that incorporated: Belle Meade first, in 1938, and, in more recent years, Berry Hill, Oak Hills, and Forest Hills.

The type of people that moved to these new suburbs and their unincorporated fringes was different from the type that moved to the existing communities. The residents of the new suburbs are in the upper income brackets, with higher educational background, and most significant, from families previously long resident in Nashville. They tend to be Nashvillians who have moved out of the city proper to secure better living conditions but without severing their economic, social, cultural, and psychological ties with the city. Their movement has simply been an extension of the migration to better neighborhoods within the central city. They continue to be active in many ways other than economic within the city and consider themselves Nashvillians. This grouping is best described as being extensively involved in the larger community, either by necessity or by inclination and usually it is both. Hereafter, they and their counterparts in the "suburban" sections of Nashville proper will be referred to as "cosmopolitans" (see below). Whether in the suburban city or the citified suburb, these people are urbanites, oriented toward the city.

On the other hand, the residents of the older suburban and outlying towns seem to be, for the most part, of a different order. Those that know them say that either they or their parents moved into Nashville from the rural countryside primarily for economic reasons, never liked the city and its complexities, never adjusted to it, and moved out to smaller, "friendlier" communities as soon as they could manage to do so. Many of this group have passed through the full rural-urban-suburban cycle within their own lifetimes. A considerable minority seems to have moved directly from the rural countryside to the smaller communities in the urban fringe,

for the same economic and social reasons, without ever having passed through a period of city living.

In the South these people are aptly called "country people." While they may, and usually do, have economic ties to the city, their social and cultural ties are primarily to their own neighborhoods, centered around home and church. They do not consider themselves to be citizens of Nashville. Indeed, they are seeking to escape from much of what they conceive the city offers. This attitude of theirs was expressed in interview after interview, indicating that it was a potent factor in determining the outcome of the referendum. This latter grouping is best described as having a constricted involvement in the metropolitan community, with little feeling of need or desire to become involved in a community larger than their own neighborhoods. Since not all of the "country people" have been able to escape the city, by any means, this group has a corresponding element within Nashville just as do the suburban cosmopolitans. Both city and suburban "country people" will hereafter be referred to as "locals."[1]

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[1]The distinction between cosmopolitans and locals is based on differences in frame of reference rather than socio-economic class. The differences in the frames of reference of the two groupings was pointed out to me by politicians who are conscious of it in non-theoretical terms. It was accepted by well over 80% of the people I interviewed in the area. The subsequent classification of areas, neighborhoods, and communities in the county as "cosmopolitan" or "local" was made on the basis of the descriptive comments furnished by the politicians and political actives I interviewed, supplemented by demographic and other data available from the Nashville-Davidson County Joint Planning Commission. Though I believe that the end result of this classification, based on these data, is accurate, only survey research techniques can properly ascertain so in the long run.

These two groups correspond closely to the "cosmopolitan" and "local" types described in sociological theory by Tonnies, Zimmerman, Merton, Gouldner, and others.[1] They seem to be considerably more important in this case than class divisions. The overwhelming majority of the people in Davidson County identify themselves with the middle class. Economically and culturally this identification seems to be apt. This would mean that it would be necessary to use sub classes in order to begin properly to divide the voters into appropriate groupings along "class" lines. Cosmppolitans and locals, though each type is predominant at certain levels of society, can be found at all levels. Locals seem to predominate at lower class, lower middle class, and upper upper class levels (to use Lloyd Warner's terminology) while cosmopolitans seem to predominate at the middle and upper middle class and the lower upper class levels. The confusion that would result from using class terminology, as well as the exceptions that would have to be made, would, in themselves, make the use of class terminology undesirable. In addition, the

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[1]Ferdinand Tonnies, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology (Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft), translated and supplemented by Charles P. Loomis (New York: American Book Co., 1940).

Carle C. Zimmerman, The Changing Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938).

Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, rev. ed., 1957), Chap. X, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials."

Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," in Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, no's 3 and 4, January and March, 1958.

The writer came upon this distinction between "cosmopolitans" and "locals" in the course of his field research in Nashville, prior to his contact with the theoretical work done by the above-mentioned social scientists. This distinction, which he originally termed "extensively involved--constrictedly involved" seemed to be of significant validity in political research, at least at the local government level. Discussions with others who have done political research at the local government level have tended to confirm the significance of this distinction.

field research has indicated that it would be inaccurate as well.[1]

Application of the "cosmopolitan-local" distinction to the election returns by civil districts, wards, and precincts (see Appendix A) reveals the basic pattern of alignments in the referendum.

Less than one-third of the eligible population in the metropolitan area (34.5 percent of the registered voters) participated in the campaign, even to the limited extent of voting. Even fewer took an active role. The highest percentages of turnout were in the districts of a higher socio-economic level in the city and suburbs. All the suburban districts roughly classified as middle class had turnouts of above 40 percent, which probably reflects the greater concern with the issue manifested by residents in all parts of the suburban fringe. The metropolitan average was brought down by the particularly low turnout in the lower class areas, primarily in the city.

Turnout, as such, was not radically different between the cosmopolitan and the local voters, except in the city machine precincts, where no effort was made to get out the vote. Considering those who voted, fourteen wards (in the city) and districts (in the remainder of the county) were judged to be predominantly local in character in terms of the definition used in this study. Eight wards and districts were judged to be predominantly cosmopolitan, by the same criterion. (See Appendix B) The following pattern emerges in the respective voting statistics of the two groups:

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[1]This is probably most true in an overwhelmingly middle class society such as that found in the United States. There are certainly distinctions within American society that must be recognized, but, for many purposes, these are not orthodox class distinctions. The distinctions that flow from the "cosmopolitan-local" division seem to have considerable applicability in this and many other cases.

Group	Total Vote	Against Charter	Percent Against
Local (14)	23,654	16,462	69.6
Cosmopolitan (8)	21,980	7,581	34.5
Total (22)	45,634	24,043	52.7

Despite the rapid urban growth outward along the pikes, much of Davidson County is truly rural. The topography of the county and its large area make it possible to get lost in back road farm country within a few minutes drive from the heart of Nashville, without any indication that a major city is nearby. These rural folk, mostly farmers, receive only the minimum services of the county (except in agriculture, of course) and want no more than that. They seem to feel no kinship to Nashville or to suburban Nashville. It is undoubtedly true that they trade in Nashville and perhaps even shop there, but as outsiders, not as members of urban society. Unlike many of the suburban dwellers, they have no particular animosity against the city itself. They do not feel themselves close enough to it to develop such feelings. At the time of the referendum, they had no desire to become any closer either.

The Nashville metropolitan area is thus divided in two different ways. On one hand, there is the geographic division of the county into the central city, its urban fringe, and, farther away, the rural countryside. Furthermore, the first two of these divisions can also be redivided into cosmopolitan and local elements. Politically, two distinct and rather polarized area groups are formed, based on a loose socio-economic division by neighborhood, whose voting records tend to run counter to each other in virtually all recent elections. (See Appendix A)

From the first division stems suburban and rural distrust of the central city, or its symbols, a distrust that has grown for at least thirty

to fifty years and probably has its origins even further back in history than that. From the second division stem some basic economic and social conflicts that must be considered in any community. While these basic differences, reflected in the election returns, do not tell the whole story of the defeat of the metropolitan charter, they help illuminate the entire range of complex causes that emerge.

The Political Environment

At the time of the charter referendum, Davidson County had only ten governments within its boundaries: the county, the city of Nashville, four incorporated suburbs, and four special utility districts.[1] Like the majority of American counties, the county government is primarily designed to serve a rural area as an arm of the state. Even where there is the will to do so, it is difficult for the county to provide services needed in an urbanized area. Legislative power is vested in a county court comprising magistrates, also known as squires, from each of sixteen civil districts in the county and from the incorporated towns. Nashville, as the first civil district, has nineteen magistrates. Districts 2 through 16 each have two apiece, and each of the towns has one. These magistrates also serve as justices of the peace within their districts. The civil district is also the subdivision from which the constables are elected, with one chosen for each. Since most of the communities outside of the city are unincorporated, these magistrates

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[1]Since the defeat of metropolitan government, there has been one further incorporation in the county. The community of Goodlettsville, on the northeast border of the county, incorporated after being prevented from doing so in April, by state law designed to restrain any new incorporations in the county during the attempt to establish the metropolitan government. Goodlettsville boasts of the fact that it is ten years older than Nashville, as a settled community, and wants no part of the larger city. It strongly opposed metropolitan government.

and constables fill the political functions normally left to mayors and other city officials. Thus, when a citizen of the county needs help from local government, he calls upon his magistrate or constable, who is generally available to handle such matters. At the time of the referendum, there was no county-wide political organization that controlled the political course of the county. In fact, political leadership seemed to be quite fragmentized and not necessarily even confined to the magistrates or constables. No one group could deliver much of the county-wide vote.

The executive powers of the county government are theoretically vested in the county judge. He is both executive officer and judge of the monthly county court, but his executive powers are actually fragmentized among a plethora of boards and commissions, each of which governs in its specific field of authority. Since many of the administrative officers of the county are directly elected by the people and the appointment of a number of the others is lodged in the hands of the County Quarterly Court, the county judge is more a titular head of the county than a functioning chief executive. Of course, his actual power varies, depending on the personality of the man in office, and can be much stronger in practice than his position seems to indicate, particularly since he is responsible for overall supervision of county fiscal affairs. The county judge is directly elected for a term of eight years. The present incumbent had to campaign for re-election during the middle of the campaign for metropolitan government. While he won, despite his pro-consolidation stand, this had some consequences for the June 17 election.

Davidson County has no independent school districts within its boundaries. Schools outside the city are controlled by a county-wide system, whose superintendent is appointed by the County Quarterly Court and

whose school board is a committee of that Court. Nashville has a school system of its own, also directed in a centralized manner.

A few years ago, the city and county health departments were consolidated under the county government. This is virtually the only formal co-operative line program in the metropolitan area.

The city of Nashville is governed by a city council of twenty-one members and a strong mayor. The council is elected from seven wards, with each ward divided into three districts. In the older neighborhoods, the wards and districts are the centers of the old machine-type organizations. In the newer neighborhoods, the voters fall into the self-proclaimed "independent" category, and the newspapers play a very important role in influencing the vote.

The then incumbent mayor had strengthened his office even beyond its designed power by virtue of his own talents. In most matters, he had effective control of the city, both administratively and politically, and exercised it. Unlike the county judge, who had a following based on personal popularity but little in the way of a formal organization, the mayor had a strong organization and did not rely on a following. The nature and composition of this organization were important factors in the metropolitan government campaign.

The city and the county both have planning commissions which meet jointly (the city planning commission is an ex-officio part of the county commission) and share a single staff. The joint commission, and particularly its staff, plays a leading role in directing the growth of the community and took a most significant lead in the development of the metropolitan government plan, charter, and campaign. Over the years, this joint commission had achieved a high degree of stature in the community. This was due to the high quality of leadership in the planning staff and the fact that its top

professionals have standing in the community, some independently of their positions as civil servants.

The incorporated suburban communities engage in little formal governmental activity. The oldest of these, Belle Meade, was incorporated in 1938, in order to create an entirely residential suburb for wealthy citizens in the Nashville area. Though it maintains a greater variety of municipal services than the other incorporated suburbs, its major function has been to safeguard a large residential area, primarily through control of zoning. It has succeeded quite well in its purpose and has even provided the minimum city services. Lack of tax base has prevented Belle Meade from furnishing a sewer system. As it is, the services it does provide are paid for from a sales tax rebate that every incorporated community in the state receives. Sewers are its major problem and played a big role in the campaign. Other utilities are provided by one of the utility districts or by Nashville.

The other three incorporated communities are of recent origin and are thought locally to have been brought into existence mainly because of the efforts of a local lawyer who has tried to promote incorporations all over the county. Forest Hills is an even wealthier edition of Belle Meade that incorporated in a referendum which passed by a very narrow margin. It provides no services other than a zoning commission. Oak Hill is another zoning commission community, somewhat less exclusive than Forest Hills. Berry Hill is the lawyer's home community, and many say he advocated its incorporation to assure a place for himself on the County Quarterly Court. At any rate, he has the office and Berry Hill does little else. All three are considered "zombie" cities by many local leaders.

Attempts have been made, led by the same lawyer, to induce other communities to incorporate, without success, since most of the residents

feel it is not to their advantage to do so. They do not want the expenses or the services of a government, even their own.

The utility district is a form of local government designed to supply certain services (in most cases, water) to particular areas in the county. Each district is established by the authority of the state with a governing board of three members. When there is a vacancy on the board, the remaining members select someone to fill it. Thus, the board is self-perpetuating with removal only for cause. It has no taxing powers and can supply only the services it is established to provide.

The Old Hickory Utility District is the only one that maintains a number of truly governmental functions. Old Hickory and the communities around it, located along the shores of Old Hickory Lake in the northwestern part of the county, were originally company towns for the DuPont Corporation, which has had large plants in the area for many years. DuPont originally built a sewer system, provided police and fire protection, and furnished other municipal services as part of the management of the company town. Several years ago, DuPont decided to rid itself of such extraneous responsibilities and began selling the houses in the town to their residents. At the same time, the corporation wished to rid itself of the governmental responsibilities also (while preventing the incorporation of a municipality which would have taxing powers, according to local residents). In order to secure both ends, they offered all their municipal facilities to the local residents for one dollar, if they would establish a utility district to manage them. Thus, the Old Hickory area has never incorporated, yet maintains as many municipal services as the great majority of its inhabitants seem to desire.

The unincorporated communities have no power to govern. Schools are controlled by the county, as are roads, health, and welfare. Other services

are either performed privately or are not performed at all.

The need for such services as police and fire protection and garbage collection has given rise to a group of government surrogates: private companies that supply at least a minimum of the needed services. Normally, the pattern is for an interested individual or partnership to form a combination police and fire company paid for on a subscription basis by the people who wish protection, in the neighborhood to be served. For a fee of ten to fifteen dollars per year, a minimum protection service is made available to each household, plus an assortment of helpful activities ranging from providing rides for the children on the fire engines to transporting the sick to a doctor.

Often the head of the police and fire department is the elected constable, who has certain law enforcement powers in the magisterial district he serves. In any case, the private police secure deputization from the county sheriff to give them the authority to act. The county does maintain a small sheriff's patrol, but it is unable to cope with the amount of police work needed in basically urbanized areas covering some 130 square miles. Of course, such police protection is quite limited, even with a large private police force.

Fire protection is based on little more than controlling the spread of any fire, since there are no fire hydrants out in most of the county's area. Each unit must bring its own water and pumping system. Consequently, fire insurance rates in the county are so high that they tend to raise the annual "voluntary" payments of county residents to the level of the annual taxes of those in the city. This fact has escaped the notice of most of the county residents, though attempts have been made to call it to their attention.

Garbage collection is also on a subscription basis. Electricity is supplied by the Nashville Electric Board for a fee. The NEB is an independent body owned by the city of Nashville. Its power supply is purchased from the Tennessee Valley Authority. Since it is thus exempt from local taxation, it pays the city government a certain amount annually in lieu of taxes. This payment is used as a device to equalize revenue contributions of city and county residents on the basis of use of city facilities by the latter. Though the county dwellers avoid city taxes while utilizing city services, they are charged proportionately higher rates for electricity to make up the difference to the city. The city water board supplies water to certain parts of the county under similar arrangements, though most of the county must obtain water from its own sources.

Overlying the physical and cultural environments of the county is the political environment which has, in great measure, created the divisions indicated above or at least controlled much of the course of their development. In great measure this political environment continues to control, regulate, and modify the other two, just as the county itself is defined by it. Even those seemingly uninterested and not affected by "politics" have the course of their lives affected and directed by the political units of Davidson County and their boundaries.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

About 1946 an informal group of local government agency heads--all men in politico-administrative positions similar to that of the planning commission staff--began to meet over dinner to discuss metropolitan area problems. All were men of standing in the community who understood the political process, yet were not involved in it as "politicians." These informal meetings were also attended by the political reporters from the local newspapers, the news editor from one of the local radio stations, and the director of one state health department.

In 1951, several of the group presented a report to the State Legislature (Tennessee cities had virtually no home rule powers at that time, and the legislature had to authorize all such local legislation or projects) requesting a formal examination of the problems facing metropolitan Nashville.

As a result, the Legislature passed a Community Services Act which authorized the city and county to establish jointly a community services commission and to appropriate $25,000 apiece for its support.

The Community Services Commission hired a staff, brought in consultants, and emerged with a report in 1952, entitled "Future Nashville." This report recommended, among other things, that the city annex suburban areas outside its present boundaries.

After submitting this report, the Commission considered its task complete and disbanded. This meant that the recommendations, which lacked a force to work for their adoption, were implemented only insofar as the governments involved desired to do so. As a result, the annexation proposal was tabled in the Legislature. Public health and welfare services were amalgamated under the county through the activities of a pressure group other than the Commission.

The main results of this first attempt were threefold. Interest in metropolitan problems was aroused, particularly on the part of the county judge and the two Nashville daily newspapers. Those interested learned by experience that a report is just the prelude to a campaign. The Legislature was acquainted with the problems of metropolitan areas and could be approached for more help. The Commission did not recommend city-county consolidation at that time because of constitutional limitations that would then have prevented such a move but which have since been removed.

While the Legislature passed a general annexation law in 1955 that enabled city councils to annex unincorporated suburban fringe areas by local ordinance, city officials in Nashville showed no inclination to take advantage of this grant of authority. Instead, the mayor of Nashville publicly stated that he would not annex any residential area without a prior favorable vote by its residents, and this policy was followed throughout the period covered by this study.

Meanwhile, the Tennessee Constitution was amended in 1953 to permit the consolidation of any or all functions of cities and counties by affirmative vote of the residents of the respective city and county, and as provided in appropriate enabling legislation to be enacted by the State Legislature. This amendment opened the door to broader experimentation in solving metropolitan problems in Tennessee. The Nashville area became the first to take advantage of its provisions.

After it became clear that the 1952 report would not lead to any substantial solutions to basic metropolitan problems, the Nashville Chamber of Commerce, whose interest had been aroused, established its Greater Nashville Committee to discuss, among other things, how to approach the metropolitan area problem anew. This committee held several discussion meetings, where

there was some talk of bringing in an outside firm to do an area-wide study with a view toward developing some solutions. However, in the end it was decided to make use of the local planning facilities. From the first, the same agency that would bear much of the responsibility for implementing the study was assigned to carry it out. This seems to be important in terms of the rather realistic study that was developed, the relatively easy massing of top community leadership behind the proposed program, and the overcoming of the many political barriers that arise naturally in the process of implementation. At least in Nashville, it seems that these things could be accomplished by a local group that understood and had the confidence of the community it served far more easily than by outsiders.[1]

Throughout all the planning and political maneuvering, the planning staff provided communication and continuity between the various committees, as well as quiet leadership which emanated from the personalities at its head.

Aside from the Joint Planning Commission itself, the greatest effort and support for this study came from the Chamber of Commerce. The members of the Joint Planning Commission were also active in the Chamber. This overlapping of official and unofficial public bodies is a common one in American government, as is the overlapping of their memberships. It is a vital form of linkage of official government to the community and becomes particularly evident when it comes to the initiation of new projects or activities. This also contributed much to the emergence of a plan which came as close to implementation as it did.

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[1]There have been plans for various local improvements prepared for Nashville by outside consultants in the past. None of them were utilized after their completion.

On June 21, 1955, the county judge, who had been included in the Planning Commission's study along with the mayor, made the first public statement on the issue before the Nashville Rotary Club and urged the adoption of one government for the city and county.

The newspapers immediately took up this proposal and began the flood of favorable publicity which they gave the issue during its lifetime. It was clear that the newspapers were trying to educate the public toward acceptance of the idea of metropolitan government and also to apply pressure on the community leaders to act with dispatch.

It was at this point that the Joint Planning Commission staff decided to "stick its neck out" and develop a plan for city-county consolidation embracing all of Davidson County. On February 29, 1956, the staff first submitted its study and recommendations to a meeting of the Joint Planning Commission. This inaugurated a series of meetings to discuss and examine every aspect of the proposed consolidation plan, attended by members of both commissions, including the mayor and the county judge. In these discussions, the participants tried to voice all honest objections to the plan in order to meet them beforehand.

On October 24, the report was made public, with a timetable for its implementation, and its complete text was published in both newspapers with editorial endorsement.

The Legislative Campaign

To implement the recommendations of the Commission, enabling legislation had to be secured from the State Legislature, and local support had to be mobilized. It was necessary to have the Legislature act in the 1957 session to avoid a delay of two more years.

Before going to the Legislature, it was necessary to have the Davidson County legislative delegation solidly behind the proposed measures. To this end, a series of public hearings were called by the delegation to discuss the plan and the proposed legislation. Both proponents and opponents of the proposal were invited to air their views. Little opposition developed at these hearings which were primarily devoted to revising some parts of the draft legislation so as to receive the endorsement of the Tennessee Municipal League and representatives from other communities in the state. The major exceptions were the politicians from the strongest machine wards whose control over their constituencies was so strong that they did not feel the need to put up a "democratic" front and did not care how they appeared to the rest of the community.

Once the local legislative delegation indicated its support for the proposed legislation, the field of battle widened to include the rest of the Legislature. Before the measures ever reached the floor of that body, a series of maneuvers had secured a broad base of support for their passage. The support of the delegations from the other three major counties had to be secured first. Their support was secured through a series of discussions between Davidson County legislators and their colleagues on one hand, and through the efforts of the Davidson County judge in contacting local politicians in the three counties on the other. For example, Shelby County (Memphis) was quite hesitant at first, but promises of support for some of the measures its delegation was sponsoring, coupled with the interest of the Shelby County delegation in maintaining a "progressive" reputation, brought them to favor the enabling legislation.[1]

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[1]Interviews with those involved in negotiating with the Shelby County delegation confirm this. The desire of the Shelby County delegation to maintain a "progressive" reputation was part of a general post-Crump outlook adopted by the delegation in the Legislature. This was confirmed repeatedly in interviews with those active on the legislative scene.

Considerable attention was naturally paid to the rural legislators, who formed the majority of the Legislature. This was done in the same two-fold manner, the county judge's contacts as president of the Tennessee Association of County Officials serving quite well in this respect. Again, several compromises were made, such as providing that the sales tax distributions would be made only to the "urban services district" of any consolidations that should emerge, rather than to the entire consolidated county, assuring that new city-counties would not take revenue from the smaller towns. Particularly influential rural legislators were convinced first, and then they helped to convince their followers in the Legislature.

In general, opposition from the other urban counties was based on the city politicians' fear of losing their jobs. In the rural areas, opposition was based on general conservatism, distrust of the cities, and fear of losing some perquisites, such as the rural areas' favored sales tax position. Headed by the county judge and members of the county legislative delegation, the Nashville area supporters determined where this opposition was located and either converted or neutralized it. A final compromise, withdrawing some additional amendments proposed by the Davidson County delegation, assured passage of the measure, which cleared the Senate on February 20, 1957, with two amendments by a vote of 29 to 1. The House concurred by a vote of 82 to 1 on February 25, and the measure was signed by the Governor on March 7.

The measure, as amended, provided for popular election of judges under any metropolitan government and an alternate plan for establishing a charter commission by private legislation in the State Legislature, if the local bodies would not act. Other provisions of the measure provided for the county judge and the mayor each to appoint five members to a charter commission, subject to

the approval of their respective legislative bodies, both of which had to pass initiating resolutions.

The two local legislative bodies were also required to appropriate $25,000 each for the expenses of the charter commission. In turn, the commission was required to complete its work by February 1, 1958. The new charter was to then be submitted to the voters of the city and county to be passed by majorities of those voting in each. If it passed in both the city and the county outside the city limits, the new government would commence operations by September 1, 1958.

While the struggle for legislative action was under way, the area of public support also came in for its share of attention. Once the report had been released, it became necessary to secure the support of leading groups and individuals in the Nashville area. The League of Women Voters immediately endorsed the proposal, followed by the Chamber of Commerce, which made the achievement of a metropolitan government its number one task for 1957. Early in 1957, the Nashville Trades and Labor Council endorsed the plan and called on union men to support it. The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association had supported the idea virtually from the outset.

A speaking campaign, which had been inaugurated in a semi-organized manner earlier, was stepped up, filling requests from individual groups. Talks describing the plan were made to a number of groups, ranging from one side of the cosmopolitan grouping in the community to the other. The response in these groups seemed to be good, and this contributed to the general feeling that "the people" were behind consolidation.

One more action helped build this feeling of confidence. An attempt to create another small city, Harpeth Hills, in the southwestern part of the county

(in one of the more exclusive residential areas) was defeated at the polls by a comfortable margin. This encouraged supporters of consolidation, who had felt that their chief opposition might well come from the wealthier elements in the area, from among those who were thought to be afraid of higher taxes and of losing their power to control their own zoning under a large urgan government.

Only scattered opposition had appeared at this stage, all of it from politicians who were generally not admired by the community leadership that had rallied behind the proposed consolidation. Even those politicians who were opposed hesitated to express themselves openly, since doing so brought immediate and violent attack from both newspapers. In a word, everything seemed much more quiet and more favorable than it was.

During the final stages in the passage of the enabling act, supporters of consolidation were already busy developing a citizens' committee to organize and present their position to the public, in preparation for the fight to ratify the expected charter. Original impetus toward the formation of such a committee officially came from the Chamber of Commerce after the idea was publicly suggested by the county judge just after the report of the Joint Planning Commission was made public in October, 1956. On January 21, 1957, a meeting to form such a committee was held, called by the then president of the Chamber. In calling this meeting, he said,

> The primary purpose (of this meeting) is to wind up with an organization large enough throughout the entire county to cover every possible segment of our community. This will be done so that discussion groups can be formed which will help everyone know more about the program. We will expend every possible effort to see that politics in this matter is kept at the lowest possible level.

This initial committee was composed of nineteen members, including officials and staff of the Chamber of Commerce, the mayor, the county judge, officers of the local League of Women Voters, the president of the Nashville

Trades and Labor Council, a suburban magistrate and real estate dealer, officers of the local PTA, the director of research of the State Planning Commission, an attorney, the president of the Junior Chamber of Commerce, a physician, and a Negro community leader. Of the nineteen, six were from the Chamber.

Actually, the Chamber had been somewhat hesitant about forming such a committee. Other civic organizations, such as the League of Women Voters, had urged formation of a citizens' committee, but had been discouraged for what were conceived to be tactical reasons earlier in the campaign. When the Chamber endorsed the proposed governmental change, it was also persuaded by the planning commission people to assume operating and financial responsibility for the committee. When the meeting was finally arranged, they could not find people to serve on the committee and, more important, could not find leadership to guide it.

Finally, a local businessman consented to serve as chairman. This man was politically inexperienced and, though he personally strongly favored the plan, was perhaps made cautious in his actions by some friends who were lukewarm or opposed to it. It seems to be quite likely, from the evidence at hand, that the committee's leadership was strongly influenced by the minority of big businessmen who opposed metropolitan government and, as a result, failed to act with any appreciable vigor in conducting the campaign. In any case, it never expanded along the lines originally proposed. Indeed, its active membership actually contracted as it proved to be increasingly ineffectual. Except for a brief moment in June, 1957, the committee does not appear on the public stage for over a year, until just prior to the referendum. The decline and drift of the citizens' committee and the consequences in the campaign will be reviewed at a subsequent point in this narrative.

The Charter Commission

Once the enabling act had been passed, the county judge and the mayor moved quickly to appoint the requisite charter commission which, by statute, was required to complete its work by February 1, 1958.

The County Quarterly Court meeting in special session voted 30 to 18 to form the charter commission, on March 29. Of those opposed, sixteen were from predominantly rural areas of the county, one was from inside Nashville, and one was the creator of suburbs who had already emerged as the most vocal opponent of the plan. The City Council followed suit at its next regular meeting on April 3, approving formation of the commission by a vote of 17 to 4.

On April 15, the Quarterly Court approved the five persons selected by the judge to serve on the commission. The five included the state senator who had led the fight for enabling legislation in his house of the Legislature, a leading industrialist who had formerly been president of the Chamber of Commerce, a local businessman who had previous experience on county commissions, a Negro druggist and community leader, and an attorney who had been a labor-endorsed state representative. All five resided outside the city limits of Nashville.

The next day, the mayor's choices were approved by the City Council, adding the other five members and completing the commission. The city five included a prominent woman attorney; a veteran elementary school principal who had also served as the community leader of his lower income neighborhood; a labor leader; a city councilman who also represented the Negro community; a local attorney; and another leading attorney who also headed the privately owned public transportation system.

At the organizational meeting of the commission, the last-mentioned member was elected chairman. It was also decided that the planning commission

report had provided sufficient material in the way of research on the problem and that the job of the charter commission would be one of drafting the actual document forthwith. To this end, the commission determined to employ a lawyer in the capacity of draftsman. A local lawyer, formerly city attorney and author of works on municipal corporations, was selected and given the title of executive director.

As it turned out, the Joint Planning Commission and its staff had to assume a large role in guiding the charter commission. The charter commissioners worked diligently, but needed guidance as to how to proceed. It was the planning commission that presented them with a brief outline of their task and explained how to get it under way.

All meetings of the charter commission were open to the public. Few citizens attended these meetings, but the press, which had insisted on this arrangement, covered all these general meetings as well as those of the various subcommittees working on different charter provisions. Some people later attributed part of the failure of the charter at the polls to this coverage,implying that exposure of the controversies that led up to completion of the document provided fuel for the opponents. This charge seems to be quite unfounded, since the opposition did not attack the charter as such, waging, instead, a campaign of obfuscation rather than criticizing the proposal itself. It seems more likely that the open meetings convinced or helped convince the group of citizenry that ultimately did support it at the polls that the plan was an honest and open one, worthy of their support.

In any case, the discussions were thorough and little was missed in the way of possible objections to a fundamental document of government. Both the mayor and the county judge participated in these discussions, and there were enough practical politicians on the commission and its subcommittees to view

the attempt with an eye toward political realities. The document that emerged amply met the criteria given the commission at the outset of its work. The charter came out stronger as a result of these discussions, but the planning staff had to play a big role behind the scenes to give the work enough direction to provide a basis for discussion. In the end, the planners performed such political-technical tasks as delineating the new councilmanic districts, within a range set by the larger commission, a task requiring more political skill than ability to manipulate population projections.

It was during the drafting of the charter that the question of Negro support for consolidation was most important. The Negroes were particularly worried over the fact that they might lose the political position they had succeeded in winning in the city, where they already had two seats on the city council and could expect more as they came to make up an even greater part of the city's population. Recognizing this fear as a legitimate one, the charter commission delineated the new councilmanic districts so as to provide for at least two Negroes on the metropolitan council. With the exception of some slight imbalance in favor of the rural population of the county which stood to lose most of its representation in any case, this was the single example of conscious drawing of district boundaries for the purpose of conciliating a special interest. Other aspects of the Negro stand will be dealt with at greater length in the discussion of the campaign itself. This was one of what might be termed "the major adjustments."

A second major adjustment was the creation of a strong mayor-council type government under the new charter. This became one of the few areas where the question of governmental reform aside from consolidation was raised. Those who favored a strong mayor carried the day, partly because Nashville already had a strong mayor tradition and the county judgeship had been so weak that it was

discouraging to all "good government" backers. This was just about the only part of the charter that was actually attacked by the opposition, and this was used as an issue primarily in connection with suggestions as to who the mayor would be.

A third adjustment covered the manner in which councilmen would be selected. Ultimately,a system was decided upon whereby fifteen councilmen would be elected from districts and six would be chosen at large. This was also a "good government" question, in which "reformers" wanted to elect the entire council at large.

A fourth was the adjustment of the differences between the city and county civil services, in order that they might be merged in such a manner as to combine efficiency with decent safeguards for the job and pension rights of then employed public servants of both.

A fifth adjustment was the development of a system for future amalgamation of the city and county school systems, a matter of much concern and one that received some sub rosa attention during the campaign.

The sixth adjustment provided for an equitable division of the city and county debts so that residents of neither area would be saddled with a large part of the other's pre-consolidation debt.

During the summer and autumn of 1957, the charter commission's subcommittees continued meeting, often calling in representatives of the departments and people concerned in each of their jurisdictions. The commission as a whole would consider the subcommittees' reports and make the final decisions as to what would be included in the charter and how. The heads of the planning staff were present at both subcommittee and commission meetings, seeking to provide what specialized help that was needed. In some cases, experts from outside the community were called in (as in the education subcommittee), but, as was noted

in another context, their advice tended to be too theoretical and not adaptable to the local situation.

By the end of March (the February deadline had been extended), the charter was filed with the county and city election authorities and the work of the charter commissioners was ostensibly completed.

As an organized group, the charter commission ceased to exist. However, the failure of the citizens' committee left the individual members of the commission with much of the task of presenting their work to the public. Many of them were actively involved in the ensuing campaign in an attempt to do so. At least some Nashvillians had learned that it was not enough to prepare a report and then leave it to a vague group of "others" to try to implement it.

CHAPTER III

THE PROPONENTS' CAMPAIGN

The Proponents' Course of Action

The proponents of the consolidation plan understood their task to be one of overcoming conservatism, apathy, and ignorance on the part of the public at large, in order to convince the electorate that a vote for consolidation was a vote that would benefit them directly. These three factors were undoubtedly important ones, and the proponents assessed them correctly. However, their methods of dealing with them were based on some less solid assumptions. The same factors that decreased the correctness of those assumptions caused the proponents to miss several crucial factors that ultimately undid much of the work they did do.

Basically, the supporters of metropolitan government came from the cosmopolitan groups in the community. Their thought patterns, their approach to politics, and their concepts of good government reflected their cosmopolitan backgrounds. Both the idealistic and self-interested reasons for their support of the charter were those commonly found in municipal reform movements. In fact, it is difficult to separate ideals and self-interest (or group interest) on this issue, as on so many others of the same general type.

The cosmopolitans' support of the proposed charter can be considered in various ways. Their support was one aspect of a general reforming tendency interested in "reducing waste" and providing more extensive services to the people of their community. It was also a reflection of the cosmopolitans' desire to attract new industry to the Nashville area by eliminating problems such as the lack of proper facilities for waste disposal. It was also an attempt to save the central city from becoming a great slum dominated by slum dwellers to the exclusion of the wealthier suburbanites and city dwellers who

were attached to the city through economic, social, and cultural ties and then held a significant share of the political power there. In the traditionally American way of reconciling ideals and self-interest, the desires for reform and for economic and political benefit were inseparably linked in the motives that led to cosmopolitan support for the proposed charter. Both sets of interests were developed in a way that made them sufficiently compatible with each other to be honestly linked in this manner. This type of compatibility is generally developed between the idealist and self-interested tendencies involved in such issues, in a way that prevents the endorsement of the extreme of either position, yet provides a means to advance both.

The locals had a set of ideals and areas of self-interest that substantially differed from those of the cosmopolitans. For example, neither industrial development nor reduction of "waste in government" seemed to concern them particularly. They were primarily concerned with taxes. The cosmopolitans did not recognize these differences and based their campaign on the promotion of cosmopolitan ideals and interests under the assumption that they were universally accepted in the community. By doing so, they did not reach the majority of the population, with ultimately fatal consequences to their proposal. The opposition, on the other hand, was able to reach the locals though they could not convince the cosmopolitans.

The proponents' campaign revolved around a series of rather specialized activities. These included intensive newspaper coverage, an organized speaking campaign, personal endorsements by "community leaders," a few radio and television discussions, and distribution of copies of the proposed charter and a rather long brochure describing the proposed change. It is clear that this was a campaign directed to the type of people who read the newspapers; attend meetings of organizations that have speakers as part of their programming; who can

read through rather complex legal material; and who are sufficiently close to the major economic, social, and cultural activities of the area to know, or at least know of,and trust the "community leaders" as their leaders. With those people who fit all or a substantial part of this description, the campaign was, by and large, a greater success than even the campaign leaders themselves expected.

But those people who distrusted the newspapers or do not read them; do not belong to or participate in "educational" organizations; do not bother to follow political developments on an abstract level; do not have many ties outside their own neighborhoods; and lack enough firsthand knowledge of the "community leaders" to place real trust in them were just not reached, much less won over. Add to that the fact that the community leaders whom they did know or come in contact with personally were, by and large, opposed to metropolitan government and campaigned actively against it, and the reasons for the defeat of the proposal become clearer.

The course of the campaign was relatively simple. Newspaper coverage began when the idea was initially proposed and continued on an ever more intense basis throughout the campaign. The leading reporters on the local political scene were assigned to cover the issue. Since the newspapers were fully in favor of one government (as they called it in print), they took it upon themselves to exert every effort on its behalf. They attended all the planning meetings; participated in the speaking campaign, wrote stories, feature articles, and columns on the subject; and used their influence to bring reluctant citizens, particularly politicians, into the fold. Each paper ran a series answering questions about the new plan. Various devices were used to develop popular support. Many pictures were printed showing the present poor state of such services as waste disposal and traffic direction, trying to point out that

metropolitan government would be able to do something about such problems. When the opposition did try to present its arguments in the press, the newspapers would parallel opposition statements with the story as they saw it.

In short, the newspapers assumed the task of educating the public. While they did not hesitate to attack opponents with great vigor, they did not distort the case for metropolitan government. On the contrary, they were very cautious about making sweeping statements that might imply that the new system would solve all the community's problems. They emphasized that it would provide the proper vehicle for their solution but would not work any miracles. To their credit, the press was intellectually honest throughout the campaign, despite their overwhelming support and coverage.

Traditionally, the two Nashville dailies have been at odds with each other for over fifty years. If one newspaper supported a proposal or a political personality, the other would go into opposition. One newspaper supports the mayor of Nashville; the other supports the county judge. It is commonly noted around the Nashville area that the two papers have even disagreed about the time of day. Both papers are published in the same building and share the same premises. Several years ago, the annual controversy over daylight saving time in Tennessee reached the point where the city businesses adopted daylight time while the state remained on standard time. The newspapers, as usual, divided on this issue. As a result, each face of the two-faced clock at the entrance to the newspaper building was set according to the predilection of the newspaper whose offices it faced, so that one face was an hour behind the other.

Given a situation like this, it is not surprising that, when "for the first time in the memory of man," both newspapers united in support of an issue, and did so vociferously, a good deal of public suspicion was aroused. It seems

that the further away from any personal contact with the press or its employees, the greater was the suspicion and the unwillingness to believe rumors to the effect that the papers stood to gain from the proposal at the expense of the community. Since many people tended to suspect the press in any case, this added fuel to the fire. The opposition capitalized on this by spreading the rumor that the newspapers did stand to benefit by receiving a greater share of national advertising under the enlarged boundaries of the proposed metropolitan area. In one form or another, this story seems to have been fairly widely believed among those who voted against the charter. The newspapers found out that this rumor was being circulated and tried to point out in their columns that a paper's share of the national advertising budget of any company is based on the area it serves without regard for the political boundaries per se. They stood to benefit only as any other business would with the expansion that was likely to materialize under the new form of government. It is doubtful that many who believed the rumors were convinced by the denials.

The newspapers were also accused of stifling the opposition. While they did print statements from opposition leaders, and even solicited such statements to give them the opportunity to state their position, each statement was flanked by commentary designed to refute it in favor of the charter. Many people, particularly those who did not trust the newspapers very much in any case, felt that this was neither fair nor democratic and that each statement should have stood on its own merits, letting the people weigh the issues. This feeling seemed to be particularly strong among the locals who generally find the newspapers to be opposed to their interests on many occasions, not only in the area of local government.

At the same time, this power of the newspapers to "make it hot" for opponents of the plan, particularly politicians, did serve to bring a number

of political leaders who are dependent on newspaper support in their own campaigns into the ranks of ostensible supporters.[1] While some of these politicians gave only lip service to metropolitan government and others even worked to

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[1]The press plays a vital role in the political life of a community such as Nashville. With the rise of the new middle class and the consequent demise of the old-line political machine as the controlling factor of a majority of the population, some new force had to fill in the vacuum. Just as the machine served the immediate interests of its individual constituents, provided them with a guide to the political world, and, in return, received their votes, so the newspaper often fills a somewhat analogous role today. Under certain conditions in the general community structure, it provides the connection with politics for much of the middle classes, provides them with most of the information they receive about political affairs, and, for all except a few "actives," is the most important political contact they have outside of actually voting. The political interests of this new middle class have passed beyond "coal-basket" politics and are of a different order. The newspapers often represent the standards of morality and governmental efficiency demanded by the new middle class and which are often irrelevant to the machine-dominated people and to the machine itself.

In return, the newspaper also exacts its price. While the machine demands party identification and the organizational regularity that should flow from it, the newspaper caters to the cult of the independent voter. The argument, a bit over-simplified, goes somewhat like this, "If you are a thinking person, you want to vote for the right candidate, not simply for a party. You will be independent and decide who will get your vote on the basis of his qualifications for the job. We, the newspaper, will report on his qualifications to you and, since you really do not have time to examine each and every candidate, we will assess each one for you and recommend those judged to be the best. Of course, we are also independent and looking for the best man for the job, regardless of party, so our recommendations will surely fit your specifications. Therefore, all you need to do is to follow our recommendations." This is certainly more subtle an approach than that of the old machine, but it is often not too much less effective among the people it is designed to reach, since it flatters them in a way they like to be flattered.

In greater Nashville, the two newspapers each have developed their own followings. Their role has been strengthened because of the general fragmentization of political power that can be found in Davidson County where a number of smaller organizations compete or coalesce with each other in the struggle for political power. Among them are the two newspapers, several ward or district organizations, a number of individuals and their followings, and a city-wide organization of limited power connected with the city government.

Each of these organizations seeks coalitions of greater or lesser permanence with others to achieve mutual goals. For example, the mayor of Nashville has a good organization for those parts of the city where traditional patronage organizations are still most successful. However, to win the city, he also needs the help of the new style, middle class, newspaper organizations. So he has a coalition with one of the newspapers for that purpose, and wins elections.

defeat it privately where they could, a good number were sufficiently neutralized to prevent them from exercising their rather considerable power of generating opposition. The mayor certainly gave more than lip service to the plan, becoming in the final campaign sincerely convinced that it was a good one.

The newspapers did their part in this campaign and quite successfully filled their traditionally limited role. They certainly were able to deliver their vote, insofar as they are ever able to do so. They did much more good than harm. Without their joint and unswerving support the plan would probably not have come as far as it did. But lack of a group that held the confidence of the local segments of the population to mediate their coverage and vouch for its truthfulness and sincerity not only prevented the newspapers from having an appreciably favorable impact on those segments of the population, but made their coverage a handicap to the proposal by increasing an already existing antagonism toward the press and, by extension, toward metropolitan government.

The speaking campaign was also begun at the very outset of the entire endeavor, picking up in intensity after the charter was prepared. At first it was an activity of individual supporters of the plan, particularly the county judge, a suburban magistrate, and some business association leaders, attempting to bring forth community support for the idea. Once the plan for metropolitan area government was released, business and civic organizations began to invite the planners and politicians to appear before them and explain the new plan. The mayor, the judge, the planning staff, the reporters, and others from the communications and business world provided a temporary speakers' bureau. This organization continued to serve the cause of metropolitan government all through the campaign. Even after a regular speakers' bureau was organized, these people bore the brunt of the speaking campaign, joined by members of the planning and charter commissions.

The citizens' committee, after its organization was made formal, selected an executive director who also headed the speakers' bureau. The person selected was a young lawyer without previous experience in organizing a political campaign, a former partner in the mayor's law firm and one-time city attorney.

To staff the speakers' bureau, he brought together a group of young lawyers who volunteered to speak to various groups on behalf of the charter. Unfortunately, some of these volunteers were more interested in acquiring political experience and contacts than in winning votes for the plan. Several did not bother to prepare sufficiently before speaking and refused to attend an orientation course that the planning staff wished to provide. As a result, many were quite ill-equipped to answer questions about the charter and to explain the plan accurately. This was harmful before audiences genuinely concerned with getting the right information. Before an audience that included opponents of the charter, the effect was devastating. An honest assessment of the net impact of this group of speakers probably would have to conclude that they did somewhat more harm than good.

The executive director has estimated that between 75 and 90 percent of the PTA groups in the city and county were reached by some speakers. Most of the civic clubs were also reached. Most of the garden clubs in the wealthier parts of the county had speakers, as did some of the veterans' organizations. It is estimated that as many speeches were made in the area that ultimately voted against the charter as in the areas that turned out in favor of it.

Most of the audiences that bothered to come to hear the speakers were for metropolitan government. A number attended more than one of the speeches, and virtually all were from the cosmopolitan groups. Thus, night after night sympathetic receptions would be recorded, and a feeling existed that broad-based

support for the charter was built up. Since speech-making represented at least 90 percent of the campaign effort of the citizens' committee, a false sense of security was developed while, in truth, only a fraction of the voting public was being reached.

It was a serious mistake to assume that a representative sample of the people attended speaking rallies. Based on the rather narrow views of their own (cosmopolitan) group, it was plausible for the proponents to assume that this was the case. Wider knowledge of the other groups in the community would have pointed up the error of this assumption.

Even in the communities where the local groups were in the majority, those who came to hear the speeches were generally the exceptions, both as to breadth of involvement and attitude toward the charter. For example, after speaking to an organization in Donelson, the speaker reported that the area would vote for the charter with a comfortable margin. When the returns came in, the vote was 70.4 percent against the plan.

Those who were disturbed about the reliance on the reactions to speakers either kept silent or tried to point out their views to the citizens' committee, with no success. The executive secretary felt that (a) the speaking campaign was progressing successfully, and (b) given his lack of finances, was the best that could be done, so he did not strive energetically for a more direct approach to the electorate.

The effect of speaking to various groups, in the framework of the whole campaign, was salutory with that segment of the population which is accustomed to being approached through speeches. The leadership elements in the cosmopolitan groups were given information about the new government which reinforced the material provided by the newspapers. The final vote demonstrated the success of the proponents in this area. But those not normally reached by newspapers are

not reached by speakers either, and they still did not receive the attention necessary to win their confidence in the plan and, ultimately, their vote.

Meanwhile, the citizens' committee was also floundering. The pattern for its ineffectiveness had been set at its first meeting in January, 1957, when the newly-appointed chairman had initiated proceedings by stating that he was sure that nobody present was prepared to support metropolitan government a priori and that the job of the committee would be to examine the proposal and then decide whether to support it or not. The only person who took issue with this unexpected approach was the representative from the League of Women Voters, who had rightly understood that the function of the committee would be to organize and manage the campaign to secure passage of the plan, not to evaluate it, since that had been done the previous year. A majority of the other businessmen present substantially agreed with the chairman. At least, they were not prepared to commit themselves to the support of metropolitan consolidation until they knew exactly how much it would cost.

With that inauspicious start, the committee began a series of weekly meetings that turned into arenas for bickering over the probable cost of the new government. Meanwhile, the planning commission people and the others identified with the proposal attempted to disabuse the committee of the idea that it was their task to review the proposed charter when it would appear and report on it with their judgement and suggestions appended. This took some time to accomplish. It seems that this interpretation of the function of the citizens' committee was a product of opposition influences who had close relationships with some of the committee's members. The opposition was still hoping to frustrate the plan before it would be brought to a vote without having to expose themselves openly.

Ultimately, a few of the influential people from the planning commission, its staff, and the citizens' committee itself were able to break down this barrier. By this time, only the executive committee of the citizens' group remained. Instead of proceeding from there, the chairman refused to call any meetings, saying that it was too early to begin the campaign since the charter had not even been completed. An attempt was made to broaden the committee's base in March, 1957, but even the small response to this attempt was rendered ineffectual by the committee's continued inactivity. In June, 1957, a mass meeting was attempted on a community-wide level, but only a few people attended it.

About five months before the referendum, the committee appointed the executive director, and the campaign headquarters was established. Aside from the lawyers who composed the speakers' bureau, no other people were attracted to the headquarters, and no volunteer organization was set up. The citizens' committee did not attempt to contact the politicians, either to gain the active support of those friendly to the charter or to put pressure on those who opposed it. Indeed, they sincerely attempted to "keep politics to a minimum," despite the fact that this was a political issue of the first order. In the later discussion of their role, it will be seen that, for reasons sufficient unto themselves, the politicians, even those favorably disposed toward the plan, did not come forward on their own and offer their organizational and campaigning services to the citizens' committee or to anyone else. Those who did campaign did so for other reasons and as a result of other pressures.

From the beginning, the matter of financing the pro-charter campaign was a problem. There are good grounds to support the position that opposition influences were able to halt any aid that might have materialized from out-of-city sources such as national firms with branches in the Nashville area. As

late as two weeks before the election, only $2,700 had been raised. Only then, after the opposition had begun its lightning windup campaign, did any money begin to come in, too late to do much to affect the course of the vote. A finance committee was never appointed and, all told, less than $10,000 was spent (by the citizens' committee) to secure the passage of the charter.

The money that was raised was used primarily to print and distribute copies of the proposed charter and a pamphlet entitled "You and Metropolitan Government." Neither item was widely read since neither provided the impact necessary in a piece of campaign literature. They certainly did not reach the unconvinced, except for the opposition leadership, which used the charter only to distort it. Even most of the cosmopolitan group was not reached by the masses of detail contained in these publications.

The citizens' committee did little with the money after paying for the printing, office expenses, and the executive director. The committee did not use mailings because it was felt that the plan was too complex to be properly explained in a short mailing. This group's leadership also felt that workers could not be obtained on the budget available, so no attempt was made to recruit a precinct organization. Previous experience with city politics also led the committee to concentrate more of its effort on the city in this campaign. None of the speakers sent out by this office was from the areas that opposed the plan, though this was at least partly due to the fact that very few of the politicians in those areas were willing to risk their political futures on this issue.

In general, the citizens' committee did not have any representation from areas other than those of the cosmopolitan citizenry, who voted for the charter. The speakers' bureau refused to use women speakers. Of course, this decision eliminated a great number of capable people who had the time to give to the campaign. While this decision was probably justified by the citizens' committee on

the grounds of "political realism," it would be hard to defend in light of the speakers finally assembled by the bureau.

It must be concluded that the citizens' committee was generally a failure. Behind the committee's failure was the basic misunderstanding of the character of the community and of the differences between the cosmopolitan and local groups within it. This basic misunderstanding led to a series of choices that directed the proponents' campaign along more or less ineffectual lines. A proper vote-getting approach was not developed. Over half of the community was not effectively reached by the speakers and newspapers. This was not realized at the time by the proponents, and the citizens' committee did not attempt to reach this neglected element by any other means, such as a door-to-door campaign or other types of personal contact. This basic misunderstanding, coupled with an over-optimistic outlook, also contributed to the lack of a fund-raising drive and the consequent lack of funds to support a proper campaign. This lack of funds hindered even the limited campaign that was conducted.

Considering the composition, outlook, and previous political experiences of the citizens' committee members and staff, it is not surprising that the committee's deficiencies should have taken the form they did. Few of the people involved in the activities of the citizens' committee had previous political experience . The general attitude of these political amateurs was to keep the issue "out of politics" insofar as possible. This rather unrealistic attitude contributed to the ineffectiveness of the campaign approach. The committee members' outlook was that of the cosmopolitan group. This outlook was never transcended. One of the consequences of this outlook, aside from those mentioned above, was the identification of the self-interest of the cosmopolitan groups with the good of the community as a whole and a rejection of the self-interest of the local groups as "selfishness." While there were some grounds

for this belief, it was by no means entirely the case. Legitimate questions of self-interest among the locals should have been recognized and dealt with by the citizens' committee.

The composition of the committee provided many ways in which subtle and covert pressures could be brought to bear on it by opponents of the charter. These pressures never had to be geared toward outright rejection of the plan. It was sufficient to influence the citizens' committee members to question the plan when they should have been supporting it or to lull them into a falsely confident attitude. While it is very difficult, if not impossible, to assess the degree and effect of this type of pressure, it seems clear that it did exist.

The consequences of the above failings were fatal to the proponents' campaign. The citizens' committee was given almost sole responsibility for directing that campaign. When it failed to do so, no other group was able to fill the vacuum. This is not to say that the proponents' campaign would surely have been successful if the citizens' committee had been all that it could have been. Other underlying factors to be discussed below played a major role in determining the outcome of the referendum. It is entirely possible that these other factors would have been decisive in any case.

There were politically knowledgeable people supporting metropolitan government who did have an idea of what needed to be done to wage a successful campaign. Some of the reporters, planning staff, political scientists at the universities, politicians supporting the plan, and a few citizens at large urged that a grass roots organization be developed to work with people in every precinct and block in the Nashville area.

With the exception of individual efforts on the part of some of these people, nothing in the nature of precinct work was done. Where these individuals

went directly to their neighbors, they were able to convince a good percentage of those they talked to to support the proposed charter, even in neighborhoods that voted substantially against it. For example, one of the members of the planning commission staff met informally with a group of 100 people in the first precinct of the third ward, a working class, lower income local area. He discussed the proposed governmental change from their point of view--how it would affect jobs, the union, and so forth. As a result, the first precinct voted 69 percent in favor of the charter, while the second and third precincts, which resemble the first in socio-economic character, voted against the charter by 51 percent. In another case, a local university professor knocked on approximately 75 doors in a local area and won the verbal support of about half of them.

The work of these and other individuals lends considerable support to the general thesis that the failure of the proponents of the plan was a failure to communicate with over half of the population. Where neighbors who were more or less trusted in their neighborhoods were able to assure the local groups that what the newspapers and others were saying was true and that the plan would be beneficial, a good part of the opposition to metropolitan government was dissipated.

The failure of the citizens' committee and its constituent bodies, the limitations of the newspapers, and the reluctance of the politicians left the direction of the campaign in the hands of the Joint Planning Commission and its staff, with the assistance of the members of the charter commission. This responsibility was assumed very reluctantly and with great reservation, particularly on the part of the planning staff, who felt that it would be an improper role for them to play in view of their status as city and county employees. On one hand, they had encouraged and supported the planned metropolitan government from the beginning, since their executive director had begun meeting with other

civic leaders to discuss local problems in the 1940's. At the same time, they had political wisdom and influence, more so than any of the other deeply committed campaign leaders, and were tempted to use it when they saw that the campaign was not being successfully prosecuted (though even they did not think it would be beaten, at least until the very end).

On the other side of the coin, their sincere support of the idea was tempered by their equally sincere conception of the role of a public agency not to engage in full-scale political activity, except as requested to do so by the city government or parent commission. This feeling had more than an idealistic side since the practical question of annual appropriations from the city council and County Quarterly Court necessitated the perpetuation of good relations with the members of both bodies. As a matter of fact, after the charter was defeated, a move was made at the next session of the court to decrease the budget and abolish the Advance Planning Division, led by the opponents of the plan. While this attempt was defeated, it is indicative of the problem the professional planning group faced.

Their decision was to confine their activities to explaining the plan and the charter when called upon to do so. This was but a step away from openly supporting the charter and campaigning for its adoption, but it did preserve the official policy of non-identification, even when there was no question of where they stood. In any case, the burden of presenting information, and thus the burden of the campaign as it was structured by the proponents, fell upon the higher echelons of the planning staff. They participated in panels, speeches, and discussions almost every night for a year, presenting descriptions of the plan. They were involved in the television presentations that were sponsored by the citizens' committee. They wrote what publicity did appear outside the newspapers. Of course, they were limited by their self-imposed rules and could

go only where they were asked. Since the citizens' committee did not even engage any staff personnel until five months before the election, the planning staff was even forced to assume much of the drudgery of the campaign.

Though the planners were undoubtedly effective among the people they reached, it is generally agreed, particularly among themselves, that they had too big a role in the campaign, but that the exigencies of the situation had left them no alternative. This is probably a good assessment of the situation. It is unlikely that their active role hurt the proposed charter, but the factors that led to their assumption of the role were indicative of a lack of ability on the part of private citizens to undertake the task of promoting the governmental change. The nature of the American system of political change makes the weaknesses of this situation apparent.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Support Among the Politicians

While the majority of the politicians were either overtly or covertly opposed to any metropolitan government, there was a significant minority in favor of the new development. Among this minority were the county judge, the mayor of Nashville, and a small number of magistrates and aldermen.

Virtually all the politicians who supported the plan in any manner can be placed among the cosmopolitan groups in the city and county. They were men whose support stemmed from those groups or whose aspirations were toward those groups. For example, the mayor is, by virtue of his position and talents as chief magistrate for the entire city, in appealing not only to the cosmopolitan voters in Nashville but in actively working with national organizations concerned with local government, a member of the cosmopolitan group. The same is true of the county judge. The magistrates and councilmen from areas inhabited by cosmopolitan groups tended to be like their constituents. In some of the other suburban areas, magistrates who were business and commercial leaders, and thus members of cosmopolitan groups, also supported metropolitan government.

It is important to point out that the converse was not necessarily true. That is, not all the politicians who are members of cosmopolitan groups supported the plan. Those whose constituencies or whose personal political interests were opposed to any significant change in the political status quo tended to oppose metropolitan government, no matter which groups they were associated with outside the political arena (see Chapter VI). Of course, none of these lines was so hard and fast that exceptions could not be found.

The county judge supported metropolitan government from the inception of the idea. Indeed, he even provided the public "trigger" that set off formal

action in his Rotary Club speech. Though there were occasions when his support seemed to waver, basically it remained with the proposal, at least until it was rejected at the polls. Perhaps because of his own cosmopolitan identification, he was convinced, just as the other proponents were, that a metropolitan government would be best for the area.[1]

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[1]Most of the judge's active support and aid came in the early stages of the campaign. As has already been noted, he actively assisted the Joint Planning Commission, the county legislative delegation, and the charter commission in developing the plans, obtaining the enabling legislation, and drafting the charter for the proposed government. He spoke to various groups in support of the plan, and he tried to influence his political colleagues either to support the charter or to remain neutral. He was instrumental in convincing the county court to submit the plan to the voters. He also played a role in the establishment of the citizens' committee and its financing, though he was progressively less involved with them after the initial effort.

In the months preceding the referendum, the judge was involved in his own campaign for reelection, which culminated in his renomination in the Democratic primary election of April 10, 1958, for a second eight-year term. It was quite natural that the months preceding the primary would be devoted to his own campaign, but after April 10, there was no real resumption of his previous level of work on behalf of the charter. He continued to make a few speeches and maintain his support for the plan, but did not figure actively in the attempt to meet the eleventh hour campaign waged so successfully by the opposition.

It would be presumptuous to attempt a definitive evaluation of the judge"s actual role in the referendum, but several factors may have had some bearing on it. The fact that he was campaigning for reelection to another eight-year term in a position of some scope (indeed, with increasing scope due to his own abilities and the needs of the urbanized county) could weaken a man's resolution sufficiently to reduce the amount of his activity, without changing his basic conviction that a metropolitan government would be a good idea. It would be only human to feel that it is one thing to support a proposal that could leave him without a position of responsibility and another to provide a large share of the campaign to achieve that end. While the county judgeship would have remained under the new charter, its functions would have been reduced to judicial activity alone, which would mean that, in order to continue as a county leader, the incumbent judge would have had to seek the office of metropolitan mayor. Of course, he had an excellent chance of winning that office, but it would have involved a real effort.

At the same time, it would have been possible for the opponents of the plan to enter another candidate to oppose him in the August general election. This possibility is not usually a likely one, since the primary is normally the equivalent of victory in Democratic Davidson County, but in the present instance it may have been likely enough to give a candidate pause. It certainly could have brought out a little hesitation in any politician, particularly since he might well have been told by his advisors that, if he merely relaxed his efforts somewhat, he would have nothing to fear along those lines.

Though the metropolitan government issue did not figure significantly in his campaign for renomination, the judge did encounter opposition to the charter among some of his constituents. His contacts with suburban and rural Davidson County seemed to have indicated a strong undercurrent in opposition to city-county consolidation. This may have caused him to taper off his activities on behalf of the proposed charter so as not overly to antagonize his opposition among his own supporters.

This feeling may have been intensified by another factor. Unlike the mayor, the strength of the judge does not lie in an organization. It is based on the support of a "following." While an organization is bound together in many ways and is subject to much control from the center, a following is a very loose aggregation whose components are tied to a personality but not to each other. It can be rallied on behalf of the personality, but not necessarily for other issues, even those endorsed by the personality himself. Thus, the judge could not "deliver" any vote or even prevent the course of a vote in particular areas. At best, he could try to persuade his followers, a risky business for his own career if carried too far against their obvious wishes.

The mayor was caught in a dilemma in this campaign. He had consolidated the various ward organizations in the city into an effective support for his own political activities. Most of the politicians in these organizations were strongly opposed to any change in the governmental structure that would further reduce their power, which had been on the wane, even in the city, with the growth of the new middle class. The reduction of the number of representatives on the metropolitan council and the complete redistricting that was to take place in the establishment of the new government would have eliminated a majority of these declining ward leaders from office and seriously threatened the futures of even those who might be elected to the council. Thus, pressure on these politicians

to bring the vote out for the charter would not be welcome, no matter from what source. At the same time, the support of the traditional organizations was not enough any more to win a mayoral election in Nashville. Support from the press and the cosmopolitan groups within the city limits had also become necessary. These groups supported metropolitan government strongly and, at least in the case of the newspaper, were quite ready to apply pressure on its behalf.

To complicate the matter further, the mayor was much less well-liked and perhaps even feared outside the city limits and would have had a much more difficult task to be elected as metropolitan mayor than he would have had to be reelected to the city post. Indeed, fear of his election as metropolitan mayor undoubtedly turned some votes against the charter, particularly since many people in the county were led to believe that he would inherit the office automatically once the charter was accepted.

Thus, the mayor ultimately came to support the attempt to establish a metropolitan government though, like the judge, it is open to question as to exactly how disappointed he was with its defeat. In line with this support, he did his part to bring victory for the charter within the city limits, doing so in a manner least likely to harm his own position regardless of the results. While he symbolized city bossism and machine politics to many outside the city limits and, as a result, became somewhat of a liability to the charter in the suburbs, it is unquestionable that his support was worth more than it cost. Without his support, the plan would never even have been submitted to the voters. While the support of the chief administrative officers of the areas in question will not necessarily guarantee victory for a proposed governmental change, absence of such support will virtually guarantee its defeat.

Neither the judge nor the mayor was properly used in the political campaign, primarily because the citizen proponents of the plan wanted to avoid as

TABLE III

VOTER TURNOUT IN THE METROPOLITAN CHARTER REFERENDUM AND SELECTED RECENT ELECTIONS

City Ward	Mayor's Election May 12, 1955	National Election November, 1956	Democratic Primary April 10, 1958	Metropolitan June 17, 1
1	52.0	41.93	28.80	15.2
2	53.5	37.71	26.97	14.1
3	45.1	54.15	29.03	22.3
4	45.8	66.83	39.49	34.1
5	53.3	55.19	30.21	18.6
6	50.4	53.20	31.86	19.8
7	47.6	59.64	35.10	23.7
Total city	49.4	54.35	32.24	22.2
Civil District				
2		69.72	53.70	45.5
3		77.68	37.78	44.0
4		73.55	53.32	47.2
5		66.23	40.54	42.3
6		70.78	39.91	40.4
7		76.81	45.54	50.4
8		70.05	43.73	40.8
9		64.93	43.82	47.5
10		71.04	45.54	50.8
11		76.75	42.62	40.4
12		64.66	40.77	34.8
13		64.83	37.28	37.6
14		66.88	41.10	45.9
15		75.66	41.21	44.7
16		78.77	43.14	45.9
Total County Districts		73.49	42.62	43.8
Total County		64.49	38.15	34.5

much "politics" as possible. If they had been put in a position where they had to help (in the way that the mayor was) and then given the backing to do so, enough politicians in the smaller areas might have been conciliated and brought to support the charter, or at least to remain fully neutral. This would have necessitated some small compromises and a few "deals" to insure the small politicians of some "place in the sun" under the new government. Of course, these compromises would have been limited by the nature of their effect on the goals of the plan and, in any case, a hard core of uncompromising opponents would have remained--people who would get nothing from the new government to compare with what they would lose. Nevertheless, the shifting of a few suburban political leaders by the mayor or judge, coupled with a more effective citizens' campaign, might have helped make the difference between victory and defeat.

From the other politicians who supported the charter, a little help was gained in the final campaign, with a few exceptions. Some helped achieve the initial steps in the local and state legislative bodies. Most were ineffectual in delivering their districts for the charter, including those whose districts did vote for it. These were mostly men without organizations who held office because they reflected their constituents' views (particularly among the local groups). In neither case were they molders of public opinion. In those districts that voted for metropolitan government, the magistrates or councilmen were not responsible for it. In those districts that were against the plan, the magistrates who had supported it generally seemed to be out of touch with their constituencies as far as political matters went.

The support for metropolitan government that developed in this campaign, viewed against the results of the referendum, does a good deal of violence to many accepted theories of community leadership. No matter what criteria might be used to define the "elite" or leadership groups and their members in Davidson

County, it is apparent that virtually all the known community leaders supported the proposed metropolitan government. This includes businessmen, professional people, civic leaders, educators, leaders of both sexes, and leading politicians. Most of the estimates as to the percentage of these leaders supporting the plan varied between 90 and 95 percent. The lowest estimate stated that perhaps 25 percent of the bigger businessmen were opposed to the idea. This concentration of support was evidenced by the organizations that endorsed the plan.

As previously mentioned, the Chamber of Commerce provided the most active support and aid, next to the Planning Commission, from the very beginning. Unfortunately, the leadership of the Chamber and its committees varies in its effectiveness, virtually from year to year. Since this issue continued over a period of four years, the variation in quality of leadership (which means, in practice, quality of the activities of the Chamber) had a pronounced effect on the worth of Chamber support for metropolitan government, as the case of the citizens' committee illustrates.

While it certainly seems that a majority of its membership supported the Chamber's stand, a small but powerful minority took steps to counteract the endorsement. In many respects the Chamber was typical of so many of the group of people it represented. While in favor of metropolitan government, many of its influential members did not want to get involved in the politics necessary to bring about the adoption of the plan.

Other community organizations also came forward to endorse the plan. Very active among these was the League of Women Voters. This group was firm in its support of the plan but not politically adept. Initially discouraged from taking an active role by the men, the League largely confined its activities to arranging panel presentations on behalf of the charter. While it could possibly have been used to increase voter turnout in the areas where its membership is

found, its membership is limited to the cosmopolitan segment of the population. This lessens its potential role in a community-wide political campaign. It did not have the awareness of the difference in approach needed to reach the locals, but neither did any of the other citizens' bodies.

The Tennessee Taxpayers' Association also endorsed the proposal when it was first presented. The TTA represents a rather small group of the biggest businesses in town and reflected the opinion of at least 75 percent of its membership on this issue. It was not expected that the Association would be able to reach the average voter in the community though it did supply valuable information on the prospective tax situation for the newspapers and panels to publicize. This information suffered the fate of most of the information disseminated by proponents of the charter. Either people did not pay attention to the media which circulated it, or they did not believe it was true, after noting its source. With the absence of trusted "middlemen" to vouch for the TTA on this issue, and the presence of such men to deny the truthfulness of the information, people remembered other stands taken by that association and simply did not believe its material.

The Tennessee Municipal League endorsed the plan and helped it through the Legislature once the mayor led the way. It did a good job in its area of specialization, but it is a lobbying organization rather than a campaigning body, so it was of little use during the appeal to the voters.

The Nashville Trades and Labor Council also endorsed the plan as soon as it was released by the Joint Planning Commission. Its leaders served on the various commissions and committees that were responsible for its development, presentation, and attempted implementation. These union leaders were sincerely in favor of it, but were faced with a conflict toward the end of the campaign. A man who served as one of the open opposition leaders contacted several union

leaders to call their attention to a clause in the proposed charter that provided for the appointment of special police to guard private industrial or other installations. While this provision is standard in most municipal charters, the wording used in this one was sufficiently ambiguous so that labor leaders could be frightened with the spectre of private police being used to break unions. In a city like Nashville, where certain employers maintain a very strong anti-union attitude and labor is not really a powerful force in the community, this threat, no matter how vague, does not sit well with union men. This apparent danger was communicated to the rank and file membership by word of mouth, and it is quite possible that the extent of the danger was magnified as the story spread.

The union leaders were placed in a difficult position. On one hand, they had been convinced that the new metropolitan government would provide the needed facilities to attract new industry, thus providing increased employment opportunities and higher wages. Their previous experience with new industry that had come to the Nashville area in the past generally confirmed this. At the same time, memories of the struggles for unionization in the past and knowledge that similar possibilities existed in the future made them leery of any ambiguous provisions in the charter that could be used to their disadvantage. Since most of the labor leaders are not extensively involved in the local community at the cosmopolitan level, they were not easily reassured by business leaders, nor did they even communicate their fears to others outside union ranks. In the end, it seems that most of them decided to vote for the charter personally, but they virtually ceased the campaign among the workers since they did not know what to say.

The rank and file workers had much less of a conflict. They were already disposed to oppose the plan by virtue of their community associations with other locals, for the same reasons of misunderstanding, ignorance, apathy, and distrust found among their neighbors. When their own union leaders circulated the report

about the special police provision in the charter and then did not attempt to convince them to support the plan any further, they had little incentive to do so from any angle. The executive director of the citizens' committee did speak to some union groups and perhaps made some of the workers reflect on the advantages of new industry. The endorsements of the Trades and Labor Council and its newspaper were probably known. But the voting records of the working class wards and districts reveal that few workers voted for the charter despite the official endorsements of the local labor movement (see Appendix B). It is also unlikely that labor played a great role in the campaign as a whole. It is another example of a specific group in the community that was alienated, rather than a determining factor of first magnitude.

Of the other civic groups that endorsed the plan, all were made up of cosmopolitans. These included some of the suburban chambers of commerce, even in areas that voted against the charter. Such endorsements and their lack of significant results point up the cleavage that exists between the cosmopolitans and locals even when both live in the same area. Unless conscious and concerted effort is made to bridge the gap--the kind of effort made by the politicians, no communication occurs.

The same hesitancy to become involved in political activity noted among the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce was evident among many of the cosmopolitans in the community. The alienation of these groups from political processes and actions was quite apparent in this campaign. While the issue itself was relatively widely discussed among these groups, actual connections with city politics continued to be tenuous. Indeed, the attitudes of many of the pro-charter businessmen were that the charter itself made too many concessions to politics. This demonstration of a lack of understanding of the political processes and the attitudes of other parts of the community made it virtually

impossible for the proponents of the plan to reach enough people and convince them of the charter's merits.

Community support was centered in the wealthy incorporated suburbs and was represented by the cosmopolitan "old Nashvillians" in that area. These "old Nashvillians," whose families have lived in the city for several generations, have produced a majority of the community leaders for most, if not all, of that time. Following the migrational pattern of most American cities of similar size, these people have moved out of Nashville to better neighborhoods in the suburbs, while retaining their close ties to the central city. Indeed, not only are their ties close, but, in every respect but the political, they dominate the city's life. Research done at Vanderbilt University indicates that 89 percent of all the doctors in the Nashville area live outside the city. So do forty of the forty-four directors of the Chamber of Commerce and nine out of ten industrialists employing over 500 workers. Similar figures apply to virtually all other categories of non-political community leadership.

These old Nashvillians have retained great interest in the city to which they are bound by ties of economics and sentiment. Not only are they concerned with protecting their interests, but they have a great pride in Nashville as such and do not want to give up their attachment to the city. Thus, there are two reasons for their desire to maintain political control over the city, as well as the control they have by virtue of their economic positions. They do not want to see their beloved city turned into a slum, even if they are protected outside of it, since such a development would affect business and "patriotic" interests alike, interests which seem to be inseparable to a great extent. There were even substantial reasons for an area of high property value occupied by wealthy people, who might possibly be subjected to higher taxes under the new government, to have become the center and main source of strength for the proposed

charter. One of these reasons was simply that, as better educated people, they could and did follow the arguments of the proponents to the effect that increased taxes would come in any case and probably would be less in a consolidated government that would eliminate some overlapping offices. Here the people seemed to realize that question of economy was more complex than simply cutting taxes and, in effect, chose the lesser of two evils.

As already mentioned, the concept of community among the cosmopolitans tends to be rather broad, embracing the entire metropolitan and prospective metropolitan area. These are the people who live in the county, have their offices downtown in the city, visit friends in both city and county, and attend social and cultural activities in both places. From all points of view, they look at a broader "neighborhood" at the outset and conceive of its expansion in broader terms.

The acceptance of the desirability for community growth on the part of a majority of the cosmopolitans in the past ten years was also of benefit to the proponents of the plan. By the same token, the minority that continued to oppose growth also opposed metropolitan consolidation. Some of these conservatives honestly oppose any changes that would basically alter the nature of the community as they know it. Others support the status quo because it seems to best serve their economic interests. Both of these types joined to oppose the charter while those in favor of attracting new businesses and industries were attracted by the plan. This was recognized by the newspapers which played up the advantages of the proposed consolidation in stimulating this type of community growth.

Support of the proposed charter on the part of the suburban cosmopolitans was made easier by the legal provisions governing the future of their incorporated "bedroom" suburbs under the consolidated county. No incorporated suburb was required to surrender its autonomy and join the urban services district except by

its own choice. They could remain parts of the general services district, receiving only the minimum number of county-wide services and providing any others as they willed locally. Even the addition of the county-wide services would have been a boon to these relatively under-serviced suburbs. They could have maintained their autonomy under these conditions until the new government had proved itself in other parts of the county. Indeed, some of the proponents of the charter used this rather cynical argument extensively in the public and private campaign in the affected suburbs. Passage of the proposed charter would have resulted in the substitution of a better county government for a weaker one insofar as these suburbs were concerned. At the same time, the residents of these suburbs would have acquired an equal vote in the management of the affairs of the central city without surrendering local autonomy where it mattered to them.

The potentialities of this arrangement did not escape the opposition, who called it to the attention of the suburban locals who lived in unincorporated areas and the city locals who resented what seemed to be an attempt by wealthy suburbanites to take over the city. Some doubters were probably influenced by this, and others were confirmed in their opposition to the charter. This became one of the stronger points in the opposition's campaign.

The Struggle in the Negro Community

The Negro population in the Nashville area is unevenly divided between city and county. As in most metropolitan areas North and South, the percentage of Negro population in the central city is increasing rapidly as the whites move out to the suburbs. In 1950, the Negroes constituted 33.8 percent of the city's population. By 1958, one specialist on metropolitan Nashville estimated their share of the city's population to have risen to 45 percent. At the same time, the county had no more than 8 percent Negroes in its population.

This difference in number is reflected in difference in status of the two Negro communities in relation to their white neighbors. Within Nashville proper, the Negroes are an influential minority, with two of their race on the twenty-one man city council. They have representation on the boards and commissions of the city government, serve as political and civil service officeholders, and embrace a class of businessmen, educators (from the several local Negro colleges), and professional people who form a cosmopolitan group and are developing rather close relations with their white counterparts.

While these developments are of fairly recent origin, progress in the last few years has been considerable. The Negro leadership has been given a stake not only in their minority community, but in the community at large. They have been able to participate not only as Negroes, but as contributing citizens, particularly in the preparation of the plan and charter for metropolitan government. This situation is entirely in line with Nashville's response to public school integration. The general attitude toward the race question seems to be a fairly consistent one, with consistent progress being made.

This was not always the case, by any means. In order to understand the positions of the Negroes on the metropolitan government issue, it is necessary at least briefly to examine the background to their achievement of representation in the community.

Prior to 1951, attempts to elect Negro representatives to the city council failed because of the power of the white community to alter the electoral system whenever such an achievement was threatened. Near the turn of the century, a Negro won a seat on the city council and was gerrymandered out of office at the next election. Some time later, another would have won, but a crucial ballot box disappeared. Once again the Negroes threatened to seat one of their race through the development of a Negro majority in one ward, so the number of wards was reduced

from twenty-four to seven, erasing the power of any Negro concentration. When a Negro majority threatened one of the larger seven wards, at-large councilmanic elections were adopted.

Finally, in 1949, a group of politically eonscious Negroes were able to organize and to persuade the present mayor, then a state senator, to secure a local bill from the State Legislature to create councilmanic districts, with the proviso that the councilmen had to reside in the district from which they were elected. This enabled the present two Negro members of the city council to win office in 1951. It also does much to explain the reason for the high rate of Negro support for the mayor that has existed since then.

At the time of the charter referendum, there was a Negro majority in the two councilmanic districts which they controlled. They were estimated to have about half the population in another one and close to that in two more. A sixth district had about 45 percent Negro population and a seventh approximately 40 percent. This means that, under the present system, the Negroes could elect one-third of the city council in the very near future and, given the rate at which their proportion of the city's population is increasing, even think about electing a Negro mayor within a generation. (Incidentally, though racial issues did not play any great role in the campaign, the idea that this was a possibility was spread covertly, by word of mouth, in some areas and probably did help intensify support among the cosmopolitan, old Nashvillian groups, who were afriad of lower class and Negro control of Nashville.)

Not only is time working in favor of the Negroes, but little can be done to change the situation by political means. It would not be possible to gerrymander the city again since a two-thirds vote in the council would be needed, and too many white councilmen depend on Negro support to win their own seats for such a move to muster the necessary majority. More than that, the two Negroes on the

council have demonstrated their general competence so well that one of them says that even the white minority (35 percent) in his district votes for him, furnishing one-third of his total vote. This last did not come about without effort on his part, but seems to be the case by now.

With a record of such solid gains in relatively few years and the possibility for even greater gains in prospect, it is not surprising that the initial reaction of the Negro community and its leadership to the proposed new government was highly negative. When the idea was first announced, both councilmen, as well as other community leaders, came out in opposition to any change in governmental structure that might weaken the Negro position and cancel any of their hard-won gains. As one of them said, "My people remember Dr. Walker (the last previous Negro councilman)."

The white leaders of the metropolitan government movement recognized this opposition, both as to its potentialities to defeat the plan and as to the legitimacy of the Negro fears. There can be no question of their sincerity in this. They did feel that the Negro gains had to be maintained and that the possibilities for increasing these gains would remain. Their whole course of action in dealing with the Negro community was predicted upon providing the political security the Negroes wanted. As a result, there was active Negro representation on the Joint Planning Commission, the charter commission, and the citizens' committee. The Negro representatives served with the entire community in mind, as well as serving as guardians of their people's interests, and were so accepted by the other members of the commissions, who thought highly of their contributions to the plans in general.

We have seen how the only attempt to safeguard specific interests in drawing up the councilmanic districts was to safeguard Negro rights by assuring them the same number of seats that they presently hold on the city council in

the metropolitan council of the same size. Since the latter would replace both city and county legislative bodies, this meant an increase in the proportion of Negro representation in the county as a whole. Of course, with the individual districts made larger, and including the entire metropolitan population, Negro representation would not increase as much in the future as it would have in the city alone, though the possibilities for them to elect another councilman either at large or in a third district were considered to be good by the planning commission.

As a demonstration of this concern for the Negro minority, the county judge appointed a Negro businessman as one of his five charter commission members, the first time a Negro was given any political appointment in the county.

At the polls, the results of this concern were reflected in the close to even division among the Negroes who voted, close to half supporting metropolitan government. Considering the obstacles that had to be overcome, this was quite an accomplishment for the proponents of the plan. This is not to say that a majority of the Negro population was won over to the support of the charter, which was not the case by any means. The division was on lines very similar to those in the white community, with the cosmopolitans voting for the charter and the locals voting against (see Table IV). Since most of the latter did not vote, the close to even division was possible.

The Negro cosmopolitan group is too disorganized and competitive to provide political leadership for the rest of their people, but it does provide cultural leadership to the extent that it is wanted. They serve as the representatives of their race to their counterparts in the white community.

These people were convinced that they should support metropolitan government for the good of the entire community, on the grounds that, if the Negroes wanted full rights of citizenship, they had to think in terms of the overall

TABLE IV

THE VOTE IN THE NEGRO PRECINCTS

Ward	Precinct	Population* Composition	Turnout	Percent for Charter	Comments
1	2	Few Negroes	18.5	36.5	
	3	Negro Majority	14.6	49.2	
	4	Negro Minority	11.7	44.0	
	5	Negro Majority	7.0	50.0	
	6	Negro Minority	18.1	44.4	
2	1	Few Negroes	15.7	51.8	
	2	Negro Majority	11.4	51.7	
	3	Predominantly Negro	6.9	29.5	
	4	Few Negro	15.2	48.5	
	5	Predominantly Negro	13.8	29.0	
	6	Negro Minority	17.8	54.1	Negroes Cosmopolitan / Whites Local
3	1	Predominantly Negro	18.2	68.9	
	2	50:50	24.1	50.4	
	3	Predominantly Negro	10.9	40.2	
	4	Few Negro	21.3	66.6	Negroes Cosmopolitan / Whites Local
	5	Predominantly Negro	21.6	72.4	Cosmopolitan
5	1	Predominantly Negro	9.4	42.9	
	2	Predominantly Negro	18.4	52.4	Cosmopolitan
	3	Predominantly Negro	15.2	44.2	
	4	Few Negroes	17.6	45.8	
	5	Few Negroes	15.3	54.8	

TABLE IV
(continued)

Ward	Precinct	Population* Composition	Turnout	Percent for Charter	Comments
6	1	Few Negroes	22.4	51.1	Cosmopolitan
	2	Negro Minority	14.8	45.6	
	3	Few Negroes	27.2	59.4	Negroes Cosmopolitan
	4	Negro Minority	20.9	56.6	
	5	Predominantly Negro	9.4	31.8	
7	4	Negro Minority	20.0	48.8	
	5	Few Negroes	15.7	75.5	
	6	Few Negroes	14.8	49.8	

*Few Negroes - Negro Minority - 50:50 - Negro Majority - Predominantly Negro

This table is compiled from information obtained from the Nashville-Davidson County Joint Planning Commission. The number of Negroes in each precinct in 1958 can only be estimated; therefore the five division scale was chosen as the best means to characterize each precinct in this regard. Cosmopolitan precincts are identified. Others are predominantly local or divided. The exceptions to the summary of voting behavior presented in the body of the text are due to local considerations, particularly the influence of specific personalities either for or against the charter in certain areas.

community, not only in terms of the particularistic Negro interests. It was on these grounds that one of the Negro councilmen changed his mind and worked to support the charter. These people provided the margin for victory in several racially mixed precincts where they represent the more cosmopolitan element. These precincts are in changing neighborhoods which are becoming Negro in composition. Those whites still remaining are primarily from the poorer elements while the Negroes who are moving in are the most cosmopolitan in their community.

The bulk of the Negro community did not vote at all in the referendum. As is so often the case in similar situations, an issue does not draw the attention that a personality does, particularly when most of the voters need to be "hauled" to the polls in any case.

School integration, as such, was a minor issue in the campaign, on either side. The issue was potentially available because the city schools were integrating while the county schools were not. Somewhat of a whispering campaign was conducted on both sides. Some whites in the county were told that the charter would bring them integrated schools. At the same time, some Negroes in the city were told that it would bring them re-segregated ones. Neither of these rumors seemed to have taken hold or affected the campaign much except in one or two isolated areas.

The Negro opposition to the charter also attempted to justify its stand in terms of the entire community, using the same reasons as the white opposition, as well as its own specific ones. The close correspondence between the campaigns and voting patterns of the white and Negro communities in this campaign is indicative of the general position of the Negro in Nashville, a city which, in certain respects, seems to have achieved more progress in the area of race relations than most cities, North or South. The fact that the point has been reached where Negroes can begin to think publicly in terms of the general welfare as well as

in terms of Negro welfare is one of the important reasons why so many Nashville Negroes could be convinced to support a metropolitan government proposal. The development of this support was perhaps the greatest achievement of the charter's proponents in the area of political campaigning. It was achieved because the problem was recognized early and plans were made to meet it, many of which were carried out.

CHAPTER V

THE OPPOSITION AND THE EFFECTS OF THE OPPOSITION CAMPAIGN

The opponents of the charter were divided into two basic categories. On one hand, there were those who opposed for reasons as close to pure self-interest as is possible. These were officeholders, most politicians, many schoolteachers, some businessmen, the underworld, and the "private government" officers and employees (such as the private police). On the other hand, there were those who opposed the plan for a combination of reasons, including self-interest, but also for reasons based on their general outlook toward government and community matters. This latter group can be subdivided into "reactionaries" and "liberals." This second group provided the leadership for the entire opposition.

The "reactionaries" are so denominated because among them were included local businessmen and industrialists who have been known to oppose every change and every progressive endeavor that has involved Nashville in the past quarter century, including TVA (a popular institution in the Nashville area as it is in the rest of the Tennessee Valley service region), every aspect of the New Deal, urban renewal (including restoration of the state capitol), and any attempts to bring new industry to Davidson County. They were comfortable with the status quo since they knew how to manipulate existing institutions to their own advantage. They opposed new industry because they did not want to have wage rates raised or the surplus labor supply eliminated. It was virtually a foregone conclusion that these people would oppose metropolitan government. The only question was how openly and how hard.

Most of the reactionaries did not campaign openly against the plan, though anyone interested sufficiently in the issue knew who they were and something of what they were doing. They stayed in the background partly because they did not want publicity and partly because knowledge of their opposition to a measure would probably help its proponents, just as a general rule. Nevertheless, they

provided the organizing framework and most of the money for the opposition campaign. In turn, they had other men lead the open opposition.

Nevertheless, a few of them had to present themselves publicly. These included the vice president of a leading bank in the community, a bluff, direct individual, not afraid to take a public stand, who has a strong record of opposition to proposed changes in the community and who comes from a family with a similar record.

A second opposition leader whose position was taken openly served as an organizer of the opposition campaigners. Generally on the basis of a misunderstanding of the question, he combined his beliefs and what he conceived to be his interests to support the opposition. A third leader from this group, and the most open of them all, was the incorporation-conscious suburban magistrate previously encountered. He is another one of those who have publicly and vociferously opposed virtually all change. While his stand was probably a sincere combination of his ideals and self-interest, his reputation as a perpetual "anti" probably gave his views little weight in any part of the community. He served as a voice for the campaign in its initial stages and helped in the efforts to organize the other opponents.

These three people represent the most active open opponents among the so-called "reactionaries." They are not necessarily close to each other, but will combine on issues of common agreement, just as the proponents did. They were backed by the minority of business leaders of similar views who did not display them publicly. They all come from cosmopolitan groups who, through a cleverly developed system of intermediaries, were able to reach the locals in the community.

The other "reactionaries" were represented by some of the county politicians, primarily the older magistrates from the most rural districts farthest

away from the central city, who not only opposed the move for the sufficient reason that their constituencies were not parts of the metropolitan area in point of fact or interest, but because they, too, were from the older political breed who had tried to resist changes of any sort over the years. These men had an interest in retaining their offices, which they knew they would lose with the reduction in size of the metropolitan council, but, even more than that, they represented another era.

These men are virtually all remnants of the old county political organization which, in coalition with the "reactionary" business interests and a group of city politicians, controlled the county before 1950. The remnants of that earlier coalition provided the money and brains behind the defeat of the charter, with the addition of the new powers in various districts of the county who were available to do the precinct work. Actually, the rural remnants of the organization were of little significance. Their districts were opposed to metropolitan government in any case and, in view of their general outlook, they had virtually no following in the county as a whole.

The "liberals" are so-called because they are people who opposed metropolitan government for ostensible reasons which they consider to be liberal and not because it represented a change as such. They identify themselves with what are usually considered liberal causes outside this issue or the local community. They support the liberal wing of the Democratic Party on social welfare issues and support the candidates identified with that wing in their campaigns. For example, many of them moved directly from working to defeat the charter to helping reelect Senator Albert Gore. They opposed metropolitan government on the surface for such reasons as "keeping government close to the people." Their beliefs were probably sincere, though involved with those beliefs were reasons of self-interest.

These "liberals" joined with the reactionaries to campaign against the proposed charter. The "liberals" served as the open opposition since, in general, they were more acceptable to the general public and to their own local constituents.

While most of these "liberals" still identified with the locals as either more congenial or as sources of political power, there were also some "liberals" from the cosmopolitan community among the opponents of the charter. The leading and most influential public speaker for the opposition, a distinguished local attorney who has represented a number of local labor unions, came from the cosmopolitan group. (He was the one who pointed out the special police clause in the charter to his union friends.) In general, he has considered himself quite left of center in his approach to social issues and had not generally been found on the same side of an issue as the reactionaries he worked with on this one. Perhaps he can best be described as an old-line Progressive. His function was to engage in such public debates as there were on the issue, on behalf of the opposition, and also to present their case on television. It should be noted that he, personally, did not oppose the charter for all the reasons that contributed most to its defeat. He was not opposed to higher taxes if better services would be provided, and he advocated annexation of the suburban urbanized areas by the city. His opposition was based on a rather negative attitude to the virtues of industrial growth, disbelief in either the necessity or practicality of the proposed plan, a belief that the services would not be provided, and a feeling that the plan would further remove local government from the hands of the people, particularly from the locals. Excluding his positions on taxation and annexation, his views did reflect the general feelings of the majority of the electorate and, as such, were indicative of the decisive reasons for the defeat of the charter.

A number of local politicians and community leaders from some of the satellite communities around Nashville were also included in the "liberal" opposition. They were quite influential in precinct work in their areas. Since they were known by their neighbors and generally trusted in their communities, their views and the information about the charter which they circulated were accepted by the communities they served. It was with these people that the proponents failed most. Since the vote, at least some of them have had second thoughts. If their interests in the matter would have been considered by the leadership of the proponents' campaign, it is entirely possible that (a) the charter would have won as is, or (b) a few changes would have been made to deal with their legitimate fears.

Their own self-interest in the matter seems to have primarily revolved around loss of status. None of this group has much of a place in the overall leadership of the community. Even those on the County Quarterly Court serve much more as representatives of their districts than as of policymakers for the county as a whole. They were quite conscious of the fact that the new government, in which the suburban communities would disappear and the metropolitan council would be so much smaller, would bring them a real loss in influence and status, since they would have to seek both primarily from the large community rather than from the smaller communities. It would have been unlikely that many of them could have achieved similar positions under the new arrangements; thus, their sacrifice would have been great. Perhaps local community leaders would have emerged even under one government. It seemed to them to be too great a chance to take.

The Negro opposition should undoubtedly be classified among the "liberals" since their stand was along lines similar to that of the leaders of smaller communities in their fear of loss of a voice in government, and they would be

classed as "liberals" on most of the other issues.

The Politicians

Despite the fact that many of the politicians publicly announced that they were in favor of metropolitan government, as a group they were definitely opposed to it and deserve to be included among the charter's opponents. In fact, many of those who announced for the plan were forced to do so by public pressure and quietly told their friends and associates to vote against it.

The opposing politicians can be dealt with in two groups: those who ostensibly supported the charter but secretly opposed it, and those who opposed it outright.

Those politicians holding positions with the city or county (particularly the city, where the mayor operates a much stronger organization) or beholden to the newspapers for support were often forced through pressure to state publicly that they supported the charter. While the exigencies of the situation required their public support, privately they would let the truth circulate to the effect that they were forced to sign statements or make announcements, and that they really opposed the plan. This not only cancelled any effects their published statements might have had (we must remember that they were probably read by those already committed to, or leaning toward support of the charter), but served to create opponents among those who felt that the coercion itself was unfair and another indication of pressure from the "higher-ups."

In some cases, the department head would come out in favor of the charter and his subordinates would campaign against it, either with his tacit approval or despite his own stand. For example, the county sheriff officially declared himself to be neutral, but the sheriff's patrol engaged in a quiet but active campaign against the charter, which opposition was locally assumed to have his blessing.

Those politicians who did not have to take a public position in favor of the charter were virtually all against it, openly and actively but not loudly. In the city, the politicians from the local districts were most open in their opposition, though they were prevented from really bringing out a large vote because of the mayor's stand. Nevertheless, they could carry their districts against the charter. While the politicians in the other districts were probably personally hesitant about the new plan, the nature of their constituencies made it difficult for them to take any formal stand in opposition.

In the county, virtually all the opposing politicians were simply following the general attitudes of their constituencies. This was particularly true the farther away from the central city the constituency was situated.

The principal old machine in the city which still holds together to some extent, despite a great loss of power with the new-style electorate, opposed metropolitan government in every possible manner, since the new governmental system threatened it with the loss of what power it had left. Since they had a fair organization and, most important, a fine reservoir of brains, their support contributed a great deal to the opposition campaign. The leaders of this machine provided the outline of the campaign and its strategy, and the newer district organizations or groupings, particularly in the local suburbs, could go out and follow through successfully in the field. This was possible because, essentially, both old and new organizations of this type were appealing to the same type of electorate. Only the forms of services to their constituents had changed.

It is a mistake to regard this concern over position as simply the selfishness of a small and anachronistic group of men. Though many of them can be described along such lines, the very fact that they are accepted and valued by their constituents, who happen to make up a majority of the area's population, indicates that either consciously or despite themselves they play a needed role

in government. This position must be identified and considered in any attempt to solve metropolitan area problems. The real nature of their role has been suggested earlier as one of providing necessary contacts with government for their local constituents. It is one that is openly presented, and understood, by the most articulate leaders of such machines and it is worth stating here.

These politicians play an important role bridging the gap between the man in the street and the top leadership in the community. In essence, they provide the connection with government for the person who is not intimately connected with it in any other way. They personalize and humanize government for their constituents. Experienced in matters political and in the politics of administration, they serve as means of access to and sources of remedy from the natural processes of bureaucracy,available to the voters they aim to serve. To the people they serve, these are the important matters in the field of government. They are much less concerned about the larger issues in local government, particularly when they have problems of immediate concern which they can remedy through their local politicians.

Of course, the new charter would not abolish politicians, but, by reducing the number of districts and representatives to the metropolitan council from a total of 75 to 21, it would reduce the number of representatives available to be contacted and remove those left even further from their constituents.

With the exception of a few of the city politicians who have district organizations which bring them money from various sources and the county law enforcement officers who also seem to profit from their positions, most of the suburban politicians seek status more than material gain. They are men otherwise economically secure (not rich, but with decent sources of support in business or the like) who want to be community leaders and are willing to provide the necessary services to secure the status they are seeking.

These men were afraid, with some cause, that consolidation of the city and the county, no matter what the virtues of the plan, would reduce them from representatives of their quasi-independent communities, with status, to "nobodies" within a large consolidated community where the power would remain only in the hands of those already in leadership positions in the city. They were middlemen afraid of being eliminated, who knew that their backgrounds would mitigate against their ever being able to break into the ranks of the top leadership. As long as their local communities were quasi-independent, with their own institutions and social structures, they would be leaders at home and, by virtue of that, have some kind of voice in the county as a whole. Once this independence would be lost, they would be, too.

Since the proponents of the charter did not recognize this problem, which did not exist in their sections of the community, they did not take even those steps possible to avert it. Many of these local political figures could have been assured of a continuance of their role in the larger community, just as the Negro leadership was. Some of them would have been convinced and, in turn, might have supplied the link between their constituents and the charter. While it would have been unreasonable to assume that those politicians with vested interests in the status quo that would have really been threatened would have been convinced, some of the others very likely would have. Indeed, some whom the judge talked to were convinced.

In general, the question of broad-based citizen participation in the political process must be considered. The magistrates and councilmen from cosmopolitan districts are not called upon to provide contacts, services, and expertise in dealing with the administration in the same way that their colleagues are in the local areas. This is at least in part because the majority of their constituents are not used to thinking of their representatives in such terms, and

the minority, usually the most wealthy, have other means of direct access.

Allied Opponents

Davidson County has developed another group of politicians that had a large stake in opposing the charter. These can be called the "private politicians," representing the private police and fire departments and the garbage collectors in the suburban areas. Actually, there was no strict separation between the private and public politicians, since many of the owners and chiefs of the private protection services were also elected constables or deputized by the sheriff. These people played the role of politicians in their communities as well as providing their clients with minimum fire and police protection. Their services had been available for such tasks as delivering groceries, transporting the sick to their doctors, giving the children rides on the fire engines, and undertaking many similar activities usually associated with the political machine, all provided at the proverbial "no extra cost." These fringe benefits seem to mean more to the average resident in the local communities than better sewers, street lights, library service, and even better protection. Perhaps this is a result of a feeling that major trouble strikes infrequently but delivery and transportation services are often needed. These services are diligently provided, with the providers constantly reminding their customers that no public police or fire department would do the same.[1]

The same is true in the case of refuse removal. The private collectors tell their customers that, if the city were doing the job, each householder would have to carry his own garbage cans out to the curb, while, for the same price,

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[1]All the politicians whom I interviewed accepted this view of the "private politicians" and the popular reaction to their services.

they provide service from the house itself.

These private politicians had a large stake in defeating the proposed charter. Even those who would not have been threatened immediately knew that, in the long run, they would lose their businesses. All those hoping to enter these businesses or already so employed combined to work against the charter.

Each private police and fire department was available as an excellent precinct organization. Its employees were already being paid and, in addition, were motivated by concern for their jobs. Each department had direct personal contacts in every part of the area it served, and its employees were trusted possessors of status in the areas of the locals. This combination of qualities provided the opposition with a precinct organization in the county to match its regular political organization in the city, both of which the proponents lacked. This organization was used, and used well.

The communities that voted for the charter, with one exception, also made use of the same arrangements for fire, police, and garbage services. The big difference can be noted in terms of the relative prestige of the private politicians in each area. There is no doubt that they were as opposed to metropolitan government in Forest Hills on the one side as in Madison on the other. However, in the cosmopolitan communities a private fireman or even a constable is regarded as a servant, a hired man brought in from the outside to provide a specific service, not as a resident of the community and participant in its activities and sharer of its values.

In a local community, a man in the same position is quite likely a resident of the area he serves and, furthermore, a respected member of the community. He, or at least his chief, is likely to engage in community activities aside from his professional services, often in a leadership role because of his contacts within the community. Even if this were not the case, the services he provides

on a professional basis are valued more highly in such an area than they would be on the other side of the city. If he is a constable, he has been elected to the position by his neighbors, as one of the three local officials an unincorporated community is entitled to elect. As such, he has prestige and his advice tends to be respected. All these prestige roles made him a man who was considered qualified to interpret the outside world to his community, particularly on an issue of local government.

Furthermore, a private politician in such a community had much more at stake than his opposite number who was considered a hired man. His whole status was at stake, just like that of his public politician counterpart. His opposite number, as was the case with politicians from the cosmopolitan communities, was not in a status position to begin with, so his campaigning could neither be as effective nor did he have that extra motivation to defeat the charter.

Other Opponents

Among the opponents whose stand was based purely on self-interest, two rather disparate groups remain to be mentioned: the underworld and the teachers. At least some members of both groups felt that their interests would be served by retaining the status quo while the proposed change might well damage them. Both took steps to prevent the change from coming into being.

It has already been noted that the numbers racketeers were probably not in favor of the proposed charter but hesitated to do too much against it in view of the mayor's stand. It was something of a different story with the gamblers and bootleggers. At least one case has been authenticated where they contributed time and money in the campaign to defeat the charter.

The schoolteachers proved to be as conservative and as afraid of change as the politicians. Despite the fact that their interests were carefully con-

sidered by the charter commission and that their positions, status, and economic benefits were guaranteed, they were very hesitant about the proposition because the two separate school systems were to be amalgamated over a period of years. This opposition was most pronounced among the county schoolteachers, who were afraid that their superintendent would not be appointed to head the new metropolitan system.

Actually, their formal stand and informal efforts present a rather confused picture. The teachers seemed to be basically locals, sharing the fears and outlook of the latter group. It seems that the county school superintendent used his influence quietly against the charter. The fact that the new board of education would be appointed rather than elected was raised but did not seem to play much of a role. Neither did the question of integration in the city and segregation in the county. Such issues were just not much of a factor in this campaign.

The primary opposition from the city schoolteachers came from people either retired or close to retirement who misunderstood the provisions in the charter guaranteeing the continuance of the special city pension plan for all those under it at the time of adoption of the new government.

The Campaign of the Opposition

With the exception of a few flurries, which were mentioned in Chapter I, the opposition campaign was largely confined to the two weeks immediately preceding the vote. This was a well-conceived strategic move that was extremely successful in befuddling the proponents and reaching the voters without allowing the former to counteract their statements.

Once the initial opposition had been registered among the members of the various legislative bodies, state and local, including charges that the plan was socialistic and a foreign import, the opposition seemed to fade away. The

proponents were concerned about this at first, and the newspapers kept trying to find an opposition to knock down. The lack of an open opposition helped retard the activities of the citizens' committee, since no sense of urgency emerged until too late. All this went according to the plans of the opponents of the charter, who had decided to develop a whirlwind campaign of obfuscation, utilizing the political means at their disposal to play upon the fears of the voters they were trying to reach.

After the referendum, they made no secret of the fact that they had intended to wage a no-holds-barred type of campaign. Some of the leaders who are considered part of the more "respectable" element later tried to rationalize their actions and even to maintain the truth of their previous statements, but others among them frankly admitted their feelings that use of any means was legitimate in order to defeat the charter. It seems quite clear that the opposition purposely avoided almost all possible real issues to distort the charter through a series of half-truths that could be used to play upon the fears of the locals at whom their campaign was primarily aimed. Behind the entire activity were these big business and industrial elements in opposition. Under the leadership described above, they contacted the various political groups that were opposed and arranged for the formation of a campaign committee, with adequate financial backing. This campaign committee was a shadowy organization. It consisted of the magistrates, constables and private politicians opposed to the charter. They formed a central coordinating committee at the beginning of June, about three weeks before the referendum. This committee accepted the strategy suggested by the leaders of the old machine, laid plans to implement it, and provided for monetary assessments to carry it out.

The approach used to defeat the charter had been used previously to defeat various bond issues. The plan was eminently suited to the needs of the

opposition. They decided to concentrate on the residents in the local suburban areas. They knew that these people tended to oppose the charter anyhow and could be reached and convinced to vote against it by just the methods used most comfortably by the machine. They did not attempt a hard campaign in the city, leaving that to the city district politicians. This was because they knew that all they had to do was to defeat the charter in the county and it would be lost, no matter what the city did. They made a relatively minor effort in the cosmopolitan suburban areas, since they knew that their type of campaign would not be very successful there. They calculated where they could apply the most pressure, in terms of impact and organization, and there did the most good.

Before the first week in June, all they did was circulate rumors about taxes, the newspapers' reasons for supporting the charter, the mayor, and the like. Then they turned to a more open struggle, sending out several mailings and utilizing their ready-made precinct organization for a door-to-door, or person-to-person,campaign.

Money was obtained from the very rich who had opposed the plan from the beginning, their friends whom they convinced to contribute, the gamblers and bootleggers, and through assessments on each private police and fire chief. The latter were assessed $500 apiece. Not all of them contributed, but enough did to provide for the mailings. The leader of the opposition issued a statement to the newspapers, declaring his opposition to the plan as opposition to increased taxes, larger government with its attendant increase in waste and corruption, and an unhealthy growth of population. He arranged for the respected liberal lawyer to make his television and other public appearances in opposition to the charter. These two men were brought together through the co-leader of the old machine, who was close to both men from other political battles, since they were not normally found on the same side of an issue.

The newspaper statement, the television appearance, and a few speeches and debates in front of various groups were about the extent of the campaign directed primarily toward the cosmopolitans.

Other public actions included full page ads in both newspapers presenting the opposition's case, a jingle sung on the radio during the last week of the campaign, and the handbills distributed and mailed to both sides of the county. The jingle was in fine singing commercial style, to the tune of "I've Been Working on the Railroad." It stressed the inevitability of a tax increase if the charter were adopted, a potent issue in the campaign. It is illustrative of a general approach to politics that many of the charter's proponents considered this to be undignified and unfair competition.

Meanwhile, the private police and fire departments had become active, according to plan. Their normal distribution of favors was increased just before the vote. At least some of these private agencies sent men around their communities to talk to the leading families about the charter, pointedly reminding them of the services they now had and of the fact that none of the proponents had come to speak to them personally. This was a first-rate grass-roots selling job.

The constables and deputy sheriffs worked very hard along the same lines. In addition, they reached those citizens whom they had helped out of difficult situations on previous occasions. For example, an alcoholic who is always quietly released from custody is worth his vote and those of his family. And they can be made to go to the polls while others are apathetic and stay home.

The old machine leadership itself did nothing more than supply the strategy since, with the state of political affairs in Davidson County, their public support had become more of a handicap than a help. This was true even in relation to the newer, small political organizations scattered about the area. They had no desire to become involved with the old organization since they represent

the "new" machine of post-war American politics. The coalition that existed up to 1950 could still serve as a significant force but had to do so further in the background.

The magistrates who openly opposed the charter did not all campaign against it to the same extent. Some confined themselves to telling their neighbors of their views while others even campaigned near the polls on election day. Those with a more professional political background who have built organizations or, at least, strong followings also tended to oppose metropolitan government more vehemently and more actively.

The handbills and advertisements that were placed before the public consisted of charges that were designed to reinforce the fears already present in the minds of the locals toward whom the campaign was directed. They concentrated on charges that taxes would be raised considerably and that the promised services would not be provided after the new taxes would be levied, probably not even within the next generation. In addition, they claimed that the county would be saddled with a massive city debt and that every individual home would automatically be mortgaged to secure that debt. The people were told that representative government would be reduced with the abolition of the County Quarterly Court and that a strong mayor would have dictatorial powers over the entire county. All employees of both present governments would be continued under the new government, so the opponents proclaimed that this created overlapping positions to waste more tax dollars and effect none of the savings that might make it worthwhile to abandon a "tried and true system of government" such as they had at present.

Most of their charges were half-truths, but, since they were half true, they could not be effectively denied, even if there had been time to do so. The question of taxes was truly an open one. All the proponents could say was that

taxes would go up in any case and would go up less under the new charter. Services had to be provided within one year after the full tax rate would have been imposed on a neighborhood, but this was easily distorted into a "taxes before services" issue. In addition, some taxes would have been added for the general services in any case. The debt charge was a false one, since the debts of both city and county were about equal to begin with, and the new arrangement for paying them would not have altered the situation appreciably.

The charge in regard to representative government was closest to the truth and was a question of conflicting ideas of governmental reform which could not be dealt with on any common ground. (It was somewhat of a political victory on the part of the planners that they resisted more of the so-called "good government" reforms when the charter was drafted. If they had not, the entire proposition would have been lost at the outset.) The same was true of the introduction of a strong mayor system. In a sense, the most interesting charge was that the new government would keep all the employees of both old governments. This provision was inserted to protect many of the very people who were now using it as a club to beat down the entire effort. In the same way, many of the possible mistakes made by the proponents should not be considered to be more serious than they were, since their actions, no matter what they would have been, could have been distorted by clever opponents, who have an advantage in regard to the truth that reformers never have.

All these formal charges were reinforced by a series of rumors planted by the opponents among all segments of the population. A few racial rumors were circulated: anti-Negro in the white areas and anti-white among the Negroes. These did not do much to influence the vote, since other issues were paramount. Other such contradictory rumors were planted in different sections of the city and county, perhaps with better results. This whispering campaign served two purposes.

First, it conditioned the people prior to the release of the advertisements, handbills, and other public campaign devices. Then, it provided a follow-up to reinforce those same public devices.

Another campaign issue revolved around the question of liquor stores and the religious element. In rather fundamentalist Davidson County, liquor stores are not allowed in the unincorporated sections and are permitted in the incorporated cities under local option. Opponents of the plan, through a prominent church layman, sent a letter to a number of ministers warning them that metropolitan government would mean that liquor stores could be opened in any part of the county. This raised the desired furor on the part of the "drys." The proponents of the plan had a prominent layman issue a reply noting that only the urban services district could have liquor stores and the remainder of the county could remain dry as long as its residents so wished. It is quite likely that this charge persisted to carry some weight even after the denial, as such charges so often do.

CHAPTER VI

THE SUCCESS OF THE OPPOSITION CAMPAIGN

All the opposition activities would not have succeeded had there not been soil in which they could take root. Indeed, the success of the opposition was based on recognition of where they could take root. It seems to be true that the majority of the people in Nashville and Davidson County were just not ready to accept a metropolitan area government, for reasons of their own.

Much of the difficulty in communication stemmed from a form of distrust of the central city by many of the suburban residents. The suburban dwellers did not distrust the central city as such. In fact, most of them identify with it, particularly when they are asked by an outsider where they come from. People will reply, "Nashville," even when they consider themselves to be loyal Donelsonians or Madisonians, etc. Their distrust was a distrust of the leadership in the central city: the political machine, the newspapers, and the business and commercial leaders. They wanted to maintain their independence (whether it is a real independence is debatable) from those top level leaders who represented a more complex way of life, over which they had little control and which they have tried to avoid.

It is important to understand the high degree of ignorance and apathy among the citizenry on questions of local government. Most people just do not know how their local government is operated. Even those who make use of their magistrates, councilmen, and constables for access to government know little about the process or institutions, except that if they need something done, they should contact the political figures accessible to them. Many people thought that the city and the county were completely separate with no interrelations at all, while just as many others thought that the advantages of metropolitan government were already available, if the people wanted them, and that this was just a scheme to enable the city and the city machine. to take over the county.

Apathy was the rule in a majority of the districts as is indicated by voting turnouts of below 50 percent over most of the county. The exceptions to this were those rural districts which indignantly opposed being incorporated into any type of urban government and the upper income districts where a larger percentage of the citizens take an interest in political campaigns. The number of people who did not know the first thing about the whole issue, after months of publicity, was probably quite large.

It is important to view the degrees of distrust, ignorance, and apathy as differing from area to area. Among the cosmopolitans,all three were less evident, with little distrust, less ignorance than in the rest of the community and with somewhat less apathy than in other areas. The greatest degree of distrust, ignorance, and apathy was found among the locals inside and outside the city limits. The locals within the city had a better relationship with the city machine but tended to distrust the other leadership in the community. Outside Nashville, the city machine is simply included as an outside group while the local machines, which are really little different in style or activity, are accepted as neighborhood phenomena.

The distinction seems to rest more upon income and educational level than upon geography. Closeness in identity and values seems to determine the degree of trust or distrust of the city and its leadership and, to a lesser extent, the degree of ignorance and apathy toward local government. Thus, the cosmopolitan suburbanites did not share this distrust of the central city while the local city dwellers did.

The role played by closeness in identity and values in determining the attitudes of the various groups toward metropolitan government can be examined from the angle of conflicting definitions of "community" that exist between the cosmopolitans and the locals.

The cosmopolitans have previously been described as those with economic, social, and cultural ties throughout the metropolitan area who tend to view the entire area as their basic community and to think in terms of government and progress for the whole area, undivided into smaller subdivisions. (This should be qualified by considering the residents of some of the incorporated suburbs who do conceive of the total area as the base community except that they reserve the right to maintain a subcommunity to support their class structure.)

In sharp contrast, the locals conceive of the basic community as one of much more restricted range. Since their economic ties are generally with the city, they do conceive of the metropolitan area as a larger community, in a very general sense. But,their social and cultural ties are generally confined to their neighborhood, block, or church; some combination of these three institutions forms the basic community for them. Since downtown shopping is so often supplemented or replaced by local shopping centers, a community focus is built around each of the small suburban communities, each developing an identity of its own insofar as each meets the needs of its residents. For example, Madison has recently acquired a large new shopping center that has done much to increase local identification with it as a basic community. Before that, the identification was on a smaller scale, based on the individual neighborhood. In other parts of the unincorporated county, it still is.

People who identified with a basic community on that level did not tend to feel the need for governmental reform based on a definition of basic community that is so far from theirs as to be almost meaningless. This was particularly true because most of them had a chance to identify with this larger community and purposely rejected it by moving to the unincorporated suburban areas. They sought to reestablish the type of voluntaristic small group life they had known out in the country. Their cultural activities revolved around church-going and

gardening, so the offer of better cultural facilities was meaningless to them. Their physical needs revolved around privacy and space, so street lights, a sewer system, and the like, which meant government intervention into their lives, did not attract them. Schools, roads, and minimum police and fire protection virtually covered the local government services they were interested in. They felt that they were receiving these in adequate measure through the county and private sources. All in all, the appeal to a desire for more and better services fell on deaf ears. To them it represented a return to the city conditions they so disliked. Even those who needed sewers and wanted better services felt that it would be too big a price to pay if it meant returning to the city's fold.

In addition, many of the local householders who had adequate septic tanks and whose neighborhoods did not suffer from lack of sewers thought that the issue was a false one that was being overplayed to frighten people into voting for the charter. Because their own definitions of community were constricted, they did not see this problem as it existed in other parts of the county as any concern of theirs. The entire issue was virtually laughed out of contention by the opposition who circulated jokes about it.

The opposition capitalized on this hostility to "big government" by suggesting that the way to handle sewer problems in the specific areas that needed help was to expand the utility districts' services or form new districts to provide local sewer systems. The existing utility districts were also interested in this type of solution since (a) it might increase their importance and (b) it was a good basis on which to rest their general opposition to metropolitan government which would ultimately put them out of business. Some of the utility districts' employees carried on an active campaign against the charter through their contacts with most of the suburban community residents who would come to their offices to pay water bills.

In addition, each of the unincorporated suburban communities seems to develop feelings of independence whether legally recognized as a community or not. For the residents of those areas who want to identify with a community larger than a neighborhood, this is a perfect outlet. Thus, most of the cosmopolitans who depend upon the locals for support seem to seek this level of identification which seems to serve to perpetuate these communities despite the centralizing tendencies of the central city. Through these people a system of government surrogates has grown up, making incorporation even less a felt necessity while intensifying the residents' identification with their local community. Under this system, the local magistrates and constables really become the acting city government. They handle all requests and local problems and recognize their roles in this system for what they are. At least one magistrate receives any mail that comes addressed to the "mayor" or his community. This is not simply a manifestation of the district system but seems to be a product of an older community tradition. This manifestation has not occurred in the same manner in districts lacking a previous community identity where any political services rendered are provided by politicians as individual representatives rather than as representatives of a local community.

In addition to the role of the local political leaders, these communities have developed local civic and social clubs, including chambers of commerce in some cases, to provide a second level of community identification and vehicles for community action. These clubs are instrumental in tying the cosmopolitans to their communities in a manner more to their liking.

If these clubs were not available, these cosmopolitans would probably drift out of the orbits of their respective communities. As it is, their connections with their fellow citizens are somewhat weakened by this basic difference in social outlook. This was well demonstrated by the fact that the more

cosmopolitan they were, the more likely it was that they endorsed and supported metropolitan government, despite the opposition in the rest of the community. The most important thing is that they were usually not aware of this opposition. Thus, the businessmen in the local communities who supported the charter poorly reflected the true state of affairs in their areas. They were the ones reached by the proponents when they spoke to the various clubs and were impressed by the amount of support found in the suburbs. They themselves underestimated the opposition in their own communities because of the gap between the two social groups, and most of them were as surprised with the results as their cosmopolitan counterparts in the rest of the county and city. This is not to say that all businessmen in the suburbs supported the charter. Probably less than half did in the local areas since that is about the proportion of cosmopolitans among the business community.

Not all the suburban communities possess an equal amount of community identification. A combination of three variables seems to determine the degree of comunity identity. They are age and historical background, distance from Nashville, and economic self-sufficiency. The older the community, the more community pride and identity seem to exist, provided it is still autonomous to some degree and has an economic function. This is best illustrated by Goodlettsville, the most identification-conscious community in the county outside of Nashville which fought the charter bitterly.

Another illustration of the role played by all three factors in community identity is Joelton, a crossroads community north of Nashville and west of Goodlettsville. There age and historical background are present, as is distance from the central city, but economic importance, while present, is relatively weak. Community identity exists in a weaker form than in Goodlettsville since the area is more akin to a heavily populated rural area rather than a suburban community.

Its population is just beginning to increase as it becomes an exurban part of Nashville. The Joelton people voted overwhelmingly against the charter for reasons of self-interest. They would not have gained services and do not need them now or in the foreseeable future.

In Madison, a community north of the central city on the Goodlettsville Pike, the combination of factors leans more heavily to the economic side. The community has no common border with Nashville and has some tradition of age, so both of these requirements are satisfied. Yet, if no shopping center had been built there, community identity would probably not be as strong. A large center was erected there a few years ago, providing a unifying factor in the community because it is a place where one can do all his purchasing without traveling to Nashville.

What was true for Madison was also true for the communities on the northeastern border of the county on the shore of the new Old Hickory Lake, a reservoir on the Cumberland River. These communities fall somewhere between Goodlettsville and Madison in regard to age, distance, and self-sufficiency, and their vote on the issue also fell in between the two aforementioned communities (82.5 percent opposed). These communities have an independent economic history, with local industries dating back to the Civil War.

The issues there were much the same as in the rest of the county. The existence of a larger range of services contributed a bit more to the feeling that the area would not benefit from metropolitan government. The fact that a larger number of people had moved into that area directly from the country, to work at the plant, made city ties even more tenuous.

One precinct in the Old Hickory civil district deviated from the 80 percent-plus opposition vote by voting only 57 percent against the charter. This was the most urbanized precinct in that district and also the location of the

homes of the DuPont officials who live in the area. Once again, the cosmopolitan elements of the local community tended to support the charter while the locals opposed it. The corporation itself took no stand on the issue. The same support was found among the local real estate men and the business community in general. Some of these businessmen were so distrusted by their neighbors that their support hurt the plan.

Donelson, a community similar to Old Hickory in its local pride and situated east of Nashville at approximately the same distance, followed along with this general pattern. Its origins lie in the early nineteenth century, it is separated from Nashville by open land, and it provides economic consumer services to its residents. While the oldtimers are considerably outnumbered by the newcomers whose community attachments are not so well developed, a sufficient number of them have internalized the traditional pattern so that it is still the strongest one. For example, when the Post Office Department abolished Donelson's independent post office a few years ago and amalgamated it with that of Nashville, Donelson residents protested sufficiently to win the right to have their mail addressed "Donelson 14," using only the Nashville post office zone number to mark the connection with the city.

Moving closer to the city, the level of community identification drops as did the percentage of the vote against the charter. More of the residents are former Nashvillians who were not alienated from the city, though the majority still fits the categories proposed earlier. Inglewood, which shares a common boundary with the city, voted against the charter by 55 percent.

Inglewood was the only community where the race issue played more than a very minor role. A number of Negroes live in the community,and there was some talk of metropolitan government bringing integration to the Inglewood schools. Closeness to Nashville has prevented the growth of any great degree of community

identity. There is no shopping center to hold the residents to the town. It is an older suburban community that is beginning to have an incipient slum problem. Its community spirit is based on neighborhoods and is correspondingly fragmentized.

One of the Nashville precincts did not fit into the general cosmopolitan-local voting pattern. Under this pattern, it should have been won by the opposition. Instead, it was carried for the charter by 75.5 percent of the vote. The reasons behind this exception to the pattern lend additional support to the general theory of a lack of communication between the charter proponents and the locals in the community.

This precinct is located in a neighborhood of definitely lower socio-economic status, predominantly locals. However, the elementary school in the neighborhood was under the principalship of a member of the charter commission who had established himself as the focal point of that community over the past twenty years as a dedicated educator who had devoted himself to building his school as a center for the community it serves. His impact on this neighborhood had been felt in many ways, and he had earned the trust of its residents through the many services, public and personal, he had rendered them. When word spread that he felt that the plan was a good one and should be supported, this trust translated itself into votes for the charter. He did not engage in any formal campaign, but simply made it known to the community leaders with whom he had worked and to the others with whom he came in contact what his views were. Since he had the confidence of the community, their fears were assuaged, and they had a substantial foundation on which to base their acceptance of the newspapers' and speakers' advocacy of the charter. This was the necessary bridge that was lacking in other similar areas.

Since that elementary school district included not only all of this one precinct but overlapped into two others, these results can be confirmed by the

fact that the number of votes for the charter in the other two precincts was also higher than in the general neighborhood though neither of them were carried for it because they were dominated by areas outside the school district. It should also be noted that turnout was not significantly higher in these boxes than in other ones of the same socio-economic level. That would have required a "get out the vote" campaign from door to door, not just endorsement by a trusted leader. The endorsement could only influence those already concerned with the problem to some degree.

Southwest of the city are the incorporated suburbs and suburban areas which voted for the charter and also turned out the largest percentages of voters. These were the areas of the cosmopolitans whose reasons for supporting the charter have already been set forth. Nevertheless, there was some opposition to metropolitan government in these areas also. It is quite likely that the very rich in the community voted against the plan because of their fear of increased taxes. This cannot be demonstrated from the voting records but can be inferred from interviews. Their reasons for opposing it are virtually identical with those used, and believed, by the locals of lower income groups. This infers some sort of circularity in the community's socio-political structure whereby both extremes meet, leaving the middle in favor of metropolitan government. If such is the case, any plan for metropolitan government would have to base itself on that middle group and broaden its area of support as much as possible in both directions.

A summary of the prominent reasons for people's opposition to the proposed charter would have to include the following: (1) People were afraid of higher taxes. This was the biggest single issue. Lack of trust in the proponent's promises coupled with the information given them by the charter's opponents, whom they trusted, led them to believe that taxes would go up without

corresponding benefits. In the case of people with limited incomes, even a slight rise in property taxes is felt. They were just not convinced that it would not happen that way. Taxes probably frightened more people than any other single issue, yet as an issue it was only a symptom of larger, underlying social differences.

(2) People did not want increased centralization of government. They are even willing to pay the price in "inefficiency" that often results and venality that sometimes does. To them it is not inefficiency, but democracy. Venality would occur more often, in their opinion, when government is further removed from the people. This issue is partly symptomatic of the underlying problems referred to above, partly a result of conservatism when it comes to altering established forms of government and partly a real concern over the problem of democratic control.

(3) People were afraid of the city machine being extended to the county. Particularly, the rule of the mayor was feared. He was sincerely distrusted outside of Nashville by people in all walks of life. A good deal of this distrust was highly non-rational,but, be that as it may, its existence helped to defeat metropolitan government. Symptomatic of the underlying problems was the fact that the county people automatically assumed that the city machine would take over the county, despite the fact that the county population was already larger than the city's and is growing where the city's was not. While the city was more highly organized, the facts of the population situation should have made it appear as if the county were taking over the city. Actually, this was what was in the minds of many of the overall community leaders who reside outside the city limits. Of course, they could not say it openly, but it certainly figured in their reasoning.

The fact that this was not recognized lends additional credence to the

cosmopolitan-local theory and to that of distrust of the community leadership rather than of the central city per se. The locals could not identify with a large enough area outside of their own neighborhoods to visualize the county as being larger than the central city. This was made even more difficult by the fact that the real antagonism was implicitly between the "little man" and the "community leaders," who were identified with the city when it came to considering who would control the new government. Thus, fear of city control was also fear of control by big politics, which was verbalized, and "big business," which was expressed openly by some (particularly in the labor movement) and expressed covertly by others when they showed their suspicion of the incorporated, i.e. rich, suburbs. The distrust of the latter was as great, if not greater, than the distrust of the central city (which we have seen was not so much that at all) among the greater number of the locals and their leadership.

(4) The people distrusted the newspapers, and their agreement on this issue was looked upon with grave suspicions.

Four major failures of the proponents can be listed. They were failures of (1) understanding, (2) organization, (3) communication, and (4) support. None of them were total failures by any means, nor should they be considered to the exclusion of the proponents' successes which were also real ones. The successes of the campaign lay (1) in the plan submitted, which was sufficiently sound so as to prevent direct attacks on it by the opposition; (2) in the mobilization of so many of the community leaders behind such a change; (3) in convincing the cosmopolitans to vote for the plan despite the fear of higher taxes; (4) in convincing the cosmopolitans among the Negroes to do likewise despite the fear of loss of some Negro gains; and (5) in bringing the plan as close to passage as it came in what was not only a first attempt in securing metropolitan government, but a first attempt in utilizing home rule powers.

Despite these successes, however, the plan was defeated. Perhaps the first failure was the most important in determining the outcome since the others are all intertwined with it. The failure in understanding the nature of the locals and their interests led directly to the other areas of weakness since the proper steps were not taken to meet those interests and provide for them.

In a democracy, the question always arises as to how much freedom of choice is due the individual and how much he must submit to society. With the growth of population and urbanization in our country, this question has become even more complex, since communities are closer together,and individuals who choose smaller ones in order to avoid big local government often find themselves in the middle of metropolitan expansion despite their attempts to avoid it. Thus, the question is posed as to how much choice such communities can have in maintaining their residents' desires to have limited local government and a "small town" atmosphere. The decisions to be made will, of necessity, revolve around the definition of "community" employed. If the basic community must include the entire metropolitan area for all purposes, the individual's right to choose is severely limited. At the same time, the close proximity of the various small communities and their interdependence in so many matters make some sort of larger community imperative, even when a narrower definition of the basic community is preferred.

Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in between, through using different definitions of community for different functions of government rather than through trying to establish a single definition for all functions. There are certain legitimate grounds for not only preferring but encouraging the development of smaller basic units for certain purposes within the larger metropolitan area. The restricted subject matter of this study precludes a full discussion of the values of a small community structure in a democratic society. Neverthe-

less, it is important to consider these values when a choice such as the one faced by Nashville and Davidson County must be made.

Perhaps a truly metropolitan government would not only confine itself to certain community-wide tasks and encourage the smaller communities to set their own levels of service in other areas but would even encourage the central city to divide into such smaller communities on the same basis. This might eliminate the imbalance between the city and the suburbs while restoring the contact between the governors and the governed that has tended to disappear in the middle class areas of the large city. This would be a somewhat different type of metropolitan federalism but might have certain advantages of its own.

In any case, the problem must be considered from the points of view of all the legitimate interests involved. An understanding of a major legitimate interest in Davidson County--that of the locals-- was lacking on the part of most of the proponents of metropolitan government there.

As a result, the type of organization developed for the campaign was not designed to deal with more than half the problem, and even it failed to function effectively in many ways. This lack of understanding and proper organization led to an absence of communication between the proponents, who were virtually all from the cosmopolitan groups, and the majority of the voters, who were from the local elements in the county. This lack of communication meant that a normal distrust, caused by a number of other factors, was never properly attacked, much less overcome. In turn, this led to the lack of county-wide and group-wide support that was necessary in order to secure passage of the charter.

The opposition did the job it set out to do in a thoroughly professional manner. They maneuvered themselves into a position that enabled them to choose the time, place, and issues on which to fight the plan. They exploited their advantage through use of an existing high command to plan and an experienced

field force to execute the plans on "battlefields" of their own choosing, against an uncoordinated though willing group of proponents who lacked a similar high command or experienced field organization. Also, they were not adverse to using tactics not available to the groups seeking to make changes, such as spreading rumors and using half-truths which furnished the bulk of their ammunition.

Supplementary to these strategic and tactical advantages, the opposition forces knew intimately the terrain over which they were to wage their campaign. In this case, the "terrain" was the people, particularly the locals in the community. The opposition understood them and their interests, so could strive to reach them on the basis of this understanding.

CHAPTER VII

SOME HYPOTHESES THAT EMERGE

1. The basic sociological factor that influenced the outcome of this contest was the division of Davidson County's residents into cosmopolitan and local elements, with different primary interests and identifications. The most important difference between these two elements lay in the different conceptions of "basic community" that each held. The problem which faces attempts at political change such as this one to establish a metropolitan government is to reconcile the conceptions and interests of these two groups and then to convince both sides of the value of the reconciliation. The people, institutions, and agencies that are believed or trusted among one element are not necessarily believed or trusted among the other. Unless this is understood and the gap is bridged, there is no communication, and support is not forthcoming from both. How much should be done to bridge this gap is a question of values before it is a question of tactics.

2. Historical factors are important in determining the degree of resistance to or support of metropolitan government proposals. The Nashville backgrounds and identifications of the majority of the leaders in the larger community contributed much to the initiation of the entire plan. At the same time, identification with the smaller communities based on their histories contributed to the development of an opposition to a form of consolidation that would tend to destroy that identity and those communities.

Historical factors are not only relevant in terms of geographic locations but in terms of group relationships, also. The opposition was able to capitalize on a coalition of certain business and political groups that had cooperated over a period of twenty to thirty years on a variety of issues. The lack of such a system of traditionally allied groups on the proponent's side contributed to their inability to organize an effective campaign.

3. Patterns of Identification: Politicians

The various groups in the larger community tended to take stands on the metropolitan government issue on the basis of some combination of their ideals and self-interest. The resultant patterns were fairly stable ones that can generally be identified.

It is commonly accepted that politicians tend to oppose governmental changes,such as this one, which may eliminate jobs and will certainly disrupt already established political relationships and power centers. Yet, this hypothesis must be qualified in view of the rise of cosmopolitan-oriented politicians. A better version of this hypothesis might be stated in the following manner. All politicians tend to be hesitant about changes in the political structure. Those politicians whose sources of strength lie with the locals will oppose such changes more or less actively because of the potential erosion of the bases of their power plus their own identification with their constituencies. Those politicians whose sources of strength lie with the cosmopolitans will either support such changes publicly or remain in the background so as not to commit themselves. If they are themselves from cosmopolitan groups, they will tend to support such changes just as their constituents will. (By the same token, if they are cosmopolitans with locals for constituents, they will be ineffective or neutralized unless they have exceptional relationships with the voters.) Furthermore, if they have hopes of furthering their ambitions through the cosmopolitan groups, they will support such changes, just as the opposite is true.

Since Davidson County is in the South, the Democratic Party is the only one that functions effectively, so it was impossible to view party rivalries as contributing to the defeat of the charter. Factional rivalries did not take any direct and overt form, though a number of followers of the county judge may have opposed the charter quietly because of their fear that the mayor of Nashville

would win the new office of metropolitan mayor.

4. Patterns of Identification: Businessmen

Since most of the larger business interests are among the most cosmopolitan elements in the community, they tended to support metropolitan government. The exceptions to this pattern were found among those commercial interests who felt that they had more to lose under a change than they would gain, whether in terms of political interests or in terms of growth patterns, or both. It might well be true that the more dependence a commercial interest has on the existing political situation (or the more its leaders feel that it has), the more likely it is that it will oppose any changes. This dependence may take the form of special favors, services, or exemptions. It may be that it is a business or industry that has had to adapt itself to a certain set of political conditions or institutions and has done so successfully. This can be seen through examination of the connections between business and political leaders.

The growth patterns of some businesses or industries are another factor in determining their stand on such an issue. If they feel that their growth will be better promoted by preserving the status quo (by keeping labor costs down, for example), they will tend to oppose change.

Smaller businesses will make their decision primarily on where they are and how they view the future. If they are expansion-minded or if they need more governmental services to grow, they will support a plan which will provide them. If they are thinking in terms of doing no more than holding their own markets, they might well prefer the status quo simply because they know where they stand.

Regulated businesses generally fall into the category of those dependent on government. They will generally prefer the situation they have learned to deal with, particularly if a new situation creates the possibility for more regulation or better enforcement of present regulations.

Taxes are another issue of concern to business interests, but too often they are considered as an issue in and of themselves. Taxes must be considered alongside of growth possibilities since the ultimate decision on whether to risk a tax increase, in the business world of today, is usually dependent upon one's estimate of prospective growth under the new tax rate. That is to say, a business or industry that expects to grow under a new and more dynamic governmental structure will be more willing to accept a tax increase to bring the growth potential about since it will expect benefits to exceed costs. On the other hand, a business or industry that does not believe that it will grow, or grow sufficiently, under a changed government, or does not want to grow, will oppose any tax increase as a decrease in profits and will generally oppose metropolitan government.

5. Patterns of Identification: Government Employees

Another group that must be considered is the civil service, including teachers. This growing group represents a sizeable bloc of voters in its own right. Furthermore, because its members are more closely involved in political questions such as metropolitan government than most of the voters, they carry a greater weight at the polls because they turn out to vote in larger numbers. If these groups are led to feel that they will lose their positions or any benefits now accruing to them or possible in the future, they will tend to oppose metropolitan government and convince their families and friends to do likewise. And they will all vote.

At the same time, the higher echelons of these civil servants tend to develop political skills of their own from their normal relations with politicians in the course of doing their jobs. These people tend to support metropolitan government for several reasons. They tend to view the role of government in a more positive manner. They tend to see problems in their community-wide scope,

and they tend to want to increase their own roles as well as to solve the problems of the community. These politically adept administrators provide powerful, even if limited, allies for attempts at metropolitan government.

6. Patterns of Identification: Minority Groups

Minority groups present another potential source of opposition to metropolitan government, depending on their position under the existing governmental structure and political system. If they have achieved a measure of influence in the community, they may be quite hesitant about risking it through a change in government. This is particularly true if the new government will embrace a larger population that will reduce them to even a smaller minority. If the larger population will strengthen their position by enlarging the minority, they may become staunch supporters of the plan.

The Negroes are the most conspicuous minority in Nashville and Davidson County, as they are in most metropolitan areas today. Their support hinges on (a) their present status on the local political scene, (b) their prospective status under a metropolitan government (or under any change, for that matter), and (c) the nature of the appeal that is made to them. It is a mistake to assume that the Negroes will oppose a metropolitan government automatically, but it would be a greater mistake to assume that they would not. The campaign discussed above illustrates that it is possible to obtain some Negro support for such a plan if their problems are understood and their needs met. In such a situation, the division in the Negro community will parallel that in the white community, based on such things as cosmopolitan and local groupings, business and political interests, historical factors, and the like. It would tend to eliminate racial bloc voting, as such.

7. Patterns of Identification: Conservatives

While ideology, as such, plays a minor role in determining stands of most

people, a sufficient number of people are basically conservative when it comes to changing traditional forms of government to oppose such changes per se. They are often among the most articulate members of the community and will take the lead in opposing any major changes. Many others are also conservative, either out of conviction or out of ignorance, and they form a bloc of voters whom it is hard to convince since they seek rationalizations for their position just as any other group does. This political conservatism is basic in the American character and must be reckoned with. The opposition in Davidson County did, with good results.

8. Institutional Variables: Forms of Government

The type of governmental structure proposed must have some bearing on the outcome of an attempt to establish a metropolitan area government since different types would bear differently on the attitudes of the major and minor community leaders who could potentially direct the opposition. As for the majority of the people, their understanding of local government is so limited that even a loose federation could be described to them as an evil centralization by a determined and effective opposition.

9. Institutional Variables: City and Suburb

Differences between city and suburb are important in the minds of many people who seek an escape from the city in the suburb. This is less a socio-economic distinction that it is commonly considered to be since there are suburbs for virtually all socio-economic groups today, except perhaps for the very poor. In the Nashville area, this issue was certainly not based on class differences between city and suburb. The important cleavage in the community, between cosmopolitans and locals, cuts across both the central city and its urban fringe. This cleavage may be expressed through a suburban-central city conflict in some situations, but not necessarily.

The amount of party autonomy in each of the communities to be included in the metropolitan area has been suggested as a clue to sources of opposition to metropolitan government. Insofar as all politicians tend to oppose metropolitan government, all will cooperate in their opposition, particularly since politicians of both parties are often closer to each other, as professionals are in any field, on some issues than to the people they serve. The cosmopolitan-local cleavage cuts across party lines rather than between parties. This is amply demonstrated in Davidson County where both mayor and county judge supported the plan while other politicians who normally choose between those two united to oppose it.

The types of governmental services desired by the two divergent groupings in the community tend to affect the adoption of a metropolitan government. The cosmopolitans may place a high value on certain services, such as a park system, a sewer system, library and cultural facilities, street lights, etc., while the locals are content with roads and schools, perhaps with a park and a library for their own neighborhood, outside of any system. Often, this difference turns out to be one of degree. With the great common pool of values shared, in this country, by a majority of the population and usually termed "middle class," such things as roads (transportation to the central city) and schools are values shared by all.

The real difference comes in the quality and amount of services desired as measured against the amount of taxes necessary to pay for them and the amount of governmental control needed to implement them. Decisions to support or oppose metropolitan government plans are made on the basis of how much service is wanted at what price, rather than on the basis of which services, when the basic services are considered. The question of which services arises when the cosmopolitans attempt to expand the definition of "basic services."

APPENDIX A

Vote in Metropolitan Government Election by City Wards and Precincts

Ward	Precinct and Type	For	Against	Total Vote	Percent For	Percent Against	Registered Voters	Percent Registered Voters Voting
1	1 L	109	197	306	35.6	64.4	1444	21.2
1	2 L	74	129	203	36.5	63.5	1098	18.5
1	3 L	93	104	197	47.2	52.8	1353	14.6
1	4 L	66	84	150	44.0	56.0	1283	11.7
1	5 L	34	34	68	50.0	50.0	974	7.0
1	6 L	28	35	63	44.4	55.6	349	18.1
	Total	404	583	987	40.9	59.1	6501	15.2
2	1 L	44	41	85	51.8	48.2	543	15.7
2	2 L	31	29	60	51.7	48.3	526	11.4
2	3 L	13	31	44	29.5	70.5	637	6.9
2	4 L	95	101	196	48.5	51.5	1290	15.2
2	5 L	51	125	176	29.0	71.0	1274	13.8
2	6 C^2	100	85	185	54.1	45.9	1037	17.8
	Total	334	412	746	44.8	55.2	5307	14.1
3	1 L	122	55	177	68.9	31.1	972	18.2
3	2 L	140	138	278	50.4	49.6	1152	24.1
3	3 L	37	55	92	40.2	59.8	845	10.9
3	4 C	225	113	338	66.6	33.4	1587	21.3
3	5 C	254	97	351	72.4	27.6	1624	21.6
3	6 C	389	150	539	72.2	27.8	1796	30.0
	Total	1167	608	1775	65.7	34.3	7976	22.3
4	1 C	405	160	565	71.7	28.3	2101	26.9
4	2 C	378	100	478	79.1	20.9	1206	39.6
4	3 C	614	164	778	78.9	21.1	2094	37.2
4	4 C	570	161	731	78.0	22.0	2117	34.5
4	5 C	312	96	408	76.5	23.5	1460	27.9
4	6 C	690	148	838	82.3	17.7	2162	38.8
	Total	2969	829	3798	78.2	21.8	11140	34.1
5	1 L	60	80	140	42.9	57.1	1493	9.4
5	2 C	109	99	208	52.4	47.6	1130	18.4
5	3 L	155	196	351	44.2	55.8	2311	15.2
5	4 L	167	198	365	45.8	54.2	2074	17.6
5	5 L/C	120	99	219	54.8	45.2	1430	15.3
5	6 C	224	191	415	54.0	46.0	1672	24.8
5	7 C	253	193	446	56.7	43.3	1397	31.9
	Total	1088	1056	2144	50.7	49.3	11511	18.6

L = Predominantly Local

C^2 = Predominantly Cosmopolitan

Vote in Metropolitan Government Election by City Wards and Precincts (Cont'd.)

Ward	Precinct and Type	For	Against	Total Vote	Percent For	Percent Against	Registered Voters	Percent Registered Voters Voting
6	1 C	166	159	325	51.1	48.9	1453	22.4
6	2 L	94	112	206	45.6	54.3	1389	14.8
6	3 C	193	132	325	59.4	40.6	1196	27.2
6	4 C	151	116	267	56.6	43.4	1277	20.9
6	5 L	20	43	63	31.8	68.2	669	9.4
	Total	624	562	1186	52.6	47.4	5984	19.8
7	1 C	303	160	463	65.4	34.6	1684	27.5
7	2 C	317	172	489	64.8	35.2	1598	30.6
7	3 C	261	169	430	60.7	39.3	1483	29.0
7	4 L	104	109	213	48.8	51.2	1067	20.0
7	5 L	117	38	155	75.5	24.5	987	15.7
7	6 L	109	110	219	49.8	50.2	1484	14.8
	Total	1211	758	1969	61.5	38.5	8303	23.7
	Total City	7797	4808	12605	61.9	38.1	56722	22.2

Vote in the Metropolitan Government Election by Civil District and Precinct

District	Precinct		For	Against	Total Vote	Percent For	Percent Against	Registered Voters	Percent Registered Voters Voting
1			Nashville						
2	1		192	574	766	33.4	66.6	1702	45.0
2	2		14	95	109	12.8	87.2	199	54.8
2	3		11	79	90	12.2	87.8	179	50.3
2	4		24	142	166	14.5	85.5	405	41.0
Total		L	241	890	1131	21.3	78.7	2485	45.5
3	1		53	150	203	26.1	73.9	610	33.3
3	2		362	865	1227	29.5	70.5	2643	46.4
3	3		129	246	375	34.4	65.6	914	41.0
3	4		417	791	1208	34.5	65.5	2685	45.0
Total		L	961	2052	3013	31.9	68.1	6852	44.0
4	1		166	957	1123	14.8	85.2	2267	49.5
4	2		18	116	134	13.4	86.6	386	34.7
4	3		13	112	125	10.4	89.6	266	47.0
4	4		13	216	229	5.7	94.3	424	54.0
4	5		120	160	280	42.9	57.1	666	42.0
Total		L	330	1561	1891	17.5	82.5	4009	47.2
5	1		68	199	267	25.5	74.5	601	44.4
5	2		42	99	141	29.8	70.2	357	39.5
5	3		7	124	131	5.3	94.7	315	41.6
Total		L	117	422	539	21.7	78.3	1275	42.3
6	1	L	106	133	239	44.4	55.6	692	34.5
6	2	L	78	193	271	28.8	71.2	837	32.4
6	3	L	129	472	601	21.5	78.5	1669	36.0
6	4	L	372	795	1167	31.9	68.1	2914	40.0
6	5	L	34	111	145	23.4	76.6	491	29.5
6	6	L	101	162	263	38.4	61.6	579	45.4
6	7	L	117	219	336	34.8	65.2	716	46.9
6	8	CC	417	397	814	51.2	48.8	1604	50.7
Total		L	1354	2482	3836	35.3	64.7	9502	40.4
7	1		603	317	920	65.5	34.5	1903	48.3
7	2		543	161	704	77.1	22.9	1481	47.5
7	3		539	186	725	74.3	25.7	1415	51.2
7	4		560	135	695	80.6	19.4	1306	53.2
7	5		439	165	604	72.7	27.3	1264	47.8
7	6		352	162	514	68.5	31.5	1037	49.6
7	7		278	145	423	65.7	34.3	689	61.4
Total		C	3314	1271	4585	72.3	27.7	9095	50.4

Vote in the Metropoligan Government Election by Civil District and Precinct (Cont'd.)

District	Precinct		For	Against	Total Vote	Percent For	Percent Against	Registered Voters	Percent Registered Voters Voting
8	1	L	49	193	242	20.2	79.8	566	42.8
8	2	L	297	510	809	37.0	63.0	2266	35.7
8	3	L	66	172	238	27.7	72.3	943	25.2
8	4	C	980	331	1311	74.8	25.2	2600	50.4
Total			1394	1206	2600	53.6	46.4	6375	40.8
9	1		8	74	82	9.8	90.2	153	53.6
9	2		23	143	166	13.9	86.1	356	46.6
9	3		9	75	84	10.7	89.3	190	44.2
Total		L	40	292	332	12.0	88.0	699	47.5
10	1		25	256	281	8.9	91.1	505	55.6
10	2		59	645	704	8.4	91.6	1427	49.3
10	3		18	135	153	13.3	86.7	315	48.6
10	4		10	62	72	13.9	86.1	134	53.4
Total		L	112	1098	1210	9.3	90.7	2881	50.8
11	1		181	595	776	23.3	76.7	1925	40.3
11	2		289	711	1000	28.9	71.1	2418	41.4
11	3		93	286	379	24.5	75.5	996	38.1
Total		L	563	1592	2155	26.1	73.9	5339	40.4
12	1		143	383	526	27.2	72.8	1240	42.4
12	2		89	326	415	21.4	78.6	1634	25.4
12	3		204	603	807	25.3	74.7	2144	37.6
Total		L	436	1312	1748	24.9	75.1	5018	34.8
13	1		19	120	139	13.7	86.3	320	43.4
13	2		133	456	589	22.6	77.4	1603	36.7
Total		L	152	576	728	20.9	79.1	1923	37.6
14	1		23	347	370	6.2	93.8	836	44.3
14	2		18	208	226	8.7	91.3	463	36.7
Total		L	41	555	596	6.9	93.1	1299	37.6
15	1	L	493	654	1147	43.0	57.0	2416	47.5
15	2	L	270	305	575	47.0	53.0	1440	39.9
15	3	L	281	372	653	43.0	57.0	1410	46.3
15	4	L	368	525	893	41.2	58.8	1981	45.1
15	5	L	307	458	765	40.1	59.9	1879	40.7
15	6	C	388	321	709	54.7	45.3	1471	48.2
Total			2107	2635	4742	44.4	55.6	10597	44.7
16	1		590	211	801	73.7	26.3	1818	44.1
16	2		606	400	1006	60.2	39.8	2354	42.7
16	3		697	324	1021	68.3	31.7	2130	47.9
16	4		739	356	1095	67.5	32.5	2248	48.7
Total		C	2632	1291	3923	67.1	32.9	8550	45.9
Total County District			13794	19235	33029	41.8	58.2	75397	43.8

APPENDIX B

Research Method

Before going out into the field, the writer reviewed such printed background material as was available, both historical and contemporary, on the Nashville area and its socio-political background. This specifically included published reports and studies that preceded the metropolitan government campaign and the proposed charter. After this overview of the area, the writer examined the voting returns of the referendum from every precinct in the city and county and compared them with similar voting records of national, state, and local elections since 1955. These figures were then compared with available data on the social, economic, and political backgrounds of each precinct. The third documentary source used was the newspaper account of the campaign as reported in the major dailies and community weeklies. Examination of the newspaper accounts was undertaken in two stages. The pre-campaign material was examined prior to interviewing, and all subsequent material concurrently or subsequent to the interviewing.

On the basis of these three types of documentary evidence, a list consisting of a wide variety of leaders to be interviewed from all levels of the community was developed, consisting of over 100 names. This large list made allowance for refusals, persons unavailable, and the like, without missing significant elements in the case. Some fifty of these were interviewed by the writer during his stay in the area.

Major Interviews in Nashville and Davidson County

Position	Remarks
Magistrate	Joelton, grocer
Political Reporter	Nashville Banner
Magistrate and Mayor	Belle Meade, automobile salesman
Executive Director	Tennessee Municipal League
Magistrate	Woodbine, cleaner
County Judge	
Principal, Charter Commission	Founder of Madison Utility District
Magistrate	Warner Elementary School: Nashville
	Berry Hill (telephone conversation only)
Magistrate	Madison, realtor
Magistrate	Belle Meade, attorney
Magistrate	Donelson, businessman
Attorney	Negro leader
Chairman, Opposition Campaign Committee	Automobile dealer, (telephone conversation and brief meeting)
Political leader	Lawyer, former city and county office-holder
Magistrate	Woodbine, grocer
Political Scientist	Vanderbilt University
Constable, Private	Donelson
Fire Department Magistrate	Nashville, businessman, attorney
Director, Advance Planning Division	Joint Planning Commission
Executive Director	Joint Planning Commission
Planning Analyst	Joint Planning Commission
President, Nashville Chamber of Commerce	President, First American National Bank
Attorney for Planning and Charter Commissions	Attorney
Executive Director	Tennessee Taxpayers Association
Charter Commission	President, Aladdin Industries
Political Reporter	Nashville Tennessean
Magistrate	Inglewood, Attorney in Nashville
	Legal Department
City Councilman	Attorney, Negro leader
City Councilman	Attorney, Negro leader
Magistrate	Goodlettsville, realtor
Editor, Goodlettsville Gazette	Goodlettsville
State Planning Director	State of Tennessee
Tennessee State Planning Department	
Fire Chief, Constable	Woodbine Fire Department
	Woodbine, grocer
State Librarian	State of Tennessee
Director of Plans and Services	Joint Planning Commission
Vice President, Commerce Union Bank	Charter Opponent (telephone conversation only)
Editor, Madison Edition	Community News
Magistrate	Madison, attorney
Citizens' Committee	League of Women Voters

Position	Remarks
Executive Director	Citizens' Committee
Acting Director of Finance	City of Nashville
Union Official	United Steelworkers of America
Union Official	United Steelworkers of America
Magistrate	Inglewood, attorney
Mayor	City of Nashville
Spokesman fo opposition	Attorney
Director of Civic Affairs	Nashville Chamber of Commerce

In addition to the interviewees named above, the writer spoke to over twenty other people, ranging from political scientists to "men on the street" about various phases of the campaign and the issue.

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2. Nashville Chamber of Commerce
3. Tennessee Municipal League