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Summary

This report is based on the assumption that—not only yesterday, but today and tomorrow—the future handling of Japan and the Japanese people constitutes a serious problem, in the solution of which the United States must assume a major responsibility. The "Japanese problem" was by no means solved by V-J Day and the end of fighting in the Far East; with the beginning of the occupation under MacArthur, the "problem" only entered upon a new phase, perhaps as difficult as the actual waging of the war. Because attitudes toward the Japanese and American understanding of "Japan and the Post-War World" may influence or implement far-reaching decisions, what people in this country think about the people of Japan is of real significance.

In the years before Pearl Harbor, public opinion in this country, at first not greatly concerned regarding conflict in the Orient, came definitely to side with China and to condemn rather than condone economic practices helpful to the Japanese cause. By the late fall of 1941, a majority of Americans had arrived at a reluctant recognition of the likelihood of war between the United States and Japan.

During the war, most Americans believed that the Japanese people were dangerous not merely because of their susceptibility to powerful leadership but primarily because of a temperament so fundamentally inclined toward war as to make them always a menace to world peace. Many people in the United States felt, also, that the Japanese had no desire to rid themselves of the military leaders in power. Before the end of the war, a majority thought that the people as well as the leaders in Japan should be held responsible for wartime atrocities.

Asked to recommend a post-war policy to be followed toward the Japanese people, about half the public advocated a middle course—strict control and supervision of all phases of Japanese life; a somewhat smaller proportion favored lenient treatment; only a few recommended the other extreme—imprisonment, torture, or even death. Questions posed in terms of "Japan" rather than "the Japanese people" tended to elicit somewhat harsher recommendations. Before V-J Day, no punishment was too harsh, in the eyes of the public, to be meted out to Hirohito and the Japanese militarists.

Although two out of every three people in this country thought that the United States should not assist Japan in reconstructing her peacetime industries, an even larger majority would insist on trying to secure reparations. Over half would accept goods for payment in lieu of money, yet only a minority would accept products which might compete with domestic manufactures. Public opinion seemed reluctant to sanction free elections in Japan or the gift of food should the Japanese people be starving after the war. On each of these several points, attitudes toward the Japanese were consistently and significantly harsher than attitudes toward the Germans.

Since V-J Day (August 14, 1945), a number of significant shifts of opinion have been observed. Almost half the public have come to look upon the Japanese people—like the Germans—as "too easily led into war by powerful leaders," and an increasing number even judge that the Japanese might become "good citizens of the world." Opinion has more than reversed itself on the issue of rebuilding Japan's peacetime industries, and a bare majority now favor resuming trade with conquered Japan. Attitudes on sending food to Japan have become somewhat more lenient. Most significant of all, perhaps, is the fact that, although in the early days of the occupation more than six out of ten Americans thought Allied policy in Japan not "tough" enough, today almost the same proportion believe that the United States is doing a good job in handling the problems involved in occupying Japan. (The occupation of Germany, at first judged to be progressing more satisfactorily than that of Japan, is now considered less successful.)

• Page 2 •
PART I

American Attitudes toward the Japanese

What did people in this country think of Japanese policy both in the Far East and as it specifically affected the United States in the years before Pearl Harbor? In fixing war responsibility and in establishing occupation policy—to what extent are administrators justified in making distinctions between the Japanese people and their leaders? Are American judgments of Japan and the Japanese based on full and accurate information about the country and its political and social institutions? Answers to these questions are vitally important, because what we in the United States think about the people of Japan may have an influence on decisions regarding the peace and the treatment of Japan in the years to come.

The Background of Pearl Harbor

The four or five years directly preceding December 7, 1941, were marked by a number of clearly defined shifts of opinion regarding the war in the Far East and the economic and political relations between the United States and the warring powers. A study of public opinion surveys made during that period reveals significant opinion shifts in three different areas:

1. American opinion, at first indifferent as to the outcome of the war between Japan and China, became definitely sympathetic toward China.
2. The public became increasingly interested in preventing Japan from receiving economic assistance, direct or indirect, from the United States.
3. By the late fall of 1941 most people in this country had begun to be aware of the imminence of war between the United States and Japan.

AMERICAN SYMPATHIES

In 1932 Manchuria became, under Japanese domination, Manchukuo. By the fall of 1937 Japanese aggression was directed in full force against China proper, yet it was not until 1939 that a strong majority of popular sympathy in the United States had swung to the side of China. The trend is shown by the following question asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll):

"In the present fight between Japan and China, are your sympathies with either side?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September, 1937</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1937</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1939</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

A change in the popular desire to remain aloof from the Sino-Japanese conflict is shown by answers to another Gallup question: "Would you join a movement in this country to stop buying goods made in Japan?" Between October '37 and June '39 the percentage of Americans with opinions replying "Yes" increased from 37 to 66 per cent.
That the public long opposed the translation of their pro-China sympathies into action is suggested by the fact that in October, 1937, 70 per cent thought the United States government should no longer continue to maintain military and naval forces in China for the protection of American residents, but should withdraw its forces and warn American citizens to leave the country.

In February, 1938, 64 per cent thought the United States should not allow shipment of arms and ammunition from this country to China.* Still another AIPO survey, released more than a year later—in June ’39, revealed an almost reversed opinion, with 60 per cent of the public answering “No” to the question: “Do you think the United States should FORBID shipment of arms or ammunitions from this country to CHINA?” while 72 per cent replied “Yes” to the same question when asked regarding Japan.

The following month Gallup reported reactions to a free-response question which suggested no specific government action but allowed people to express the ideas uppermost in their minds. Answers seemed to indicate that—at least before the outbreak of open war in Europe—the public preferred the use of economic rather than diplomatic or military pressure against Japan.

The question:

“How far do you think the United States government should go to protect American interests in China?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight Japan</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests through the State Department</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping arms shipments</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do nothing</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A month later, however, in August, 1939, a more specific AIPO question revealed that 82 per cent of the public believed that, when the trade treaty between the United States and Japan expired in six months time, this country should refuse to sell Japan any more war material. Democrats and Republicans answered the question almost identically. And in October, 1940, Gallup reported a 90 per cent majority of the opinion that “our government should forbid the sale of arms, airplanes, gasoline, and other war materials to Japan.” Thus, over a period of more than three years the American public slowly came to recognize the implications of Japanese aggression in China.

EXPECTATIONS OF WAR

On the question of possible actual conflict between the United States and Japan, public opinion crystallized even more clearly in the period before Pearl Harbor. In September of 1939 the Fortune Survey asked: “Should we get out of the Philippines and stay out, even if Japan seizes them?” Half of the public answered “No,” with the rest dividing almost equally between “Yes” and “Undecided.” Eleven months later, in August, 1940, a somewhat different Fortune question revealed even more persons willing to take a military stand:

“If a major foreign power actually threatened to take over any of the following places by armed invasion, would you be willing to see the United States come to the rescue with armed forces?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See AIPO release of the dates indicated.
**Fortune figures have been rounded to the nearest full per cent.
Between February and March, 1941, Gallup found a significant shift from a negative to an undecided response on this question:

"Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February, 1941</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15% (100%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1941</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the summer and fall of 1941, the polls clearly showed an increasing public awareness of the growing tension between the United States and Japan. A Gallup question, asked first in July and repeated during the last week of November, revealed an 18 point increase in the majority favoring firm measures against Japan. This increase was due to the combined effects of decreases both in the number opposing such measures and in the number undecided on the issue. The question:

"Should the United States take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means war with Japan?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July, 1941</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18% (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And during that last week in November, 1941, Gallup put a still more direct question to the American public. The results were released to newspapers for publication on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941:

"Do you think the United States will go to war against Japan sometime in the near future?"

Yes ........................................ 52% =5%

No ......................................... 27%

Unready to guess........... 21% =100%

If only those with opinions are considered, 65 per cent "felt that some clash was inevitable in the near future."*

Were the Japanese People Misled?

Public opinion surveys have shown that the people of the United States judge the Japanese more harshly than they do the Germans. In May, 1942, however, only a minority of Americans stated that they actually hated either of the Axis peoples. When Gallup asked: "Do you, personally, hate the Japanese people? . . . the German people?" 28 per cent of those interviewed said they hated the Japanese; 18 per cent said they hated the Germans.

*AIPO release, December 7, 1941.
An NORC question asked in September '45, about a month after the surrender of Japan, revealed a pattern of attitudes consistent with those found on other questions:

"Just to sum up, do you personally feel as though you want to get even with the Japanese, or just how do you feel about them?"

17% were SEVERE in their sentiments to the extent of expressing a definite desire for revenge.

46 answered in terms of strict supervision and control. These included:

- 19% expressing feelings of bitterness, distrust, and a desire for punishment but no particular statement of vengeance;
- 10 demanding firmness in dealing with the Japanese people and/or punishment of war criminals; and
- 17 advocating definite control without mention of punishment.

31 gave lenient answers—expressing attitudes ranging from indifference to friendliness and concern. Specifically:

- 7% expressed only a desire for peace;
- 8 were largely non-committal;
- 3 believed the United States has already gotten even with Japan; but
- 13 evinced positive concern for the welfare of the Japanese people.

3 gave other replies,

3 were undecided.

100%

A FOUR-YEAR TREND—NORC

A National Opinion Research Center trend question, asked first in 1942, showed—during the war years—varying majorities of persons with opinions expressing the opinion that the Japanese people will always want war. Since V-J Day, however, the proportion holding this view has declined first to a 49 per cent plurality and then to a 37 per cent minority. The trend:

"Which of the following statements comes closest to describing how you feel, on the whole, about the people who live in Japan?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Japanese people will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible.&quot;</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Japanese people may not like war, but they have shown that they are too easily led into war by powerful leaders.&quot;</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Japanese people do not like war. If they could have the same chance as people in other countries, they would become good citizens of the world.&quot;</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Undecided | 13% | 7% | 8% | 13% | 10% | 7% | 7% | 7% |

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Until the spring of '45 majorities of almost all population groups judged the people of Japan to be incurably warlike. This view was shared by pluralities of those Americans most privileged educationally, economically, and occupationally. During the summer and fall of 1945—with the surrender of the Axis powers—pluralities of these most privileged groups came to judge the Japanese people as misled rather than basically inclined to war. On all surveys, grade and high school educated people more than those with college experience, women more than men, adults over 40 more than those younger, and whites more than Negroes tend to believe that "the Japanese people will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible."

- Page 6 -
When, over the same period of time, the same question was asked regarding the Germans, all judgments were milder than those regarding the Japanese. An increasing proportion of the public, however, considered the German people essentially warlike. Only 22 per cent held this view in June, 1943, but in July, 1945, the proportion had increased to 41 per cent of those with opinions—still substantially less than the 56 per cent who—in July '45—said they thought the Japanese people would always want war. Until the post-V-E Day survey, however, a larger proportion of the public judged the Germans misled than judged them essentially war minded. The two most recent surveys, November '45 and May '46, showed almost identical pluralities—43 and 44 per cent—of the opinion that the basic fault of the German people is their susceptibility to the force of powerful leaders.

Persons with a college or high school background (and, to a somewhat lesser extent, persons in the more privileged economic and occupational brackets) have tended to appraise the German
people as weak and misled rather than fundamentally bad or fundamentally good. The less privileged, however, are significantly more inclined to select one of the extreme appraisals.

On the most recent survey, opinion divides as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Adults Interviewed</th>
<th>Attended College</th>
<th>Attended High School</th>
<th>Eighth Grade or Less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The GERMAN people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... will always want war</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... are too easily misled by powerful leaders</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... could become good citizens of the world</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The JAPANESE people      |                        |                  |                      |                      |
| ... will always want war | 37%                    | 24%              | 36%                  | 44%                  |
| ... are too easily misled by powerful leaders | 42 | 52 | 43 | 36 |
| ... could become good citizens of the world | 21 | 24 | 21 | 20 |
| Undecided                | 7%                     | 4%               | 4%                   | 12%                  |

A differently worded question regarding the Japanese—asked about a month after V-J Day—revealed the same basic feeling (on the part of a plurality of Americans) that Japan might never become a truly peaceful nation. About one person in five is “Undecided” on the issue. The question:

“Do you think the Japanese will ever become a peaceful nation?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Adults Interviewed</th>
<th>Those with Opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In December ’45 the Fortune Survey released results of another question—results again confirming findings of similar NORC and AIPO research. The question:

“How POPULAR WERE THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS?”

Would the people of Japan have liked to be rid of their military leaders if they could have done so? Although no empirical answer to this question can be given, it is significant that, before the end of the war, almost half the public in the United States believed that the Japanese were satisfied with their national leadership. On the other hand, when a similar question was asked about the Germans a year earlier, fewer than two out of ten Americans considered the Germans satisfied with their Nazi leaders. The two NORC questions read:

• Page 8 •
"Do you think that most of the people living in Japan would like to get rid of their military leaders now, or not?"

"Do you think that most of the people living in Germany would like to get rid of their Nazi leaders now, or not?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The more education a person had the less likely he was to believe that the Japanese people wanted to get rid of their military leaders. "No" answers were given by 51 per cent of respondents with a college background, 48 per cent of those with high school, and only 39 per cent of those with no more than a grade school education. Likewise 46 per cent of white persons but only 35 per cent of Negroes thought that the Japanese were not inclined to rid themselves of their leaders.

In Their Own Words

Many of the 45 per cent who believed that the Japanese would not like to get rid of their military leaders made remarks amplifying and explaining their attitude. The two most common reactions were that the Japanese had demonstrated by their actions their loyalty to their leaders and that the people knew no other leadership:

"We don't know how the Japanese feel about their government. We're not there. But if they weren't loyal to their leaders they wouldn't commit 'hari-kari' so much." "They must be pretty satisfied; they won't stop fighting."

"The Japanese are subject to so much restriction of the press, they don't realize the crimes of their military leaders."

"Their leaders seem right to them, just as ours do to us. That is all the kind of government or leadership they know about."

"The Japanese believe their leaders are gods."

"They'll believe in their leaders as long as the Emperor does. The Japanese believe they'll go to heaven if they follow their Emperor."

A few of the minority who believed that the people of Japan would like to depose their leaders also made comments. An express messenger in Minneapolis, for instance, said: "I think they'd like to live like other countries. They can't open their mouths for fear." A retired businesswoman in Los Angeles thought: "The Japanese will realize when the war goes against them that their leaders are no good." A yeast mixer in New Jersey replied: "All nations, after they have taken a good shelling, want to get rid of their military leaders."

A few qualified their affirmative answers as did a Portland, Oregon, house painter, who suggested that "the older people would like to get rid of their military leaders, but the young people are satisfied." A retired bench worker in Lorain, Ohio, answered: "I don't know. I have no way of knowing except by the papers, and I doubt their accuracy."

Responsibility for Atrocities?

Before the surrender of Japan, about six out of every 10 persons in this country believed that the Japanese people were responsible for and in sympathy with the many cruelties perpetrated during the course of the war.

In June, 1945, the American Institute of Public Opinion reported that, while 63 per cent of the public believed that the Japanese people were entirely in sympathy with some war atrocities, less
than half as many—31 per cent—thought the German people were in complete agreement with the wartime cruelties of the Nazi regime. Persons of all educational backgrounds held substantially the same views on these two questions:

"To what extent do you think the Japanese people approve of the killing and starving of prisoners—entirely, partly, or not at all?"
"To what extent do you think the German people have approved of the killing and starving of prisoners in Germany—entirely, partly, or not at all?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entirely approve</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly approve</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People unaware of atrocities</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To another AIPO question, "Which people do you think are more cruel at heart—the Germans or the Japanese?" almost five times as many people named the Japanese as named the Germans. However, a question asked by the National Opinion Research Center twice in 1945—about a month before and again about a month after the surrender of Japan—showed a significant decline in the proportion placing at least partial responsibility for wartime cruelties on the Japanese people. On the later survey a definite majority would blame the military leaders alone. NORC asked:

"Do you think we should blame the Japanese people themselves, or the military leaders, or both the people and their leaders for the cruelties in this war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1945</th>
<th>Sept. 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese people</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both people and leaders</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>57%</strong></td>
<td><strong>44%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese leaders only</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you think we should blame the Japanese people themselves, or the military leaders, or both the people and their leaders for the cruelties in this war?

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On the earlier survey residents of the Pacific Coast states (California, Washington, and Oregon) differed significantly from the rest of the country in their opinions on the question. Educational differences, too, were of special interest. The comparison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Those Interviewed</th>
<th>Pacific Coast</th>
<th>Rest of Country</th>
<th>Attended College</th>
<th>Attended High School</th>
<th>Eighth Grade or Less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese people ..........</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both people and leaders ..</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese leaders only ...</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided ................</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In July '45—two months after the surrender of Germany—a comparable cross-section was polled on the question of responsibility for German cruelties. Opinions regarding the two Axis groups were almost identical: 56 per cent of the cross-section blamed both the German people and their Nazi leaders; 42 per cent blamed the leaders only, and the remaining 2 per cent were undecided.

In Their Own Words

Some of those interviewed who thought both the people and the military leaders of Japan should share the responsibility for wartime cruelties added comments explaining their attitude. A woman insurance adjuster in Chicago, for example, remarked: “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink. If the people weren’t willing, you couldn’t make them commit atrocities.” A Minneapolis shipping clerk commented: “If the people all stuck together, they wouldn’t have to let those dreadful things happen.” A janitor in Portland, Oregon, characterized the Japanese as a “cruel race—abusing even their own people, especially the women.” A machine operator in a cotton mill at Millboro, Virginia, blamed both the Japanese leaders and the people for wartime atrocities because “the leaders are ambitious and the people are uneducated.”

A number of the 40 per cent who blamed the military leaders alone for Japanese war crimes also volunteered remarks, such as:

- “There are lots of good Japs regardless of what people say.”
- “The military leaders taught the people to do all these things.”
- “If the Japanese people were taught to be peace loving, they wouldn’t want to fight.”
- “The Japanese people have no idea what is going on in the world and what is being done.”
- “The leaders are basically to blame. I read in a piece in YANK magazine just last night about what the Jap G.I. goes through in his basic training, and after reading that I can see what I couldn’t see before.”
- “I don’t think any people as a whole are war loving. After all we have Japanese people hero in the United States who are no different than you or I.”

In December '45 Fortune published results of a question on awareness of rather than responsibility for wartime atrocities in the Axis nations. On this score Japan is seen in a somewhat more favorable light than is Germany. The question:

“Do you think many, only a few, or practically none of the civilian population in Japan (Germany) knew about the atrocities in prison camps while the war was still going on?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many knew about atrocities</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only a few knew</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practically none knew</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fortune comments: "The difference here may be due to the greater and earlier publicity the German prison camps received in the U.S. It may also be due to an awareness that many of the Japanese camps were on the Asiatic mainland where the civil population of Japan would not be so likely to know about them; to the smaller numbers in the Japanese camps; and to a belief in the greater strictness of Japanese censorship or 'thought control.' It may also be due to the fact that many Germans were imprisoned in the German camps and that therefore the rest of the Germans would be likely to know of the existence and condition of the camps."

The Chief Enemy?

The problem of differential attitudes toward the peoples of Japan and Germany has been approached in various ways by the public opinion polls. A question put by the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton would seem to indicate that, when the issue is posed squarely in terms of the people or the government, only a few Americans would consider either of the Axis peoples the "chief enemy." The people of Japan are named by a somewhat larger proportion of the public than the people of Germany. In August, 1944, OPOR asked:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In the war with Japan do you feel our chief enemy is the Japanese people as a whole or the Japanese government?&quot;</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In the war with Germany, do you feel our chief enemy is the German people as a whole or the German government?&quot;</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over a period of more than two years, the American Institute of Public Opinion used a question to differentiate attitudes toward Japan and toward Germany:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In this war, which do you think is our chief enemy—Japan or Germany?&quot;</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>21% =100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Sections (February, 1943)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>8% =100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England, Middle Atlantic states</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russian gains against Germany between June '42 and February '43 may be responsible for the almost complete reversal of opinion during that period. Hostility of Pacific Coast residents toward the Japanese is accentuated by the low "Undecided" vote—an indication of attitudes more clearly defined than in any other section. Of all the sections the South evinces the strongest anti-German feelings, possibly because of the fact that a majority of Southern whites are of early English, Scotch, or French extraction. In conjunction with this tendency, opinion is influenced by the attitudes of Negroes—who seem less hostile to the Japanese than is the white population. In December, 1941, just after Pearl Harbor, a Gallup question—approaching the issue from a somewhat different angle—revealed that 64 per cent of the United States public believed Germany to be "a greater threat to America's future" than Japan, while only 15 per cent considered Japan the more dangerous enemy. A question asked by the Office of Public Opinion Research almost three years later, in August, 1944, indicated that a majority of the public then considered Japan the more dangerous enemy. The comparison follows:

- Page 12 -
"Which country is the greater threat to America's future—Germany or Japan?"
(AIPO, December, 1941)

- Germany: 64%
- Japan: 15%
- Equal: 15%
- Undecided: 6%
- 100%

"Which country is the greatest military threat to the United States—Germany or Japan?"
(OPOR, August, 1944)

- Germany: 30%
- Japan: 52%
- Equal: 12%
- Undecided: 6%
- 100%

The 30 months' lapse of time between the two questions—including such opinion-shaping events as the D-Day landing in France—rather than the slight difference in wording, would seem most likely to account for the shift in opinion.

How Much Do We Know about Japan?

That many people in the United States know very little about Japan and the Japanese is clearly shown by the findings of a nation-wide survey reported in the April, 1944, issue of Fortune. In order to discourage guessing on the questions, Fortune Survey interviewers were instructed to tell the respondents, "If you have no idea what the answer is, don't hesitate to say so, but if you have an idea, we'd like your guess." Large numbers of people, Fortune reports, frankly said they didn't know on all six questions; but even more made guesses, often wide of the mark. As one interviewer remarked: "By now, they feel, they ought to know something about Japan."

POPULATION?

The first of three questions touching upon the Japanese way of life read:

"Which of these figures do you think is closest to the size of the population of Japan proper (the home islands)?"

- 50 million: 6%
- 75 million (correct)*: 14%
- 90 million: 19%
- 110 million: 16%
- 125 million: 16%
- Don't know: 29%
- 100%

LITERACY?

A question on Japanese literacy again shows a high degree of misinformation on the part of most people in the United States, with interesting differences in patterns of response. Fortune asked:

"About how many Japanese do you feel can read their own language?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Those Interviewed</th>
<th>Negros</th>
<th>Pacific Coast Residents</th>
<th>Upper Standard-of-Living Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nearly all of them</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of them</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About half</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only a few</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before the war elementary school education was compulsory in Japan. If Japanese literacy figures are accepted, "Nearly all of them" would be the correct response. On the basis of American judgment "Most of them" would be a more accurate answer.

---

*The correct population figure for Japan, according to Fortune, is 73 million, so the "75 million" choice was the correct one. Fortune adds: "Opinion pollers have found that where the public merely guesses on information questions the results form a pattern not very different from this one. Pure guesswork would give each of these five answers 14.1 per cent—leaving out the 'Don't know'; moreover, people's poker-playing instinct makes them lean toward the middle answers as the safest bets when they are uncertain."
THE POSITION OF THE EMPEROR?

The correctness of response to a third Fortune question hinges upon the somewhat controversial point: Exactly how powerful was the Emperor of Japan? The question:

"Which of these comes closest to expressing your idea of the position of the Japanese Emperor?"

- He is the dictator. .................................................. 16%
- He is to Japan what the King is to England. ................................. 6
- He is only a figurehead (except in religion). .............................. 19
- He is the only Japanese god. ............................................ 44
- Don't know ......................................................................... 15

100%

"Since there is no Occidental counterpart of the Japanese Emperor or any simply understandable term in which his role can be described... Fortune's editors framed a scale of possible functions for the Emperor, phrased in American terms. No answer on this scale could be wholly right, but the third is nearest and the fourth not wholly wrong."

WAR POTENTIAL?

A survey taken today might possibly show a greater popular knowledge of comparative Japanese and German military strength than existed in April, 1944. Fortune asked:

"Is it your impression that the Japanese Army is larger than the German Army, smaller, or about the same size?"

- Larger ........................................................................... 29%
- Same ............................................................................. 17
- Smaller ........................................................................... 36
- Don't know ....................................................................... 18

100%

At the time the survey was taken, the Japanese Army was actually less than half as large as the German, according to Fortune, but the fact that some 46 per cent replied either "Larger" or "Same" reflected the tendency to overestimate Japan.

Two questions on the comparative industrial effectiveness of Japan and the United States show a much higher percentage of the public answering correctly:

"How do you think Japan's steel industry compares in size with ours—would you say it is larger, about the same, or smaller?"

- Larger ........................................................................... 7%
- Same ............................................................................. 11
- Smaller ........................................................................... 62
- Don't know ....................................................................... 20

100%

"Do you feel that Japanese industry in an equal length of time can produce more goods per workman than American industry, about the same, or less?"

- More .............................................................................. 10%
- Same ............................................................................. 11
- Less .................................................................................. 66
- Don't know ....................................................................... 13

100%

Men did much better than women on these two questions; 75 per cent of men correctly answered "Smaller" to the question on steel; 74 per cent correctly replied "Less" on productivity.

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PART II

What Shall We Do with the Japanese?

When people think in terms of Japan as a country their recommendations for post-war treatment are distinctly harsher than when they think in terms of the Japanese people. In either case, the public advocates more stringent measures against Japan and the Japanese than against Germany and the Germans.

In February, 1944, the National Opinion Research Center asked this question to ascertain attitudes toward the Axis peoples:

“If you had your say, how would we treat the people who live in Japan after this war?”

40% advocated lenient treatment—a kindly attitude toward the people (but not toward their leaders)... active assistance...
or a re-education program.
49% recommended strict supervision and control of economic and political life—a probationary period... isolation... policing... or disarmament.
20% favored more severe measures—definite punitive action, torture... or even complete extermination.
2% gave other suggestions.
8% were undecided.

119% *

People with a college background were more likely than those with less education to recommend either leniency or strict control of the Japanese, but less likely to advocate extreme severity. Residents of the Pacific and Rocky Mountain states differed significantly from persons living in other parts of the country in that they were less likely to suggest the most lenient treatment and more likely to suggest strict supervision and control of the Japanese people. Racial attitudes also differ sharply, with 53 per cent of Negroes, in contrast to only 38 per cent of whites, recommending friendly treatment of the Japanese people.

When NORC asked, on the same survey, how the people of Germany should be dealt with after the war, 65 per cent of the public recommended lenient treatment, 42 per cent favored strict supervision and control, 8 per cent advocated extreme severity, 1 per cent made other suggestions, and 5 per cent were undecided.

Punish the Japanese Severely

The 20 per cent who advocated severe treatment of the Japanese were about equally divided between those who recommended strong punitive measures and those who would annihilate the Japanese—individually and collectively. Typical harsh recommendations included: “Starve them; torture them. They don’t even let Red Cross ships in.” “Treat the Japanese the same way as they are treating our prisoners now.” “I think they ought to be slaves.” “Treat them like criminals. That’s what they are.” “Shoot the leaders; arrest the balance and put them to hard labor.” “Give them an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth—no sympathy.”

An electrician’s wife in Baltimore answered: “I think the worst we could treat the Japs would be too good!” In like vein a bookkeeper in Huntington, West Virginia: “Those stinkers ought to be put at hard labor or worse. Nothing is too bad for them.” A farm laborer near Honeyville, Utah, replied: “Keep the Japs prisoners until the countries they have fought are on their feet.” An Army wife in Altus, Oklahoma, believed the Japanese should be treated “just as horrible as pos-

*Since a number of people made more than one suggestion, the percentages total more than 100.
sible—just like our boys are being treated now in their prisons." A produce stocker in a Los Angeles market answered: "Women and children should be excepted. The men should pay for all cruelty done to soldiers and American prisoners. Treat them like they did our men."

Some respondents would be satisfied with getting rid of Japan as a nation. A Pennsylvania paper-hanger, for instance, made this recommendation: "Destroy the nation entirely and never let them rule again. Take their industries from them." A number advocated turning Japan over to China—carte blanche. These reactions are representative:

- "Don't allow any Japan to exist. Put Japan under Chinese rule." Farmer's wife, near Bixby, Oklahoma
- "I'd put them back on their island and let China and Korea settle with them." Farmer, near Chester, South Carolina
- "Give all of Japan to China and let them rule it and do what they want to with it." Railroad conductor, Birmingham
- "I'd put them under the Chinese. I don't think Occidental minds can understand Oriental minds." Fruit farmer, near Portland, Oregon
- "Let China control the Japanese. They are of a different race than we are and China could handle them best." Housewife, Chicago

More people, however, answered: "Exterminate the Japanese." "Shoot them all." "Destroy all of them." "Wipe them off the face of the earth." "Don't allow any of them alive." "String them all up." "Cut them all to pieces." or "Put them all at the bottom of the Pacific." Examples of even more detailed and picturesque suggestions include:

- "Exterminate the Japanese. They're barbarians. They're not a fit race to live with white people. They'll plot to start another war from the time this one is over." Old age pensioner, Silverton, Oregon
- "Just line them up and shoot them." Farmer, near Tuteliver, Mississippi
- "I'd put them all in the middle of the ocean—the ones here, too. Sink 'em all!" Machinist, war plant, Los Angeles
- "Kill every Jap in Japan and put out everyone in this country." Railroad telegrapher, Baltimore
- "I hope all the Japanese will be killed and we won't have to bother about dealing with them." Laundryman, Dallas
- "I'd treat the Japs like a bunch of rats. They've just about asked to be annihilated!" Shipyard worker, Portland, Oregon
- "Amnihilate the whole Japanese race. Get rid of every last one, women and children, too." Housewife, Dallas
- "There won't be no Japan; there will be a complete massacre. We'll have to kill all of them." Watch repairman, Spokane, Washington
- "There won't be any people left in Japan if I had my say. They would be bombed right off the earth." Nurse, Indiana
- "Blow the Japanese off the globe. Don't leave one alive!" Army wife, Jenks, Oklahoma
- "If we could find enough dynamite, I'd blow up the whole damned outfit!" Retired realtor, San Francisco

Supervise Them Strictly

A number of the 49 per cent who recommended strict supervision and control of the Japanese spoke in rather general terms: "Keep them down." "Rule them completely." "Strip them of all power." "Deprive them of their political rights." or "Hold them under subjection one way or another." A farmer near Phoenix, Arizona, thought: "They ought to be so severely controlled that they can't make war again." A secretary in Huntington, West Virginia, answered: "If the Japanese people are not completely annihilated in the war, they should be held under strict supervision. They're even more warlike than the Germans. They say that at five years, while an American child plays with a train, a Jap child plays with a dagger."

Some respondents assumed that Allied control of Japan would be needed indefinitely: "Take all their rights away from them. Never give them a chance to rule again." "Keep the Japs down. Never let them rise again." Others suggested a probationary period. For example: "Exercise complete control of the Japanese until they become worthy of association with other countries."
"They should be very strictly disciplined until they find out how to live." "There must be a long probationary period during which the Japanese must be thoroughly looked after." According to the manager of a Cleveland life insurance company, "We ought to keep the Japanese under strict military supervision for at least 25 years." In Santa Monica, California, the wife of a Navy ensign answered: "Keep the Japanese under strict control for the first 10 years and then let them rule themselves."

Other suggestions emphasized the idea of **specific political and economic controls**:

- "The Japanese should never be allowed to come near to being a first-rate nation again. They should be taught and supervised in their education, government, and religion. It would be wonderful to hear that Fujiyama had erupted and the whole island was destroyed!"
- "Do away with Japan's military government. Take full control until that government is broken up."
- "The Japanese will have to be governed by a commission made up of interested nations. Japanese exports and imports should be controlled."
- "Occupy Japan for a period of time—depending on their behavior. Supervise their education and government."
- "The Japanese should be given a chance at democratic government. If their make-up is such that they can't cooperate, then they should have a government supervised by the Allied nations, so Japan won't endanger the peace of the world."
- "Japan needs stricter supervision than other countries. Watch her armaments and leaders."
- "If we conquer Japan, our government should dictate their form of government."

Some Americans believed that keeping a close watch over the Japanese would be sufficient precaution; more advocated a **military police force**:

- "The Japs are deceitful people who can't be trusted. Leave them alone, but watch them carefully."
- "We'll always have to keep an eye on the Japanese."
- "Let them have their own form of government, but watch them all the time."
- "Set up martial law as soon as we conquer Japan. I think it will take a generation of martial law to set them right about things."
- "It looks like they're gonna have to police Japan to see that they get some other kind of thinking in their minds."
- "Strip all leaders of power and put civilians under military control."

Another group said: "Disarm the Japanese and never let them arm again." "Don't let the Japs prepare for war again. Don't sell them scrap iron like we did." "Take all arms away from them and see that they don't get any more." "Take their army and navy away from them forever." "Destroy the military and naval cliques." A business executive in New Iberia, Louisiana, replied: "The Japs should be deprived of any and every material that will help to make them a world menace again."

Even more people believed that the United States should **isolate** Japan, "have nothing whatsoever to do" with Japan or the Japanese—"leave them strictly alone." Specifically:

- "Isolate the Japanese completely until they see the errors of their present philosophy and thinking."
- "Isolate Japan so she can never be a world power again."
- "Keep the Japanese at arm's length. Don't do business with them or have them in this country."

- Page 17 -
“Keep the Japanese people in Japan. Make them stay there and send the ones here back there. Have nothing to do with them.”

“Let the Japanese have their islands and fishing boats to provide food for their people, but do not let them mingle with the rest of the world.”

“Just ignore the Japanese—have nothing to do with them.”

Treat Them Leniently

Many of the 40 per cent of the cross-section who recommended a lenient post-war policy toward the people of Japan replied in such general terms as: “Treat them fairly,” “. . . justly,” “. . . decently,” “. . . like human beings,” “. . . as we would want to be treated”; “Try to get their good will,” “Practice the Golden Rule,” or “Treat them right if they act right.” Some were more specific:

“I don’t like the Japanese, but you can’t hurt or mistreat them after the war.”

“Not all the Japanese are devils. They should be treated decently.”

“It’s pretty hard to be fair about it now, but I’d treat the Japanese as a friendly nation. We won’t have a lasting peace if we don’t. I think our fighting boys feel that way, too.”

“We should be friendly with them, but not give them any aid. We are to love our neighbors!”

“The Japanese should be treated with understanding if we don’t want another war within a few years.”

“They should be given access to raw materials necessary to maintain their economy but should not be allowed to re-arm.”

A number made a distinction between the treatment of the Japanese people and the treatment of their war leaders. These reactions are typical: “After the military clique is stamped out, treat the Japanese people with consideration and understanding.” “Treat them in accordance with their deeds: punish the military leaders severely; re-educate the others and treat them justly.” “They should be treated humanely and fairly and given an equal chance in world affairs. The Japanese people aren’t to blame; it’s the leaders that cause trouble.”

Many people emphasized the need for re-educating the Japanese—for establishing “an entirely new system of education.” Some expressed this idea in rather general terms; some stressed the need for Allied supervision, the importance of religious and ethical training, or some other specialized aspect of the problem. These replies are representative:

“Do away with the rulers and educate the common people.”

“Japan should have an entirely new educational system organized under Allied direction.”

“We should Christianize the Japanese and teach them a new form of government.”

“The Japanese people must be re-educated. It would take a long time and we would have to supervise.”

“I’d try to educate them into tolerance, understanding, and to love one another.”

“Treat the Japanese as children. Teach them to love each other. Work with them and show them how to live civilized.”

“They should be educated and given light as to other religions besides theirs. Give them something to choose from.”

“The Japanese should be educated in our ways of living. After about 100 years they might be ready to assume some responsibility.”

* Page 18 *
Less typical are answers such as these:

"Find the right thinking people in Japan and work with them in training the others to live right."

"The Japanese have got to be forced into a different way. It is a child program, and the children should be separated from their parents to change Japan."

"The Oriental mind is so different that it will take a long process of education to make the Japanese even decent."

Only a few—3 per cent of the total cross-section—suggested active assistance to the Japanese—sending them food, clothing, and other supplies. A delivery man in Louisburg, North Carolina, was one of a number to reply: "Feed them and clothe them if necessary." Another response common among this group was that of a retired clergyman living in Atlanta, Georgia: "Do everything to improve conditions in Japan." A Harvey, Illinois, clergyman answered: "I'd feed the Japanese and give them a chance to set up a government of their own. Just give them a chance to get going again." A drug clerk in San Francisco went so far as to say: "Allow the Japanese to exist as an empire. They should be given room for expansion on the continent of Asia, a part of China."

Some of this group who would give Japan concrete help qualified their answers even further than by adding "if necessary." An Army wife in Rockville, Indiana, for instance, said: "Feed and clothe the Japanese, but make them work." The wife of a dairy farmer near Brighton, Colorado, suggested: "They should be given help to rehabilitate themselves but not enough to assert themselves again." A farmer's wife near Houston, Texas, replied: "Give the Japanese the things they need, but don't let them get materials to build up ammunition as we did before."

COMPARISONS: TREATMENT OF JAPANESE AND GERMANS

A number of respondents compared the treatment to be accorded the Japanese people with that to be accorded the Germans. Two points of view were expressed. Some people in this country felt that the Japanese and the Germans should be treated the same way. Others believed that the Japanese deserved more severe punishment than the Germans.

Those who would give the same treatment to the Japanese and the Germans made comments such as these:

"Treat the Japanese the same as the Germans. Have no relations of any kind with them—trade or otherwise."

"We should treat the Japs the same as the Germans. Keep them under strict military rule."

"We will have to police Japan like Germany."

"I'd treat the Japanese and the Germans very much the same way. I don't think any of us would want them to suffer, but they must be held in subjection."

"Treat Japan the same as Germany. Get the leaders; let the people alone after that."

"Treat Japan the same as Germany. Treat the people just like we do our own. It isn't the PEOPLE'S fault."

"Treat the Japanese the same way as Germany, but there won't be many left. Feed and clothe them, but don't allow them to manufacture. Don't lend them money."

The opinion that the Japanese should be treated more harshly was expressed in terms such as the following:

"The Japanese are more dangerous than the Germans; keep them under firm control."

"I'd treat the Japanese more severely than the Germans. They ought to be made to stay in their own country and not allowed to expand at any time."

"I'd treat the Japanese worse than I would treat the Germans. I'd wipe the Japs off the face of the earth."

"Be stricter than on the Germans. Try to reform their ideas by education."
"Japan" or "the Japanese People"?

Comparisons between results obtained on various surveys suggest that when a question is asked in terms of treatment of "Japan" recommendations are apt to be somewhat more severe than when the question is phrased in terms of "the Japanese people."

The NORC question just discussed found almost half of those interviewed in favor of strict supervision of the Japanese PEOPLE.

In November, 1944, a Gallup question asked in terms of Japan as a COUNTRY found almost half the public advocating extreme severity.

During the 10 months interval between the NORC and the AIPO surveys many new Japanese atrocities were reported, possibly affecting American attitudes. Gallup asked:

"What do you think we should do with Japan as a country after the war?"

- 8% placed major emphasis on rehabilitation and re-education to the end that Japan might again take a place in the world as a civilized nation.
- 28% suggested control or supervision by the Allies with policing and reform of the country, but without any territorial dismemberment.
- 46% recommended extreme severity. These included:
  - 33% who would destroy the country as a political entity or cut it up into small states, and
  - 13% who would kill all Japanese left alive at the end of the war.
- 18% gave answers classified as miscellaneous or undecided.

100%

When the same question was asked regarding Germany, 12 per cent recommended rehabilitation or re-education, 32 per cent suggested Allied control or supervision, 34 per cent advocated extreme severity, and the remaining 22 per cent gave other answers or were undecided.

What was GI opinion regarding the Japanese? In contrast to the opinions of civilian adults in the United States, how have the soldiers themselves felt about what should be done with Axis countries after the war? Army survey results* reported in July, 1944, indicated that at that time a plurality of infantrymen who had actually fought the Japanese in the Pacific still made a distinction between the people and leaders. On the other hand, a majority of fighting men in Europe, who had never had any contact with the Japanese, nevertheless recommended wiping out the entire nation after the war. About two-thirds of combat veterans interviewed in both the Pacific and European theatres made a definite distinction between the German people and their leaders. The comparison:

"What would you like to see happen to the Japanese after the war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY VETERANS</th>
<th>IN THE PACIFIC</th>
<th>IN EUROPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punish the leaders but not the ordinary Japanese</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make the Japanese people suffer plenty</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wipe out the whole Japanese nation</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
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</table>

"What would you like to see happen to Germany after the war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFANTRY VETERANS</th>
<th>IN THE PACIFIC</th>
<th>IN EUROPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punish the leaders but not the ordinary Germans</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make the German people suffer plenty</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wipe out the whole German nation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Research Branch, Morale Services Division, War Department, reported in departmental publications, What the Soldier Thinks, Number 7, July, 1944. The survey, made in conformity with approved polling practices, included confidential interviews with representative cross-sections of enlisted infantrymen, combat veterans, in the European and Pacific theatres respectively.
In the fall of 1945, shortly after V-J Day, NORC phrased a question about the post-war treatment of "Japan" in such a way as to make maintaining world peace the determining factor. The inclusion of the clause "to make sure she stays at peace with the world" rather than of the lapse of time, probably was responsible for the pattern of replies somewhat different from those reported by Gallup. The NORC question:

"What do you think ought to be done about Japan to make sure she stays at peace with the world?"

11% recommended a program of re-education.
74 suggested supervision and control with the main emphasis on occupation of the country and secondary emphasis on demilitarization and/or industrial control.
6 advocated extreme severity—annihilation.
8 gave other answers.
10 were undecided.

109%*

The Emperor and the Military Leaders?

Even before the end of the war with Japan, the punishment of the Japanese military leaders and the ultimate fate of Emperor Hirohito were the subject of wide discussion and speculation. While an overwhelming majority of the public in the United States favored the greatest severity in the treatment of the Japanese militarists, opinion was divided as to what would be the wisest method of handling Hirohito—"the symbol of the throne, mystical and religious cornerstone of Japanese life." The American public, on the whole, would punish the Japanese military leaders more harshly than the Nazi leaders in Germany, but recommended more lenient treatment for the Emperor than was advocated for Hitler before the surrender of Germany.**

HOW PUNISH THE MILITARISTS?***

According to the results of a Gallup survey made in November, 1944, more than eight out of every ten Americans favored the use of the harshest possible measures against the Japanese military leaders. The 88 per cent who answered "Yes" to the question: "After the war, do you think the Japanese military leaders should be punished in any way?" were asked to specify the punishment they would recommend. The great majority of answers were made in what Gallup describes as "pretty gruesome terms . . . enough to make your hair stand on end." Only a few (4%) made such suggestions as "Treat them justly," "Handle them under international law," or "Demote them."

WHAT FATE FOR HIROHITO?

Fundamental to any analysis of opinions regarding the treatment to be accorded Emperor Hirohito is a consideration of the degree of information upon which the opinions are based. Poll findings suggest that many people in the United States have known little about the Emperor of Japan, his functions and his position in the Japanese religious and political pattern.

In the late spring of 1945 Gallup asked a nation-wide cross-section: "Can you tell me the name of the Emperor of Japan?" According to Gallup, only a little more than half of those interviewed (54%) answered correctly "Hirohito." Another 5 per cent named Tojo, a former premier. Other guesses went as far afield as Tito, Hari-Kari, Yokohama, or Fujiyama. "A sizeable number either said they could not pronounce his name, or did not know it at all." The Fortune Survey question quoted on page 16 indicates that a considerable minority in the United States hold confused opinions regarding the Emperor's position or frankly "Don't know."

*Since a number of people made more than one suggestion, the percentages total more than 100.
**Compare Report No. 24, pages 21-22.
***See also NORC question, page 27.
Although nearly half of the American public apparently know very little about the Emperor of Japan, the people in the United States have some very definite ideas as to what should be done with Hirohito. A majority think he should be treated like any other war criminal, according to results reported by several different polling organizations.

In February, 1945, the Iowa Poll released findings secured through the use of a question offering respondents the choice of several possible answers:

"After Japan is defeated, should we:

- Leave Emperor Hirohito at the head of the government?............. 3%
- Exile him to some far-off place?........................................ 10
- Have him stand trial as a war criminal?.................................. 69
- Execute him ........................................................................... 9
- Other ideas ............................................................................. 2
- Undecided .............................................................................. 7

100%"

In April '45 the Minnesota Poll reported state-wide opinion strongly in favor of punishing Hirohito for Japan’s war guilt:

"The Japanese people think of their Emperor as a god rather than a military leader. Do you think he should or should not be punished for Japan’s war guilt?”

Should be punished...86% Should not be punished...4% Undecided...10% = 100%"

An AIPO question, asked at the same time as the question on the Emperor’s name, presented no list of possible answers. A clear majority, however, suggested the use of harsh measures against the Emperor. The question read:

"What do you think we should do with the Japanese Emperor after the war?"

Execute him ............................................................................. 33% Try him and let the court decide his fate..................................... 17 Keep him in prison for the rest of his life........................................ 11 Exile him .................................................................................... 9 Do nothing—he’s only a figurehead for the war lords................. 4 Use him as a puppet ruler to run Japan for the Allies.................. 3 Other answers or undecided....................................................... 23

70% 100%

When the Australian Public Opinion Polls asked the same question in the summer of 1945, 25 per cent favored executing Hirohito, 22 per cent advocated treating him as a war criminal, and 9 per cent suggested exiling or imprisoning him—a total of 56 per cent recommending harsh measures. A British Institute of Public Opinion survey made late in August—after the surrender of Japan—showed two-thirds of the public as a whole—67 per cent—of the opinion that the Japanese Emperor should be deprived of his throne. This view was expressed by 70 per cent of the poor but only 61 per cent of the middle class and 57 per cent of the prosperous. (Interestingly enough, the 11 per cent “Undecided” remains the same for all three economic groups.)

After V-J Day, however, a majority of Americans with opinions expressed approval of the official decision to allow Emperor Hirohito to remain in office. In September '45 NORC asked:

"Do you think it was a good idea or a bad idea to agree to let the Japanese keep their Emperor?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Adults Interviewed</th>
<th>Those with Opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good idea</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad idea</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXPERT OPINION

Somewhat in contrast to the views of the “man in the street” are the opinions of a panel of experts on the Far East, only 10 per cent of whom believe the Allies should arbitrarily abolish the Emperor
as an institution. The poll was made by mail during June, 1945, by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University.* Included in the group of 57 persons "especially competent and experienced in regard to Japanese political and social developments" were 46 who had lived in Japan and four who had visited the country.

One of the questions put to the panel of experts read:

"In your judgment, what should be done about the Japanese Emperor system after victory is won? (The institution is referred to, not the individual.)

1. "Leave it to the Japanese to work out for themselves."
   30%

2. "Have the Allies take necessary steps to abolish the institution."
   10%

3. "Have the Allies try to retain and use the Emperor institution."
   7%

4. "Have the Allies exert influence upon the Japanese to take action themselves, either to abolish the institution or drastically to curtail the Emperor's powers."
   46

Other suggestions
   7

100%

It should be noted that a total of 76 per cent (those who chose alternatives 1 and 4) supported policies under which the problem would be worked out largely by the Japanese people themselves. "While most of the experts believe the Emperor system must go, they fear that outside coercion will defeat its own ends."

Those experts who advocated leaving the problem of the Emperor entirely to the Japanese people stressed most frequently "the views that the Emperor legend is too deeply embedded in Japanese history for outsiders to be able effectively to change it, and that attempts by the Allies would only drive the Japanese to resistance and to underground continuation of Emperor worship." One panel member, for example, commented:

"For the United Nations to insist upon either the abolition or the retention of the Imperial institution would be equally unfortunate. So long as the Imperial institution exists Japan will never be democratic or non-militarist; but the destruction of that institution by foreign pressure would serve only to strengthen the institution in the heart of every patriotic Japanese subject."

Most of those who believed the Allies should encourage the Japanese people to take some action against the Emperor institution felt "that drastic reform and support of new forces of liberal revolt are demanded and that these are possible only if the Emperor institution undergoes basic change." Among the comments made were these:

"... We must be prepared to EXTEND EFFECTIVE SUPPORT to those Japanese groups which will revolt against the old oligarchical system when defeat comes. The decision as to the Emperor can then be left to these new groups."

"Abolish the institution by cooperating in every possible way with those Japanese who want to establish a more liberal government. This is a little stronger than (4). We should make it appear that this is being done by the Japanese, but we must see to it that they do not fail in this objective. Militarism finds its deepest roots in Emperor worship, and Imperial rule is closely associated with exploitation of the common people."

"Intern the Emperor as a United Nations prisoner somewhere outside of Japan. Later, the Japanese could be allowed a plebiscite to vote on his return. If they don't want him, fine; continue his internment to the end of his days. If they do vote him back, at least the precedent will have been established that the Emperor owes his throne to the people. This might be the beginning of a genuine constitutional monarchy, which could become more quasi-republican as time goes on. But I confidently expect an anti-monarchist trend —whose chief danger will be that we, not the Japanese, may smother it.""
PART III

Economic Problems

Although the problems of industrial reconstruction and reparations are closely inter-related, comparatively few people in the United States realize that Japan will probably be unable to pay any sort of substantial reparations if she is reduced to a primarily agricultural nation. A series of questions on an NORC survey completed before the surrender of Japan showed that:

ALTHOUGH 65% of the public believed that the United States should assume no responsibility in helping Japan get her peacetime industries going again after the war,

NEVERTHELESS 79% thought the United States should try to get reparations from Japan, and

52% said that this payment should be made mostly in goods.

HOWEVER, ONLY 21% would be willing to accept as reparations Japanese goods which could be sold cheaper than similar goods made in this country—even if that were the only way Japan could pay part, at least, of what the war cost the United States.

Another NORC survey made shortly after the surrender of Japan revealed that:

73% think that the Japanese should be allowed to rebuild their peacetime industries, and

51% would then favor the United States' resuming trade with Japan.

Shall Japan's Peacetime Industries Be Rebuilt?

Although 59 per cent of the people in this country would like to see the United States government help set the wheels of Germany's peacetime industries turning again, 65 per cent were against giving similar assistance to Japanese industry after the war. (Of course, the definition of and distinction between wartime and peacetime industries is a highly technical problem requiring careful study and decisions by experts.)

NORC asked the question about Germany in 1944, the one about Japan a year later in 1945:

"Would you like to see our government help Japan (Germany) get her peacetime industries going again after this war, or not?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undecided</strong></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A definite "Yes" response without qualifications was given by 21 per cent, while the other 4 per cent would have the United States help Japan only under specified conditions.

In September '45—several weeks after the surrender of Japan—NORC asked a somewhat differently worded question in which the issue of United States assistance was not raised:

"Do you think the Japanese should be allowed to rebuild their PEACETIME industries?"

<p>| | | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>73%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undecided</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

=100%
The 73 per cent majority who replied “Yes” were also asked:

"After their peacetime industries are rebuilt, do you think we should begin to trade with them again?"

Yes............51%  No.............17%  Undecided.............5% =73%

**In Their Own Words**

Many of those who—in the summer of '45—expressed **unqualified approval** of United States assistance made comments explaining their attitude. As in the earlier question on Germany, some people approached the question from an idealistic point of view, but more seemed to face the issue in the light of cold economic facts:

"The Japanese could pay their war debts better if they have their industries going."

"The quicker they get back on their feet, the less we will have to do."

"The Japanese must survive, and if we don't help, we'll have to keep them. We'd be taxed to death."

"Sixty-five million people starving to death in any part of the world is bound to have bad effects on every other part of the world."

"The safety of the world depends on everyone being prosperous."

"If we are building for the future, we have to make the Japanese self-supporting and self-respecting again."

"If we want to live up to what we preach as Christian people, we must help Japan."

Attorney, Texarkana, Texas

Merchant seaman, Wichita

Wife of newspaper manager, Ohio

Wife of theatre manager, Queens, New York

Wife of insurance agent, St. Louis

Accountant’s wife, Robbinsdale, Minnesota

Wife of truck driver, Helena, Montana

The 4 per cent who gave **conditional approval** believed the United States should help re-establish Japan’s peacetime industries “if the United States has complete control,” “if they agree to our terms,” “if America can afford to help them,” “if we could do it without working a hardship on our own industries,” or “if we could help them by guidance, but not with materials and money.” The 65 per cent majority who opposed helping reconstruct Japanese peacetime industry volunteered a variety of comments, almost all of which indicated a strong feeling of bitterness and hostility against the Japanese. The following selected comments express all shades of anti-Japanese feeling:

"I hope there isn’t any Japan left after this war is over with."

"They have done too much to our boys. If I had my way, I would destroy them all."

"The Japanese should be held as slaves the rest of their lives."

"I don’t think we should spend a dime on Japan."

"They have dealt us enough misery already; why give them a chance to do it all over again?"

"Japan was able to organize itself for a long war. They should be made to rebuild themselves now so they will know just what war costs."

"They don’t deserve it. We’ve helped them so much during earthquakes and they’ve always double crossed us. They’ll never forget this. Keep them down altogether—let them manage the best they can. They asked for this war; we didn’t."

"I have some aversion to helping the Japanese in manufacturing. They should become agricultural until they have proven themselves trustworthy. Their whole system of sweatshops is a troublesome competitive deal; there’s something healthy about their getting back to the soil, and they can do that by themselves."

Sailor’s wife, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Trucker, Newington, Connecticut

City employee, Atlanta

Farmer, near Independence, Missouri

Mechanic’s wife, Houston, Texas

Wife of bank teller, Scranton, Pennsylvania

Wife of rigger foreman, Minneapolis

Manager, farm seed company, Minneapolis
RATIONING?

Those persons who wanted the United States government to help get Japan’s peacetime industries in operation after the war and those who were undecided—35 per cent of the cross-section—and those with the same views regarding Germany on the earlier question (66%) were asked:

"Would you be willing to have some things rationed in this country for several years after the war in order to help Japan (Germany) get her peacetime industries going again?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While over half of those asked the question about Japan were unwilling to sacrifice to help Japanese peacetime industries, more than half of those asked the question about Germany said they were willing to continue rationing to help German industries get going again.

Those unwilling to help Japan made such remarks as the following: "We shouldn't deny ourselves for the Japanese," "I wouldn't make that much sacrifice for them," "The Japanese started the war, not us," "They should be able to produce their own," "Japan's struggle to get back on her feet might be a lesson for the future."

Some of those willing to accept continued rationing added: "For a short time," "Just some things," "If it's necessary," "It will help make trade," "If it would make the world any better," and similar comments.

On both the general issue of United States help and the specific issue of rationing to make such help possible, Negroes are more willing to assist Germany than any other population group studied. Persons with a college background are somewhat more willing to help than are persons with less education. Men are more willing than women to see the United States help Japan get her peacetime industries started again after the war. Farmers more than residents of cities or towns would favor continued rationing in the United States if it would help to rebuild Japan.

IOWA OPINION: INDUSTRIAL CONTROL

The more education a person had the more likely he was to favor control rather than complete elimination of Japan’s industrial potential, according to a question reported by the Iowa Poll* in February '45:

"When Japan is finally defeated, there are two general ideas we might follow to keep her from starting another war. Do you favor either of them or are you opposed to both?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Adults Interviewed</th>
<th>Attended College</th>
<th>Attended High School</th>
<th>Eighth Grade or Less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTROL RAW MATERIALS going into Japan to keep her from building up munitions and weapons for another war...</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROY EVERYTHING INDUSTRIAL in Japan—shipyards, merchant marine, steel industries, airplane factories—making her dependent on farming and fishing.&quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to both ideas</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

*Sponsored by the Des Moines Register and Tribune.
Another Iowa Poll question showed that 70 per cent of the state-wide cross-section would favor the idea of partially "balancing the books in the South Pacific by giving China and other countries the tools and factory equipment which the United Nations might deem it wise to take away from Japan."

THE OPINION OF EXPERTS

The Bureau of Applied Social Research found the experts in almost perfect agreement regarding the most desirable type of economic policy: 95 per cent believed that the Japanese should be allowed opportunities for economic recovery in the post-war period. The question:

"Which of these two general types of policy toward Japan do you think the Allies should adopt at the end of the war?

1. "Keep Japan down; crush Japanese industry and trade and reduce the nation to a low level of life." .................................................. 5%
2. "Let the Japanese have opportunities for economic recovery (though with thorough demilitarization) as a basis for building a reformed and reconstructed Japan." .......................................................... 95%

Some of the 95 per cent explained their views more fully in replies such as these:

"I prefer policy (2) because it seems to me quite absurd to imagine liberal and moderate elements in Japan coming to the fore in an atmosphere of starvation and utter economic depression and ruin."

"Economic recovery should not be of a kind leading to the political and social recovery of the Zaibatsu and other civilian warmakers who are quite as militaristic as the uniformed militarists."

"To deny opportunity for economic recovery is to deny both human rights and economic common sense."

Should We TRY to Get Reparations?

OPINIONS: 1943, 1944

To an NORC survey question asked in January, 1943, only 28 per cent of the public expressed themselves as willing to "forget reparations—that is, not try to collect any money from Germany or Japan to pay for what the war has cost us and our Allies."

More than a year later (in February '44), NORC approached the same problem in a somewhat different way, yet found exactly the same proportion—28 out of every 100—willing to forego reparations payments after the war. As on the earlier question, the more extensive the respondent's educational background, the less likely he was to insist on Japanese reparations. The question:

"If Japan is made to give up all the land she has taken, and if Hirohito and the other Japanese leaders are punished, should we try to make the Japanese people pay for our cost of this war, or not?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Adults Interviewed</th>
<th>Attended College</th>
<th>Attended High School</th>
<th>Eighth Grade or Less</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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On the same survey a similar question asked regarding Germany showed that only 48 per cent of the public would insist upon trying to get reparations "if Germany is made to give up all the land she has taken since 1930, and if Hitler and the other Nazi leaders are punished."

The 64 per cent who would hold the Japanese to a strict reckoning included 5 per cent who qualified their answers by recommending that the Japanese people should pay for "what they can" or "to
the extent of their ability.” Typical of comments made by some of the others was the reply of a farmer’s wife near Brighton, Colorado: “The Japanese should pay in whatever way they can, money or goods, but no money or goods can pay for the lives that are being lost.” The wife of a Chicago coal trucker remarked: “Lordy, yes! My son is over there fighting them now.” A New York City secretary answered: “The Japanese should be dealt with more severely than the Germans, because they don’t treat prisoners of war according to the rules. They invaded us at Pearl Harbor instead of declaring war on us.” And a New England housewife felt that “the people are just as responsible as the leaders are.”

A number of the 28 per cent who answered, “No, don’t make the Japanese people pay,” made comments such as these: “They can’t replace lives.” “It would be nice if they could pay—but it’s economically impossible.” “They will have nothing to pay with.” “If the Japanese give up all that land, we ought to call it a day.” “If their leaders are done away with, that is what we want. Their leaders are causing most of the trouble.”

OPINIONS: 1945

Another NORC survey question used shortly before the end of the war with Japan indicated that eight out of ten Americans believed that we should try to make the people of Japan pay us, somehow, for the cost of the war. Persons with a college background and adults in the 21-to-39 age bracket endorsed the suggestion by somewhat smaller majorities than did the public as a whole. The comparison is shown on the opposite page.

Some of the 79 per cent who favored trying to make the Japanese pay the cost of the war added comments indicating how strongly they felt on the point: “I should say we should be paid; the Japs should pay and pay and pay!” “They started this and what they start they should pay for.” “We

*A year earlier 62 per cent of the public answered “Yes” to a similar question about German reparations: “Do you think we should try to make the people of Germany pay us either in money or goods for our cost of this war?” Only 29 per cent, however, believed that “Germany will be able to pay us either in money or goods for our cost of this war—within 25 years after the war is over.”

---

*Includes 5% qualifying their answer.
should get something from the yellow rats!” “They have destroyed our property and should pay for it!” The wife of a stockman near Cheyenne, Wyoming, exclaimed: “We should get all we can out of those countries. Let them pay it instead of our children and our children’s children!” A few (1%) suggest that part payment is all that can be expected: “A certain amount, anyway,” or “enough to make the Japanese realize the wrong and crime they’ve done.”

The 14 per cent who opposed the idea of trying to get reparations from Japan included 4 per cent who made voluntary comments to the effect that “The Japanese have nothing to pay with,” “It won’t do any good, they won’t have anything left,” or “You can’t get blood out of a stone.” Other scattered remarks such as these were recorded: “If the Japanese lose the war and give up, that’s enough; the least we can have to do with them the better off we are.” “When the Japs are licked, leave them alone and hope they all starve.” “Reparations might cause another war.” “Their people may be innocent; it was their government.”

“Do you think we should try to make the people in Japan pay us IN SOME WAY OR OTHER for our cost of this war, or don’t you think we should try to get repaid?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All adults interviewed</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth grade or less</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended high school</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended college</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults 40 and over</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults 21 to 39</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When replies to the question about helping Japan reconstruct her peacetime industries were compared with answers to the question as to whether or not we should try to get reparations from Japan, it appeared that, among persons with opinions on both questions:

62% were definitely inconsistent in that they opposed helping Japan re-establish her peacetime industries but would insist, nevertheless, on trying to get reparations.

33% were realistic and practical, in that:
- 23% would help Japan get her peacetime industries going and would also demand reparations, while
- 10% would neither give Japan industrial help nor insist on reparations.

5% were unusually lenient in that they would help Japan to re-establish her peacetime industries, but they would not favor trying to get Japan to pay our cost of the war.
Money or Goods?

Even before the end of hostilities, a majority of people in the United States seemed convinced of the uselessness of demanding reparations from Japan in money. Less than one-fourth of the public considered money the most feasible medium of payment, about half specified goods, and the remainder either suggested some other non-monetary form of payment or were undecided. The NORC question:

"If our government decides that Japan MUST pay us for our cost of the war, which one of these ways do you think we'd have the best chance of getting paid; by accepting payment mostly in money, mostly in goods, or mostly in some other way?"

22% said mostly money.
63 answered in terms of goods or other non-monetary payment.

These included:

52% who said mostly goods;
5 who suggested payment in land—bases, islands; or in natural resources, such as oil, coal, and other minerals;
3 who recommended payment in labor and services, particularly for reconstruction purposes; and
3 who made still other suggestions.
15 were undecided.

The more education a person had, the more likely he was to believe that the most practical form of reparations would be goods or some other non-monetary type of payment. This is the comparison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Money</th>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>Other Non-Monetary Payment</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All adults interviewed</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended college</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended high school</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth grade or less</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another NORC question, the third in the series, brings out more sharply the concern over potential Japanese industrial competition. While a majority of the people in every population group studied were against accepting low-cost Japanese goods as reparations, opinion varied significantly, with business and professional people and white collar workers most opposed to the idea, and farmers and Southerners least opposed:
"If the only way Japan COULD pay us for our cost of the war would be in goods, would you be willing for our country to accept any goods which could be sold cheaper than similar goods we make in this country?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willing to Accept</th>
<th>Not Willing</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All adults interviewed</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England and Middle Atlantic states</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic, personal service, and protective workers</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional people</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar workers</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Their Own Words

Some of the 22 per cent who advocated reparations in money made comments revealing the reasons for this recommendation. A contractor's wife in Reading, Pennsylvania, was one of several to advance the idea: "The Japanese have money salted away somewhere just like Germany had. We'll find it." Others emphasized economic reasons why they believed payment in money would be preferable to payment in goods: "People wouldn't buy 'made-in-Japan' goods." "If we accepted goods we should be opening up a way for them to do business with us." "They can produce the goods so much cheaper; it would be harder on our labor."
Only a few of the 52 per cent who recommended reparations in goods added comments. These are representative:

"Goods would benefit us more than money; their goods are fine."
Bridge repairman, Atlanta

"They have a lot of stuff over there we could use."
Watchman, war plant, Connecticut

"They never had no money; let 'em send silk."
Wife of feed company owner, Evansville, Indiana

"Let's get those stockings rolling!"
Teacher, Cleveland

The 11 per cent who suggest various forms of non-monetary payment voiced their opinions in such terms as these:

"We should retain for military use all islands and other captured territory."
Oil company clerk, Houston

"We should take their territory; if we take their goods, in the end it will make them more powerful industrially."
Veterinarian, Montgomery, Alabama

"We have plenty of money, and as far as goods is concerned we produce better goods over here. They should rebuild everything they have ruined."
Upholsterer, Minneapolis

"Take all their industries away from them and make them work on our farms and our sugar plantations. Make a farm out of all Japan proper."
Farmer, near Granite Falls, North Carolina

"We should take Japanese art treasures."
Teacher, Lewiston, Maine

"We should control their trade relations with other nations."
Matron in school, Schenectady, New York

"Just anything the Japanese have that we want should be ours."
Farmer, near Clay, Kentucky

Only a few of the 21 per cent who would be willing to accept Japanese goods which could be sold more cheaply than comparable American goods made comments explaining their attitude. The wife of a farmer near Wellington, Ohio, says: "If we couldn't get it in any other way, we'd have to take it that way. It might hurt our own goods, but we have always bought stuff from the Japanese." Others added remarks such as: "We'd have to be willing to take what Japan would have to offer."
"The more we get from Japan the more she will buy from us. But it would be better for the peace of the world if Japan was an agricultural country."
"We have been buying goods from Japan for a long time and it didn't make any difference."

Many of the 68 per cent who would be unwilling to accept Japanese goods mentioned their reasons—usually a fear that such an arrangement would mean a lower standard of living and fewer jobs in the United States. These examples suggest the pattern:

"We had too much competition with Japan in that line before. Either we have to come down to Japan's scale or they have to come up to ours."
Brewery employee, Minneapolis

"It would hurt American labor; Japan can put the stuff out for a dime, they live so cheap; it would cost us a quarter."
Messenger, Minnesota

"Absolutely not! We should raise our standard of living, not lower it."
Custodian, Tacoma, Washington

"It will take jobs away from us, and their goods are cheaper material."
Wife of industrial engineer, Berlin, Connecticut

"It would put people in this country out of work."
Wife of lumberman, Middleboro, Massachusetts

"It would ruin our domestic industries."
Wife of businessman, Los Angeles

"I'm for high tariff; I don't believe in free trade."
Farmer, near Buckley, Washington

"We should accept only goods not produced in this country."
Farmer, near Wichita

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PART IV

Political and Administrative Problems

The post-war administration of Japan by the Allies involves many specific problems—political, social, and economic. Part III is devoted mainly to economic issues—reparations and Japan’s industrial future. The present section endeavors (1) to summarize public opinion on certain political and social problems—through the answers to definite questions, many of which pose clear-cut issues raised by the public itself when people were asked the more general questions considered in the first two sections; and (2) to report opinion regarding our policy since the Allied occupation of Japan.

Relief and Rehabilitation for Japan

When the question of post-war relief for starving people has been proposed without naming specific countries—Axis or Allied, large majorities in the United States have favored the idea in principle. In two 1942 surveys—February and May—the National Opinion Research Center found more than nine out of ten Americans replying “Yes” to the question: “If, after the war, people in some of the countries in the world are starving, do you think the United States should help to feed the people in these countries?” As for the financing of such a program, about a third of those interviewed favored government loans to the needy countries, another third preferred voluntary contributions through the Red Cross and similar organizations, and only a few thought such a program should be financed directly through taxation in the United States. (The remainder made still other suggestions or were undecided.)

In January ’43 and again in March ’46, NORC asked more specific questions which revealed a significant shift in opinion on sending food to the Axis peoples. At the height of the conflict, public opinion was definitely divided on the question of whether—after the war—food should be given free, sold to, or withheld entirely from the Germans and Japanese. Today the largest group in the population clearly favors sending food to both countries in exchange for money or goods. Americans look more leniently on the Germans than on the Japanese: more people would give or sell food to Germany and fewer would send none. Particularly noticeable is the decline in the percentage who would send no food at all to the Japanese. After V-J Day, the wording of the question was changed slightly:

“If the people in Japan are starving right after the war (at the present time), do you think the United States should sell them only what food they can pay for, or send them food as a gift if they can’t pay, or not send them any food at all?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Send food as a gift....</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell or exchange........</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send none................</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided................</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Send food as a gift...</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell or exchange......</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send none..............</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided..............</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the more recent survey, comparisons show, at least a plurality of every population group studied believe that we should **sell** food to Japan in exchange for money or goods. In most cases the
percentages replying either “Give” or “Send none” DECREASED between 1943 and 1946. On both surveys, persons in the more privileged educational, economic, and occupational groups reply “Give” oftener and “None” less often than do those less privileged. The most significant comparisons follow:

FOOD TO THE JAPANESE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1943</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1946</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Give</td>
<td>Sell</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Give</td>
<td>Sell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended college</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended high school</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth grade or less</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, business, and white collar workers</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual and factory workers</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England and Middle Atlantic states</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Mountain and Pacific states</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except in one or two instances, at least a plurality of all groups studied think that we should sell food to Germany. The percentages replying “Send food as a gift” run consistently higher for Germany than for Japan. As in the case of Japan, more people reply “Sell” on the post-war survey than on the wartime one, and fewer people in almost every group answer either “Give” or “Send none.”

A related question asked on the March ’46 survey reveals that 68 per cent of the public said they would “be willing to have meat and butter rationed again so that we could send more food to needy countries that fought on our side* in the war.” Only 29 per cent were not willing, and 3 per cent were undecided. When replies to the two questions are compared, it is found that those willing to resume rationing—for the sake of the Allies—more frequently favor sending food as a gift to Germany and Japan than do those unwilling to resume rationing. For example:

Of those WILLING to resume meat and butter rationing for the benefit of the Allies:

- 36% favor sending food as a gift to Japan.
- 39% favor sending food as a gift to Germany.

Of those NOT WILLING to go back to rationing:

- ONLY 19% favor sending free food to Japan.
- 24% favor sending free food to Germany.

In Their Own Words**

GIFT Among the 30 per cent who would send food to the Japanese people as a gift, a number volunteer comments which explain their opinion on the issue. A common attitude is that of an Ottumwa, Iowa, housewife, who adds: “Send food whether they can pay for it or not.” The wife of a Hammond, Indiana, steel worker is one of a number to comment: “I don’t want anybody to starve.” A retired railroad conductor in Pennsylvania, who is not willing to resume rationing to help feed the people of the Allied nations, nevertheless answers: “Give the Japanese and Germans what they must have. I don’t believe in letting people starve. They’re human—but sell them what they can pay for.”

Others introduce a religious element: “Christianity demands that we keep even our enemies from starving.” “If America is going to be a Christian nation, we have to forgive and forget.” “Charity is a great commandment.”

*Boldface for report purposes only.
**Many of those interviewed gave like answers regarding the Japanese and Germans and did not differentiate in their comments.

• Page 34 •
The following comments represent four different implied qualifications appearing in a number of interviews:

"For the babies in both countries, I would GIVE the food to them."  
Teacher’s wife, Oak Park, Illinois

"Give the Japanese only enough to keep them from starving to death."  
Hardware dealer, Goshen, Indiana

"The Germans and Japanese should get LAST consideration, though. Take care of all the others first."  
Foreman, automotive factory, Toledo

"Give them food until they are built up as a nation, and then let them support themselves."  
Bakery clerk, Chicago

Occasionally, still other angles are introduced. For example:

"We can’t expect to re-educate hungry people."  
Custodian’s wife, Indiana

"If we give them food, there won’t be so much hatred."  
Plasterer’s wife, Philadelphia

"There will be a revolution if we don’t feed them."  
Housewife, Chicago

"If we leave them to starve, it might spread disease."  
Laborer’s wife, Connecticut

"If we send food at all, we’ll have to give it. They don’t have any money."  
Lawyer, Portland, Oregon

"The poor people aren’t to blame—they do what they’re told."  
Wife of railroad inspector, Lorain, Ohio

SELL OR EXCHANGE  
Among the 46 per cent plurality who believe that we should send food to the Japanese only in exchange for money or goods, perhaps the most common reaction is typified by this comment from a garage owner in Glendale, California: "They stole from every other country. Why feed them free?" Similarly, a Fredericksburg, Virginia, housewife is one of several to add a remark such as: "It’s not the Christian way, but they treated our boys so terribly!" Others say: "Much as we dislike them, we must feed them all," or "It’s only the Christian thing to do—of course, they won’t appreciate it."

A Pennsylvania storekeeper recommends: "Sell the Japanese and the Germans all they can pay for, then give them the remainder that they need; our occupation forces can take charge of it." Only rarely do respondents go so far as to say: "If they can’t pay let them starve!"

Some lay special emphasis on the desirability of sending food on a trade or barter basis: "Make it straight barter. Let them give anything we can use now. If they can’t furnish enough now, make them even up later when they have more." "Each country must have something we can use or need—like raw materials in exchange for food." "It’s better for the morale of the Japanese and German peoples to know that they are paying or exchanging something of value for the food." "Let them pay for it, and it will make them a little more thrifty and independent." "Sell the Japanese and Germans what they can pay for. That will keep up business and commerce between the countries."

Scattered comments introduce still other considerations into the picture:

"Feed them on a subsistence basis. Make them pay no matter how long it takes."  
Government Information specialist, Mount Ranier, Maryland

"Let them pay so they will realize what it means to have war."  
Wife of automobile salesman, Portland, Oregon

"Send them only surplus goods. If they could feed their armies during the war, they should be able to feed their people now."  
Railroad supervisor, Dunmore, Pennsylvania

"I believe they should learn to help themselves—besides I don’t believe the people in either country are actually starving."  
Retired teacher, Manning, South Carolina

A few of those who favor selling food to Germany but sending none at all to Japan explain their reasons for this differentiation. A Reading, Pennsylvania, housewife, for example, comments:
“German people are smart, they can give us something which they make in exchange for food,” BUT “Let the Japs die if they don’t have food!”

A strong feeling of bitterness toward the Japanese and Germans is the common denominator of many comments from those who would send no food to the Axis nations on any terms. For instance:

They were against us—let them starve. Serviceman’s mother, Van Buren, Arkansas

They done us dirty—why should we feed them? Truck driver’s wife, Amherst, Ohio

They cost us enough now—they can root hog or die. Owner of antique shop, Philadelphia

They started it. Let them get out of it. I have no sympathy for them. State highway patrolman, Santa Barbara, California

They caused enough trouble—they caused two wars, and if they haven’t got the ‘guts’ to knock out their leaders, let them suffer. Wife of arsenal employee, Morris-town, New Jersey

Don’t send them any food at all. Let them die out. They seemed to be doing all right while the war was on. Farmer, near Blacksburg, Virginia

If you use brotherly love, you must, of course, but why build them up to fight us again? Farmer, near Vermillion, Ohio

Some question the actual need for food on the part of the Axis peoples. A Pennsylvania respondent, for example, believes: “These countries have money salted away. They also have reserves of food stolen from other countries.” A Virginia secretary who thinks neither the Japanese nor the Germans should be sent food adds: “We’ve got plenty starving right here as well as them—for lack of work and money to buy food.”

Another NORC question asked in late September ’45—several weeks after V-J Day—found a clear majority of people in the United States of the opinion that food should be sent to the Japanese if the need were urgent. This question put the issue directly to the public:

“During the next year or so, if the Japanese get to the point of starvation, do you feel that we should help them?”

Yes ...............55%  
No ............... 36%  
It depends........ 5%  
Undecided .... 4%  

Disarmament, Peace, and World Organization

In a now famous speech before the United States Senate on January 10, 1945—four months before V-E Day—Senator Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan proposed (1) that the Allies make a definite agreement to keep Germany and Japan permanently disarmed, and (2) that the President should have the power, without having to obtain Congressional approval beforehand, to use force immediately should Germany or Japan move to re-arm. A series of three Gallup questions, released a few weeks after Vandenburg’s speech indicated that, while the public was overwhelmingly in favor of permanent disarmament, opinion was divided regarding the most desirable means of implementing this policy.

* Page 36 *
The questions:

"After the war, should Germany and Japan be kept permanently disarmed?"

Yes................92%  No...............6%  Undecided................2% = 100%

"Should the United States, England, Russia, and China make a written agreement now to keep Germany and Japan disarmed, or should we wait until the war is over to make such an agreement?"

Make agreement before end of war................................. 57%
Wait ........................................................................... 39
Undecided ....................................................................... 4

\[100\%\]

"If it becomes necessary to use force to keep Germany and Japan from arming again, should the President have the right to order the use of American armed force immediately, or should approval of Congress be obtained first?"

President............41%  Congress........54%  Undecided........5% = 100%

A question asked by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in December, 1942, approached the problem of world peace from a somewhat different angle:

"After this war, which of these two steps do you think would do most to insure future peace?

1. "Complete domination of Axis countries by the United Nations, including complete control of their industry, trade, and politics." OR

2. "Formation of a League of Nations in which every country in the world, including Germany, Italy, * and Japan, would be represented, and which would decide differences between nations.""

Undecided

\[100\%\]

In the fall of 1943 an NORC survey showed that:

ALTHOUGH 83% of the public thought that "a union of nations would have the best chance of working if all countries were members,"

ONLY 54% thought that Germany, Italy,* and Japan should be members of the union.

In January of the same year, when the question of membership was asked without the preceding question on workability, only 39 per cent of the public favored membership for Japan, and 44 per cent for Germany.

Japan's Political Future

SHOULD JAPAN BE PERMITTED FREE ELECTIONS?

Although prior to the end of the war a clear majority of people in the United States favored allowing free elections in Germany after surrender, public opinion was almost evenly divided on the question of free elections in Japan. The more educated elements in the population were most favorably disposed toward allowing citizens of the Axis countries a degree of political responsibility. NORC asked the question about Germany in the spring of 1944, the question about Japan a year later:

"After the war, do you think we should let the people in Germany (Japan) vote in a free election to choose the kind of government they want?"

FREE ELECTIONS

\[\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Yes} & \text{No} & \text{Undecided} \\
\hline
\text{All adults interviewed} & 56% & 37% & 7% =100% \\
\text{Attended college} & 66 & 30 & 4 \\
\text{Attended high school} & 58 & 36 & 6 \\
\text{Eighth grade or less} & 48 & 43 & 9 \\
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Yes} & \text{No} & \text{Undecided} \\
\hline
\text{All adults interviewed} & 42% & 47% & 11% =100% \\
\text{Attended college} & 57 & 36 & 7 \\
\text{Attended high school} & 41 & 50 & 9 \\
\text{Eighth grade or less} & 35 & 50 & 15 \\
\end{array}\]

Opinions regarding free elections in Japan varied widely among the different population groups studied. Clear majorities of the more privileged educational, economic, and occupational groupings favored the idea, and clear majorities of other groups were just as definitely against it. The most interesting comparisons follow:

*Asked before the surrender of Italy.
"After the war, do you think we should let the people in Germany (Japan) vote in a free election to choose the kind of government they want?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Und.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All adults interviewed</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended college</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended high school</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th grade or less</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional people</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar workers</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business men</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic, personal service, and protective workers</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual and factory workers</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England and Middle Atlantic states</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican voters, 1944</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic voters, 1944</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Page 38 -
In Their Own Words

A sixth (7%) of the 42 per cent who favored free elections made certain qualifications. They would wait until the people have shown that they can be trusted, or they would hope for some "Allied review or supervision of political activities:

"The Japanese should have an election when they are ready for it—maybe not at first, but later on."
- Salesman’s wife, New Iberia, Louisiana

"After a certain length of time an election might be all right if the Japanese showed they were going in the right direction."
- Railroad switchman, Atchison, Kansas

"I’d favor an election when conditions are established which will enable the Japanese to exercise a free vote intelligently."
- Attorney, Winfield, New York

"If you could pick men in Japan that could be trusted, I’d say ‘Yes.’"
- X-ray salesman, Chicago

"The Japanese will have to be watched by some international group."
- Woman clerical worker, Schenectady, New York

Most of those interviewed who answered, without qualification, that the Japanese should be allowed to hold a free election made no comment. A few, however, mentioned either practical or ideological reasons why a free election would be desirable:

"We couldn’t try to tell Japan what government to have without keeping a whole standing army over them."
- Filling station manager, Mississippi

"Looks to me like we’d pretty nearly have to let them have their elections. We can’t manage the entire world."
- Nurse, Indiana

"There are enough people that would be able to vote intelligently."
- Engineer’s wife, Minneapolis

"All human beings ought to rule themselves."
- Apartment house superintendent, The Bronx

"That’s what we practice here—democracy. Why should we curtail anything over there?"
- Truck driver, Minnesota

A number of the 47 per cent who opposed the idea of free elections in Japan made comments explaining their point of view. Most frequently expressed was the opinion that the Allied nations should make all decisions regarding the government of Japan:

"A government should be established on the right principles, and we should force the Japanese to accept it."
- Wife of government employee, Montgomery, Alabama

"They should be governed by an Allied council for a long time."
- School teacher, Indiana

"If we are going to have a permanent peace, and if we are the ones who win the war—then they must accept a government like ours."
- Wife of truck driver, Onawa, Iowa

"Not what THEY want, but what WE want is what we'd better see to."
- Negro laborer, Chester, South Carolina

Others questioned the probable judgment the Japanese might exercise in voting in a free election:

"I believe the Japanese are incapable of establishing a desirable government."
- Soldier’s wife, Bruning, Nebraska

"The Japanese haven’t showed good sense in their government; it would take years to train them before they could choose their own."
- Mechanic’s wife, Plattsburg, New York

"They’d choose one just like they have now."
- Trucker, Willard, Oklahoma

EXPERT OPINION: HOPES FOR A LIBERAL JAPAN?

The questionnaire submitted by the Bureau of Applied Social Research to the panel of experts on the Far East included several questions regarding future political developments in Japan. In essence, the experts believe that, if the Allied authorities deal with political problems effectively—if they choose their occupation policies wisely, liberal and non-militaristic groups within Japan can become sufficiently strong for satisfactory self-rule.
The first question on this aspect of the Japanese problem asked of the experts read:

"If reasonable opportunities for recovery are provided, what chance do you think there is that during the next 10 or 15 years Japan will develop a non-militaristic spirit and will have a government which can be trusted not to move toward new wars of aggression?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chance</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little or no chance</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair chance</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good chance</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful or impossible to say</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the more pessimistic element among the experts come comments to the effect "that the time mentioned (10-15 years) is too short, and that the long history of militarism in Japan must be taken into consideration." One of the group remarked:

"Japan has never had democracy. There is no precedent on which to build a non-militaristic government."

From the more optimistic panel members come comments which point to "hopeful factors in Japanese history and psychology . . . that the Japanese are an adaptable people and that militarism is not inherent; that there are significant anti-militarist and liberal elements in Japan; that the political developments in Japan of the 1920's give reason for hope; that the discrediting of the military will be a helpful factor." For example:

"I am convinced that a larger percentage of the population are against war and will be only too glad to become free from the regimentation which has driven them to it. They are not naturally warlike; it is the system which has compelled acquiescence with the war program."

"Freedom of thought, political activity, and press will soon create strong progressive forces which are able to do nation-wide re-education work. I consider the re-educational success of the Japanese Communist leader Okano in Yenan, in his school for Japanese war prisoners, proof of the educability of the Japanese people."

"People of Japan will be sick of war and will be starved for outside contacts, uncensored news, etc., and convinced their military misled them. They will wish to return to the more liberal period of the 1920's, when they were in process of establishing responsible parliamentary government."

A third group of responses stresses the fact "that what will happen to Japan is contingent upon certain conditioning factors, the most important of which are the direction of Allied Far Eastern policy and the atmosphere created for democratic elements to emerge in Japan." Included were these:

"The chance is considered only fair because of a degree of skepticism about the ability of the victors to apply correctly and adequately the policies required to make the best use of the opportunities for change."

"'Fair chance' would be 'good chance' if I had more confidence in the State Department."

"Geographical disarmament, i.e., loss of all jumping-off places on the continent, represents a tremendous weakening of Japan. Without its colonies and with a minimum of controls Japan can never be as great a menace as Germany, taking into consideration the latter's large and well-balanced resources for heavy industry. Stripped of its colonies Japan falls definitely into a second or third class power as it was half a century before the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Consequently, there is reasonable hope that intelligent Japanese would accept the futility of renewed aggression. Another condition of Japanese armistice, of course, is agreement among the great powers. Aggressive elements in Japan will only take heart if there is major discord among the powers."

"This is all contingent upon the establishment of an over-all organization of life in the Pacific which assures security, and free access to essential materials, with fair trade practices, and peaceful policies on the part of the leading powers. Japan will follow their lead. Otherwise, I am afraid Japan will before long be in collusion with one or another of us, in preparation for the resumption of the power-struggle in World War III."

"It is impossible to say whether or how soon the now United Nations will return to a Balance of Power policy, in which one or another will consider the desirability of using Japan as a check (a) upon the rising influence of the Soviet Union, (b) upon the dominance of Anglo-American capitalism, or (c) upon the growing strength of Chinese and Indian nationalism."

"Japan's basic internal needs to become peaceful and free are the end of parasitic landholding and usury and political reform abolishing the Emperor's autocratic position and making possible representative government."

*This question followed one regarding economic policy in post-war Japan, see page 27 above.
Reactions to another question showed that a majority of the experts felt that a reformed non-militaristic Japan would be most likely to result from a policy of dealing with new leaders rather than with the old established business and governmental elements. The Bureau of Applied Social Research asked:

"In your judgment, which of the two following types of policy is more likely to lead to a reformed non-militaristic Japan:

1. "If the victorious powers encourage and work with a Japanese government composed of the 'moderate' elements from the business groups and former government circles. ...................... 16%"

2. "If the powers avoid working with the groups that have been close to the old government, but instead give encouragement to any new movements and leaders that begin to have popular support and that are opposed to the old ruling groups." ...................... 63%

Doubtful and other answers .......................................................... 21%

100%"

Dr. Kornhauser in the SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT commented: "Several of the replies which choose [the first policy] explain this choice by saying that there are no new elements capable of assuming leadership in Japan, or that a coalition government, comprising labor and liberal groups as well as the 'moderates' is the desideratum. Only one expert is outspokenly confident of the good will and desire for peace of the 'moderates.'"

According to the same analysis, most of the experts who chose the second policy emphasize "the necessity for eliminating the control of the old ruling class completely. They point to the fact that the 'moderate' elements are too closely connected with the old militarists for comfort. Some of these experts are convinced that Japan will organize new wars of aggression unless all the old elements are swept out. Others point to the analogy of Allied policy in the European war."

The following comments are representative of the larger number reported:

"Stability in Japan is impossible without a complete change in national political economy. The business community includes strong realistic elements that can, if their survival depends on it, as easily be won for a welfare-motivated program of development as it was won for a militaristic one. Experience in Italy, Greece, and elsewhere has shown that friction for the Allies is intensified rather than eased when they uphold reactionaries in the vain hope of thus quickly re-establishing law and order."

"All remnants of feudalistic control both by the militarists and the Zaibatsu* must be eliminated. Power must be transferred from the industrialists and militarists to the people."

"It will be more difficult for our forces to establish a regime composed of new leaders; it will, therefore, take longer for our forces to achieve stability; but once achieved, such stability might endure after our withdrawal."

Some of the panel laid particular stress on the fact that the Japanese must do their own reforming and on certain other points. For instance:

"Japan needs new leaders, and the only way in which they can be properly encouraged to re-make Japan is by our agreeing to let the Japanese people alone (free from military occupation and long-term control) and by our willingness to let them develop their industry and commerce."

"Again, domestic conditions in Japan will reflect the state of the Pacific world, and the terms of our victory, degrees of coercion by our occupying forces, their policies, etc. The initiative will be with us, not Japan. Our 'encouragement' of new movements is a most delicate matter. We do not know enough about Japanese life to attempt safely to direct its reconstruction. Occupation should be limited to military policing, maintenance of order."

"One qualification I would add is that, although preferring to deal with groups popularly supported which are opposed to the 'old gang' in Japan, we should not rule out the possibility that some individuals represented in (1) [see question above] might be willing (perhaps for reasons of enlightened self-interest) to cooperate with groups (2) [see question above]. Consequently too rigid an exclusion is not advisable since it is to our advantage to have as many responsible Japanese as possible convinced that it is in Japan's best interest to cooperate peacefully with its neighbors."

*Group of families controlling Japanese industry.
Most of those who do not choose either alternative suggest that the two possibilities presented are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Two remarks were:

"... The able leaders... should be sought out, whether inside the government or not, and given the backing of our government to work out a satisfactory system."

"Liberalism is not a class phenomenon in Japan, but a personal one—the cleavage is vertical, not horizontal, between liberals and reactionaries. Our aim should be to encourage liberalism, wherever located."

Results on a question coupled with the one just quoted indicate that a majority of the experts expect to see significant liberal and democratic movements in Japan after the war:

"As far as you can judge now, are significant liberal and democratic movements likely to exist in Japan after the war?"

Yes...........58%  No...........14%  Doubtful and other answers...........28% = 100%

Reasons given by the majority who are convinced of the existence of definite liberal elements include, among others:

"They have always existed but have been cruelly suppressed."

"Millions of votes against fascism at home and aggression abroad in the 1936 and 1937 elections; strikes even during the war in big war factories; a land-hungry and oppressed peasantry; peace ‘agitation’ denounced by Japan’s war leaders in recent months, arrests of thousands of oppositionists, continuing through the war."

"The thoughts most frequently expressed by those who answered ‘No’ to this question are that the liberals in Japan have all been slaughtered or imprisoned and that a radical or communist movement may emerge, rather than a liberal or democratic one."

From those who did not check a definite answer come suggestions emphasizing primarily "that what happens will depend upon the direction of Allied Pacific policy, and that, too, little is known of the present-day development of democratic movements in Japan to make prediction possible."

These two comments seem particularly provocative:

"The whole question depends upon our liberalism. Do we believe in democracy enough to believe that the Japanese people will want it too? Or do we think that democracy is a special ‘culture’ instead of a ‘gospel’? If the former, we shall make mistakes which will bring Japan a period of chaos."

"The old liberals will be few in number. They were mostly old men, probably too old to steer Japan through the coming crisis. There are probably no young liberals since the younger generation has been so thoroughly indoctrinated with the military tenets."

U. S. Policy in Occupied Japan?

What do the people of the United States think about Allied and American policy in occupied Japan? What are popular reactions to what is known about occupation policy—in theory and practice? Although public opinion on the issues involved may neither determine nor change policy, attitudes revealed in this highly controversial and rapidly shifting area are of real importance.

IS U. S. POLICY TOUGH ENOUGH?

That a considerable demand exists for a tougher policy toward Japan seems evidenced by findings of polls asked by both NORC and AIPO. When a comparison is made of attitudes toward policy in Japan and policy in Germany, the demand for a harsher policy in Japan is definitely stronger than the demand for stricter measures in Germany.

An NORC survey made shortly before the surrender of Japan indicated that, among those somewhat familiar with the surrender terms presented to Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and China, more than half considered the terms about right—neither too harsh nor too easy. It is significant, however, that a third said that the terms should be harder—because they favored (1) punishing or even annihilating the Japanese people and their leaders; (2) destroying Japan.
as a nation; (3) eliminating the Emperor; or still other measures not understood to be included in the proposed terms.

Many of the harshest answers were similar to that of a Denver waitress, who said: "We should have said that we would wipe them all out, every last one." Others brought in additional angles:

"I'd like to see the Japs wiped off the earth. They started this war and if allowed to live can start another."  
Wife of mechanical engineer, Belleville, New Jersey

"They should be wiped off the earth. We don't want to raise boys to fight them again."  
Restaurant owner, Atlanta

"Look at the way they have tortured our boys! I think they should be exterminated!"  
Clerk, Detroit

"We need to wipe them from the face of the earth. This atomic bomb will do it!"  
Traffic engineer, South Bend, Indiana

"I hain't in favor of letting them live!"  
Housewife, California

"They should be exterminated like rats. I have sons in this war, and I think we should use gas on these Japs."  
Business executive, Royal Oak, Michigan

"Clean up the whole nation and kill them all off. They are a menace to civilization!"  
Stockroom clerk, Reading, Pennsylvania

"Unconditional surrender is too easy. The terms should say to burn or kill all the Japs."  
Elevator operator, Brooklyn

A number of respondents believed that the surrender terms should specify destruction of Japan as a nation and complete internal control. A Homewood, Alabama, housewife, for instance, replied: "We did not demand enough. Japan should be completely destroyed as a nation." A Pennsylvania advertising man would "do away with the Japanese nation entirely. The name 'Japanese' should cease to exist." A variety of more specific suggestions were embodied in answers such as these: "I think the Allies should just take over the country and the government and run it and not let the Japs have a thing to say." "They should make them give up their present form of government and their religion, too." "They should be wiped out as a nation and absorbed by some other country, China perhaps." "I think Japan should be divided up and made into small countries under the rule of the United States."

Other answers emphasize the need—unmet in the surrender terms as understood by the public—for disposing of the Emperor . . . territorial adjustments . . . disarmament . . . reparations. An Indiana school teacher, for example, remarks: "They haven't said a thing about getting rid of the Emperor. If they get rid of him, I think there will be a much better situation. I am in favor of a democracy for Japan." The wife of a zoo employee in St. Louis said: "The Japanese should be made to learn to live like us in a democratic government and not allowed to have the Emperor business."

A Fairbury, Nebraska, housewife criticized the surrender terms on the following grounds: "I think Japan was left the main islands, and they did not have to pay for any damage, only losing the land they had stolen." According to an insurance salesman in St. Joseph, Missouri, "The offer was too easy on the Japanese homeland. The Allies agreed to let the Japs keep all their home islands and Hirohito—they shouldn't be allowed the same form of government." The manager of a Los Angeles filling station believed: "They should give us all the islands we fought and died for." A New York City advertising man replied: "No punishment could be severe enough. I never read the terms, but all the land the Japs have gotten since 1895 should be taken away—that's unconditional surrender as we originally meant it."

These views, too, were expressed: "The surrender terms offered the Japanese too much freedom." "The Japanese should never be allowed to have an army or navy again." "The Japs should be fixed so they can never come back and fight—don't let them have anything that they could make war materials out of." "Japan should not be given the right to buy in the open market." "They shouldn't be allowed to use their industries for war purposes again."
The handful who considered the terms **too harsh** explained their feeling in words such as these:

- "The terms should be easier if we want the Japs to surrender at once."
- "If we had not told them they must do away with their present system of government, perhaps we would have a quicker surrender."
- "Unconditional surrender is too hard, and it puts too many obstacles in the way of an early peace. The Japs feel they won't survive."
- "We shouldn't tell ANY country what they should do."
- "God didn't give us ANY right to control other nations."
- "The PEOPLE of Japan will have to pay for that which the war lords are alone responsible for."

Tool grinder, South Bend, Indiana
Building contractor, New Jersey
Stock clerk, New York City
Landscape gardener, Wichita
Minister's wife, Denver
Truck farmer, near Laurinburg, North Carolina

An NORC question asked at the end of August, 1945—only two weeks after V-J Day—illustrates the fact that various population groups studied tend to differ **only in degree** in their opinions regarding policy toward Japan, while attitudes toward Germany vary **widely.** NORC asked:

> "In general, would you say the Allied program for the treatment of Germany is too hard, about right, or not hard enough? How about the Allied program for the treatment of Japan?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY TOWARD JAPAN</th>
<th>POLICY TOWARD GERMANY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Hard Enough</td>
<td>About Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All adults interviewed...</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth grade or less.....</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended high school.....</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended college.........</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that this question suggests "About right" as a possible evaluation. Two months later Gallup released results of a somewhat differently worded question suggesting only two alternatives, yet a considerable minority volunteered the answer "About right." The question:

> "What is your opinion of the way we are treating the Japanese (the Germans)—are we being too tough or not tough enough?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Tough Enough</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>Too Tough</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese ..........</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany ............</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the AIPO question regarding the **JAPANESE**, "Not tough enough" replies were distributed as follows: eighth grade or less—68%, attended high school—63%, attended college—46%; adults 21-29—68%, adults 30 and over—59%.

**Between the Quotes**

Comments volunteered by those interviewed in the NORC survey are surprisingly similar in intent to comments reported in the second section of this report ("What shall we do with the Japanese people?") and those made regarding the peace terms. Of the 68 per cent who considered the Allied program for Japan **not hard enough**, a number added comments such as these:

- "I don't think that we could find anything hard enough to do to Germany and Japan."
- "Nothing is too bad for the Japanese."
- "They were so terrible to our boys who were prisoners!"
- "We can never get even for their atrocities."
- "We should kill all the Japs right off."

Farmer's wife, near Blair, Oklahoma
Dairy farmer, near Helena, Montana
Housewife, Leesburg, Virginia
Farmer's wife, near Marshall, Indiana
Laborer's wife, Taylor, Pennsylvania
Less common were reactions such as that of an Iowa farmer: "Japan is entirely too cocky for a defeated nation, and unless we take it out of her we will be fighting her again before long." "We're entirely too lenient—you couldn't be too severe. But the American way seems to be to forget," says a clothing cutter in Cincinnati. And a retired businessman in Bell, California, emphasizes the point: "Bring the Japanese leaders to justice."

Some of the 21 per cent answering "About right" make remarks such as that of a Kentucky bartender's wife: "We are the leading nation and must set the example—even though the Japanese don't really deserve fair treatment." At Points of Rocks, Maryland, a laborer's wife suggests: "The Bible teaches us to do good for evil." A Pennsylvania farmer feels: "If they continue to send our men to occupy Japan and run things over there, I'd say it's about right." And a retired major-general near Kansas City exclaims: "It's all right. I don't know what the Allied program is for Japan, but I do know MacArthur!"

THE MacARTHUR ADMINISTRATION

Replies to three different survey questions seem to suggest a considerable degree of satisfaction with the MacArthur administration as such, in its early stages at least. In late September '45 NORC asked the following question:

"Who do you think should make the decisions on what to do with Japan—the people in Washington or General MacArthur?"

MacArthur........54 % Washington.......17 % Both........19 % Other........3 % Undecided........7 %

An AIPO question released in November '45 indicated that United States public opinion did not at that time endorse the Allied control plan which was to go into effect a month later. Gallup asked:

"Do you think we should continue ruling Japan as we are, or should an Allied council with representatives from England, Russia, China, and the United States rule Japan?"

Continue single authority.... 60 % Allied council....27 % Undecided....13 % = 100 %

A Fortune Survey question reported in December, 1945, approached a specific phase of the MacArthur policy:

"There seem to be two schools of thought as to the way we are now running civilian affairs in Japan. One group feels that we are letting the Japanese have too much to do with running their civilian affairs, while others feel this is the only way the situation could be handled so far. With which do you agree?"

Situation well handled............................................. 61 %
Japanese have too much influence.................................... 27
Undecided ........................................................................ 12

100 %

General MacArthur's great personal popularity, together with skillfully handled publicity, may account in part for the high degree of satisfaction Americans evince regarding the progress of the United States' occupation of Japan. Nine months after V-J Day—according to a Gallup release dated June '46—people felt that the occupation of Japan was being carried out far more successfully than the occupation of Germany.

The American Institute of Public Opinion asked:

"Do you think we have done a good job or a poor job in handling our occupation of Japan? . . . Germany?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 % 100 %
Gallup comments: "The two occupations present, of course, somewhat different problems, since American forces control the whole of Japan but only a part of Germany. Also the great personal popularity of General Douglas MacArthur with the American public is undoubtedly a factor which enters into the more favorable reaction toward the Japanese occupation."

The "excellent" leadership of MacArthur is mentioned again and again by respondents explaining why they think the United States has done a "good job" in handling the occupation of Japan. According to the release, "by far the largest number of comments deal with MacArthur and his personal leadership. People also mention the lack of trouble in Japan. So far as they have been able to see, they say, everything is going very smoothly. There is evidence, they point out, of a successful effort at democratizing Japan—witness that women recently went to the polls. Finally, people point out that there has been little interference with MacArthur, 'a unified command,' as contrasted to Germany with its zones of occupation."

**ARMY OF OCCUPATION**

General MacArthur has stated that it "will take many years to fulfill the terms of surrender" in Japan. Stassen of Minnesota and Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, too, have stressed the need for long-term supervision. Particularly since the surrender of Japan, American public opinion, as indicated by NORC and AIPO survey results, is in substantial agreement with the views of these experts. A short period of occupation—no more than five years—was anticipated by a 55 per cent majority of the public in early August '45, before V-J Day (according to NORC), but by only a 21 per cent minority three and a half months later (according to the Gallup Poll). While the lapse of time—an eventful period during which the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan surrendered suddenly—obviously accounts for much of the difference between the two sets of findings, the distinction in emphasis as expressed in the wording of the questions must also be taken into account.

- During the first week in August, 1945, NORC asked:

  "After Japan surrenders, how long do you think it will be necessary for the Allies to keep an army of occupation in Japan?"

In November '45 Gallup reported results of both a general and a specific question in this area. The general question:

  "Do you think we will have to police the Japanese many years, or do you think we can withdraw our troops in a few years?"

Many years needed........64% Few years needed........23% Undecided........13% = 100%

Those replying "Many" or "Few" were asked more specifically: "How many years?" Results of the two specific questions compare as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAPAN SHOULD BE OCCUPIED FOR:</th>
<th>August '45 (NORC)</th>
<th>November '45 (AIPO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 year or less..................</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1 through 2 years...</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 through 5 years...</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL—5 years or less</strong>.....</td>
<td><strong>55%</strong></td>
<td><strong>21%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 through 10 years...</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 through 20 years...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20 through 50 years...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 50 years................</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forever..........................</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undecided</strong>........................</td>
<td><strong>29%</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided on primary question...</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation period needed.....</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Gallup reports combined percentage only.

- Page 46 -
The Pacific Islands?

Who should govern the island stepping stones of the Pacific? This is a question of vital concern to the people of the United States and the people of Australia as well as to other members of the United Nations. Most of the islands in question were German possessions up to World War I and were subsequently assigned to Japan as mandates. Public opinion in Australia has been inclined to favor some sort of joint control under the United Nations as a whole or some combination of interested member-nations. In the United States, however, the largest segment of opinion has tended to support retention by the United States of some or all of the Pacific islands as military bases, either independently or as a trusteeship to be delegated by the United Nations.

In the spring of 1944, the American Institute of Public Opinion reported the following question:

"After the war should the United States keep all of the Japanese islands which we conquer between Hawaii and the Philippines?"

Yes .................. 69%  No .................. 17%  Undecided .................. 14% = 100%

An NORC question, asked in the fall of 1945, after V-J Day, approached the problem from a somewhat different angle:

"There's a good deal of discussion about what should be done with the islands in the Pacific that we captured from the Japanese. Which one of these plans do you think would be best?"

"The United States should own these islands outright—just like we own Hawaii and Alaska."

"The United States should not own these islands outright, but we should be allowed to govern them for the United Nations Organization, and should have the right to fortify them."

It is significant that, while Democrats and Republicans held almost the same views on the issue, persons with a college background were considerably more likely than those with a limited education to concede a degree of trusteeship to the UNO. The comparison:

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own Outright</th>
<th>Govern under UNO</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All adults interviewed</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended college</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended high school</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth grade or less</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDR voters, 1944</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewey voters, 1944</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over a four-year period, the National Opinion Research Center has studied opinion in this country on the somewhat more general issue of what the post-war territorial policy of the United States should be. The NORC trend question reads:

"Which of these four statements comes closest to what you think the United States should do about NEW land and possessions in the world after the war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United States should:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...give up all the land outside of the United States that is difficult to defend...</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...be satisfied with the amount of land in the world she had before she entered the war.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...try to get new military bases, but nothing else.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...try to get as much new land in the world as she can.&quot;</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the question was first asked, in February, 1942, the largest single group—42 per cent of those with definite opinions—believed that the United States "should be satisfied with the
amount of land in the world she has now” (the wording used before the fall of the Philippines). Only 34 per cent believed the United States should try to get new military bases. The temporary decrease in interest in new military bases noted between July ’42 and January ’43 may have been a reaction to the costly Solomons campaign with the heavy casualties at Guadalcanal. Between June ’43 and March ’45 the proportion thinking that the United States should attempt to get new military bases after the war increased from 44 to 53 per cent. Possibly even more significant, historically speaking, was the rise from 53 per cent in March ’45 to 60 per cent during the first week of August ’45, just before the Japanese surrender.
PURPOSES OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

1. To establish the first non-profit, non-commercial organization to measure public opinion in the United States. Through a national staff of trained investigators, representative cross-sections or samples of the entire population are personally interviewed on questions of current importance.

2. To make available to legislators, government departments, academicians, and organizations a staff of experts in the science of public opinion measurement and a highly trained nation-wide corps of interviewers.

3. To analyze and review the results of surveys made by other polling organizations.

4. To create a research center to discover, test, and perfect new methods, techniques, and devices for ascertaining the status of public opinion.

5. To provide the University with a graduate department devoted to the newest of the social sciences, public opinion research.

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How Is a Public Opinion Survey Made?

The subjects for the Center's surveys are determined in consultation with its Board of Trustees and other experts. Members of the Center's staff collaborate in drawing up a questionnaire. The individual questions are carefully "pre-tested," that is, tried out on various types of respondents in order to eliminate, insofar as possible, the chance of more than one interpretation and to produce wordings universally understandable and capable of measuring all shades of opinion relative to a specific attitudinal area. "Specifications," or sets of directions for interviewers, are also compiled to insure uniform interviewing procedure. Each member of the Center's personally trained interviewing staff is sent a set of questionnaires and assigned a quota of interviews he is to secure, together with the distribution by sex, age, economic or rent level, and general place of residence.

When the completed questionnaires are returned to the Center the answers are classified and given code numbers for transfer to a punched card. A separate card is punched for each question. The punched cards are then run through a special tabulating machine which can be set to count the answers, to separate the cards into categories, and in other ways materially to assist the statisticians. The final percentaged results—the responses to the various questions—are reported not only for the total cross-section interviewed, but also for comparisons between various population sub-groups, such as men and women, young people and older people, groups of people with varying educational and economic backgrounds, farm and city dwellers, and residents of various sections of the country. The differences of opinion shown in these breakdowns are often of even greater significance than the opinions of the entire cross-section.

The results of the Center's surveys are published in news releases and reports which are utilized by educators, scientists, government officials, publishers and broadcasters, businessmen, and others especially interested in keeping up-to-date on public opinion trends. Comparisons of NORC's results with those of other opinion-finding organizations are frequently published in OPINION NEWS—the Center's fortnightly digest of outstanding polls and surveys.

Factual Information

The Cross-Section The population samples upon which NORC surveys are made are representative, within a small degree of error, of the national population 21 years of age and over. That is, the samples used are stratified according to certain sociological characteristics of the adult population of the United States.

Geographical Distribution Within each of the nine Census Divisions of the country, interviews are properly apportioned among the adult civilian population in the metropolitan districts, towns, and rural areas of that division. For the urban population the interviews are apportioned to metropolitan districts, with the proper proportion between central city and suburbs, and towns in various size groups, while in the rural areas the interviews are properly apportioned among farm and non-farm residents.

Size of Cross-Section As a result of statistical research, it is now known that a poll will not be accurate, no matter how large a sample is taken (short of a total census of the entire population), if the cross-section is not an accurate miniature of the whole population.

According to a statistical table copyrighted by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, the number of interviews in a national survey necessary to be within 3 per cent correct on questions that divide evenly is 2,500. This number is sufficient 997 times in 1,000. The Harvard table adds that HALF this sample, or 1,250 interviews, would be within 3 per cent correct 962 times in 1,000. NORC surveys used in this report are based on over 2,500 interviews.

Age and Sex Before the war, the adult population for the entire country could be said to be split approximately equally between persons 40 years of age and over and those between 21 and 39 years. Today NORC interviews only the adult civilian population. The resulting sex split is 47 per cent men and 53 per cent women. On the age distribution, 56 per cent are 40 and over, with the remainder between 21 and 39.

Race Within each Census Division are obtained a number of Negro respondents proportional to the Negro population in that area. These interviews are properly apportioned among the urban, rural non-farm, and farm residents.

Economic Status Within each sex group the interviews among the white population are assigned on the basis of four standard-of-living categories. For purposes of tabulation the two upper groups are combined in this report. The economic characteristics of persons in each one of these three groups can be defined roughly as follows:

Upper (16 per cent of the sample)—Those persons who have all the necessities of life and some of the luxuries characteristic to their community. Two per cent of the sample is made up of what is understood as the wealthy group. The remaining 14 per cent is made up of persons who can afford some luxuries, but must choose rather carefully which ones to buy.

Middle (52 per cent of the sample)—This group is called the great middle class of America. They have incomes large enough to maintain an adequate standard of living but can seldom afford luxuries.

Lower (32 per cent of the sample)—This group has difficulty in maintaining an adequate standard of living. Included are the lowest income non-relief families and also those receiving government aid.
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