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Americans View The Military:

A 1984 Update

By

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and
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SUMMARY

NORC's General Social Survey (GSS) is an annual survey in which a representative sample of approximately 1,500 American civilians are personally interviewed on their opinions concerning a wide variety of national issues. Most of the questions put to respondents are repeated verbatim in each survey, or on a rotating schedule, to allow social scientists to track trends over time in American attitudes on such topics as national spending priorities, women's rights, confidence in major social institutions, crime, and racial integration. From time to time, the regular GSS questions are supplemented by questions on special concerns.

The 1982 GSS included such a supplement sponsored by the Ford Foundation, and dealing with questions on issues related to the U.S. military. Results were published in NORC Report No. 131, "Americans View the Military: Public Opinion in 1982." In 1984 the Ford Foundation again sponsored a supplement devoted to these same issues. Many of the 1982 questions were repeated verbatim, permitting an analysis of trends in opinion, while other questions probed issues which had not been studied in prior research.

We summarize here the major findings of the 1984 survey.

The Findings

Trends in Public Opinion

Support for a peacetime military draft declined from 44 percent in 1982 to an all-time low of 24 percent in 1984. At the same time, 84 percent of the public would approve of a return to the draft in case of national emergency.

Satisfaction with the All-Volunteer Force increased from 63 percent to 84 percent over the same period, and the proportion who assign favorable ratings to the quality of military personnel rose from 53 percent to 72 percent.

While confidence in U.S. military leaders showed a small but significant increase, attitudes toward military spending shifted more strongly. Support for increased military spending declined from 31 percent to 19 percent, while opposition to further increase rose from 32 percent to 38 percent.

Responses to nine other questions reveal no significant change over the two-year period. Majorities continue to favor compulsory national service for youth (though not if this means increased taxes) and to approve the recruiting of women and minorities to the Armed Forces. About two-thirds of the public continue to believe that the United States should take an active part in world affairs.

As in 1982, groups most favorable to the All-Volunteer Force included young adults, non-veterans, and Southern Blacks. Least favorable were veterans and white Southerners. Over the two-year period, each group experienced about the same amount of pro-AVF, anti-draft shift.

The absence of support for a peacetime draft is shown by the fact that only about half (52 percent) of the most favorable group--white Southern veterans--indicate approval. Among Northern non-veterans aged 18-34, only 13 percent approve of a peacetime draft.

Military Service As A Moral Obligation

Although support for a peacetime draft is at an all-time low, it is clear that military service is regarded as a worthwhile profession. Five out of six Americans favor a draft in a national emergency and almost three-quarters now favor mandatory universal service (either military or civilian) for men and 63 percent for women.

A question on the 1984 survey revealed that 89 percent of the public thinks that military service is "a good experience" for men and 73 percent believe it to a be good experience for women.

However, viewed as a moral obligation that citizens owe their country, military service ranks relatively low. Survey interviewers read a list of six civilian and four military "obligations that some people feel American citizens owe their country" and asked people to rate the importance of each.

Three of the six civilian obligations were regarded as "very important" by large majorities of 80 percent or more of the general public. These were "Reporting a crime that he or she may have witnessed," "Being able to speak and understand English," and "Voting in elections." No more than 5 percent considered any of these to be not an obligation.

"Serving on jury, if called" and "Keeping fully informed about news and public issues" were regarded as very important obligations by smaller majorities--65 and 57 percent, respectively. "Volunteering some time to community services" was seen as very important by only 31 percent of the public.

Among the military items, "For young men, serving in the military when the country is at war" was the only one to find strong consensus. Eighty-four

percent regarded this as very important; only 2 percent did not see it as an obligation.

Wartime service for women is rated as very important by only 46 percent, significantly behind five of the six civilian obligations. Peacetime military service for men (33 percent) or women (18 percent) is seen as a civic obligation by only a minority.

Attitudes toward civilian obligations are very strongly affected by age. Among older Americans, aged 60 or older, 60 percent rated five or all six of the civilian obligations as very important. Among those under age 30, only about one-fourth endorsed this many. The strong effects of age in determining attitudes toward civilian obligations remain, even after controlling for sex, education, and marital status.

The groups most likely to view peacetime military service as a moral obligation include veterans, those who feel civilian volunteer activity is a duty, the less educated, and those over 30. But even in these most favorable groups, the proportion stays close to 50 percent, and among young, college-educated nonveterans the figure drops to 14 percent.

The Educational Role Of The Armed Services

Five out of six American civilian adults--an overwhelming majority--endorse the proposition that the armed services should accept educationally unqualified volunteers and upgrade their basic skills. There is strong support for this policy among every population subgroup we examined.

Opinion splits about 50-50, however, on a proposal that the military provide enlisted personnel with job training for postservice civilian employment.

Most favorable to civilian job training and educational upgrading are Blacks, non-veterans, adults who have not completed high school, and persons aged 18-34. These differences hold even after controls are applied.

Civilian job training receives clearcut majority support throughout the Black community, but obtains majorities from whites only among younger or poorly educated non-veterans.

The Military Involvement Of The Civilian Population

Although only 4 percent of American civilians are employed by the Department of Defense or a defense supplier, an additional 16 percent report some kind of direct economic dependence on the military: they live in a household where someone received military or VA benefits, or they have an immediate family member currently serving in the Armed Forces.

To this 20 percent who have direct economic ties to the military, we may add another 35 percent of the public who believe that their local community is very dependent or somewhat dependent upon defense business. Finally, we might add 6 percent of the civilian population who have no current direct personal or community dependence on defense, but who are veterans of Armed Forces.

Perception of community dependence on defense business is most characteristic of the larger metropolitan areas, where almost two-thirds of the public think their area is dependent, and in the South, where the proportion is 50 percent. Perceptions of community dependence are unrelated to personal characteristics such as age, sex, socioeconomic status, and political preference.

Although a majority of adult Americans report some kind of personal or community dependence upon defense, these involvements seem to have no effects upon attitudes toward the military. In their expectations of future armed conflict, their confidence in military leaders, or their attitudes toward defense spending, respondents with ties to the military did not differ from those without such ties.

Public Expectations of Military Futures

As a possible explanation of public attitudes toward the military, the 1984 survey asked people to rate six military possibilities for the next ten years on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 ("Won't happen") to 7 ("Certain to happen"). The scenarios ranged from all-out atomic war, through large-scale ground war, repeated guerrilla wars, increasing arms buildup by the U.S. and Russia, to arms reduction, and total elimination of atomic weapons by both the U.S. and Russia.

By far the most expected future is "repeated guerrilla wars against left-wing rebels." Almost three-quarters of the public rate this as more likely to happen than not. At the other extreme, only 9 percent foresee the elimination of atomic weapons during the next ten years.

The other four scenarios all fall close to the 50-50 mark. Slightly more than half expect a large-scale ground war, and a similar number expect an arms buildup. Slightly fewer than half expect either an atomic war or a reduction of atomic weapons.

Only 7 percent rate an all-out atomic war as "certain to happen" in the next ten years, but 22 percent rate it as more likely than not, and 41 percent give it about a 50-50 chance. The majority expect neither atomic war nor arms reduction, but either an arms buildup or the status quo.

Younger adults, and especially those aged 20-29, are more pessimistic about the military future; they are more likely to expect future ground wars and even atomic war. Women are relatively pessimistic about ground war, but not nuclear war. The more highly educated tend to foresee an arms buildup but not an atomic war. The lower occupational and income groups are relatively pessimistic about atomic war.

Perhaps surprisingly, expectations of war and peace are almost totally unrelated to attitudes toward the other military issues included in the survey: military spending, the draft, confidence in military leaders, or the quality of AVF personnel.

INTRODUCTION

This report is a sequel to NORC Report No. 131, "Americans View the Military: Public Opinion in 1982." The findings of both reports are based on personal interviews with nationwide probability samples of approximately 1,500 adults as part of the General Social Survey (GSS) conducted annually by NORC. In 1982 and again in 1984, a separate section dealing with attitudes toward the military was sponsored by The Ford Foundation and appended to the GSS.

Many of the same questions asked in 1982 were repeated in the 1984 survey. Thus, we can track any changes in public attitudes toward such issues as the level of military spending, confidence in the military, the All-Volunteer Force, compulsory national service, the draft, and women and minorities in the Armed Forces.

In addition, the 1984 survey asked about respondents' perceptions of an American citizen's obligations to his country; the obligation of the Armed Forces to provide education and training to volunteers who lack them; the public's present and past connections to the military; and their expectations of peace and war during the next ten years. A copy of the 1984 Military Attitudes Supplement can be found in Appendix A.

This report is divided into five chapters, the first of which reviews the trends in public attitudes toward the military. Chapter 2 considers the obligations of U.S. citizens as seen by the public, and Chapter 3 discusses the educational and training role of the military. Chapter 4 describes the degree of personal and local involvement with the military, and Chapter 5 summarizes public expectations of war and peace.

The General Social Survey

The 1984 GSS is the eleventh in a series of unique national surveys carried out by NORC since 1972. While the sampling design and personal interviewing methods are standard for national studies of high quality, the General Social Survey program is unique in that:

- The questions cover a broad array of topics chosen to reflect variables of interest to professional social scientists
- Almost all the items are repeated in each survey or appear in a fixed rotation scheme that enables one to track change and stability
- The data are immediately placed in the public domain for analysis by hundreds of investigators and students all over the country (and the world)

(For a detailed description of the program and the sample design, see Davis and Smith, 1985.)

Occasionally, GSS adds one-time substantive or methodological sections to the questionnaire if the topic is of social science interest and the data can be placed in the public domain.* Such supplements enrich the GSS coverage and provide the sponsors of the supplement a much wider array of information at a cost far below that of a "stand-alone" survey. After discussions among NORC, the Ford Foundation, and a specially appointed Advisory Committee (see Acknowledgments), a 39-variable section dealing with public attitudes toward the military was added to the GSS-1982, and a similar supplement was administered as part of GSS-1984.

GSS uses a two-stage area probability sample designed to yield estimates for the "noninstitutionalized English-speaking population of the

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*Codebooks and data tapes for the 1984 GSS and the military supplement are available from The Roper Center, P.O. Box 440, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06268-0440.

continental United States, 18 years of age or older" (Davis and Smith, 1985, p.328). This definition of the "universe" is typical for modern national surveys, but the reader should bear in mind the following:

- By setting the floor at 18 years of age we excluded young people most likely to be affected by the military personnel policies in the next few years.
- Deliberate exclusion of the "institutional" population means that military personnel living on base and college students living in dormitories (but not those living at home or in apartments) are excluded. This makes the sample of persons in their early twenties less than totally representative.
- Deliberate exclusion of persons who do not speak English may remove a small proportion of Latinos and hence influence the questions on Spanish-speakers in the military (52 out of 2,157 original cases, or 2.4 percent, were excluded on language grounds).

Except for a slight overrepresentation of Blacks in its first year, GSS samples have never shown any biases relevant to the findings discussed in this report, and the staff has no information that GSS-1984 differs from its predecessors in quality.

The response rate for GSS-1984 (completed cases divided by eligible respondents) is 78.6 percent (Davis and Smith, 1985, p.336). This is one of the highest response rates for any GSS (the lowest, 1978, is 73.5 percent) and quite satisfactory by comparison with similar non-Federal surveys. As in any sample survey, the results reported here could be strongly biased if the missing 21.4 percent differed <u>overwhelmingly</u> on any of the measures. Since the losses involve a wide variety of reasons (refusal, illness, unavailability throughout the field period, etc.), and since statistical analyses of "lost respondents" have yet to show any strong reliable correlates, we have confidence that the data reported here are trustworthy.

Some Notes On Presentation Of The Data

Ns (number of cases) on which the statistical data are based are generally, but not always, shown in the tables and figures. For purposes of clarity and convenience, the NA (No Answer, due to interviewer error or respondent refusal) and DK (Don't know, No Opinion) categories have been subtracted from the percentage base. The NA figure seldom exceeds 1.5 percent for any item. The DK figure is generally very low (for example, less than 1 percent on citizens' obligations). However, it may range up to 14 percent on a few items; the highest DK rate here was recorded on the item dealing with attitudes toward Hispanics in the military.

In a few of the more complex tables in which we examine the relationships between key attitudinal and/or demographic variables (for example, Tables 3.1, 4.5) we have used a technique suggested by Jacob Cohen in Statistical Power Analysis for the Social Sciences (Revised Edition, 1977, Academic Press). This procedure produces a figure which we call N^* (N-star), indicating the number of cases required to confirm a statistically significant relationship at the .05 confidence level. The smaller this number, the stronger the association. Veteran status by sex, for example, yields an N^* figure of 23, meaning that only 23 observations would be required to demonstrate that veterans are predominantly male. In general, any N^* figure of more than 1,500 is not statistically significant for these data.

CHAPTER 1

TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MILITARY

The 1984 General Social Survey (GSS-84) included fourteen major question items concerning military attitudes that were repeated verbatim from prior surveys. Ten of these were asked in both GSS-82 and GSS-83, while four were asked only in GSS-82. Table 1.1 shows the percentage of the U.S. noninstitutionalized civilian population reporting each of these attitudes over the two-year period.

TABLE 1.1

TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY ISSUES (1982-1984)

(Proportion of Population Holding Each Attitude)*

	1982	1983	1984
Favor return to peacetime draft	44%	30%	24%
All-Volunteer Force has worked very well, fairly well	63	--	84
Rate quality of military personnel excellent or good	53	69	72
We are spending: too much on defense	32	34	38
too little on defense	31	26	19
Great deal of confidence in military leaders	31	30	37
U.S. should take active part in world affairs	64	68	69
If return to draft, favor drafting of women (Percent of those who favor return to draft)	55	48	50
Approve return to draft if national emergency	88	87	84
Approve national service even if taxes go up	45	--	45
Approve national service for men	75	--	73
Approve national service for women	63	--	63
Satisfied with current proportion of Hispanics in armed forces	60	62	62
Satisfied with current proportion of women in armed forces	57	59	58
Satisfied with current proportion of blacks in armed forces	69	70	72
N =	(1,506)	(1,599)	(1,473)

NOTE:
*Those with no opinion are excluded from percentages.

Public opinion as measured by surveys is often regarded as extremely volatile, reflecting people's weekly or even daily response to headline news and their reactions to conflicting messages. In actual fact, opinion change on constant issues moves very slowly. In an analysis of trends on General Social Survey questions, Smith found that only about one attitude in seven showed a linear trend over a six-year period, with most of the others either constant or "bouncing around."[1]

Of the fourteen items shown in Table 1.1, nine reveal no statistically significant change over the two-year period. One item--confidence in military leaders--showed a borderline increase, while four items produced large and significant change. It is noteworthy that three of these top four issues relate to the All-Volunteer Force and a peacetime draft:

- Current support for a peacetime draft declined from 44 percent to 24 percent.
- Satisfaction with the All-Volunteer Force increased from 63 percent to 84 percent.
- The proportion who assign favorable ratings to the quality of military personnel rose from 53 percent to 72 percent.

The fourth item to show significant change was attitudes toward military spending, for which there is declining support and rising opposition.

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[1]Tom W. Smith, "A Compendium of Trends on General Social Survey Questions," NORC Report No. 129, National Opinion Research Center, Chicago, 1980, Table 1, p. xvii.

In contrast, public opinion on the "social policy" military issues, such as compulsory national service for youth and the recruiting of women and minorities to the Armed Forces, underwent little or no change. In other areas, about two-thirds of the public continue to believe that the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs, and support for a military draft if there is a national emergency remains extremely high.

The sharp decline in support for a peacetime draft, from 44 percent to 24 percent, represents a striking change in public opinion over a two-year period and indeed continues a longterm decline shown in Table 1.2. Approval of military conscription was almost universal (90 percent) in 1965 as intervention in Vietnam began to build. This approval rapidly diminished during the Vietnam years, as an increasing percentage of the public rejected the war and increasing numbers perceived the draft to be unfair because "draft dodgers" were escaping service. Support for the draft reached a post-Vietnam high of 59 percent in 1980, but has resumed its steady decline in more recent years.

TABLE 1.2

PROPORTION OF PUBLIC WHO SUPPORT COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

December 1965 (H)	90%
August 1966 (H)	84
May 1968 (H)	53
February 1977 (G)	36
February 1979 (G)	45
February 1980 (G)	59
July 1980 (G)	58
August 1981 (G)	48
February 1982 (NORC)	44
February 1983 (NORC)	30
February 1984 (NORC)	24

NOTES:
Question wordings varied somewhat, but all items asked, essentially, "favor or oppose the draft," "return to a military draft at this time, or not," or "return to a military draft or continue to rely on volunteers."

H = The Harris Survey.

G = The Gallup Poll.

NORC = General Social Survey.

Our analysis of the 1982 data showed that support for a peacetime draft was strongest among those with pro-military attitudes, veterans, older Americans, and political conservatives. While support for increased military spending has been declining for the last two years, this appears to reflect a concern over federal budget deficits and spending priorities rather than any broad swing toward pacifism. Indeed, the public's overall attitudes toward the military and toward involvement in world affairs seem to be more favorable now than they were in 1982. The proportion of the public who believe the United States should "take an active part in world affairs" has increased rather than decreased. Confidence in U.S. military leadership rose sharply in 1983-84, while the proportion who expressed satisfaction with the performance of the All-Volunteer Force and who gave high ratings to the quality of military personnel both showed large increases and were at all-time highs.

Our earlier report noted that younger Americans are significantly less supportive of the military draft than are their elders. The generation who grew up during and after the Vietnam conflict is much less likely than the World War II generation to favor a peacetime draft. We observed two years ago that if these differences of opinion represented the attitudes of a new generation, rather than simply the effects of chronological aging, support for conscription is likely to continue to diminish.

We also noted in the earlier report, and we note again, that opposition to the draft does not represent a principled objection to compulsory national service under all circumstances. In the event of "a national emergency" (not otherwise specified), 84 percent of the public say we should return to a military draft, a figure only slightly below the proportion who gave that answer in 1982. Furthermore, 73 percent of the public favor a program that would "require

all young men to give one year of service to the nation--either in the military forces or in non-military work such as in hospitals or with elderly people," and 63 percent would approve such a program for all young women. These proportions are almost identical to those found two years ago.

Figure 1.1 provides a graphic representation of the trends in three of our items over the last two years. The three are the proportion of the general public who reject a draft and say we should continue to rely on volunteers, the percent giving high ratings to the quality of present military personnel, and the percent who believe too much or too little is being spent on the military. It is clear that preferences for an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) over the draft have paralleled the increasingly favorable ratings accorded to the quality of the AVF and may also reflect the rising hostility to military spending.

While we have no data on the public's view of the relative cost of the draft versus the AVF, it would seem that the public (who would overwhelmingly approve a draft in a national emergency) regard the draft as a fallback position if the AVF does not work. With satisfaction with the AVF and ratings of the quality of its personnel at an all-time high, it is understandable that support for the draft is at an all-time low.

The relationship between these attitudes can be demonstrated statistically in Table 1.3, where the top row (Control=None) shows a 15.03 percentage point decline in support for the draft between 1982 and 1983, and a further 5.96 percentage point decline from 1983 to 1984.

FIGURE 1.1

TRENDS IN SELECTED MILITARY ATTITUDES
(Percent of Total Sample)



NOTE:
*Three wording variations combined

The second row shows the amount of change when attitudes toward the quality of military personnel are held constant. The 1982-83 change drops from 15 to 11 percentage points and the 1983-84 change from 6 to 5 points. Thus, about a quarter of the 1982-83 change and about one-sixth of the 1983-84 change can be explained by more favorable ratings of military personnel. The third and fourth rows show similar results when we control for attitudes toward military spending and when we control for both factors simultaneously. Thus, opinions on military spending and evaluations of personnel quality do not completely explain the decline in support for the draft, but contribute to it in substantial measure.

TABLE 1.3

EFFECTS OF ATTITUDE TOWARD QUALITY OF AVF AND MILITARY SPENDING, ON SUPPORT FOR DRAFT

(Percentage Point Difference in Support for Peacetime Draft)

Control Factor	1982 to 1983		1983 to 1984	
None	-15.03	(8.07)*	-5.96	(3.48)
Quality of AVF	-11.24	(6.11)	-4.97	(3.05)
Level of Military Spending	-13.51	(7.49)	-4.07	(2.45)
Both	- 9.93	(5.63)	-3.08	(1.96)

NOTE:
*Parenthetical figures are adjusted chi-square values with one degree of freedom.

Trends in Subgroups

Although the demographic characteristics of the population are continually changing, the changes are so gradual that "background variables," such as age and education, are of little use in explaining short-run changes of the sort we are examining here. Thus, while the U.S. population is "aging" and there are age differences in opinions about the draft, one would have to track

opinions for decades before the changing age composition could produce trends of even a few percentage points. Nevertheless, it is useful to look at change in particular population subgroups to see whether the shifts are general or are concentrated in certain categories. For example, has support for the draft declined across the board or does it represent a weakening of support among previously staunch pro-draft groups?

Figure 1.2 shows differences and trends on two items--quality of military personnel and support for a peacetime draft--for a socioeconomic status index (SES) that combines occupation, education, and income. For quality of personnel there is an inverse relationship: the lower the socioeconomic status, the higher the ratings of military quality--though it is the high SES group that has shown the greatest rate of change in a favorable direction since 1982. But for the draft, the differences are smaller and less consistent. While the lowest SES group, formerly the most critical of the draft, is now more supportive, there has been a significant decline in support among all three groups.

Turning from the high-low vertical dimension of socioeconomic status to the more "horizontal" or cultural variables, Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show attitudes toward two key military issues by Religion, Region, and Race. To avoid small cell sizes and to focus on the group differences, the data in these figures ignore year-to-year trends and show for each group the combined opinions over all three years, 1982 to 1984.

Religious differences are generally inconsistent, although Jews and agnostics show a tendency to give lower ratings to the quality of military personnel and to be somewhat less supportive of a peacetime draft. There is, however, a distinct regional tilt in attitudes toward the draft. Within each major faith and also among those who profess no religion, Southerners are more pro-draft than Northerners.

PERCENT

FIGURE 1.2a

RATE QUALITY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL HIGH



FIGURE 1.2b

FAVOR DRAFT



FIGURE 1.3

SUM OF OPINIONS, 1982-1984
RELIGION AND REGION (WHITES ONLY)

Percent Rating Military Quality "High"

	North	South
Protestant		
Fundamentalist	68% (666)	62% (576)
Other	65% (735)	54% (276)
Catholic	68% (862)	67% (171)
Jewish	51% (73)	38% * (16)
None	52% (214)	52% (64)

N = (3,653)

NOTE:
* Fewer than 20 cases.



Percent Favoring Draft

	North	South
Protestant		
Fundamentalist	33% (691)	37% (597)
Other	32% (744)	43% (286)
Catholic	32% (914)	39% (183)
Jewish	24% (80)	36% * (14)
None	25% (230)	31% (64)

N = (3,803)

NOTE:
* Fewer than 20 cases.



FIGURE 1.4

SUM OF OPINIONS, 1982-1984
RACE AND REGION

Percent Rating Military Quality "High"

	North	South
White	65% (2,659)	60% (1,137)
Black	67% (220)	75% (225)

N = (4,241)



Percent Favoring Draft

	North	South
White	31% (2,718)	38% (1,155)
Black	33% (229)	20% (224)

N = (4,326)



FIGURE 1.5

PERCENT RATING MILITARY QUALITY "HIGH"



	Race/Region	Year 1982	1983	1984
●	White Southerners	46% (372)	66% (384)	67% (381)
⊡	Northerners	54% (945)	69% (1,018)	73% (916)
✳	Black Southerners	68% (66)	78% (72)	77% (87)

N = (4,241)

FIGURE 1.6

PERCENT FAVORING DRAFT VERSUS VOLUNTEERS



	1982	1983	1984
● White Southerners	50% (382)	37% (388)	28% (376)
⊡ Northerners	44% (952)	28% (1,061)	22% (916)
✱ Black Northerners	20% (65)	16% (75)	25% (83)

N = (4,298)

When we add Race to Region (Figure 1.4), however, we observe an interesting change. Among Northerners, there is very little race difference. There is only two percentage points' difference between Blacks and whites on both items. In the South, whites give lower ratings to the quality of military personnel than Blacks do, and Southern whites are much more supportive of the draft. These interracial differences within regions are statistically significant and they suggest three groups: (1) Southern whites, relatively pro-draft and anti-AVF; (2) Northerners of both races, in the middle; and (3) Southern Blacks, relatively pro-AVF and anti-draft.

In Figures 1.5 and 1.6, we see the trends in the attitudes of these three groups in the 1982-84 period. Figure 1.5 shows a sharp rise in military quality evaluations from 1982 to 1983 in all three groups and not much change from 1983 to 1984. Since the shifts are about equal in all three groups, the three lines are roughly parallel. In all three years, Southern Blacks give the highest quality ratings and Southern whites the lowest, with Northerners in between. However, the changes are sharp enough that in 1984 Southern whites rated the quality of military personnel just about as highly as Southern Blacks did in 1982. Figure 1.6 shows a very similar pattern of attitudes toward the draft. Except for Southern Blacks in 1984 (a figure based on only 83 cases, with a 2-sigma confidence interval of 10 percentage points), support for a civilian draft declines from year to year in each group, with white Southerners remaining relatively most favorable.

The relatively pro-draft stance of Southern whites is consistent with their "conservatism" and history of support for the military, but the strikingly high ratings accorded to the quality of military personnel by Southern Blacks is more puzzling. Though our present data cannot explain this finding, a clue is provided in Samuel A. Stouffer's classic study of the American soldier, which found that Black soldiers stationed in the South during World War II received an

ironic morale boost from the high levels of segregation in the nearby civilian communities.[1] Perhaps the extraordinary success of Blacks in the present AVF has been particularly salient to Southern Blacks, where the military is generally more visible and racial differences in civilian income and status are still quite strong.

Veteran Status, Sex, and Age form another cluster of predictor variables, as shown in Figures 1.7 and 1.8. If one simply crosstabulates sex and attitudes toward the draft (not shown in the figure), one finds a major difference by sex: men are about 10 points more pro-draft. But when we control for veteran status (bottom panel, Figure 1.7), we observe very little difference by sex. The apparent sex difference in attitudes toward the draft is almost entirely a function of military experience. Both male and female veterans are about 20 points more favorable to the draft than are their nonveteran counterparts, but since many men and only a very few women have had military experience, there appears to be a sharp sex difference. As we have seen, high ratings of the current quality of military personnel go along with opposition to the draft, and the upper panel of Figure 1.7 shows essentially the same relationships to sex and veteran status. Women and nonveterans both give higher ratings to current military personnel than do men and veterans. One anomaly, however, is the extremely high proportion of women veterans (only 32 cases over three years) who give favorable ratings to the quality of AVF personnel. As in the case of Southern Blacks, the data suggest that the population subgroups with a symbolic stake in the AVF are strong supporters.

---

[1] Samuel A. Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. 1, "The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life," p.563, Princeton University Press, 1949.

FIGURE 1.7

ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY ISSUES

BY VETERAN STATUS AND SEX

Veteran Status	Sex	Percent Rating AVF Quality "High"	N
Veterans	Male	54	(730)
	Female	81	(32)
Nonveterans	Male	63	(1,105)
	Female	68	(2,357)
			N = (4,224)



Status	Sex	Percent Favoring Draft	N
Veterans	Male	52	(738)
	Female	49	(35)
Nonveterans	Male	30	(1,116)
	Female	28	(2,420)
			N = (4,309)



FIGURE 1.8

ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY ISSUES
BY AGE

Percent Rating Military Quality "High"

	Veterans		Nonveterans	
Age	Percent	N	Percent	N
18-34	60	(139)	68	(1,518)
35-54	54	(312)	65	(987)
55-up	51	(308)	67	(948)

N = (4,212)



Percent Favoring Draft

	Veterans		Nonveterans	
Age	Percent	N	Percent	N
18-34	50	(139)	21	(1,545)
35-54	54	(320)	59	(1,002)
55-up	49	(310)	35	(978)

N = (4,294)



FIGURE 1.10

PERCENT RATING MILITARY QUALITY "HIGH"



Groups who were relatively favorable toward the AVF in 1982 (young adults, nonveterans, Southern Blacks) remained relatively favorable in 1984. Those who were relatively anti-AVF (veterans, white Southerners) remained relatively opposed. Each group experienced about the same amount of pro-AVF, anti-draft shift.

By 1984, support for a peacetime draft was very low. Even among a very conservative group, white Southern veterans, just half (52 percent) favored the draft. Among Northern nonveterans aged 18-34, a mere 13 percent approved of a peacetime draft.

While these are very large changes for a two-year period, the pace of change slowed between 1983 and 1984 and it may be that both items are approaching their ceiling. As yet, the data reveal no sign of any shift away from support of the AVF and in favor of resuming a peacetime draft, but that possibility cannot be entirely ruled out as the public responds to new situations and events on the world scene.

CHAPTER 2

MILITARY SERVICE AS A MORAL OBLIGATION

The phrase "military obligation" has two meanings:

> A legal obligation to serve when a military draft is in effect (or if a universal military service program should be implemented).
>
> A moral obligation to contribute to the national welfare through military service.

In Chapter 1 we looked at public attitudes toward the draft--the legal obligation. But in considering public opinion on military manpower policies, it would be useful to have data on the extent to which the national public does indeed see service as a moral obligation, rather than a purely legal one.

It is clear that U.S. adults in general view military service in a positive light, despite the trauma of Vietnam and current debates on Central America. The point was demonstrated in our previous report, and the 1984 data confirm it. While support for a peacetime draft is at an all-time low, 84 percent would return to a draft in a national emergency, and almost three-quarters now favor mandatory universal service for men and 63 percent for women. Our 1984 survey also asked the following question: "For most young men/women, do you think military service is definitely a good experience, probably a good experience, probably not a good experience, or definitely not a good experience?" The results are overwhelmingly favorable, as shown in Table 2.1 below.

TABLE 2.1

PERCEIVED VALUE OF MILITARY SERVICE

Military Service Is:	For Men		For Women	
Definitely good	33%	89%	15%	73%
Probably good	56		58	
Probably not good	9	11%	20	27%
Definitely not good	2		7	
	100%		100%	
N =	(1,422)		(1,393)	

But is military service seen as a moral obligation? And where does military service rank in relation to other obligations that a citizen owes to his or her country? We could find no data on such questions from prior national surveys, so on the 1984 GSS we presented respondents with ten activities that many might regard as citizen obligations. Our question was worded as follows:

> "We all know that American citizens have certain rights. For example, they have the right to free public education and to police protection, the right to attend religious services of their choice, and the right to elect public officials."
>
> "I'd like to ask now about certain obligations that some people feel American citizens owe their country. I just want your own opinion on these--whether you feel it is a very important obligation, a somewhat important obligation, or not an obligation that a citizen owes to the country."

Each of the following statements was then read to the respondent and the answer coded in the appropriate category. Note that the first six represent civilian obligations and the last four military obligations.

> "First, to vote in elections?
>
> How about volunteering some time to community services?
>
> How about serving on a jury, if called?
>
> Reporting a crime that he or she may have witnessed?
>
> How about being able to speak and understand English?
>
> Keeping fully informed about news and public issues?
>
> How about, for young men, serving in the military during peacetime?
>
> For young men, serving in the military when the country is at war?
>
> For young women, serving in the military during peacetime?
>
> For young women, serving in the military when the country is at war?"

Figure 2.1 displays the results. In the left-hand column are the six civilian obligations. Three of these (reporting crime, speaking English, and voting) show consensus. In each case 80 percent or more say "very important" and

FIGURE 2.1

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SELECTED CIVIC OBLIGATIONS
(Percent of Total Sample Who Say Each Is
"A Very Important Obligation"/"Not An Obligation")



only a handful say "not an obligation." Jury service (oddly enough, the only legally mandatory one in the group) and keeping informed show majority support (65 and 57 percent) but less than consensus. One item, volunteering services, is regarded as very important by only 31 percent.

Looking at the military items in the right-hand column of Figure 2.1, we find strong consensus (84 percent very important, 2 percent not important) that wartime service for men is indeed a citizen's obligation. But the ratings for the other three possibilities are conspicuously lower. Wartime service for women is rated as very important by 46 percent, significantly behind five of the six civilian obligations. Peacetime military service for men (33 percent) or women (18 percent) is seen as a civic obligation by only a minority.

These results are rather clear-cut, and they lend confirmation to our other data on attitudes toward the draft. American adults agree that wartime military service is an obligation that men owe to their country; they do not feel that peacetime service is an obligation of either sex. They give men's peacetime service about the same degree of obligation as civilian volunteer work and rate it less pressing than women's wartime service or keeping informed on public issues.

Group Differences in Attitudes

To explore group differences in attitudes toward citizens' obligations, it will be helpful, given the six civilian and four military items, to summarize them in some sort of indexes. For the military items, the first step was to test for consistency of attitude; the results are gratifying. Only 1.1 percent of the sample, or 15 cases, gave the seemingly illogical answer that male military service is very important in peacetime but not in wartime. If we discard these 15 cases, the sample can accordingly be separated into three distinct groups, as shown in Table 2.2.

Figure 1.8 examines attitudes by age, with veteran status as a control, since about one-fourth of adults 35 or older are veterans, but less than 10 percent of those aged 18-34. The lower panel of Figure 1.8 shows, as expected, that veterans are more favorable to the draft than nonveterans at each age level. With respect to age itself, the highest level of support for the draft is found in the middle years, 35 to 54, and much the lowest level of support among the 18-34 age group. This was noted in our previous report as well and seems to reflect the political history of recent cohorts of young adults, as well as their greater personal vulnerability to a draft. Among nonveterans there are no significant age differences in quality ratings of the AVF personnel, but older veterans rate them less highly than the younger veterans (who are a relatively small group).

Figures 1.7 and 1.8 combine data for three years in order to magnify the subgroup sample sizes. Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the subgroup trends year by year. As in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 relating to Race and Region, the trends are roughly parallel for each group. Figure 1.9 shows the decline in support for the draft among veterans, older nonveterans, and younger nonveterans. In Figure 1.10 we see a rising trend among both veterans and nonveterans in their rating of the quality of military personnel.

In Summary

Between 1982 and 1984 support for the All-Volunteer Force and opposition to a peacetime draft both increased sharply. Where 1983 data are available, as in ratings of the quality of AVF personnel and attitudes toward the draft, we can see that the largest part of the shift occurred between 1982 and 1983, but the trends continued at a somewhat slower pace in 1983-84.

These changes do not have any connection with military-social issues such as the recruiting of minorities and women. Attitudes towards these issues remained stable over the period.

FIGURE 1.9

PERCENT FAVORING DRAFT VERSUS VOLUNTEERS



		Year		
		1982	1983	1984
●	Veterans	63% (248)	47% (289)	44% (236)
⊡	Nonveterans 35-up	48% (666)	32% (674)	23% (640)
✳	Nonveterans 18-34	31% (485)	18% (561)	15% (499)

TABLE 2.2

MILITARY OBLIGATION INDEX

Men Have An Obligation to Serve	Percent
In war as well as peace	33%
In war only	52
Not a very important obligation in war or peace	15
	100%

(N = 1,413)

One-third of U.S. adults feel that military service is a very important obligation for men in peacetime as well as war; 52 percent feel it is only a wartime obligation; and 15 percent do not feel it is a very important obligation in either situation.

Turning to the civilian obligations, the sample can again be arrayed in three groups, depending upon the number of "very important" answers they gave to the six items.

TABLE 2.3

CIVILIAN OBLIGATION INDEX

Number of Civilian Obligations Ranked Very Important*	Percent
5-6	43%
4	26
0-3	31
	100%

(N = 1,419)

NOTE:
* = Civilian obligations listed were: report crime; speak English; vote; serve on jury; keep informed; perform volunteer services.

The distribution is skewed toward the high end. Forty-three percent rated five or six duties as very important and 69 percent did so for four or more. The low rating of peacetime military service seems even more telling in light of this generally "dutiful" response pattern.

Table 2.4 shows bivariate associations of attitudes toward civilian and military obligations with four major background characteristics: sex, age, ethnology, and socioeconomic status (SES). The SES is a composite index based on occupation, education, and respondents' reports of relative family income. The figures shown in the table represent N*, which is the number of cases required for statistical significance at the .05 level. The smaller this number, the stronger the association. The age differences we find, for example, would be significant in a sample of fewer than 300 cases; we have 1,400 or more cases, so the association is robust. The sex differences we find barely reach significance for the civilian obligations, but for the military items they are too weak to reach significance.

TABLE 2.4

BIVARIATE ASSOCIATIONS WITH BACKGROUND MEASURES

	Civilian Obligations	Military Obligations
Sex	1,350	2,932 NS**
Age (4 groups)	251	294
Ethnology (7 groups)	1,326 NS	878
SES (3 groups)	17,154 NS	734

NOTES:
All numerical entries = N* = number of cases necessary for statistical significance at the .05 level.

** NS = Not statistically significant.

Civilian Obligations

For civilian obligations, the table shows age to be by far the most important factor in predicting attitudes, while sex and ethnology both have associations of borderline significance. Women and Blacks are somewhat more dutiful than men and whites.

Figure 2.2a plots the percentages of American adults who cite five or six civilian obligations as very important by age in five-year groups. The steep climb is impressive. Among those under age thirty in 1984, about one-fourth endorsed as many as five or six obligations; among those sixty or over, the figure is around 60 percent.

Figure 2.2b plots the age trends for three selected civilian obligations. At all ages, voting is perceived as the most important of the three, with jury service not far behind. Volunteer community service is much less widely perceived as a citizen obligation. Within each age group, the three obligations are ranked identically, but the perceived importance of each again climbs steadily with increasing age. In contrast to near unanimity among older Americans on the importance of voting, only about two-thirds of the under-thirty group assign it a high importance. There is strong consensus among the oldest age group concerning the importance of jury service, but among those under thirty only a little more than half see it as very important. While volunteer community service is accorded lower importance at all ages, the age group differences are even more striking for this activity. Almost half of the older age groups regard this as an important citizen obligation, but fewer than 20 percent of the youngest.

The age groups clearly disagree, but whether this is an aging process (we become more dutiful as we get older) or a cohort effect (the newer generation is less dutiful than the older was at a similar age) cannot be determined from a single cross-section survey.

The importance of age in determining attitudes toward civilian obligations is clearly demonstrated by a multivariate analysis involving Age, Sex, Education, and Marital Status. While the data are too complex to be presented here, they can be conveniently summarized as follows:

FIGURE 2.2a

PERCENT

PERCENT CITING 5 or 6 CIVILIAN OBLIGATIONS
AS VERY IMPORTANT, BY AGE



N = (184) (180) (157) (168) (116) (98) (72) (95) (88) (90) (60) (42)

FIGURE 2.2b

PERCENT CITING SELECTED SPECIFIC ITEMS
AS VERY IMPORTANT, BY AGE



The strong effects of age shown in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b remain about the same, even after controlling for these other variables. The older the respondent, the more likely it is that he or she will assign great importance to civilian obligations, net of sex, education, or marital status.

Men remain about 7 percentage points less "dutiful" than women, even after adjusting for age, education, and marital status.

Education shows a slight switch. The raw data indicate that the better-educated are somewhat less dutiful than those who did not finish high school, but when we control for the other factors, the better-educated are seen to be more dutiful.

This reversal reflects the high correlation between age and education in the United States. The older age groups are less highly educated than the younger. Because the sense of citizen obligation increases with age, the unadjusted figures imply that education has a negative effect. But controlling for age, the data show that at each age level the better-educated are more dutiful.

A similar finding is even more evident when we examine marital status. The raw figures show the single population to be much less dutiful than the married and the ex-married. This might seem to confirm the notion that when people get married, they "settle down" and accept their responsibilities. But the adjusted data show practically no differences by marital status. The raw differences are entirely explained by the younger age of the never-married population.

In sum, there is a strong positive correlation between age and high scores on the civilian obligation index. The older the American, the more dutiful. This correlation is not in any way an artifact of sex, education, or marital status, and none of these variables makes a big difference.

Military Obligations

We saw in Table 2.4 that attitudes toward military service as a citizen obligation are largely unrelated to sex, are (again) strongly associated with age, and show a moderate relationship with ethnology and socioeconomic status. Table 2.5 shows the ethnology pattern, encompassing race, region of residence at age 16, and religion at age 16. (We use the respondent's religion and place of residence at age 16, when he or she was growing up, as better measures of the effects of these variables than present religion or place of residence.)

TABLE 2.5

ETHNOLOGY PATTERN AND SCORE ON MILITARY OBLIGATION INDEX

Ethnic Pattern			Percent Saying Military Service Is Very Important Obligation				
Race	Region	Religion	Never	War Only	War and Peace	Total	N
Black	any	any	25*+	32*-	43*+ =	100%	157
White	South	Fundamentalist Prot.	10*-	48	42*+	100	191
White	South	Other Protestant	12	53	34	99	90
White	North	Other Protestant	11	56	33	100	209
White	all other		16	54	30	100	124
White	North	Catholic	17	55	28	100	329
White	North	Fundamentalist Prot.	16	58	26	100	200

NOTE:
* + or - = Significantly high or low at .05 level.

White Southern Fundamentalist Protestants are the one group that stand out as most supportive of military service as a citizen obligation. They are significantly high on the duty of service in both wartime and peacetime, and they are significantly low in feeling that military service is never a very important obligation. Blacks go to both extremes; they are significantly high on "Never" and significantly high on both war and peacetime service. The finding on white Southern fundamentalists is not unexpected, though it should be noted that only 42 percent of even this group see military service as a very important obligation in both war and peacetime. The polarity of the Black population is harder to interpret, but may reflect a large regional difference, with Southern Blacks highly supportive of military service and Northern Blacks opposed. Our sample does not contain enough Blacks to establish any reliable differences within the group.

To explore the other correlates, we carried out another multivariate analysis using the single item "Peacetime military service is a very important obligation for men" as the dependent variable, and age, education, veteran status, and agreement that volunteering time to community services is a very

important citizen obligation as predictors. Again, the results are too complex for effective presentation in a single table or chart, but the findings are as follows:

Among the predictors examined, veteran status is, by a narrow margin, the strongest. Veterans are 19 points higher than nonveterans in belief that peacetime military service is a very important obligation for men--net of age, education, and attitudes toward community service.

Agreeing that civilian volunteer work is a very important obligation to one's country is also a strong predictor, however, with a 17-point net effect. It would seem that one's general sense of identification with the community independently influences one's view of military obligations.

Education has a negative effect. College attendance reduces the importance attached to peacetime military service by 12 percentage points, while persons who failed to complete high school are 12 points more positive in their endorsement, again holding constant age, veteran status, and attitudes toward community service. Unlike citizen obligations in general, therefore, the higher the education, the lower the probability that one will see peacetime military service as a very important duty to the country.

Age, as expected, has a positive effect. The older the American, the more likely he or she is to see peacetime service as a duty--net of education, veteran status, and opinions about civilian volunteer work. It should be noted, however, that the net effect of age here is distinctly less than in the case of civilian obligations. Age plays only a part in evaluating military obligations, while it dominates civilian ones. We should also note that the big age difference is between the 20-29 group and all others. Table 2.6 summarizes the demographic predictors.

TABLE 2.6

PERCENT RATING PEACETIME MILITARY SERVICE FOR MEN AS VERY IMPORTANT

Education	Nonveteran		Veteran	
	Age 20-29	Age 30-up	Age 20-29	Age 30-up
0-11 years	28% (60)	46% (259)	-- (3)	50% (58)
12 years	20% (125)	33% (267)	-- (8)	60% (70)
13 years or more	14% (158)	28% (291	-- (8)	37% (91)

While each variable shows a contribution--education, age, and veteran status all have independent effects--even in the most favorable groups (veterans, the less educated, and people over 30) endorsement does not get much beyond 50 percent. Among those who have attended college, on the other hand, the figure is only 14 percent for younger nonveterans and rises no higher than 37 percent for older veterans.

In Summary

Americans show near unanimity in characterizing certain citizen contributions as moral duties: reporting crime, speaking English, voting, and military service for men in wartime.

But for peacetime service and for military service by women even in wartime, clear majorities do not view these as moral obligations.

Feelings of obligation on civilian matters are dominated by age. When asked about six civilian obligations, 60 percent of older Americans rated five or all six as very important; among those under age 30, only about one-fourth endorsed this many. The strong effects of age in determining attitudes toward civilian obligations remain, even after controlling for sex, education, and marital status.

Belief that peacetime military service is a moral obligation is more multifaceted. Veterans, those who feel civilian volunteer activity is a duty, the less educated, and those over thirty are more likely to view peacetime military service as a very important obligation. But even in the most favorable groups the proportion stays close to 50 percent, and among young, college-educated non-veterans, the figure drops to 14 percent.

CHAPTER 3

THE EDUCATIONAL ROLE OF THE ARMED SERVICES

Though the public may be divided in its perceptions of the citizen's moral obligation to serve in the military, there is considerable agreement about the military's obligation to assume responsibility for educating the citizenry. Indeed, the U.S. military in peacetime represents probably the largest vocational/technical college in world history. Soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines spend a large amount of their time in schools, and a significant portion of the military budget goes into the maintenance of a huge educational system.

For normal peacetime recruiting the Armed Forces assume that an adequate pool of high school graduates will be available with the basic skills necessary to absorb vocational schooling, and that these recruits, primarily enlisted personnel, will be trained in a wide variety of military occupations ranging from rifleman to computer programmer. In short, military education centers on vocational training for military jobs. It has not been expected to provide basics such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, nor has it sought to provide other than incidental vocational training for civilian jobs.

In recent years, however, the notion of broadening this educational mission has surfaced both within and outside the Department of Defense. An improving economy and a demographic shrinkage of the teenage population raise the possibility that, in the next decade, the civilian sector may not routinely generate an adequate supply of qualified volunteers. In addition, since the establishment of the AVF, more volunteers have come from sectors of the society (minority groups) where public education is sometimes deficient. To some observers, then, it seems that both the Armed Services and the larger society would gain if the military were to accept volunteers with lower academic skills, and use its excellent educational resources to improve these skills.

Similarly, concern has been expressed about the lack of availability of trained personnel to fill the increasing demands for specialized skills in a technological society. Again, the military is seen by some as an unused educational resource. Why should not the Armed Services provide the kind of skills required for its discharged personnel to perform needed tasks in the civilian economy? Our 1984 survey provides some limited evidence on public attitudes toward an expansion of the educational role of the armed services.

Survey Findings

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of public opinion on the two issues we asked about in this survey. The top part of the table, which we have labeled UPGRADE, reveals that an overwhelming 83 percent of the adult civilian population believe that the Armed Services should accept volunteers who lack the necessary basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic, and give them the education they need. Only 17 percent, about one person in six, believe that such volunteers should be rejected.

But the public is evenly divided on the second proposition, which we have labeled JOBTRAIN. Here only 49 percent believe that the Armed Services have an obligation to train everybody in service for future civilian jobs, while 51 percent reject such an obligation on the part of the military. Thus, the vast majority of the public support "remedial" education in service, but there is no clear mandate for or against vocational training for post-service civilian jobs.

TABLE 3.1

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD EDUCATIONAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY

UPGRADE

"Many people who want to volunteer for service in the Armed Forces do not have the necessary basic skills like reading, writing, and arithmetic. Do you think the Armed Forces should refuse to accept such volunteers, or should they accept them and give them the necessary education?"

	Percent of Total Sample
Refuse to accept them	17.2%
Accept and educate them	82.8
	100.0%

N = 1,421

JOBTRAIN

"Most people in the armed forces are taught skills they can use in civilian jobs later. But some don't get such training. They are taught only combat skills. Do you think the Armed Forces have an obligation to train everybody in service for civilian jobs later, or is that not a responsibility of the Armed Forces?

	Percent of Total Sample
Yes, an obligation	48.9%
No, not an obligation	51.1
	100.0%

N = 1,412

In probing for sources of support or opposition to the idea of increasing the educational role of the Armed Services we discover again one of the central findings of this research. Public response to questions about military personnel policies and about military activities generally is topic-specific and not dependent upon generalized feelings about "militarism" or "national security." Table 3.2 makes this point statistically.

TABLE 3.2

INTERRELATIONS AMONG MILITARY POLICY ITEMS

(Phi)

Mnemonic*	JOBTRAIN[1]	UPGRADE[1]	BLNUMOK[2]	FENUMOK[3]	MESERVE[4]	DRAFT[5]
JOBTRAIN		+.223	NS	NS	NS	NS
UPGRADE			+.087	NS	NS	NS
BLNUMOK				+.265	+.058	NS
FENUMOK					+.049	NS
MESERVE						+.276

NOTES:

NS = Not statistically significant at .05 level, assuming design effect of 1.5.

* = A mnemonic is an acronym assigned to each question item (variable) to promote standardization in the use of the GSS variable names and to meet the demands prescribed by computer software systems such as SPSS. We use these mnemonics in tables to conserve space. For definitions of the mnemonics in this table, see the footnotes below.

1. See Table 3.1 for question wording.

2. "Do you think there are too many Blacks in the Armed Forces (0), about the right number (0), or should there be more Blacks in the armed forces (1)?"

3. "Do you think there are too many women in the Armed Forces (0), about the right number (0), or should there be more women in the Armed Forces (1)?"

4. "How would you feel about a program that required all young men to give one year of service to the nation--either in the military forces or in non-military work such as in hospitals or with elderly people--Would you strongly favor it (1), probably favor it (1), probably oppose it (0), or strongly oppose it (0)?"

5. "Do you think we should return to a military draft at this time, or should we continue to rely on volunteers?" Draft (1) Volunteers (0).

The table shows the interrelations (Phi, the product moment correlation coefficient for a 0-1 variable) for six policy questions. JOBTRAIN and UPGRADE are our educational items, as shown in Table 3.1. The next pair concern women and minorities: BLNUMOK asks whether there are too many, too few, or the right number of Blacks in the Armed Services; FENUMOK asks a similar question about the number of women. The last pair concern attitudes toward universal national service for young men (MESERVE) and resumption of the draft (DRAFT).

The pattern in the table is clear. Items in each pair show positive relationships with each other; items from different pairs are essentially unrelated. That is, when people are asked about thematically related policies, their answers are reasonably consistent; but position on a given cluster tells us virtually nothing about positions on another cluster. For example, people who favor the draft are quite likely to favor universal service, but pro-draft respondents are neither more nor less favorable than anti-draft respondents on the other four issues. Similarly, people who favor upgrading the skills of undereducated volunteers are also more likely to approve training for civilian jobs later, and also slightly more likely to welcome more Blacks in the Armed Services; but their attitudes on these issues are unrelated to their opinions about the draft or universal service or women in the military.

The pattern in Table 3.2 has two consequences for our analysis. First, because the answers to our two educational items are related, we can combine them in a single index. Second, to find out who favors and who opposes educational proposals, we have to start from scratch rather than drawing on our analyses of attitudes toward other policies.

In Table 3.3 we have divided our sample into three groups. The first group consists of all those who would reject volunteers who lack the elementary education skills. (About three-quarters of them also reject the idea of training for a civilian job future.) Those who endorse remedial education are divided into two groups according to their response on civilian job training.

TABLE 3.3

UPGRADE/JOBTRAIN SCALE DISTRIBUTION

UPGRADE	JOBTRAIN	PERCENT
Reject uneducated	--	17.6%
Accept and educate	No obligation to train for civilian jobs	38.0
Accept and educate	Train for civilian jobs	44.0
	N = 1,393	99.6%
	80 DK, NA	
	1,473	

A little less than half the civilian public (44 percent) would accept educationally unqualified volunteers and would also institute civilian job training for everybody in service. A somewhat smaller proportion (38 percent) would accept the unqualified and give them the necessary education, but they reject the idea of training for civilian jobs. Approximately 18 percent would not accept unqualified volunteers at all.

To discover where support and opposition to these proposals lie, we cross-tabulated Age, Sex, Race, Education, Military Experience, and Geographical Region against the UPGRADE/JOBTRAIN index. There were no regional differences, and the slight sex difference can be explained by sex differences in military experience. The other four predictors, however, make a difference, as shown in Table 3.4.

Part "A" of the table reveals a definite age effect. Younger adults (age 18-34) are more favorable to job training (52.6 percent) and less likely to reject the unqualified (only 12 percent). The views of the two older groups are more similar to each other, though there is greater support for civilian job training among those over age 55.

TABLE 3.4

CORRELATES OF UPGRADE/JOBTRAIN SCALE

A. AGE

	REJECT*	MILTRAIN*	JOBTRAIN*	Total	N
55-up	19.1%	38.5	42.3	99.9%	418
35-54	22.8	40.3	36.9	100.0%	447
18-34	12.0	35.5	52.6	100.1%	527
Total	17.6	37.9	44.5	100.0%	1,392

B. EDUCATION

	REJECT*	MILTRAIN*	JOBTRAIN*	Total	N
13-20 years	22.8%	39.3	37.9	100.0%	544
12 years	17.8	39.7	42.5	100.0%	461
0-11 years	10.1	34.1	55.8	100.0%	387
Total	17.6	38.0	44.4	100.0%	1,392

C. RACE

	REJECT*	MILTRAIN*	JOBTRAIN*	Total	N
White	18.6%	40.2	41.2	100.0%	1,236
Black	9.6	20.4	70.1	100.1%	157
Total	17.6	38.0	44.4	100.0%	1,393

D. MILITARY EXPERIENCE

	REJECT*	MILTRAIN*	JOBTRAIN*	Total	N
Veteran	25.0%	46.6	28.4	100.0%	232
Nonveteran	16.1	36.3	47.6	100.0%	1,152
Total	17.6	38.0	44.4	100.0%	1,384

NOTES:
*REJECT = Would not accept educationally unqualified.

MILTRAIN = Accept and educate unqualified, but train for military jobs only.

JOBTRAIN = Accept and educate unqualified, and train all personnel for civilian jobs.

While many studies have shown the highly educated to be more "liberal" on social issues, Table 3.4 Part "B" goes in the opposite direction. Among both high school graduates (12 years of education) and college attenders (13-20 years), about 20 percent would reject the educationally unqualified, and about 40 percent support training for civilian jobs. But among those with 0-11 years' schooling, only 10 percent would reject volunteers who have educational deficiencies and a strong majority (56 percent) would offer training for civilian jobs to all members of the Armed Services. Clearly, those who have not completed high school are more enthusiastic about expanded education in the military.

The strongest difference shown in Table 3.4 is for Race (Part "C"). Among Blacks, 70 percent endorse military training for civilian jobs and only 10 percent would reject the educationally unqualified. Among whites, on the other hand, only 41 percent see civilian job training as an obligation of the military and 19 percent would reject volunteers who do not have basic educational skills.

The bottom panel of the table (Part "D") shows large differences between those with and without military experience. Veterans are distinctly less enthusiastic about educational programs, indicating the least support of any group for civilian job training (28 percent) and the highest level for rejection of the educationally unqualified (25 percent). Although veterans are undoubtedly more sophisticated about the Armed Services than are those without direct experience, we should bear in mind that the vast majority of the veteran group were in the "qualified" category when they entered service.

The totality of Table 3.4 suggests a simple and consistent hypothesis: those groups who would be more likely to benefit from military acceptance and civilian job training (young people, the poorly educated, and Blacks) are more

strongly in favor of these policies. The relative opposition of veterans may reflect their own lack of need for remedial schooling when they entered service, and the absence of any civilian oriented vocational training while they were on duty.

But before accepting this interpretation, we need to apply some controls because our predictors are not unrelated to each other; for example, young people are better educated and less likely to be veterans, the better educated are more likely to be whites and veterans, and so on. The method used to introduce these controls is "direct standardization." Briefly, a computer program adjusts the data so that Age, Race, Education and Military Experience are totally unrelated statistically, while their associations with the UPGRADE/JOBTRAIN index are undisturbed. Figure 2.1 shows the results.

In Figure 3.1, the vertical axis is the percent who favor JOBTRAIN; that is, who endorse upgrading the educationally unqualified and also training enlisted personnel for civilian jobs. For each of the four predictor variables (Race, Age, Military Experience, and Education), there are two columns labeled RAW and STD. The lefthand column shows the raw data presented in Table 3.4 (70 percent of Blacks but only 41 percent of whites favor JOBTRAIN). The next column to the right shows the results after computer adjustment (standardized). The 44 percent in the middle of the columns represents the proportion of the total survey sample who favor JOBTRAIN, and is shown for comparative purposes.

In the Race column, it is evident that after racial differences on the other variables are removed, the 70-41 difference between Black and white shown in the raw data drops to 65-41 in the standardized. That is, 5 points of the raw Black percentage are explained by differences in the age, military experience, and educational characteristics of the Black population. (The figure for whites does not change because they account for 90 percent of the total sample and "standardizing" produces very little change. Assigning the much smaller number of Blacks the same age, schooling, and military experience as the total sample produces a larger change.)

FIGURE 3.1

PERCENT WHO FAVOR "JOBTRAIN"
(Raw Figures versus Standardized)



Table 3.5 concisely summarizes the data presented graphically in Figure 3.1. Both before and after standardization, the Black-white difference is the largest, but even after standardization, the other three variables also are shown to have independent effects. Thus, nonveterans are 18 points more supportive of JOBTRAIN than are veterans, even after controls are introduced for age, race and schooling. The younger age group and those with less education also remain more favorable after other variables are standardized.

TABLE 3.5

PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS ON "JOBTRAIN," RAW DATA VERSUS STANDARDIZED

		Point Difference	
Variable	Comparison Groups	Raw	Standardized
Race	Black versus White	29	24
Military Experience	Nonveteran versus Veteran	20	18
Education	0-11 years versus 12-20 years	16	16
Age	18-34 versus 35-up	14	10

Knowing that each of the variables has an independent effect, we would expect their influence to be cumulative. That is, we would expect high levels of support for the expansion of military education efforts among young, poorly educated, nonveteran Blacks, and very little support among older, better educated, veteran whites. The relatively small number of Blacks in our total sample preclude any detailed examination of this group, but Table 3.6 shows the findings.

Among whites (Table 3.6-A), the cumulative hypothesis works well. In the upper left-hand corner we see that 61.5 percent of less educated, younger, nonveterans support job training, while the lower right-hand figure shows that only 22.2 percent of better educated, older, white veterans support the idea of

an expanded educational effort by the military. Among Blacks (Table 3.6-B), education has no effect, while the relatively small differences by age and military experience do not reach statistical significance. In every subgroup of Blacks, strong majorities favor upgrading and civilian job training.

TABLE 3.6

PERCENT SUPPORTING "UPGRADE/JOBTRAIN"
BY RACE, AGE, EDUCATION, AND MILITARY EXPERIENCE

A. WHITES

Military Experience	Education: 0-11 Years, Age 18-20	0-11 Years, Age 35-up	12-20, Age 18-34	12-20, Age 35-up
Nonveterans	61.5% (78)	55.1% (196)	48.3% (350)	32.5% (394)
Veterans	-- (3)	31.3% (48)	22.7% (22)	22.2% (135)

B. BLACKS

Variable	Category	Percent	N
Education	0-11 years	70.5%	(61)
	12-20 years	69.5	(95)
Age	18-34	73.6	(72)
	35-up	66.7	(84)
Military Experience	Nonveteran	71.2	(132)
	Veteran	62.5	(24)

In Summary

Although the educational mission of the Armed Services is not on the front pages of the nation's press nor regularly featured on TV news, almost all American adults have definite opinions, and subgroup differences are strong.

- There is strong support in every subgroup for the proposition that the Armed Services should accept educationally unqualified volunteers and upgrade their basic skills.
- A proposal that the military provide enlisted personnel with job training for postservice civilian occupations splits the adult population about 50-50.

- Blacks, nonveterans, adults who have not completed high school, and persons aged 18-34 are more favorable to job training and upgrading. These differences hold even after controls are applied.

- Civilian job training receives clearcut majority support throughout the Black community, but obtains majorities from whites only among younger or poorly educated nonveterans.

- In short, radical expansion of the military's educational role receives majority support only from those population groups who would most benefit from it--and these are the groups least likely to become audible and influential in a national policy decision.

CHAPTER 4

THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

In addition to its educative role, the military touches the lives of civilians in a number of other concrete ways. Although only a little over 2 million persons out of a 115-million person labor force serve on active duty in the Armed Forces, and 1.5 million in the Guard and Reserve, civilians can be tied to the defense establishment in a variety of ways. These would include, among others:

- Veterans of the Armed Forces
- Recipients of veterans' benefits
- Close kin of service personnel
- Employees of defense suppliers
- Employees of the Department of Defense
- Residents of communities dependent on defense business

Indeed, some commentators have surmised that a pro-military bias will inevitably result from these widespread direct and indirect connections to the military enterprise. According to these critics, interest in industrial profits and civilian jobs will lead the public to favor disproportionate expenditures on military research and production contracts. Such concerns underlay the remarks of President Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell To The Nation address, when he warned of "the potential for the disastrous use of misplaced power" by "the military industrial complex."

A careful scrutiny of this problem leads far beyond the nose-counting of a sample survey--into considerations of political contributions, Congressional appropriations, the intelligence community, corporate tax policies, foreign policy, veterans' organizations, the media, and so on--but it is not amiss to consider a simple count of how many adult Americans have what kinds of ties to the military. Our aims in this chapter are to assess the kinds and patterns of civilian involvement in the military, and whether involvement is related to the person's opinion on military policy issues.

Involvement with the Military

The 1984 GSS included questions on the following items to measure respondents' identification with or attachment to the military:

- Veteran status*
- Military service of members of immediate family
- Pay or benefits from the Veterans' Administration
- Respondent's employment by a defense supplier
- Respondent's civilian employment by Armed Forces or Department of Defense
- Respondent's judgment of the dependence of his community on defense contracts

Table 4.1 summarizes the results.

TABLE 4.1

PROPORTION OF 1984 SURVEY RESPONDENTS WITH VARIOUS ATTACHMENTS TO THE MILITARY

Have ever been on active duty for military training or service for two consecutive months or more ("Veterans")	17%
Have member of immediate family serving in Armed Forces now	14%
Have parent or spouse or child or sibling who has served in Armed Forces	74%
Have member of present household currently receiving pay or benefits from military or Veterans' Administration	10%
Are now working for company where major part of business is selling supplies or services to Armed Forces	3%
Have ever worked for such a company	12%
Are now working on civilian job for Armed Forces or Defense Department	1%
Have ever worked for Defense Department or Armed Services as civilians	6%
Say their metropolitan area or county is very or somewhat dependent on defense business	46%

N = 1,473

*The GSS sample design excludes current Armed Service personnel unless they live off base in a U.S. household. Because most service personnel are under age 30, we must keep in mind this lack of representation in the survey when we examine age differences. However, because there are about 40 million people aged 20-29 and only 2 million in service, inclusion of the latter group would not greatly change our findings.

The above figures are not additive because there is considerable overlap among them. For example, many veterans are included in the group that considers its community to be dependent on defense orders, and many of those receiving military benefits are themselves veterans. The magnitude of some of the figures is nevertheless striking. That almost half of the civilian population believe their community to be at least somewhat dependent on defense business surely represents a powerful deterrent to proposed actions that would reduce military spending. And the fact that three Americans out of four have at some time had an immediate family member in the Armed Forces must certainly make the military one of the most salient of our public institutions.

To get a more precise estimate of the number of Americans who have a direct economic tie to "the military-industrial" complex, we identified those survey respondents who:

> Now work for a company whose main business is defense contracts,
> or now have a civilian job with the Armed Forces or DOD,
> or live in a household where someone receives military or VA benefits,
> or have a member of their immediate family now serving in the military.

Table 4.2 shows these data, by sex and by veteran status, and combined with respondents' perceived dependence of their community on defense business.

TABLE 4.2

PATTERNS OF INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MILITARY

(In Percentages)

Ties to Military*		Men			Women			Total Sample		
Direct Economic Tie	Community Dependence	Veterans	Non-veterans	Total	Veterans	Non-veterans	Total	Veterans	Non-veterans	Total
+	+	7.2	6.2	13.4	0.1	8.9	9.0	3.5	7.8	11.3
+	-	4.6	3.5	8.1	0.8	9.5	10.3	2.0	7.0	9.0
-	+	12.7	23.4	36.1	0.3	33.2	33.5	5.5	29.1	34.6
-	-	15.3	27.2	42.5	0.1	47.1	47.2	6.5	38.8	45.3
	Total =	39.8	60.3	100.1	1.3	98.7	100.0	17.5	82.7	100.2
	N =			(569)			(783)			(1,352)

NOTE:
* + = Direct economic tie
  - = Community perceived as very or somewhat dependent

  - = No Direct economic tie
    = Community perceived as not dependent at all

The top two lines of the table ("Direct Economic" = +) show the distribution of the population with direct economic ties to the military. In the "Total Sample" columns, we find that the top two lines total 20.3 percent, or one-fifth, of the adult civilian population. Overall there are no differences by sex: 21.5 percent of the men and 19.3 percent of the women have direct economic ties. Without regard to sex, veterans (31 percent, not shown) are more likely than nonveterans (18 percent) to have direct economic ties to the military.

The third line of Table 4.2 shows the percent of American civilians who have no personal direct economic ties with the military, but who believe that the economy of their community is at least somewhat dependent on defense business. For the total sample this figure is 34.6 percent. Addition of this sizable segment of the public to the 20.3 percent with direct economic ties to the military indicates that well over half of all Americans (55 percent) perceive some economic involvement with defense, either personally or in the importance of defense contracts to local industry and services.

Looking at these figures in a slightly different way, we can take the 20.3 percent who have direct economic ties to the military and add to them the 12 percent of the population who have no current economic ties to the military but who are veterans of military service (bottom two lines of the table under Total Sample: Veterans). This produces a total of 32.2 percent, or one-third of the civilian population, with a personal tie to the military. Among men, this proportion is half (49.5 percent); among women, it is one-fifth (19.7 percent).

Finally, if we combine all three types of involvement--direct economic ties, perceived dependence of the local economy on defense contracts, and prior personal military service--we find that 61.4 percent of the public have some level of personal or economic attachment to the defense establishment. Only

about a quarter of the men (27.2 percent) and slightly fewer than half of the women (47.1 percent) lack any one of these three ties.

Whichever combination of figures one chooses to concentrate on, it appears that at least one-third and perhaps a majority of U.S. civilian adults have some sort of economic or personal involvement with national defense, to the extent that a sharp change in the level of military expenditures could affect their lives or fortunes.

The Geography of Community Economic Dependency

Our question on the extent to which survey respondents believe their local communities are economically dependent on defense business enables us to examine the distribution of this belief within the four main geographical regions of the U.S. and within communities of various population size. Table 4.3 demonstrates the strong relationship between city size and perceived economic dependence on defense business.

TABLE 4.3

PERCENT WHO BELIEVE THEIR COMMUNITY IS AT LEAST SOMEWHAT DEPENDENT ON DEFENSE BUSINESS, BY SIZE OF PLACE

		Respondent lives in		
SMSA	Size of Central City	Central City	Suburb	Unincorporated Area
Yes	Over 250,000	64% (251)	58% (285)	60% (72)
Yes	50,000-250,000	45% (147)	41% (87)	44% (132)
No	10,000-49,999	39% (97)	NA	NA
No	Under 10,000	20% (304)	NA	NA

NOTES:

NA = Not applicable outside SMSAs.

In classifying city size, the U.S. Census generally designates any place of 50,000 or more population as the central city of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), which also includes the suburbs and unincorporated areas surrounding the central city. Places of under 50,000 population are classified within nonmetropolitan counties. The four rows of Table 4.3 show the responses to our question within four sizes of place: large SMSAs, where the central city contains more than 250,000 inhabitants; other smaller SMSAs; cities with populations of 10,000 to 49,999 and towns with a population of less than 10,000, or open country.

The column of percentages under "Central City" shows extremely large differences in perception of economic dependency on defense. Almost two-thirds of the people living in the central cities of large SMSAs believe that their area is at least somewhat dependent economically on defense business, while just under half (45 percent) of those in smaller central cities hold that view. Outside the metropolitan areas, there is significantly less feeling of dependency upon defense industry: 39 percent of the people living in nonmetropolitan cities of 10,000 or more, and only 20 percent of those living in smaller towns and open country believe their communities are economically dependent on defense.

Looking across the top two rows of Table 4.3, we find only small and insignificant differences within various parts of the SMSAs. Persons living in the suburbs and unincorporated areas surrounding New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and other large metropolitan areas generally share the opinions of their neighbors within the central city. This finding at least partially reflects the fact that our survey question deliberately asked people to respond in terms of the perceived dependence of the metropolitan area or nonmetropolitan county in which they reside, rather than the dependence of their own particular town or neighborhood.

The top panel of Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of attitudes on our question within the four main geographical regions of the U.S., and the two lower panels show how this distribution is affected by city size within the regions. In the top panel the stylized map reveals significantly higher levels of perceived dependence on defense business among residents of the West (53 percent) and South (50 percent) and a significantly lower level in the Midwest or North Central division (37 percent), with the Northeast (44 percent) near the national figure of 46 percent.

The middle panel of Figure 4.1 presents population data that illustrate the varying degrees of urbanization within the four regions. Thus, in the West, 64 percent of the population reside in large metropolitan areas and in the Northeast 55 percent live in the large metropolitan areas. In the North Central region, in contrast, only 41 percent are in the largest places, and in the South only 30 percent. These figures are reversed at the smallest level of population size. In the West and Northeast, only 11 percent and 14 percent, respectively, reside in towns of less than 10,000 population or rural areas. In the North Central division and South, the respective figures are 27 and 28 percent.

It is important to take into account the city size differences shown in Table 4.3, when studying the regional variation in perceived dependence upon defense business. The bottom panel of Figure 4.1 shows the percentages for each region after the figures have been adjusted to standardize the distribution of population by city size. Here we see that the South's percentage is now higher than shown in the unadjusted top panel and that the figure for the West is substantially lower. These changes reflect the differences shown in the middle panel of the figure: more people in the West and fewer in the South reside in large cities; thus, city size largely accounts for the regional differences found in the top panel. The North Central region, in contrast, remains significantly low in its perceived dependence upon defense business.

FIGURE 4.1

REGION, CITY SIZE, AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON MILITARY

A) Percent Believing Community is "Somewhat or Very Dependent"[a]

WEST	NORTH CENTRAL	NORTHEAST
53% + (250)	37% - (394)	44% (275)
	SOUTH 50% + (456)	

N* = 509

B) Population by Size of Place within Region[a]

Size
I = 250,000 +
II = 10,000-249,999
III = Less than 10,000

WEST	NORTH CENTRAL	NORTHEAST
I 64%+ II 26 - III 11 - 101%	I 41% II 32 III 27 + 100%	I 55%+ II 31 III 14 - 100%
	SOUTH I 30%- II 42 + III 28 + 100%	

N* = 172

C) Percent Believing Community is "Somewhat or Very Dependent"--Adjusted Data[a]

WEST	NORTH CENTRAL	NORTHEAST
42%	39% -	40%
	SOUTH 54% +	

N* = 456

NOTE:
[a] + or - = significant at .05 level.

Total = (1,375)

The similarity of opinion in the three non-Southern regions, after adjustment for city size differences, suggests a simple comparison of the South versus all other regions. Table 4.4 presents these data, unadjusted, and provides a convenient summary of the major findings. Among Americans who live in the urban South or in large cities outside the South, 50 percent or more believe their community is at least somewhat dependent on defense business.

TABLE 4.4

REGION, SIZE OF PLACE, AND
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON MILITARY

(Percent Rating Their Community as
"Somewhat or Very Dependent")

Size	Region	
	Other	South
250,000+	59% (473)	67% (135)
10-249,999	38% (272)	50% (191)
Under 10,000	10% (174)	33% (135)

The Composition of Military Involvement

In an effort to understand the characteristics of those Americans who indicate special ties to the military, we examined three measures of military involvement--veteran status, direct economic ties to the military, and perceptions of community dependence upon defense business--in terms of a variety of social, demographic, and ideological variables. The relationships are summarized in Table 4.5.

TABLE 4.5

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN BACKGROUND VARIABLES
AND MEASURES OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

	Nature of Tie to Military		
Background Variable	Veteran	Direct Economic	Community Dependence
Age (4 categories)	307	4,271 NS	9,286 NS
Ethnology Index	4,243 NS	2,653 NS	1,231
Socioeconomic Status	1,154	2,425 NS	6,242 NS
Sex	23	3,630 NS	1,743 NS
Political Party	8,836 NS	45,869 NS	18,875 NS
Liberal-Conservative Ideology	2,214	1,314	14,636 NS
Veteran Status	--	315	2,280 NS
Direct Economic	315	--	558
Community Dependence	2,280 NS	558	--

NOTES:
Numerical entries = N^*, number of cases required for statistical significance
NS = Not significant.

Looking down the last column we see that community dependence on military business is essentially unrelated to background characteristics. This is only to be expected, because most communities have a wide range of social and demographic groups. The item is strongly related to direct economic ties to the military, as it should be if it is a valid measure, and is weakly related to ethnology pattern (race, region of residence at age 16, and religion at age 16). The latter relationship mainly reflects the regional concentration of ethnology groups in the U.S., with Blacks and Southern Protestants more frequently reporting that their communities are dependent upon military business.

The "Veteran" column in Table 4.5, on the other hand, yields a larger number of significant relationships. Veterans are overwhelmingly male (N* = 23), definitely older (N* = 307), somewhat higher in socioeconomic status (N* = 1,154), and slightly more conservative politically (N* = 2,214).

Figure 4.2 charts the percentage of males with military service in the current adult civilian population by year of birth, grouped into five-year cohorts. The distribution is almost bell-shaped, reaching a peak of 75 percent in the cohort of males born 1920-1924. These men reached age 18 around 1940. Despite the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the curve sweeps steadily down on either side of the high point, except for slight bulges for those reaching 18 in 1918 (World War I) and 1966 (Vietnam). The result is that in cohorts born between 1915 and 1940 (approximately), the majority of men entered military service, in striking contrast with those born before or after those dates. As a consequence, the majority of males now aged 40 to 70 are veterans of military service.

The Socioeconomic Status index comprises three variables: education, occupational prestige, and self-rating of relative family income. We have not analyzed these relationships to veteran status in detail, but Table 4.6 reveals some interesting educational differences.

TABLE 4.6

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY AGE AND VETERAN STATUS
(GSS MALES 1982-1984)

PANEL A. Proportion Not Graduating from High School

Age	Nonveteran	Veteran	Difference
20-29	18.1% (426)	16.1% (62)	- 2.0
30-39	16.2% (260)	10.6% (161)	- 5.6
40-59	43.6% (211)	22.2% (320)	-21.4
60-up	59.0% (205)	42.2% (206)	-16.8

PANEL B. Proportion of All High School Graduates with Some College

Age	Nonveteran	Veteran	Difference
20-29	47.8% (349)	42.3% (52)	- 5.5
30-39	67.0% (218)	67.4% (144)	+ 0.4
40-59	56.3% (119)	59.4% (249)	+ 3.1
60-up	54.8% (84)	48.7% (119)	- 6.1

Panel A shows that in all age groups, and particularly among the older men, higher percentages of nonveterans failed to graduate from high school. But Panel B shows that among all high school graduates, there are no large or consistent differences in the proportion of veterans and nonveterans who go on to college. The fact that veterans are more likely to have completed high school but are then no more likely to go on to college probably reflects the service rejection rates for the less educated. Among those who have completed high school, military service does not seem to provide a special spur to higher educational attainment.

While veteran status is not related to political party preference, Table 4.5 showed it to be marginally associated with respondents' self-rating of their political views on a 7-point scale ranging from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative." As shown in Figure 4.3, consistently, since 1974, a higher proportion of veterans than of nonveterans have described themselves as conservative. In the 1984 survey this difference widened to 13 percentage points, with 47 percent of the veterans but only 34 percent of nonveterans reporting their political views to be conservative rather than middle-of-the-road or liberal.

FIGURE 4.2

PERCENT VETERANS BY YEAR OF BIRTH
(MALES, GSS 1982-1984)



FIGURE 4.3

PERCENT "CONSERVATIVE"
(GSS Surveys, 1972-1984)



On closer analysis, however, it is evident that the greater political conservatism of veterans is not a function of their military service, but derives rather from other characteristics of this group. Veterans, for example, are overwhelmingly male, and men are more likely than women to rate their political views as conservative. As a group, male veterans are also older and better educated than nonveteran males, and older men and high school graduates are more likely to describe themselves as political conservatives. Thus, when we compare men of equivalent age and education, the 13-point difference between veterans and nonveterans shown for 1984 in Figure 4.3 drops to 0.5 percentage points; that is, it disappears. The apparent tendency for veterans to be more conservative is totally explained by their sex, age, and education.

Beyond veteran status and community dependence, our third measure of military involvement is direct ties to the military, either through personal employment in defense work, receipt of veterans' benefits by a member of the household, or having a member of the respondent's immediate family currently in military service. Table 4.5 shows that this variable is essentially unrelated to age, ethnic type, socioeconomic status, sex, or political party, but is significantly associated, as we might expect, with veteran status and with community dependence upon defense business, and also with attitudes on the liberal-conservative scale. The only clue to the nature of this latter relationship that we have found is shown in Table 4.7.

TABLE 4.7

PROPORTION "CONSERVATIVE" BY SEX, VETERAN STATUS, AND DIRECT TIES TO MILITARY

Sex	Veteran		Direct Ties to Military: Yes	Direct Ties to Military: No	Difference
Male	Yes	45.7%	45.5% (67)	+ 0.2 (156)	
Male	No	42.0%	36.3% (50)	+ 5.7 (272)	
Female	No	43.6%	30.6% (143)	+13.0 (647)	

Leaving aside the 11 female veterans in our 1984 sample, Table 4.7 shows us again that veterans, as a group, are more "conservative" in their political views than nonveterans. But among male veterans, whether or not they have direct ties to the military makes no difference in their propensity to describe themselves as conservative. Among nonveteran males, the difference is relatively small (5.7 percentage points), but among women, almost all of whom are nonveterans, 43.6 percent of those with direct ties to the military call themselves conservatives, in contrast to only 30.6 percent of those without such ties. Possibly civilian exposure to the military increases conservatism only among those groups (such as perhaps women) with fewer other channels of information about the subject; but this is only conjecture.

Military Ties and Opinions on Defense Policies and Issues

The previous sections of this chapter have shown that substantial portions of American society either have direct economic or personal ties to the military or believe that their community is at least somewhat dependent upon defense business. This segment of the population, which could range from one quarter to one half or more of the total, constitutes potential mass support for a "military-industrial complex." But its significance greatly depends upon the attitudes that these people hold, as a result of or in spite

of their ties to the military. Certainly, if exposure to or dependence upon the military led one to be suspicious and hostile toward it, distrustful of its leaders, or pacifist in international matters, civilian ties to the military would hardly threaten civilian control of the military. Table 4.8 summarizes the relationships between involvement with the military and attitudes toward defense policies and issues.

TABLE 4.8

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY TIES AND OPINIONS ON DEFENSE POLICIES AND ISSUES

	Nature of Tie to Military		
Opinions on:	Veteran	Direct Economic	Community Dependence
Nuclear futures	16,042 NS	6,004 NS	10,591 NS
Land war	5,777 NS	1,694 NS	23,440 NS
Level of military spending	1,725 NS	525 NS	2,972 NS
Level of confidence in military	9,167 NS	1,583 NS	1,086 NS
Quality of military personnel	766	28,907 NS	41,966 NS
Value of military service for men	51	434	3,858 NS
Resumption of draft	117	442	1,212
National service for men	201	744	5,461
Volunteer army	244	25,852 NS	7,575 NS

NOTES:
Numerical entries = N*, number of cases required for statistical significance.

NS = Not significant.

The story in Table 4.8 is clear. Civilian ties to the military, whether because of personal prior military service, direct economic ties, or community dependence on defense business, are essentially unrelated to "big picture" military matters, such as expectations of nuclear or ground war, confidence in military leaders, and attitudes toward military spending. But military ties, especially personal ones, have a distinct effect on opinions about the draft and national service. Veterans and those with direct economic ties to the military are significantly more favorable to a peacetime draft and to national service for men. Table 4.9 shows very clearly how support for a peacetime draft grows with increasing ties to the military.

TABLE 4.9

PROPORTION FAVORING PEACETIME DRAFT FOR MEN
BY TIES TO MILITARY (MEN ONLY)

Personal Ties of the Military			Perceived Level of Community Dependence		
Veteran	Direct Economic		High	Low	Total
+	+	50.0%	46.2% (40)	48.5% (26)	(66)
+	-	45.7%	38.4% (70)	41.7% (86)	(156)
-	+	23.5%	30.0% (34)	25.9% (20)	(54)
-	-	19.5%	14.3% (128)	16.7% (154)	(212)

The final column under "Total" shows that almost half (48.5 pecent) of all male veterans who also have direct economic ties with the military (defense job, veterans' benefit, or family member now in Armed Forces) support a peacetime draft. The level of support drops 7 points among veterans without direct ties. Among nonveterans with direct ties, about one-fourth (25.9 percent) favor a peacetime draft, while among nonveterans without direct ties, only 16.7 percent support the draft.

When community dependence on defense business is introduced (middle columns, Table 4.9), we see that 50 percent of those with all three ties to the military--that is, veterans with direct economic ties and high community dependence on defense business--support the draft, compared to 14.3 percent of those who lack any of these ties. Indeed, in 1984, the only nontrivial support of a peacetime draft was provided by those groups with personal ties to the military, especially veterans.

The effect of veteran status on attitudes toward the draft is so strong that it completely explains the large age differences in draft attitudes among men. Table 4.10 summarizes.

TABLE 4.10

SUPPORT FOR PEACETIME DRAFT BY AGE
MEN ONLY

Comparison	Raw Data	Adjusted for Veteran Status
Age 20-29 versus 30-up	-15.73	- 1.14
Age 30-39 versus Others	+ 1.59	+ 3.65
Age 40-59 versus Others	+ 8.39	- 3.54
Age 60-up versus 20-59	+ 6.34	+ 1.87

NOTE:
Cell entry = Percentage difference.

The raw data from the 1984 survey show the youngest adults (aged 20-29) to be heavily opposed to a peacetime draft (only 17.9 percent favor it), while among men 30 and older, 33.6 percent support a draft--a difference of 15.73 percentage points. But this is entirely due to the low percentage of veterans in the youngest group. When the data are adjusted so that every age group has the same proportion of veterans, the difference shrivels to 1.14 percentage points. Such an adjustment of the data also affects the 40-59 age group, which is the most favorable to the draft and also contains the largest proportion of veterans. When controlling for veterans status, we find that the 40-59 age group actually becomes less supportive of the draft than are other ages.

Summary

Although only one American civilian in twenty-five works directly for a defense supplier or for the military, a majority of the population have some kind of personal involvement with national defense. In addition to the 4 percent who are employed by the Department of Defense or a defense supplier, 16 percent of the civilian public report some kind of direct economic dependence; they live in a household where someone receives military or VA benefits, or they have an immediate family member currently serving in the Armed Forces.

To this 20 percent who have direct economic ties to the military, we may add another 35 percent of the public who have no direct economic stake in the military but who believe that their local community is very dependent or somewhat dependent upon defense business. To complete the picture, we can also add 6 percent of the civilian population who have no direct or community dependence on defense, but who are veterans of the Armed Forces and who perhaps follow defense policy issues with some attention. The sum of all these groups constitutes a majority of 61 percent of the American public and would thus seem to provide a solid nucleus for a "military-industrial complex" to flourish.

The data have shown that community dependence on defense business is concentrated in the big cities, where almost two-thirds of the public think their area is dependent, and in the South, where the proportion is 50 percent. Perceptions of community dependence are unrelated to respondents' personal characteristics, such as age, sex, socioeconomic status, and political preference.

Veterans have distinct social and personal characteristics. Almost all of them are male, they are concentrated in the ages over 40, and they are better educated in the sense that a significantly larger proportion of them have completed high school. Though they are more likely to rate themselves as politically conservative, the difference is explained by their age, sex, and education.

Although a majority of adult Americans report some kind of personal or community economic dependence upon defense, these involvements seem to have no effects upon attitudes toward the military. Our survey did not cover a wide range of defense and foreign policy issues, but respondents with ties to the military did not differ from those without such ties on subjects like expectations of future armed conflict, confidence in military leaders, or the

level of military spending. The sole exception was in attitudes toward military personnel policies, where veterans in particular are much more likely to support a peacetime draft. Because veterans will probably represent a declining proportion of the population in future years and decades, and because direct or indirect economic ties to the military have not yet demonstrated that they affect opinions on defense issues, we may conclude that the influence of a potential "military-industrial complex" is not likely to have serious impact on policy in the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER 5

PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS OF MILITARY FUTURES

The previous chapter explored the possibility that expectations of various economic benefits would create a strong pro-military bias in the population. In this chapter we will consider the influence of more elusive expectations--those that involve visualizations of America's future in world affairs. One might reasonably assume that expectations of the military future would influence public attitudes toward military policy. For example, one would expect that those who foresee universal disarmament in the near future would see little reason for a military draft, as would those who see a likely prospect of nuclear obliteration. The 1984 survey included a battery of questions that allow us to determine:

- What military futures seem most likely to Americans?
- How do various population subgroups differ in their expectations?
- Are these expectations related to attitudes on military policy?

Expectations

Our questionnaire asked people to rate six military possibilities for the next ten years on a numerical scale ranging from 1 ("won't happen") to 7 ("certain to happen"). The six scenarios were described as follows:

- "An all-out atomic war" (ATOMIC WAR)
- "A conventional ground war involving thousands of troops" (GROUND WAR)
- "Peace but increasing arms buildup by the U.S. and Russia" (BUILDUP)
- "An agreement with the Russians to reduce atomic arms by both sides" (REDUCE ATOMIC WEAPONS)
- "Elimination of atomic weapons by both U.S. and Russia" (ELIMINATE ATOMIC WEAPONS)

- "Repeated guerrilla wars against left-wing rebels" (GUERRILLA WARS)

Figure 5.1 summarizes the distributions, with the items arrayed from left to right in terms of our judgment of their relative "optimism". The top panel shows the means; in the middle panel are the proportions giving answers 5-6-7 (more likely than unlikely), and the bottom panel displays standard deviations (all about the same).

There appears to be consensus that . . .

- Guerrilla wars are to be expected (74 percent rated them 5-6-7; the mean is 5.4).
- Elimination of atomic weapons is very unlikely (only 9 percent rate this 5-6-7; the mean is 2.0).

The other four possibilities all fall within one point of the equiprobable value 4.

- A ground war and an arms buildup: each is seen as having a bit more than a 50-50 chance.
- Atomic war and reduction of atomic weapons: each is seen as having somewhat less than a 50-50 chance.

The overall picture is hardly one of blithe optimism; indeed, it is largely pessimistic. Three unpalatable situations (continued guerrilla wars, increased arms build-up, and large scale ground war) are respectively seen as more likely than not. The elimination of atomic weapons is considered very unlikely. As for all-out atomic war, only 7 percent rated it 7 (certain to happen), but 22 percent rated it 5-7 (more likely than not), 41 percent rated it 4-7 (logically equivalent to 50-50 or greater), and 77 percent chose something other than "won't happen." It is important to emphasize that there is no evidence here of atomic jitters or panic, but in general the public seems to be expecting the military situation to get worse rather than better.

FIGURE 5.1

PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS OF MILITARY POSSIBILITIES



We can gain further insight into these same numbers by looking at the pattern of answers to the four items on nuclear futures. After combining REDUCE ATOMIC WEAPONS and ELIMINATE ATOMIC WEAPONS into a single item (scored + if the respondent answered "likely," 4-5-6-7, on either), we get the typology shown in Table 5.1.

> Type I, 20 percent of the total, expect a reduction or elimination of atomic weapons and do not expect atomic war.
>
> Type II, 26 percent of the total, do not expect reduction, elimination, or increase of atomic weapons, nor do they expect atomic war. Presumably, they expect continuation of the status quo.
>
> Type III, 36 percent of the total, expect further arms buildup but do not expect the extremes of reduction, elimination, or atomic war.
>
> Type IV, 18 percent of the total, expect an atomic war within the decade and do not expect either reduction or elimination of atomic weapons.

Table 5.1

ATOMIC FUTURES TYPOLOGY

Type	REDUCE or ELIMINATE	ARMS BUILDUP	ATOMIC WAR	Percent	Label
I	+	+ OR -	-	19.9%	Reduce
II	-	-	-	26.2%	Status quo
III	-	+	-	35.7%	Buildup
IV	-	+ or -	+	18.2%	Atomic War

NOTES:

+ = 5-7

- = 1-4

N = 1,318. Excludes 21 respondents + on REDUCE or ELIMINATE, and + on ATOMIC WAR, and 134 Don't Know or No Answer on any of the items.

To provide a more complete picture, Table 5.2 cross-tabulates this typology against expectations of GROUND WAR. The table demonstrates that

Americans' expectations of the military future are all over the map, with no group accounting for more than 18 percent of the total. But putting the numbers together in various ways again suggests a rather pessimistic view:

55 percent think a ground war or atomic war is likely

73 percent think a ground war or atomic war or atomic arms buildup are likely

88 percent do not expect both a reduction of atomic weapons and avoiding of ground war

TABLE 5.2

EXPECTATIONS OF GROUND WAR,
BY ATOMIC FUTURES (Percentage)

Possibility of Ground War	Expectation of Future				
	REDUCE	STATUS QUO	BUILDUP	ATOMIC WAR	Total
Not likely (1-4)	12.1	15.0	18.2	6.5	51.9
Likely (5-7)	7.6	11.1	17.6	11.7	48.1
Total	19.7	26.1	35.8	18.2	100.0

Who Expects What?

To see how the major social groupings of the population sort out on these issues, we tabulated expectations of GROUND WAR and the ATOMIC FUTURES typology against the following variables:

Age, in four groups

Ethnology in eight groups combining Race, Region, Religion

Socioeconomic Status, an index combining Education, Occupational Prestige, and self-rating of family income relative to average

Sex

The results are summarized in Table 5.3, where the N^* statistic is used to summarize the significance of a large number of relationships. N^* is an adjusted value of Chi Square which indicates the number of cases necessary to

make the association statistically significant after allowing for a design effect of 1.5. As a rule of thumb, values under 1,000 should be taken seriously, and values under 500 represent quite strong relationships.

TABLE 5.3

CORRELATES OF MILITARY EXPECTATIONS

Predictor	Expectation of GROUND WAR	Expectation of ATOMIC FUTURES
Age	510	980
Sex	840	2,096 NS
Ethnology	3,570 NS	1,270 NS
Socioeconomic	2,222 NS	530

NOTES:
Numerical entries = N*, number of cases required for statistical significance.
NS = Chi Square is not statistically significant at .05 level.

For GROUND WAR, the results are simple: Age and Sex make a difference, Ethnology and SES do not. Younger adult are distinctly less optimistic about the chances of avoiding a conventional ground war in the next decade. As shown in Figure 5.2, below age 40, between 50 to 60 percent of Americans rate a land war as more likely than not (ratings 5-7). Above age 40, the values fluctuate around 40 percent. For the bulk of our analyses of these data, the most salient characteristics of young people are their higher levels of education and their lower probability of being veterans; but since neither SES (N^* = 2,222) nor Veteran Status (N^* = 1,763) is significantly related to expectations of GROUND WAR, neither is a likely explainer.

At each age level, men are less optimistic than women about the chances of avoiding GROUND WAR, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Under age 40, 60 percent of the men and 54 percent of the women think conventional land war is likely in the next decade. Over age 40, slightly fewer than half the men and only 38 percent of the women believe it to be likely. Various possible explanations of these age and sex differences suggest themselves, but the limitations of our data preclude any further investigation.

FIGURE 5.2

PERCENT SAYING GROUND WAR IS LIKELY, BY AGE
(Scale Choices 5-6-7)



Turning to ATOMIC FUTURES, the data presented in Table 5.3 reveal that the main correlates are Age and Socioeconomic Status. As with GROUND WAR, younger adults are generally more pessimistic, whereas High SES adults seem more likely to expect atomic BUILDUP. Because young people are better educated but not higher on occupation and income, and because the three components of SES sometimes work in separate directions, we have examined the independent contributions of (1) Age, (2) Educational Attainment (0-11, 12, 13+ years), and (3) an SES index (SES2) that scores only Occupational Prestige and Rating of Family Income. The data summarized in Figure 5.4 have been standardized, so that Age, Education, and SES2 are unrelated. This is logically identical to finding the partial effect of each, with the others controlled. The figure shows the results. Each page treats a separate variable, the first page showing the effect of Age on ATOMIC FUTURES.

The vertical axis is the difference for that category versus all the others. Thus, Figure 5.4a shows how young adults (those aged 20-29) compare with the rest of us in terms of the four atomic futures. The value -4.2 at the left of that chart tells us that young adults are 4.2 percentage points lower than the rest of the population in expecting reduction of atomic arms; the 11.9 at the right says they are 11.9 percentage points higher in expecting ATOMIC WAR. The dots represent the values after adjustment--that is, with the other variables controlled. A box around the dot means the difference is statistically significant at the .05 level.

FIGURE 5.3

PERCENT SAYING GROUND WAR IS LIKELY,
BY AGE AND SEX
(Scale Choices 5-6-7)



FIGURE 5.4a

CORRELATE OF ATOMIC FUTURES TYPOLOGY--AGE



FIGURE 5.4b

CORRELATE OF ATOMIC FUTURES TYPOLOGY--EDUCATION



FIGURE 5.4c

CORRELATE OF ATOMIC FUTURES TYPOLOGY--SES



Looking at the findings on Age, we observe that:

> Young adults, those 20-29, are significantly more pessimistic about ATOMIC WAR--controlling for their Education and SES2.
>
> Adults 30-39 do not differ significantly from the general population, but the nonsignificant trend is in a pessimistic direction.
>
> Middle-aged adults (40-59) are relatively optimistic. They are 7 percentage points higher in expecting REDUCTION and 7 points lower in expecting ATOMIC WAR (both significant).
>
> The older population (aged 60-up) is significantly less likely to foresee ATOMIC WAR, but not otherwise much different from the general population.

Notice that the significant differences are at the extreme outcomes. The age groups don't differ much on STATUS QUO or BUILDUP. The big difference is that young adults are more likely to expect ATOMIC WAR than REDUCTION, while the opposite holds among the older age groups. The difference is easily seen in the raw data shown in Table 5.4.

TABLE 5.4

ATOMIC FUTURES BY AGE

	Expect				
Age	REDUCE	STATUS QUO OR BUILDUP	ATOMIC WAR	Total	N
20-29	17%	58	25	100%	303
30-39	15%	67	18	100%	298
40-59	23%	62	14	100%	355
60-up	21%	66	13	100%	269

The pattern for Educational Attainment (Figure 5.4b) is a bit different. Controlling for Age and SES, schooling's impact is centered on the expectation of BUILDUP. The higher the educational level, the more likely one

is to expect "Peace but increasing arms buildup by the U.S. and Russia," and the less likely to expect any of the other possibilities. Table 5.5 clearly shows the relationship in the raw data.

TABLE 5.5

PERCENT EXPECTING ATOMIC ARMS BUILDUP
BY YEARS OF EDUCATION

Years of Education	Expect BUILDUP	N
0-8	19%	123
9-11	28	215
12	33	449
13-15	42	284
16	49	136
17-up	46	110

Again, our survey data do not permit detailed investigation of the causes of this relationship.

Figure 5.4c shows the effect of SES2 (Occupation and Income, net of Age and Education). The differences here combine the two patterns we have seen above: the higher the SES2 level, the greater the expectation of BUILDUP and the lower the expectation of ATOMIC WAR. The finding is rather interesting sociologically, as occupation and income seldom have a strong impact on opinions and attitudes once education is controlled.

The findings may be summarized as follows:

REDUCE: Middle-aged adults (40-59) are the only social grouping that stands out. Net of education and SES2, they are more optimistic about reducing atomic weaponry.

BUILDUP: The higher the education and the higher the occupation and income (SES2), the more likely an individual is to adopt an attitude of "grim realism"--increasing arms buildup but no atomic war.

ATOMIC WAR: Young adults (aged 20-29) and lower SES2 respondents are significantly more pessimistic about avoiding nuclear war. In neither case can the differences be explained by educational attainment.

Expectations and Other Attitudes

As Table 5.6 demonstrates, the story here is a simple one. Public expectations of war and peace are almost totally unrelated to attitudes toward the other military issues included in our survey.

TABLE 5.6

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS OF WAR AND PEACE AND ATTITUDES TO OTHER MILITARY ISSUES

	Expectations of:	
Other Military Issues	GROUND WAR	ATOMIC FUTURES
Level of military spending	1,388 NS	1,146 NS
Level of confidence in military leaders	9,708 NS	1,090 NS
Quality of military personnel	15,863 NS	11,059 NS
Involvement of U.S. in world affairs	1,700 NS	1,031
Value of military service to men	99,999 NS	5,838 NS
Resumption of draft	5,764 NS	21,000 NS
National Service for men	10,186 NS	3,024 NS
Volunteer army	14,611 NS	3,688 NS

NOTES:
Numerical entries = N*, number of cases required for statistical significance.

NS = Not significant.

Of the sixteen associations, only one is statistically significant at the .05 level. Our measure of Isolationism does have a small significant association with ATOMIC FUTURES. Predictably, those who say "The U.S. should stay out of world affairs" are a few points higher in expecting ATOMIC WAR, and those who say "The U.S. should take an active part in world affairs" are a few points higher on BUILDUP.

It is not that Americans lack opinions on future military possibilities or on domestic military issues. Our survey data show that they have definite opinions in both areas, but the two do not seem to be related psychologically.

Summary

American adults in midwinter 1984 did not seem to have atomic jitters. Only 22 percent felt an atomic war is more likely than not in the next ten years. But they are hardly optimistic: half expect a large-scale ground war, and only 20 percent expect a reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons. The modal expectation is what might be called "grim realism"--anticipation of a nuclear arms race but not atomic war.

In terms of social characteristics, young adults, especially those aged 20-29, are relatively pessimistic about the chances of avoiding future ground wars and even atomic war. Women are relatively pessimistic about ground war, but not nuclear war. The more highly educated are more likely to foresee an arms buildup but not an atomic war. The low occupational and income groups are relatively pessimistic about atomic war.

Anticipation of future land wars or of various nuclear futures are almost totally unrelated to attitudes toward the military in general or military manpower issues in particular.

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APPENDIX A

MILITARY QUESTIONS ON THE GSS

GSS
MILITARY ATTITUDES SUPPLEMENT

NORC

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

5183

FEBRUARY 1984

BEGIN DECK 23

CASE #

01-06/

RANDOM PROBE QUESTION

TO BE USED ONLY WITH SCIENTIFICALLY SELECTED RESPONDENT

TIME INTERVIEW BEGAN: _____ AM PM

07-08/

09/

CONFIDENTIAL

(MAS 5153)

The first of these questions is . . .

1. A. How would you feel about a program that required all young men to give one year of service to the nation--either in the military or in non-military work such as in hospitals or with elderly people? Would you strongly favor it, probably favor it, probably oppose it, or strongly oppose it?

Strongly favor.....1* 10/
Probably favor.....2*
Probably oppose.....3
Strongly oppose.....4 MESERVE
DON'T KNOW.....8

B. And how would you feel about such a program for all young women? Would you strongly favor it, probably favor it, probably oppose it, or strongly oppose it?

Strongly favor.....1* 11/
Probably favor.....2*
Probably oppose.....3
Strongly oppose.....4 FESERVE
DON'T KNOW.....8

C. INTERVIEWER CHECK: IN Q. 1 DID RESPONDENT STRONGLY FAVOR (CODE 1) OR PROBABLY FAVOR (CODE 2) SERVICE FOR EITHER MEN OR WOMEN?

YES (GO TO Q.2).....1 12/
NO (SKIP TO Q.3).....2

---

2. And suppose that the costs of such a program made it necessary to increase your taxes by a small amount--for example, 5 percent. Would you strongly favor it, probably favor it, probably oppose it, or strongly oppose it?

Strongly favor.....1 13/
Probably favor.....2
Probably oppose.....3
Strongly oppose.....4 TAXSERVE
DON'T KNOW.....8

---

3. As you know, this country stopped the military draft in 1972. Since that time we have relied on volunteers. Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about our armed forces.

How would you rate the quality of the men and women now serving in the armed forces--Would you say the quality of personnel is excellent, good, not so good, or poor? (Just your own opinion based on what you've heard or read.)

Excellent.....1 14/
Good.....2
Not so good.....3
Poor.....4 MILQUAL
DON'T KNOW.....8

4. A. At the present time, about 9 percent of the armed forces are women. All things considered, do you think there are too many women in the armed forces, about the right number, or should there be more women in the armed forces?

Too many women.....1		15/
About right number.....2		
Should be more.....3	FENUMOK	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

B. At the present time, about 4 percent of the armed forces are Hispanics. All things considered, do you think there are too many Hispanics in the armed forces, about the right number, or should there be more Hispanics in the armed forces?

Too many Hispanics.....1		16/
About right number.....2		
Should be more.....3	HINUMOK	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

C. At the present time, about 22 percent of the armed forces are Black. All things considered, do you think there are too many Blacks in the armed forces, about the right number, or should there be more Blacks in the armed forces?

Too many Blacks (ASK 1).....1		17/
About right number.....2		
Should be more (ASK 1).....3	BLNUMOK	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

1) IF TOO MANY BLACKS OR SHOULD BE MORE:
Why do you feel there (are too many/should be more) Blacks in the armed forces? RECORD VERBATIM

18-19/
20-21/
22-23/

---

5. All things considered, how well do you think relying on volunteers has worked for the armed forces--has it worked very well, fairly well, or not well?

Very well.....1		24/
Fairly well.....2		
Not well.....3	MILVOLOK	
Don't know.....8		

6. A. Thinking about opportunities and equal treatment for minority groups, like Blacks and Hispanics. Would you say that their treatment and opportunities are better in the military, better in civilian employment, or that there isn't any difference these days?

Better in the military.....1	25/	
Better in civilian employment.....2		
No difference.....3	MINMILOP	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

B. And what about women? Would you say that their treatment and opportunities are better in the military, better in civilian employment, or that there isn't any difference these days?

Better in the military.....1	26/	
Better in civilian employment.....2		
No difference.....3	FEMILOP	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

---

7. Do you think we should return to a military draft at this time, or should we continue to rely on volunteers?

Return to draft (ASK A).....1	27/
Rely on volunteers (ASK B)....2	
DON'T KNOW (ASK B).....8	DRAFT

A. IF RETURN TO DRAFT, ASK:
If we should return to a military draft at this time, should young women be drafted as well as young men, or not?

Should.....1	28/
Should not.....2	
DON'T KNOW.....8	DRAFTFE

GO TO Q. 8

B. IF RELY ON VOLUNTEERS OR DON'T KNOW, ASK:
If there were a national emergency, do you think we should return to a military draft or should we continue to rely on volunteers?

Return to draft (ASK C).....1	29/
Volunteers (GO TO Q. 8).....2	
DON'T KNOW (GO TO Q. 8).....8	DRAFTEM

C. IF DRAFT ON "B", ASK:
If we should return to a military draft in a national emergency, should young women be drafted as well as young men, or not?

Should.....1	30/
Should not.....2	
DON'T KNOW.....8	DRAFTFEM

8. Even though they are no longer drafted for military service, young men are still required by law to register for the draft when they become 18 years old. If a young man refuses to register for the draft, do you think he should be punished in any way?

Yes (ASK A).....1	31/	
No (GO TO Q. 9).....2		
DON'T KNOW.....8	COPUNISH	

IF YES

A. If a young man refuses to register for the draft, would you approve or disapprove of sending him to jail?

Approve.....1	32/	
Disapprove.....2		
DON'T KNOW.....8	COJAIL	

---

9. A. For most young men, do you think military service is definitely a good experience, probably a good experience, probably not a good experience, or definitely not a good experience for them?

Definitely good.....1	33/	
Probably good.....2		
Probably not good.....3		
Definitely not good.....4	MILOKME	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

B. How about for most young women, do you think military service is definitely a good experience, probably a good experience, probably not a good experience, or definitely not a good experience for them?

Definitely good.....1	34/	
Probably good.....2		
Probably not good.....3		
Definitely not good.....4	MILOKFE	
DON'T KNOW.....8		

---

10. Many people who want to volunteer for service in the armed forces do not have the necessary basic skills like reading, writing and arithmetic. Do you think the armed forces should refuse to accept such volunteers, or should they accept them and give them the necessary education?

Refuse to accept them.....1	35/	
Accept and educate them.....2		
DON'T KNOW.....8	UPGRADE	

---

11. Most people in the Armed Forces are taught skills they can use in civilian jobs later. But some don't get such training. They are taught only combat skills. Do you think the Armed Forces have an obligation to train everybody in service for civilian jobs later, or is that not a responsibility of the Armed Forces.

Yes, an obligation.....1	36/	
No, not an obligation.....2		
DON'T KNOW.....8	JOBTRAIN	

12. Do you think it would be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?

Active part.....1 37/
Stay out.....2
DON'T KNOW.....8 USINTL

---

13. I'm going to read you some possible military situations the U.S. might face in the next ten years. (HAND CARD A) Some people feel these situations are certain to happen (think of these as point 7 on the scale), others think these situations won't happen at all (think of these as point 1 on the scale). And of course some people have opinions somewhere in between. For each of these possible military situations, please give me your best guess as to how likely it is to happen.

For example, an all-out atomic war. Where would you put the likelihood of an all-out atomic war during the next ten years? (Would you say 7-it is certain to happen, 1-it won't happen at all, or something in between?) (CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR "A" AND REPEAT FOR B-F)

HAND CARD A		Won't Happen						Certain to Happen	DON'T KNOW	
A.	An all-out atomic war?	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	98	38-39/ NUKEWAR
B.	A conventional ground war involving thousands of troops?	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	98	40-41/ LANDWAR
C.	Peace but increasing arms build up by the U.S. and Russia?	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	98	42-43/ MORENUKE
D.	An agreement with the Russians to reduce atomic arms by both sides?	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	98	44-45/ LESSNUKE
E.	Elimination of atomic weapons by both U.S. and Russia?	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	98	46-47/ NONUKE
F.	Repeated guerilla wars against left wing rebels?	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	98	48-49/ GUERILLA

14. Have you ever been on active duty for military training or service for two consecutive months or more?

Yes (ASK A & B).....	1	50/
No (GO TO Q. 15).....	2	VETYEARS

IF YES

A. What was your total time on active duty?

Less that 2 years.....	1	51/
2-4 years.....	2	
More than 4 years.....	3	VETKIND

B. In what branch of the service was that?

Air Force Guard.....	01	52-53/
Air Force (including reserve).....	02	54-55/
Navy (including reserve).....	03	56-57/
Army (including reserve).....	04	58-59/
National Guard.....	05	60-61/
U.S. Marine Corps (including reserve)..	06	62-63/
Coast Guard (including reserve).....	07	64-65/

---

15. Have any members of your immediate family--that is, your spouse, parents, children, brothers or sisters--ever served in the armed forces?

Yes (ASK A).....	1	66/
No.....	2	VETFAM

IF YES

A. Are any other members of your immediate family serving in the Armed Forces now?

Yes.....	1	67/
No.....	2	VETFAMNW

---

16. Are you or any members of your present household currently receiving any pay or benefits from either the military or the Veterans Administration?

Yes.....	1	68/
No.....	2	
DON'T KNOW.....	8	VETAID

---

17. Have you ever worked for a company where a major part of their business was selling supplies or services to the armed forces?

Yes (ASK A).....	1	69/
No.....	2	DEFWRKEV

IF YES:

A. Do you work for such a company now?

Yes.....	1	70/
No.....	2	DEFWRKNW

18. Have you ever had a civilian job with the armed forces or the Defense Department?

Yes (ASK A).....	1	71/
No.....	2	MILWRKEV

IF YES:

A. Do you have a job now with the armed forces or with the Defense Department?

Yes.....	1	72/
No.....	2	MILWRKNW

---

19. Would you say the economy of (NAME METROPOLITAN AREA OR COUNTY) is very dependent on defense business, somewhat dependent, or not dependent at all on defense business?

Very dependent.....	1	73/
Somewhat dependent.....	2	
Not dependent at all....	3	
DON'T KNOW.....	8	RESDEFWK

20. And one last question. We all know that American citizens have certain rights. For example, they have the right to free public education and to police protection, the right to attend religious services of their choice, and the right to elect public officials.

I'd like to ask now about certain obligations that some people feel American citizens owe their country. I just want your own opinion on these--whether you feel it is a very important obligation, a somewhat important obligation, or not an obligation that a citizen owes to the country. (READ EACH STATEMENT AND CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH.)

	(REPEAT ANSWER CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY)	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not an Obligation	DON'T KNOW	
OBVOTE	A. First, to vote in elections.	1	2	3	8	07/
OBVOL	B. How about volunteering some time to community services?	1	2	3	8	08/
OBJURY	C. How about serving on a jury if called?	1	2	3	8	09/
OB911	D. Reporting a crime that he or she may have witnessed	1	2	3	8	10/
OBENG	E. How about being able to speak and understand English?	1	2	3	8	11/
OBKNOW	F. Keeping fully informed about news and public issues?	1	2	3	8	12/
OBMEPAX	G. How about, for young men, serving in the military during peacetime?	1	2	3	8	13/
OBMEWAR	H. For young men, serving in the military when the country is at war?	1	2	3	8	14/
OBFEPAX	I. For young women, serving in the military during peacetime?	1	2	3	8	15/
OBFEWAR	J. For young women, serving in the military when the country is at war?	1	2	3	8	16/

TIME INTERVIEW ENDED _____ AM PM 17-18/ 19/

APPENDIX B

CODEBOOK FOR ITEMS IN THE MILITARY SUPPLEMENT TO THE GSS

CODEBOOK FOR ITEMS IN THE MILITARY ATTITUDES SUPPLEMENTS
TO THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, 1982-1984

The following tables show the raw frequency data for each "punch" for each of the items included in the 1982 and 1984 Military Attitudes Supplements.

Some of these items were also asked in 1983 as part of the regular GSS questionnaire.

The first item below ("page 2" at right) is VETYEARS: Number of Years in Armed Forces. This item was asked in all three years. The first column shows the 1982 data, the middle column 1983, and the third column 1984. Outside the boxes, under "Row Total," are the combined figures for all three years.

For each response category, the number answering is shown (N), and below that the percentage who gave that response. Note that NA (No Answer), DK (Don't Know) and NAP (Not Applicable) figures are never included in the percentage base.

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF VETYEARS YEARS IN ARMED FORCES BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

VETYEARS		YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
NONE	0	1246	1301	1205	3751
		82.9	81.5	83.4	82.6
LESS THAN 2 YRS	1	52	58	50	160
		3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5
2 TO 4 YEARS	2	159	181	136	476
		10.6	11.3	9.4	10.5
MORE THAN 4 YRS	3	45	56	54	155
		3.0	3.5	3.7	3.4
NA	9	5M	3M	28M	36M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1501	1596	1445	4542
		33.0	35.1	31.8	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 36

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

VETXING BRANCH OF SERVICE — CROSSTABULATION OF — BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

VETXING	COUNT / COL PCT	82I	83I	84I	ROW TOTAL
SEVERAL	0	1 .4	3 1.0	4 1.7	8 1.0
AIR FORCE GUARD	1		1 .3		1 .1
AIR FORCE	2	37 14.3	51 17.3	40 16.5	128 16.1
NAVY	3	44 17.1	70 23.7	48 19.8	162 20.4
ARMY	4	148 57.4	137 46.4	118 48.8	403 50.7
NATIONAL GUARD	5	8 3.1	5 1.7	5 2.1	18 2.3
MARINES	6	16 6.2	23 7.8	25 10.3	64 8.1
COAST GUARD	7	3 1.2	5 1.7	2 .8	10 1.3
PUBLIC HEALTH	8	1 .4			1 .1
NAP	-1	1245M	1301M	1205M	3751M .0
NA	9	3M	3M	26M	32M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	258 32.5	295 37.1	242 30.4	795 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3783

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

USINTL TAKE ACTIVE PART IN WORLD AFFAIRS — CROSSTABULATION OF — BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

USINTL	COUNT / COL PCT	82I	83I	84I	ROW TOTAL
ACTIVE PART	1	920 64.2	1038 68.0	942 69.2	2900 67.1
STAY OUT	2	512 35.8	488 32.0	419 30.8	1419 32.9
DK	8	69M	66M	58M	223M .0
NA	9	5M	7M	24M	36M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1432 33.2	1526 35.3	1361 31.5	4319 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 259

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
FESERVE MANDATORY UNIVERSAL SERVICE FOR FEMALES? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

FESERVE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 STRONGLY FAVOR		400		338	738
		27.6		23.7	25.7
2 PROBABLY FAVOR		512		554	1066
		35.3		38.9	37.1
3 PROBABLY OPPOSE		320		316	636
		22.1		22.2	22.1
4 STRONGLY OPPOSE		217		217	434
		15.0		15.2	15.1
0 NAP			1599M		1599M
					.0
8 DK		39M		28M	67M
					.0
9 NA		18M		20M	38M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		1449	0	1425	2874
		50.4	.0	49.6	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1704

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MESERVE MANDATORY UNIVERSAL SERVICE FOR MALES? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MESERVE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 STRONGLY FAVOR		557		497	1054
		38.3		35.0	36.7
2 PROBABLY FAVOR		528		546	1074
		36.3		38.4	37.4
3 PROBABLY OPPOSE		228		244	472
		15.7		17.2	16.4
4 STRONGLY OPPOSE		141		134	275
		9.7		9.4	9.6
0 NAP			1599M		1599M
					.0
8 DK		37M		32M	69M
					.0
9 NA		15M		20M	35M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		1454	0	1421	2875
		50.6	.0	49.4	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1703

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
TAXSERVE FAVOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE GIVEN TAXES? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

TAXSERVE	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 STRONGLY FAVOR	226		193	419
	21.4		19.1	20.3
2 PROBABLY FAVOR	431		460	891
	40.7		45.6	43.1
3 PROBABLY OPPOSE	244		250	494
	23.1		24.8	23.9
4 STRONGLY OPPOSE	157		106	263
	14.8		10.5	12.7
0 NAP	388M	1599M	400M	2387M
				.0
8 DK	30M		21M	51M
				.0
9 NA	30M		43M	73M
				.0
COLUMN TOTAL	1058	0	1009	2067
	51.2	.0	48.8	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2511

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MILQUAL QUALITY OF PERSONS IN MILITARY BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MILQUAL	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 EXCELLENT	82	134	161	377
	5.9	9.1	11.6	8.9
2 GOOD	646	877	832	2355
	46.7	59.5	60.1	55.5
3 NOT SO GOOD	497	355	335	1187
	35.9	24.1	24.2	28.0
4 POOR	158	108	56	322
	11.4	7.3	4.0	7.6
8 DK	116M	121M	69M	306M
				.0
9 NA	7M	4M	20M	31M
				.0
COLUMN TOTAL	1383	1474	1384	4241
	32.6	34.8	32.6	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 337

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MILPAY PAY AND BENEFITS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MILPAY	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 SHOULD BE LARGER		515	434		949
		39.1	31.2		35.0
2 ABOUT RIGHT		771	925		1696
		58.5	66.5		62.6
3 SHOULD BE SMALLE		31	33		64
		2.4	2.4		2.4
0 NAP				1473M	1473M
					.0
8 DK		181M	202M		383M
					.0
9 NA		8M	5M		13M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		1317	1392	0	2709
		48.6	51.4	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1869

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
FENUMOK NUMBER OF WOMEN IN MILITARY BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

FENUMOK	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 TOO MANY		123	120	108	351
		8.9	8.2	8.0	8.4
2 ABOUT RIGHT NUMB		789	864	785	2438
		57.3	59.2	58.0	58.2
3 SHOULD BE MORE		464	476	460	1400
		33.7	32.6	34.0	33.4
8 DK		124M	133M	93M	350M
					.0
9 NA		6M	6M	27M	39M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		1376	1460	1353	4189
		32.8	34.9	32.3	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 389

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
HINUMOK NUMBER OF HISPANICS IN MILITARY BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

HINUMOK	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
TOO MANY	1	41	94	59	194
		6.5	7.0	4.7	6.0
ABOUT RIGHT NUMB	2	387	844	779	2010
		61.6	62.5	61.8	62.1
SHOULD BE MORE	3	200	413	422	1035
		31.8	30.6	33.5	32.0
NAP	0	759M			759M
					.0
DK	8	115M	240M	177M	532M
					.0
NA	9	4M	8M	36M	48M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	628	1351	1260	3239
		19.4	41.7	38.9	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1339

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
BLNUMOK NUMBER OF BLACKS IN MILITARY BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

BLNUMOK	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
TOO MANY	1	75	129	111	315
		11.3	9.2	8.4	9.3
ABOUT RIGHT NUMB	2	445	987	947	2379
		67.3	70.5	71.7	70.4
SHOULD BE MORE	3	141	284	262	687
		21.3	20.3	19.8	20.3
NAP	0	759M			759M
					.0
DK	8	83M	189M	122M	394M
					.0
NA	9	3M	10M	31M	44M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	661	1400	1320	3381
		19.6	41.4	39.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1197

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
HINUMOKY NUMBER HISPANICS IN MILITARY-VERSION Y BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

HINUMOKY	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
TOO MANY	1	42			42
		6.6			6.6
ABOUT RIGHT NUMB	2	379			379
		59.3			59.3
SHOULD BE MORE	3	218			218
		34.1			34.1
NAP	0	747M	1599M	1473M	3819M
					.0
DK	8	112M			112M
					.0
NA	9	8M			8M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	639	0	0	639
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3939

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
BLNUMOKY NUMBER OF BLACKS IN MILITARY-VERSION Y BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

BLNUMOKY	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
TOO MANY	1	84			84
		12.5			12.5
ABOUT RIGHT NUMB	2	481			481
		71.6			71.6
SHOULD BE MORE	3	107			107
		15.9			15.9
NAP	0	747M	1599M	1473M	3819M
					.0
DK	8	80M			80M
					.0
NA	9	7M			7M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	672	0	0	672
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3906

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MILVOLOK HOW WELL HAS VOLUNTEER MILITARY WORKED? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MILVOLOK	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
VERY WELL	1	144 / 10.3		273 / 19.8	417 / 15.0
FAIRLY WELL	2	737 / 52.6		883 / 64.0	1620 / 58.3
NOT WELL	3	520 / 37.1		224 / 16.2	744 / 26.8
NAP	0		1599M		1599M / .0
DK	8	94M		69M	163M / .0
NA	9	11M		24M	35M / .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1401 / 50.4	0 / .0	1380 / 49.6	2781 / 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1797

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
FIGHTAIR WOMEN AS JET FIGHTER PILOTS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

FIGHTAIR	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	916 / 62.4			916 / 62.4
SHOULD NOT	2	551 / 37.6			551 / 37.6
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M / .0
DK	8	32M			32M / .0
NA	9	7M			7M / .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1467 / 100.0	0 / .0	0 / .0	1467 / 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3111

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MECHANIC WOMEN AS TRUCK MECHANIC BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MECHANIC	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	1234			1234
		83.4			83.4
SHOULD NOT	2	245			245
		16.6			16.6
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M
					.0
DK	8	19M			19M
					.0
NA	9	8M			8M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1479	0	0	1479
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3099

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
NURSE WOMEN AS NURSES IN COMBAT ZONE BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

NURSE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	1391			1391
		93.7			93.7
SHOULD NOT	2	94			94
		6.3			6.3
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M
					.0
DK	8	14M			14M
					.0
NA	9	7M			7M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1485	0	0	1485
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3093

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

TYPIST WOMEN AS TYPIST IN PENTAGON BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

TYPIST	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	1449			1449
		97.5			97.5
SHOULD NOT	2	37			37
		2.5			2.5
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M
					.0
DK	8	12M			12M
					.0
NA	9	8M			8M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1486	0	0	1486
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3092

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

BRASS WOMEN IN COMMAND OF MILITARY BASES BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

BRASS	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	853			853
		58.7			58.7
SHOULD NOT	2	601			601
		41.3			41.3
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M
					.0
DK	8	42M			42M
					.0
NA	9	10M			10M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1454	0	0	1454
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3124

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF FIGHTLND WOMEN IN HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

FIGHTLND	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	506 34.7			506 34.7
SHOULD NOT	2	953 65.3			953 65.3
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	38M			38M .0
NA	9	9M			9M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1459 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1459 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3119

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF TRANSAIR WOMEN AS JET TRANSPORT PILOT BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

TRANSAIR	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	1063 72.7			1063 72.7
SHOULD NOT	2	399 27.3			399 27.3
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	35M			35M .0
NA	9	9M			9M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1462 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1462 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3116

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
GUNNER WOMEN AS AIR DEFENSE GUNNER IN U.S. BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

GUNNER	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	860 59.2			860 59.2
SHOULD NOT	2	593 40.8			593 40.8
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	44M			44M .0
NA	9	9M			9M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1453 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1453 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3125

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
FIGHTSEA WOMEN AS CREW MEMBER OF COMBAT SHIP BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

FIGHTSEA	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	833 57.4			833 57.4
SHOULD NOT	2	619 42.6			619 42.6
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	43M			43M .0
NA	9	11M			11M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1452 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1452 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3126

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF FEFIGHT ARE WOMEN ASSIGNED TO COMBAT BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

FEFIGHT	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 YES, THEY ARE		333			333
		28.9			28.9
2 NO THEY ARENT		820			820
		71.1			71.1
0 NAP			1599M	1473M	3072M
					.0
8 DK		342M			342M
					.0
9 NA		11M			11M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		1153	0	0	1153
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3425

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF FEDIRTY ARE WOMEN ASSIGNED TO DIRTY JOBS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

FEDIRTY	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 YES, THEY ARE		725			725
		67.1			67.1
2 NO THEY ARENT		356			356
		32.9			32.9
0 NAP			1599M	1473M	3072M
					.0
8 DK		411M			411M
					.0
9 NA		14M			14M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		1081	0	0	1081
		100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3497

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF FEBRASS DO WOMEN COMMAND OVER MEN BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

FEBRASS	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 YES, THEY ARE	700			700
	63.4			63.4
2 NO THEY ARENT	404			404
	36.6			36.6
0 NAP		1599M	1473M	3072M
				.0
8 DK	387M			387M
				.0
9 NA	15M			15M
				.0
COLUMN TOTAL	1104	0	0	1104
	100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3474

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF FEHLPMIL DO WOMEN RAISE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

FEHLPMIL	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 RAISED EFFECTIVE	300			300
	22.5			22.5
2 NO DIFFERENCE	916			916
	68.8			68.8
3 LOWERED EFFCTIVE	115			115
	8.6			8.6
0 NAP		1599M	1473M	3072M
				.0
8 DK	169M			169M
				.0
9 NA	6M			6M
				.0
COLUMN TOTAL	1331	0	0	1331
	100.0	.0	.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3247

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

DRAFT RETURN TO THE DRAFT? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFT	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 DRAFT	1	625	458	329	1412
		44.3	30.0	23.7	32.6
2 VOLUNTEERS	2	786	1070	1058	2914
		55.7	70.0	76.3	67.4
8 DK	8	91M	66M	64M	221M
				-	.0
9 NA	9	4M	5M	22M	31M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1411	1528	1387	4326
		32.6	35.3	32.1	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 252

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

DRAFTFE IF RETURN TO DRAFT, DRAFT WOMEN? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTFE	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 SHOULD	1	333	212	160	705
		55.0	47.5	49.8	51.3
2 SHOULD NOT	2	273	234	161	668
		45.0	52.5	50.2	48.7
0 NAP	0	877M	1136M	1122M	3135M
					.0
8 DK	8	18M	11M	7M	36M
					.0
9 NA	9	5M	6M	23M	34M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	606	446	321	1373
		44.1	32.5	23.4	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3205

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DRAFTEM IF EMERGENCY, RETURN TO DRAFT? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTEM	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
DRAFT	1	700	928	889	2517
		84.0	86.5	82.9	84.5
VOLUNTEERS	2	133	145	184	462
		16.0	13.5	17.1	15.5
NAP	0	625M	458M	329M	1412M
					.0
DK	8	36M	42M	26M	104M
					.0
NA	9	12M	26M	45M	83M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	833	1073	1073	2979
		28.0	36.0	36.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1599

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DRAFTFEM IF EMERGENCY, DRAFT WOMEN ALSO? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTFEM	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
SHOULD	1	371	460	451	1282
		55.7	51.3	52.5	53.0
SHOULD NOT	2	295	436	408	1139
		44.3	48.7	47.5	47.0
NAP	0	796M	645M	539M	1980M
					.0
DK	8	26M	29M	22M	77M
					.0
NA	9	18M	29M	53M	100M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	666	896	859	2421
		27.5	37.0	35.5	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2157

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DRAFTCOL COLLEGE STUDENTS EXEMPT FROM DRAFT? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTCOL	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	406 28.0			406 28.0
NO, NOT EXEMPT	2	1043 72.0			1043 72.0
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	55M			55M .0
NA	9	2M			2M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1449 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1449 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3129

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DRAFTMAR MARRIED PERSONS EXEMPT FROM DRAFT? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTMAR	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	635 44.1			635 44.1
NO, NOT EXEMPT	2	804 55.9			804 55.9
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	64M			64M .0
NA	9	3M			3M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1439 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1439 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3139

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF DRAFTPAR PARENTS OF SMALL CHLDRN EXEMPT FRM DRAFT BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

DRAFTPAR	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	1054 71.7			1054 71.7
NO, NOT EXEMPT	2	416 28.3			416 28.3
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	34M			34M .0
NA	9	2M			2M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1470 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1470 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3108

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF DRAFTGAY GAYS EXEMPT FROM DRAFT? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

DRAFTGAY	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	242 17.0			242 17.0
NO, NOT EXEMPT	2	1179 83.0			1179 83.0
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	79M			79M .0
NA	9	6M			6M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1421 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1421 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3157

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DRAFTCO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPT FROM DRAFT BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTCO	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	526 37.0			526 37.0
NO, NOT EXEMPT	2	894 63.0			894 63.0
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	81M			81M .0
NA	9	5M			5M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1420 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1420 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3158

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DRAFTDEF DEFENSE OCCUPATIONS EXEMPT FROM DRAFT? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DRAFTDEF	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	807 56.4			807 56.4
NO, NOT EXEMPT	2	624 43.6			624 43.6
NAP	0		1599M	1473M	3072M .0
DK	8	72M			72M .0
NA	9	3M			3M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1431 100.0	0 .0	0 .0	1431 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3147

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
VETFAM FAMILY MEMBERS SERVED IN ARMED FORCES? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

VETFAM	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1	1074		1066	2140
		71.6		73.7	72.6
NO	2	427		381	808
		28.4		26.3	27.4
NAP	0		1599M		1599M
					.0
NA	9	5M		26M	31M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	1501	0	1447	2948
		50.9	.0	49.1	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1630

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
VETFAMNW ANY FAMILY MEMBERS IN ARMED FORCES NOW BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

VETFAMNW	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1			144	144
				13.6	13.6
NO	2			912	912
				86.4	86.4
NAP	0	1506M	1599M	381M	3486M
					.0
NA	9			36M	36M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1056	1056
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3522

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
VETAID ANY IN HH RECEIVE MIL OR VET BENEFITS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

VETAID	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1			145 10.0	145 10.0
NO	2			1298 90.0	1298 90.0
NAP	0	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
DK	8			2M	2M .0
NA	9			28M	28M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1443 100.0	1443 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3135

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MINMILOP BLK OPPORTUNITIES BETTER IN MILITARY? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MINMILOP	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
MILITARY BETTER	1			706 52.3	706 52.3
CIVILIAN BETTER	2			85 6.3	85 6.3
NO DIFFERENCE	3			558 41.4	558 41.4
NAP	0	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
DK	8			100M	100M .0
NA	9			24M	24M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1349 100.0	1349 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3229

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
FEMILOP FEM OPPORTUNITIES BETTER IN MILITARY? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

FEMILOP	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 MILITARY BETTER				267 19.5	267 19.5
2 CIVILIAN BETTER				474 34.7	474 34.7
3 NO DIFFERENCE				625 45.8	625 45.8
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK				83M	83M .0
9 NA				24M	24M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1366 100.0	1366 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3212

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
COPUNISH PUNISH DRAFT RESISTERS? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

COPUNISH	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 YES				956 68.2	956 68.2
2 NO				446 31.8	446 31.8
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK				50M	50M .0
9 NA				21M	21M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1402 100.0	1402 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3176

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

COJAIL JAIL DRAFT RESISTERS? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

COJAIL	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 APPROVE	1			405	405
				44.2	44.2
2 DISAPPROVE	2			511	511
				55.8	55.8
NAP	0	1506M	1599M	496M	3601M
					.0
DK	8			38M	38M
					.0
NA	9			23M	23M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	916	916
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3662

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

MILOKME MILITARY SERVICE GOOD EXPERIENCE FOR MEN BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

MILOKME	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 DEFINITELY GOOD	1			471	471
				33.1	33.1
2 PROBABLY GOOD	2			796	796
				56.0	56.0
3 PROB NOT GOOD	3			132	132
				9.3	9.3
4 DEF NOT GOOD	4			23	23
				1.6	1.6
NAP	0	1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
DK	8			29M	29M
					.0
NA	9			22M	22M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1422	1422
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3156

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MILOKFE MILITARY SERVICE GOOD EXPERIENCE FOR FEM BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MILOKFE	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 DEFINITELY GOOD			208 14.9	208 14.9
2 PROBABLY GOOD			807 57.9	807 57.9
3 PROB NOT GOOD			283 20.3	283 20.3
4 DEF NOT GOOD			95 6.8	95 6.8
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK			58M	58M .0
9 NA			22M	22M .0
COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1393 100.0	1393 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3185

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
UPGRADE REFUSE VOLS WITH NO BASIC SKILLS? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

UPGRADE	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 REFUSE TO ACCEPT			245 17.2	245 17.2
2 ACCEPT & EDUCATE			1176 82.8	1176 82.8
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK			27M	27M .0
9 NA			25M	25M .0
COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1421 100.0	1421 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3157

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
JOBTRAIN OBLIGATION TO TRAIN FOR CIVILIAN JOBS? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

JOBTRAIN	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 YES,OBLIGATION				690	690
				48.9	48.9
2 NOT OBLIGATION				722	722
				51.1	51.1
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				36M	36M
					.0
9 NA				25M	25M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		0	0	1412	1412
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3166

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
NUKEWAR POSSIBILITY OF AN ALL-OUT ATOMIC WAR BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

NUKEWAR	COUNT / COL PCT	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 WON'T HAPPEN				322	322
				22.7	22.7
2				264	264
				18.6	18.6
3				203	203
				14.3	14.3
4				317	317
				22.4	22.4
5				166	166
				11.7	11.7
6				47	47
				3.3	3.3
7 CERTAIN TO HAPPE				99	99
				7.0	7.0
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				33M	33M
					.0
9 NA				22M	22M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		0	0	1418	1418
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3160

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
LANDWAR POSSIBILITY OF A CONVENTIONAL GROUND WAR BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

LANDWAR	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 WON'T HAPPEN				91	91
				6.4	6.4
2				91	91
				6.4	6.4
3				186	186
				13.2	13.2
4				355	355
				25.1	25.1
5				295	295
				20.9	20.9
6				179	179
				12.7	12.7
7 CERTAIN TO HAPPE				216	216
				15.3	15.3
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				38M	38M
					.0
9 NA				22M	22M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1413	1413
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3165

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MORENUKE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING ARMS RACE BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MORENUKE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 WON'T HAPPEN				91	91
				6.5	6.5
2				83	83
				5.9	5.9
3				112	112
				8.0	8.0
4				319	319
				22.7	22.7
5				296	296
				21.1	21.1
6				227	227
				16.1	16.1
7 CERTAIN TO HAPPE				278	278
				19.8	19.8
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				43M	43M
					.0
9 NA				24M	24M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1406	1406
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3172

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
LESSNUKE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING ATOMIC WEAPONS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

LESSNUKE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 WON'T HAPPEN				271 19.2	271 19.2
2				249 17.6	249 17.6
3				239 16.9	239 16.9
4				364 25.8	364 25.8
5				155 11.0	155 11.0
6				67 4.7	67 4.7
7 CERTAIN TO HAPPE				66 4.7	66 4.7
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK				39M	39M .0
9 NA				23M	23M .0
COLUMN TOTAL		0 .0	0 .0	1411 100.0	1411 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3167

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
NONUKE POSSIBILITY ELIMINATING ATOMIC WEAPONS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

NONUKE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 WON'T HAPPEN				832 59.1	832 59.1
2				224 15.9	224 15.9
3				110 7.8	110 7.8
4				117 8.3	117 8.3
5				52 3.7	52 3.7
6				29 2.1	29 2.1
7 CERTAIN TO HAPPE				43 3.1	43 3.1
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK				44M	44M .0
9 NA				22M	22M .0
COLUMN TOTAL		0 .0	0 .0	1407 100.0	1407 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3171

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
GUERILLA POSSIBILITY OF GUERILLA WARS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

GUERILLA	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 WON'T HAPPEN				52	52
				3.8	3.8
2				27	27
				2.0	2.0
3				72	72
				5.3	5.3
4				202	202
				14.8	14.8
5				259	259
				19.0	19.0
6				274	274
				20.1	20.1
7 CERTAIN TO HAPPE				476	476
				34.9	34.9
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				88M	88M
					.0
9 NA				23M	23M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1362	1362
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3216

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DEFWRKEV EVER WORK FOR MILITARY SUPPLIER? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DEFWRKEV	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 YES				181	181
				12.5	12.5
2 NO				1262	1262
				87.5	87.5
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
9 NA				30M	30M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1443	1443
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3135

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
DEFWRKNW CURRENTLY WORK FOR MILITARY SUPPLIER? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

DEFWRKNW	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1			37	37
				20.7	20.7
NO	2			142	142
				79.3	79.3
NAP	0	1506M	1599M	1262M	4367M
					.0
NA	9			32M	32M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	179	179
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 4399

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MILWRKEV EVER WORK FOR MILITARY OR DOD? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MILWRKEV	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1			82	82
				5.7	5.7
NO	2			1363	1363
				94.3	94.3
NAP	0	1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
NA	9			28M	28M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1445	1445
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3133

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
MILWRKNW CURRENTLY WORK FOR MILITARY OR DOD? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

MILWRKNW	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
YES	1			13	13
				16.7	16.7
NO	2			65	65
				83.3	83.3
NAP	0	1506M	1599M	1363M	4468M
					.0
NA	9			32M	32M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	78	78
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 4500

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
RESDEFWK LOCAL ECONOMY DEPENDS ON DEFENSE WORK? BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

RESDEFWK	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
VERY DEPENDENT	1			132	132
				9.6	9.6
SOMEWHAT DEPENDE	2			495	495
				36.0	36.0
NOT AT ALL	3			748	748
				54.4	54.4
NAP	0	1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
DK	8			72M	72M
					.0
NA	9			26M	26M
					.0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1375	1375
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3203

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
OBVOTE OBLIGATION--VOTING IN ELECTIONS BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

OBVOTE	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT				1152	1152
				79.6	79.6
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA				229	229
				15.8	15.8
3 NOT OBLIGATION				66	66
				4.6	4.6
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				4M	4M
					.0
9 NA				22M	22M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		0	0	1447	1447
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3131

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
OBVOL OBLIGATION--COMMUNITY SERVICE BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

OBVOL	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT				451	451
				31.3	31.3
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA				808	808
				56.1	56.1
3 NOT OBLIGATION				182	182
				12.6	12.6
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				11M	11M
					.0
9 NA				21M	21M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		0	0	1441	1441
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3137

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
OBJURY OBLIGATION--JURY DUTY BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

OBJURY	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT			941 65.4	941 65.4
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA			418 29.1	418 29.1
3 NOT OBLIGATION			79 5.5	79 5.5
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK			12M	12M .0
9 NA			23M	23M .0
COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1438 100.0	1438 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3140

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF
OB911 OBLIGATION--REPORTING A CRIME BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT
PAGE 1 OF 1

OB911	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT			1312 91.0	1312 91.0
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA			114 7.9	114 7.9
3 NOT OBLIGATION			16 1.1	16 1.1
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK			8M	8M .0
9 NA			23M	23M .0
COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1442 100.0	1442 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3136

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

OBENG OBLIGATION--BEING ABLE TO SPEAK ENGLISH BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

OBENG	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT				1207	1207
				83.5	83.5
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA				200	200
				13.8	13.8
3 NOT OBLIGATION				39	39
				2.7	2.7
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				6M	6M
					.0
9 NA				21M	21M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		0	0	1446	1446
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3132

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

OBKNOW OBLIGATION--KEEPING INFORMED BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

OBKNOW	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT				813	813
				56.5	56.5
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA				545	545
				37.9	37.9
3 NOT OBLIGATION				81	81
				5.6	5.6
0 NAP		1506M	1599M		3105M
					.0
8 DK				11M	11M
					.0
9 NA				23M	23M
					.0
COLUMN TOTAL		0	0	1439	1439
		.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3139

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

OBMEPAX OBLIGATION--PEACETIME MIL SERVICE-MEN BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

OBMEPAX	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT			476	476
			33.2	33.2
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA			700	700
			48.9	48.9
3 NOT OBLIGATION			256	256
			17.9	17.9
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M
				.0
8 DK			18M	18M
				.0
9 NA			23M	23M
				.0
COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1432	1432
	.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3146

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

OBMEWAR OBLIGATION--WARTIME MIL SERVICE-MEN BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

OBMEWAR	YEAR 82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT			1208	1208
			83.9	83.9
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA			198	198
			13.8	13.8
3 NOT OBLIGATION			34	34
			2.4	2.4
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M
				.0
8 DK			12M	12M
				.0
9 NA			21M	21M
				.0
COLUMN TOTAL	0	0	1440	1440
	.0	.0	100.0	100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3138

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

OBFEPAX OBLIGATION--PEACETIME MIL SERVICE-FEMALE BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

OBFEPAX	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT			256 17.9	256 17.9
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA			725 50.7	725 50.7
3 NOT OBLIGATION			449 31.4	449 31.4
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK			20M	20M .0
9 NA			23M	23M .0
COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1430 100.0	1430 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3148

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

CROSSTABULATION OF

OBFEWAR OBLIGATION--WARTIME MIL SERVICE-FEMALE BY YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

OBFEWAR	YEAR 82	YEAR 83	YEAR 84	ROW TOTAL
1 VERY IMPORTANT			663 46.3	663 46.3
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTA			531 37.1	531 37.1
3 NOT OBLIGATION			237 16.6	237 16.6
0 NAP	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
8 DK			16M	16M .0
9 NA			26M	26M .0
COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1431 100.0	1431 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3147

FILE: COMBINED 1982-83-84 GSS-MAS SYSTEM FILE

MAS WHEN AND HOW MAS DONE — CROSSTABULATION OF — BY YEAR — GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT

PAGE 1 OF 1

MAS	COUNT / COL PCT	82	83	84	ROW TOTAL
DONE WITH GSS	1			1449 99.7	1449 99.7
LATER IN PERSON	2			4 .3	4 .3
LATER ON PHONE	3			1 .1	1 .1
MAP	0	1506M	1599M		3105M .0
NOT DONE	9			19M	19M .0
	COLUMN TOTAL	0 .0	0 .0	1454 100.0	1454 100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3124

PRECEDING TASK REQUIRED 13.03 SECONDS CPU TIME; 70.88 SECONDS ELAPSED.

```
11  0          FINISH

   11 COMMAND LINES READ.
    0 ERRORS DETECTED.
    0 WARNINGS ISSUED.
   14 SECONDS CPU TIME.
   79 SECONDS ELAPSED TIME.
      END OF JOB.
```