Trends in White Attitudes toward Negroes

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Report No. 119

Mildred A. Schwartz

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CHAPTER I

TRENDS IN WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGROES

Introduction

The past twenty years have witnessed great changes in the extension and guarantee of rights and opportunities to Negro Americans. While much remains to be done to ensure that Negroes obtain both equal rights and the opportunities for enjoying them, there is little question that progress has been made since World War II. Especially noteworthy is the recent responsiveness of governmental agencies to removing barriers to full civic participation.

What has been the public reaction to the changes that have occurred during this time? While we begin with no assumptions about the relation between public opinion and public policy, we do feel that a review of public attitudes over time will give a better understanding of the context in which major social changes have occurred, both by revealing sources of support for and opposition to these changes and by suggesting the possible limits of further change.

The primary concern of this report is, then, to describe the climate of opinion in which social changes with regard to Negro rights have taken place. Along with this, the differential impact of specific civil rights issues and the differential response of various population groups will be traced.

Selection of Issues

Data for this report come from surveys conducted between 1942 and 1965, with some reference to earlier material. The main part of the analysis is based on ten surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center and supplemented by one Roper and five Gallup surveys. Data used to fill in trends and to extrapolate trend data were obtained from some ten additional surveys conducted by the same organizations. In those cases where direct use of the surveys was made, data were supplied by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research or by NORC. Reports on supplementary questions came mainly from Gallup releases, especially those compiled in the Spring, 1962, issue of the Public Opinion Quarterly.

Since the main concern was with tracing changes in opinions, we looked for questions which had been repeated in different surveys over a period of time.

¹For a recent review of the legal means for overcoming discrimination, see Vern Countryman (Ed.), <u>Discrimination and the Law</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

Our research turned up eleven questions which were repeated in several surveys and had a significant bearing on civil rights issues. These questions dealt with education and intelligence, housing, jobs, transportation, public services, and future prospects for desegregation. Information on these questions was, however, often more appetite-whetting than satisfying. Even more disappointing was the absence of trend questions on other important issues.

The amount of data available on the attitudes of whites toward Negroes is indicative of the handicaps to research on such critical social issues. The first major study in this area was conducted in 1942 by NORC, supported by the Office of War Information. Another full-scale survey on white attitudes was done in 1944 under the sponsorship of NORC itself, with the aid of Field Foundation funds. But support for research in this area declined soon after, and in a 1946 study NORC was able to ask only five questions concerning attitudes on civil rights issues. Not until 1956 did NORC resume questioning in this area, and then only by appending one or two questions to studies commissioned for other purposes. Another hiatus in data-collection exists from 1956 to 1963, when questions were again either attached to other studies or supported by NORC itself.

Meanwhile commercial organizations had been giving some attention to Negro-white relations, but their approach was more haphazard than that of NORC, and they were less concerned with collecting data for the systematic tracing of trends. Between 1935 and 1942, for example, Paul Sheatsley found a public record of only four relevant questions, three of them on a bill concerning lynching and the fourth on the resignation of Eleanor Roosevelt from the Daughters of the American Revolution because of their discriminatory practices. Since then we have found four other questions asked in a Roper survey during the same period, but there is no evidence that these were ever published.

The picture of research interest in the Negro issue prior to World War II is, then, quite dismal, and from that time until late in the 1950's the record hardly improved. Recently, there has been greater interest in collecting data for trend analysis.

Presentation of Data

The discussion of trends begins with an overview of opinions for the time periods available, looking at the total sample of white respondents. In some cases, where the survey data were not readily available in their original form, it has been necessary to use results for the total sample, including non-whites. This is regrettable, but fortunately not too serious, 3 since where it is possible

 $^{^2\,\}mathrm{Paul}$ B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," <u>Daedalus</u>, 1965 (Winter), 217.

 $^{^3{\}rm For\ most}$ national samples, non-whites are about 10 per cent of the total. This is in keeping with their share in the population generally.

to compare the total sample with the white sample, differences in the distribution of opinions do not vary more than two percentage points.

In an analysis of this sort, where a number of different surveys are used for comparative purposes, it is important to make an early decision on the choice of variables for critical attention, if only to prevent inundation by the data. Using data collected at different times, by different organizations, and under differing conditions, normal sampling variability has been compounded to an unknown extent. This argues that the analysis should be kept on a fairly simple basis. With such crude data, it hardly seems advisable, for example, to try to deal with a large number of variables simultaneously. In order to make best use of the different survey questions, it is preferable to select a number of distinctive variables which allow for the emergence of gross differences of opinion.

Using this as a criterion of selection, supplemented by a review of published and unpublished material on white attitudes toward Negroes, and especially by the advice of Paul Sheatsley, we decided to examine opinion trends in relation to two population characteristics--region of residence and level of education.

In order to permit comparisons across surveys, regional and educational distinctions have been treated quite crudely. This is especially the case with region. Respondents are divided into only two categories—those who live in the South, and all others, who for the sake of convenience are termed northerners. Southern residents are those living in any one of sixteen states designated by the census as South Atlantic, West South Central, and East South Central, and including the District of Columbia. Variations among these states and the District of Columbia in the treatment of Negroes are considerable. The remainder of the continental United States, classified as northern, is also highly variable. Despite these internal differences, however, we find that the North-South distinction is a meaningful one, accounting for most differences in opinions.

Educational backgrounds are divided into three categories. The lowest level includes no schooling to the completion of grade school. The second level comprises a high school education, covering nine to twelve years of schooling. The college category includes thirteen or more years of schooling. Although it is not as significant differentia as is region of residence, educational level also serves to account for differences in white viewpoints about Negroes.

Responses that indicate trends are presented both in tables and in graphs as least squares regression lines, regressing on time the per cent favorable to Negro aspirations on each issue. This was done for the total sample for eleven questions and for regional and educational subgroups for six questions.

⁴These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.

There are several advantages to a regression approach. It is a highly efficient means for presenting data on several points in time and, wherever available, for several population groups in the space of one chart. In addition, it enables us to iron out minor fluctuations in the trend line. For example, when the per cent favorable to Negroes rises, declines, and then rises again and continues to do so, it might appear that the decline has some critical relation to current events. But the imprecise nature of the data indicates that the overall trend is more reliable than moderate variations away from it, especially if the decline is relatively minor, and the direction of the trend is to increasing favorability. In the case of our own data, there are almost no significant departures from linearity, although this is partly the result of having a small number of measures for each question. Finally, and most important, the slope of the lines gives a very dramatic picture of the course of opinion change and of the sharp contrasts between educational levels in the North and the South.

The presentation of the assembled questions proceeds topically. Thus Chapter II deals with education; III with housing; IV with jobs, transportation, and public services; and V with future prospects. At the same time, a more general theme runs through the topical presentation.

The question items used in this report suggested a three-fold distinction. The normative dimension subsumes all questions in which a respondent is asked for his evaluation of what a given state of affairs should be. The second, more personal dimension, concerns the actual behavior of respondents or that of their family. These questions deal essentially with the degree of social distance or contact between whites and Negroes. The third category includes all other opinions and beliefs about Negroes. While this classification was derived mainly from an examination of the questionnaire items themselves, it was also suggested by the literature on attitudes and opinions in general, as well as those specifically relating to Negro-white relations.

In particular, it appeared that specific questions available to us might provide an empirical basis for Myrdal's thesis on value-conflict experienced by white Americans whose treatment of Negroes contradicts their professed values. ⁵ Two small studies by Westie and Campbell have recently examined Myrdal's theory in relation to the consistency of values and opinion. ⁶ Other current research has moved from concern with the expression of values about integration to an examination of actual behavior. The contrast between what people believe about

⁵Gunnar Myrdal, <u>An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy</u> (New York: Harper, 1944).

⁶Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test," <u>Amer. Sociol. Rev.</u>, 1965, <u>30</u> (August), 527-38; Ernest Q. Campbell, "Moral Discomfort and Racial Segregation--An Examination of the Myrdal Hypothesis," <u>Social Forces</u>, 1961, <u>39</u> (March), 228-34.

the desirability of an integrated society and how they behave when in contact with Negroes is the focus of investigation. On the basis of Myrdal's description of the "dilemma," one would anticipate that beliefs are more favorable to integration than is behavior.

Although we are interested in such contrasts, we will restrict the present study to inferences from available data. Fortunately, and unlike most other studies cited, we have some ability to examine shifts over time, using data from national samples, with questions on norms, beliefs, and behavior all posed directly in terms of white-Negro relations. Our analysis is limited, however, by the lack of complete coverage of these issues over a period of time or for all related areas. But wherever possible, contrasting response patterns on similar issues will be closely examined, especially when the questions are posed in terms of moral judgments and social contacts.

The Salience of Civil Rights Issues

In appraising public opinion data, it is useful to know how the public judges the importance of a particular issue and how deeply involved it feels in its outcome. In fact, only with such information can we begin to determine the stability and consistency of the opinions indicated by the replies given to survey questions. While we have no way of determining the salience of specific questions for our data, we do have some general indications of the public relevance of civil rights and Negro-white relations. These are derived from three sources: the order of priority which rank-and-file Negroes assign to civil rights issues, replies to open-ended questions on the most important national issues, and the extent of lack of response to survey questions.

In the course of a national survey conducted in May of 1963, NORC interviewers contacted 163 Negroes and asked them the following questions: "Here is a list of things that Negro groups working for equal rights frequently want.... Which do you think is the most important to work for now?" Equal job opportunities; open housing; desegregation of public schools; desegregation of public places, like restaurants, stores, and parks; and voting rights were possible responses. The results, shown in Table I.1, indicate that equal job opportunities were of uppermost concern to the respondents.

In December of 1963, another national survey was conducted by NORC, this time largely devoted to civil rights issues. The 183 Negroes interviewed were asked the following questions: (a) First, how many Negroes do you think feel strongly about the right to send their children to the same schools that white

⁷See, for example, David Gottlieb, <u>Educational and Occupational Aspirations of High School Students</u> (forthcoming); Seymour Sudman and Norman Bradburn, <u>Social Psychological Factors in Intergroup Housing</u> (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1966).

children go to? (b) How many do you think feel strongly about the right to vote? (c) How many feel strongly about the right to live in white neighborhoods? (e) How many feel strongly about the right to hold the same jobs as white people? (g) How many feel strongly about the right to use the same parks, restaurants and hotels as white people? Two additional items were included, one about the right of intermarriage and the other about the desirability of Negroes living in a separate area of the United States. Respondents could select one of five categories of number of Negroes feeling strongly about these issues.

Only the percentages choosing "almost all Negroes" for each item are shown in Table I.2. The data support the findings of the previous study on the importance of job opportunities. But they also indicate that Negroes perceive members of their race as highly concerned with integration of public facilities, although comparable priority was not given to this issue when respondents answered for themselves in the previous study. In both studies, the right to vote outranked school integration (although only by a fraction of a per cent in one case) as a critical issue.

TABLE I.1

NEGROES' EVALUATION OF RIGHTS MOST IMPORTANT TO BE WORKED FOR NOW

(Per Cent Choosing Item as Most Important)

			Per Cent
Equal job opportunities			58
Voting rights			13
Desegregation of public schools .			13
Desegregation of public places			3
No discrimination in housing			1
Can't choose one			7
No answer			5
N = 163			

Source: NORC Survey SRS-160, May, 1963.

TABLE I.2

NEGROES' EVALUATION OF RIGHTS WANTED BY ALMOST ALL NEGROES

(Per Cent Choosing Each Item as Wanted by Almost All)

Pe	r Cent
Right to hold the same jobs as whites	80
Right to use same parks, etc	74
Right to vote	63
Right to send children to same schools as whites .	
Right to live in white neighborhoods	22
N = 183	

Source: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

It is interesting to compare this ordering of issues with their coverage in other survey research. Trend questions asked by both academic and commercial agencies have been weighted heavily on the side of educational issues. Much less attention has been paid to job problems, despite their critical importance to Negroes. No comparable questions on the importance of voting rights have been asked over a period of years, since this issue has only recently become a public concern.

One indication of the salience of civil rights issues to the public-and this means primarily the white public--comes from answers to an open-ended question on the most important problems facing the country today. Some version of this question has been asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup organization) ever since its inception in 1935. Up until 1956, spontaneous mention of racial problems was made only infrequently by no more than 4 per cent of the survey population. Crises associated with school integration during 1956 and 1957 placed racial problems in the first or second rank of all problems mentioned in the two surveys available for those years. From 1958 to 1963, however, this issue dropped to from 4 to 10 per cent of all problems cited. Civil rights activities, and a cooling-off of some international issues, brought associated problems to the fore of public concern again in October, 1963, and since then they have fluctuated between first and second place in national surveys, depending on the international political situation. Despite the urgency of the problems to those concerned, the population generally has not been acutely troubled by racial problems until relatively recently. In this respect, then, the commercial polling agencies have been following the public lead in pursuing issues of apparent salience. This does not, of course, gainsay the loss of important historical data on attitudes toward Negroes during an era when these issues did not yet have their current popular appeal.

When questions on civil rights have been asked, whites have displayed considerable awareness of and concern with these issues. The proportion of respondents who were unable or unwilling to give a response to each question posed rarely exceeded 10 per cent for all the questions used in this study. In most cases "no answers" and "don't knows" combined were only about 3 or 4 per cent. While this tells us little about how knowledgeable the respondents actually were about the issues involved, it does give at least a rough indication that respondents were quite willing to take a position on these matters. This is even more evident when our results are compared with those from surveys on other substantive issues, where the rate of "don't knows" is frequently much higher. 8

⁸See the discussion and data cited by V. O. Key, Jr., <u>Public Opinion and American Democracy</u> (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 78-82 and Sheatsley (<u>loc. cit.</u>).

The significance of civil rights issues is unquestioned as far as Negroes are concerned, and is of growing importance for white Americans. However, the likelihood of research on these important concerns has been largely dependent, for academic agencies, on the availability of funds, and for commercial ones, on perceived public interest. The selection of issues for this report, then, has been dependent primarily on their availability. This is hardly a satisfactory way to engage in research, even when it is necessarily based on a secondary analysis of data. Nevertheless, we can end this critique of available data on an encouraging note: Despite the limitations of such a secondary analysis, the material which follows should be adequate proof that a great deal can be learned, both from the data analyzed and from the procedures used here. Any complaints are largely regrets that survey organizations did not take greater advantage of the opportunities to measure public responses to history in the making. In the meantime, we can proceed with the knowledge that these matters are of considerable concern to both Negro and white Americans.

An Overview of Trends


Before turning to a detailed examination of opinions on education, housing, and other areas of civil rights activity, it may be useful to have some overview of how opinions have shifted through time. A brief summary of the results of eleven trend questions, as viewed by white respondents, is presented here. The questions are arranged by topic, beginning with an assessment of Negro intelligence. Accompanying the discussion is a regression line for each of the questions, indicating the direction and slope of opinion changes. Details on sources of data, actual results, regression coefficients, and standard errors are not given here but can be found in charts in the chapters following.

A basic requisite of Negro children's full enjoyment of the opportunities provided by the public educational system is that they have an educable potential at least the equal of whites. Experts still do not agree on whether it is possible to test such potential without the distortions introduced by the conditions of poverty in which so many Negroes live. But the white layman's admission of the intellectual equality of Negroes seems to indicate a relatively favorable perception of Negroes, regardless of the accuracy of this perception. On seven different occasions, NORC interviewers have asked respondents, "In general, do you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people--that is, can they learn just as well if they are given the same education?" In 1942, 42 per cent of a national sample of white Americans replied that they believed Negroes to have the same intelligence as whites. From that time on, the proportion answering

⁹In one survey, the question ended, "... given the same education and training." This change does not appear to have had an effect on the results.


"yes" has risen, slowly in the 1940's and sharply thereafter. By 1956, 78 per cent of the population believed in the intellectual equality of Negroes and whites, and since then similar proportions have given this answer. The direction and slope of this general trend is indicated in the accompanying chart as a regression line. Full details on the sources of data, actual observations, and regression statistics are given in Chart II.1.

Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Bellieving Negroes and Whites Are of Equal Intelligence, 1942-1963



Given this recent belief in the equal intellectual capabilities of Negroes and whites, it is relevant to ask whether there has also been a rise in willingness to accept school integration. Nine measures of the question, "Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?" were used, and again the trend was to growing favorability toward Negro rights and equality, as the regression line in the chart graphically illustrates. (For full detail see Chart II.3.) In 1942, 30 per cent felt that


Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Agreeing Negroes Should Go to the Same Schools as Whites, 1942-1965




schools should be integrated; the percentage rose to just under 50 in 1956, and to over 60 per cent in the 1960's. Beginning at a lower level of favorability than was the case with views of Negro intelligence, a comparatively smaller proportion of white respondents were favorable toward school integration by the 1960's.


While the desirability of school integration appears to be increasingly recognized, the likelihood of respondents' sending their own children to such schools is not so clear-cut. In 1954, Gallup asked all white respondents, "Would you object to having your children attend a school where the majority of pupils are Negroes?" In 1958 and 1963 the question was asked in terms of varying proportions of colored children and was addressed only to those with children in grade or high school. We will consider as comparable to the 1954 question the one that asked, "Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where more than half of the children are colored?" The results clearly support the Myrdalian expectation that feelings of social distance with regard to Negroes are stronger than normative views of what the school situation should be. While the 1954 question was asked of all white respondents, and the two later ones only of those with children in school, some degree of comparability was obtained by tabulating the earlier question only for those with children between the ages of four and twenty-one. While this difference still limits full comparability, nonetheless, the rough outlines of a trend emerge. As a maximum, about two-fifths of white parents would send their children to schools where Negroes would be in the majority; at a minimum, onequarter would do so. Not only are a minority of white parents willing to permit their children to be outnumbered by Negro students, but as our chart shows, the acceptability of such a situation actually declined from 1954 to 1963. (See Chart II.7 for details.) In other words, it is in the realm of behavior that we find an important instance of the limits of white tolerance.

> Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent with No Objection To Sending Own Children to a School with a Majority of Negroes, 1954-1963



The school question came into prominence as a result of the Supreme Court decision in 1954 that upset previous rulings and practices on the legality of "separate but equal" schooling and ordered the integration of all public schools. On nine occasions since then, Gallup has asked for respondents' evaluation of this decision, using the question, "The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation in the public schools is illegal. This means that all children, no matter what their race, must be allowed to go to the same schools. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision?" Between 1954 and 1961 the per cent approving ranged from 54 to 63. While this represents a significant trend, in terms of our regression analysis, the movement was not as sharp as that for other issues. This is made clear by a simple visual comparison of the regression lines in this and the preceding charts, or by a comparison of the metric b, indicating the slopes of the lines. To opinions on the Supreme Court decision, b is .97. This contrasts with b's of 1.69 on intelligence and 1.59 on school integration.





It is somewhat surprising that there has not been more change in opinions on the issues in question. Unlike other questions which cover a time span used in this report, this is one of the few instances where there is so little noticeable trend. Perhaps more unexpected, however, is the apparent lack of influence on opinions stemming from the Supreme Court decision itself. For those who

¹⁰ Data presented in the text refer to the total national sample, including Negro respondents, since it was not possible to separate Negroes from the remainder in the published results. However, experience with other data indicates that this does not affect the results by more than one or two percentage points.


 $^{^{11}{\}rm For}$ details in the regression analysis of the question on the Supreme Court decision, see Chart II.5.

follow the Summerian position on the stability of mores in the face of changing stateways, the absence of a growing acceptance of the Supreme Court decision might be anticipated. But the current view, supported by research experience, has revealed many instances when events, including new laws, do in fact change opinions. This is particularly likely to be true when the event is a <u>fait accompli</u>, and when it is accomplished through the efforts of normally prestigious elements in the population. ¹² For reasons which we will explore in the next chapter, however, this particular legislative effort has not produced any sizeable bandwagon effect.

Turning from schools to jobs, we are hampered by a lack of trend data. Extant data concern normative views elicited by such questions as, "Do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?" Willingness to give Negroes equal job opportunities has changed dramatically since the 1940's, when under half replied that Negroes should have equal opportunities, to 1963, when over 80 per cent were of this opinion. The trend line is presented in the accompanying chart, and full details are given in Chart IV.1.

Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Saying That Negroes Should Have as Good Chance as White People To Get Any Kind of Job, 1944-1963






¹² For data and relevant discussion, see, for example, Milton J. Rosenberg, Carl I. Hovland, William J. McGuire, Robert P. Abelson, and Jack Brehm, Attitude Organization and Change: An Analysis of Consistency among Attitude Components (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 213; Bernard Berelson and Garry A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 574; Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952); William M. Evan and Mildred A. Schwartz, "Law and the Emergence of Formal Organizations," Sociology and Social Research, 1964, 48 (April), 270-80.

Housing—an issue able to evoke almost as much emotional furor as school integration—ranks relatively low on the list of Negro priorities, as we recall from tables I.1 and I.2. But both Gallup and NORC, reflecting the impact of this issue on the white community, have devoted research attention to it, particularly since 1960. The NORC trend question, asked in 1942, 1956, and four times between 1963 and 1965 was, "If a Negro with just as much income and education as you had moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?" Those who answered that it would make no difference, or that the difference would be a desirable one, were considered to give a reply favorable to Negro aspirations. Over the years this issue has produced growing favorability, beginning with a low of 35 per cent in 1942 and currently at a level of 67 per cent. The regression of these per cents on time is given in the chart included with the text. Additional information on its components can be found in Chart III.1.

Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Who Would Not Mind if Negro with Same Income and Education Moved on Same Block, 1942-1965




Gallup has explored the housing issue in recent years with even more regard to feelings of social distance. We have information for three time periods in 1958, 1963, and 1965 when two questions were asked. The first asked, "If colored people came to live next door, would you move?" In the two earlier years, about 55 per cent said they would not move, and this rose to 65 per cent in 1965. In other words, specification of having Negroes as next door neighbors results in a response pattern fairly similar to the prospect of having Negroes of the same class background on the same block. But the question, "Would you move if colored people came to live in great numbers in your neighborhood?", asked at

 $^{^{13}}$ In addition to the chart in the text, see also Chart III.3.

the same time as the preceding one, produced quite a different reaction. From 20 to 31 per cent of the respondents said that they would be willing to remain under these circumstances. While this represents a noticeable trend, as the accompanying chart and the more detailed information in Chart III.5 indicate, the general level of acceptability of Negroes is fairly low. Although having an unspecified number of Negroes living on the same block (presumably isolated families), or having Negroes move next door, has become acceptable to a majority, the prospect of living among large numbers of Negroes, again an unspecified quantity, remains undesirable.


Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Saying They Would Not Move if Colored People Moved Next Door, 1958-1965

Per Cent



Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Saying They Would Not Move if Colored People Came To Live in Great Numbers in Neighborhood, 1958-1965


Per Cent



Unlike housing and school segregation and job discrimination, separation of Negroes and whites in public transportation both has not been practiced outside of the South and has been more rapidly eliminated in the South in conformity with Supreme Court rulings. Yet as long as it existed, such separation was a source of tension between whites and Negroes. In Montgomery, Alabama, it provided the focus for the bus boycott that was to introduce a new era of civil rights activity. National attention was evoked by the Freedom Rides that tested conformity to integration in public facilities. Either because separation in public transportation was confined to the South, quickly eliminated, or dramatized by protest activities, the proportions of the public who disagreed with the question, "Generally speaking, do you think there should be separate sections for Negroes in street cars and buses?" rose sharply over time. This is made clear by the accompanying chart and the data in Chart IV.3: in 1942, 44 per cent were opposed to separate sections; in 1956 it was 60 per cent; and in 1963 about 78 per cent. We can anticipate that segregated transportation will soon disappear altogether as an issue of controversy.

> Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Saying There Should Not Be Separate Sections for Negroes in Street Cars and Buses, 1942-1963






Public opinion on general prospects for desegregation in the South was surveyed by Gallup in 1957 and 1958^{14} and by NORC in 1963. Both organizations asked the same question: "Do you think the day will ever come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools, eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations?" In order to make

 $^{^{14}\}mathrm{This}$ same question was also asked in 1956 and 1961, but published results are only those for selected population subgroups.

use of all three parts of the question, it was necessary to make comparisons with national samples including Negroes. However, in the two instances where it was possible to separate whites and Negroes, the inclusion of Negroes in the total affected the relevant percentages by only one point. Results given here and in Chart V.2 indicate that expectation of integration rose sharply in 1963. Over half agreed that desegregation would come to the South in the late 1950's; by 1963 over three-quarters had come to share this view.

Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Expecting That Day Will Come in the South When Whites and Negroes Will Be . . . Sharing the Same Public Accommodations, 1957-1963

Per Cent




A final trend question on general assessment of the racial situation has been asked by Gallup: "Do you think the situation in the South between the races will get better or worse during the coming year?" Unfortunately the question is quite ambiguous in this form. "Better" could mean that Negroes would accept white domination, that whites would accept integration, or--to those disposed to extremist solutions--that there would be insurrection. The safest interpretation seems to be to relate "better" to a decrease of racial tension and "worse" to the opposite. In 1957, when Gallup first asked this question, 41 per cent felt that the situation would get better. But at the four later times the question was posed, there was a steady decline in the proportions believing that the situation would improve in the coming year. By 1964, only 17 per cent gave an optimistic response.

 $^{^{15}{}m In}$ 1964 "in the South" was omitted, but results still followed the trend line. Like the preceding question, this one also is presented in terms of the total sample.

Least Squares Linear Trend Line in Per Cent Feeling That the Situation between the Races Will Get Better in the Coming Year, 1957-1964

Per Cent



These eleven questions represent the available data for tracing an overview of white public opinion on racial issues. From the 1940's to the present there has been considerable change in outlook, and for the most part this has been in the direction of growing favorability to Negro aspirations.

While questions have been presented in terms of the contrast between norms, beliefs, and social contact, the number of questions available do not permit much in the way of comparative conclusions. Yet we can see that, over time, trends on normative questions have risen more sharply than have those on social contact. Trends on beliefs appear to lie in between.

The degree to which favorability of white opinions to Negro rights has increased is more strongly affected by the content than by the character of the question. For example, all opinions on school integration, whether referring to norms, beliefs, or social contact, have remained most resistant to change. In addition, while there is some trend of increased willingness to accept integrated situations, there is still strong reluctance to accept situations where Negroes are as numerous as whites.

It is difficult to make a clear-cut interpretation of the trends in public opinion on the racial situation. But available data appear to indicate that the majority of respondents feel that racial tension will increase before Negrowhite relations improve. On the whole, this short-range pessimism has not hindered the increasing favorability toward the exercise of civil rights by Negroes. In the following chapters the overview of public opinion trends presented here will be elaborated and supplemented with additional data, and a more detailed exposition of public opinion on selected issues concerning Negroes will be given.

CHAPTER II

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EDUCATION OF NEGROES


Negro Intelligence


The first available measure of the attitudes of whites toward Negro intelligence comes from the results of a Roper survey of September, 1939, that, as far as I know, have not been published elsewhere. 1 Over five thousand respondents were asked, "Do you think Negroes now generally have higher intelligence than white people, lower, or about the same?" Seventy-one per cent of the respondents replied "lower," and 22 per cent, "about the same." Those who answered "lower" were then asked to give their evaluation of the reasons. The largest category--44 per cent--believed that Negroes were born with less intelligence. Thirty-two per cent attributed the difference to lack of educational opportunities, and another 22 per cent felt that both lack of opportunity and inferior inborn intelligence accounted for this difference. When NORC began studying beliefs about Negro intelligence in 1942, 42 per cent of the respondents said that Negroes were as intelligent as whites. This apparent increase in the favorable perception of Negro intelligence may represent some real gain from the 1939 data, perhaps attributable to the new contacts and experiences encountered in the armed forces and increasing urban migration. However, it may also be due to the change in wording of the question. From 1942 to 1963 the NORC wording was followed consistently, and in that time there was a sharp rise in the proportion of white respondents believing that Negroes and whites do not differ in innate intellectual capacity. The results of these seven surveys are presented in Chart II.1, where the straight line represents the regression on time of the per cent believing that Negroes are as intelligent as whites, and the points represent the actual observations. The latter appear to show a sharp rise in favorable views in 1956 and some levelling off from then until 1963.

The extent and continuity of opinion differences between critical population groups is especially noteworthy. The data presented in Chart II.2 as regression lines show the direction of trends between 1944 and 1963 for those living inside or outside the South for three educational levels: grade school education or less, high school, and at least some college education. (Actual data on which this chart is based can be found in Appendix Table 1.) Dramatic

 $^{^{}m l}$ Tabulations were done by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

²Only marginal data are available for the 1942 study.





differences emerge from the trend lines. The contrast between North and South is the most pronounced, regardless of the amount of schooling of respondents. As might be expected, non-southern respondents have a more favorable view of Negro intelligence than do southerners. The amount of difference between the two regions remains great over time and shows no sign of decreasing.

An examination of the actual results and the trend lines reveal several pertinent findings. For one thing, the levelling-off in favorable views shown in Chart II.1 is more pronounced in the data on subgroups. There is some indication that the favorable views of college-educated southerners and grade schooleducated northerners on this issue have reached the tolerance limit and may even be declining. Differences between educational levels generally tend to be minor, although they are slightly greater in the South than in the North. In addition, while the pattern is not completely consistent, there is a somewhat greater tendency for those with a high school education or less to think that Negro and white intelligence are equal than is the case for the college-educated. This is true in both the North and the South.

It is normally not desirable to forego the interpretation of such data until later in the discussion. But in this instance, the full significance of the findings emerges only after the responses to other questions are examined. Therefore, the data on education and school desegregation will be presented before analyzing these trends.

The Desirability of Integrated Education

A 1944 NORC interview asked, "Generally, do you think Negroes in the United States are as well educated as white people?" More than three-quarters of the respondents replied that Negroes were not as well educated as whites. In both the North and the South, the greater the respondent's own education, the less likely he was to feel that Negroes were as well educated as whites. Whites with less than a high school education were more likely to have been exposed to Negroes with similar education to their own and to infer the educational equality of Negroes and whites. This was less likely to be true in the case of the high school-educated and least likely in the case of the college-educated. For all groups, however, the majority clearly saw Negroes as educationally inferior.

Of those respondents who answered that Negroes were less well educated than whites, the largest proportion--about two-fifths--attributed this to lack of ambition and lack of capacity to learn. Only about one-fifth felt that lack of opportunity generally, and insufficient or inadequate schools contributed to the educational disparity. With most of the blame for educational deficiencies

³NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

placed on the Negro himself, it is hardly surprising that 85 per cent of the respondents thought that Negroes had the same educational opportunities as whites. Only college-educated southerners appeared to have noticeable doubts about this: 66 per cent felt that there was equal educational opportunity in their community.

Respondents' opinions of actual educational opportunities in their community were highly distorted and were probably influenced by their values, since 89 per cent thought that "... Negroes in this town should have the same chance as white people to get a good education." While some regional and educational differences in commitment to equal education are apparent, the large proportion believing in the legitimacy of equal educational opportunities is striking. For example, of the group least likely to believe that Negroes were as well educated as whites—southerners with a grade school education or less—fully 76 per cent were sympathetic to the principle of equal education. The progression in order of favorability increased with education, first in the South and then in the North, with 95 per cent of college-educated northerners expressing support for equality.

What did these questions actually measure? Hardly a commitment to integrated education. The results, although lacking depth, illustrate the rationalizations and easily-expressed values current in 1944. The large majority of respondents expressing approval of equal educational opportunities for Negroes should not be misleading. For one thing, many whites felt, with considerable justification, that it was far from easy to obtain an adequate education for their own children. Their admission that Negroes should be permitted to engage in the same struggle may not have been a great concession. Further, adherence to the principle of equal education frequently rested on a belief that education could be both separate and equal. This interpretation is supported by an examination of responses to a related question, asked by NORC interviewers in 1942. Respondents were asked, "Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?" Thirty per cent felt that white and Negro children should attend the same schools. During 1956, the same question was asked three times, and just under half the respondents were in favor of integrated schools, a far cry from the 89 per cent who favored equal educational opportunities for Negroes in the 1944 survey. Our interpretation of the NORC survey results is reinforced by a small study done in Indianapolis by Frank Westie. 4 Ninety-eight per cent of his respondents felt that "Children should have equal educational opportunities." However, only 79 per cent agreed with the statement, "I would not mind having Negro children attend the same school my children go to." One might well anticipate, in conformity with Myrdal's hypothesis, that such a suggestion would meet with less favor than would questions

⁴Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test," <u>Amer. Sociol. Rev</u>., 1965, <u>30</u> (August), 531.


on the general moral issue of equal education. Thus, while appearing favorable to Negro educational aspirations, many whites have responded in terms of separate but equal education for Negroes, despite the presently-defined illegality of such separation.

Since the 1950's, the major educational issue in the context of race relations has been that of school integration. Unfortunately, however, until 1963 measures of public opinion on this matter were largely limited to the 1942 and 1956 surveys already mentioned. One indication of the climate of opinion operating at the time of the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school desegregation is given by a 1950 Roper survey. 5 Almost three thousand respondents were asked, "Which of these statements would you come closest to agreeing with? (a) Children of all races and color should be allowed to go to the same schools together everywhere in the country, (b) Children of all races and color should be allowed to go to the same public schools together everywhere except in the South, where white and Negro children should go to separate schools. (c) White children and Negro children should be required to go to separate schools everywhere in the country." By 1950, integrated education was beginning to pick up adherents: 41 per cent were in favor of "the same schools together everywhere," and another 17 per cent in favor of the same schools "except in the South." These results are mirrored by the NORC survey findings of 1956. It is not clear exactly when a majority of white people came to accept these views, but over 60 per cent of the respondents to a 1963 survey agreed with the principle of integrated schools. The overall trend, then, has been in the direction of increasing acceptance of equal educational opportunities for Negroes.

Regional and educational differences in opinion among population subgroups are especially noteworthy. Regression lines showing such shifts, based on data from seven surveys conducted between 1956 and 1965, are given in Chart II.4, and actual data are given in Appendix Table 2. The most sizeable differences are between North and South, though educational differences are also considerable. This is hardly surprising in the light of the long history of school segregation in the South. At the same time, the apparent responsiveness of white northerners to integrated schools is open to some skepticism in view of the extent of de facto school segregation in northern cities. If nothing else, the survey results indicate growing public approval of the claim for shared educational facilities.

The increase over time in favorability to integrated education has proceeded in such a fashion that regional and educational groups remain differentiated in a stable fashion. Least favorable are southerners with a grade school

⁵The data reported here were tabulated by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, and it is not clear whether or not Negro respondents were included in the sample.



-26-

education or less, followed by southerners with a high school education, and by college-educated southerners. The same order of increasing favorability with increasing educational level is true for the North, as well. But the six subgroups under consideration remain far apart in outlook. By 1965, 53 per cent of southern whites with a college education approved of desegregation, a proportion similar to the northern grade school-educated in 1956. In other words, the most tolerant southerners have, as a group, only recently attained the level of tolerance manifested by the least tolerant northerners a decade ago.

Within these two broad regions, there are some differences in the relative differences of opinion between educational groups. For example, while differences are greatest in both regions between the college and grade school-educated, on the average they are greater in the South, where there may even be some movement to increasing differentiation. In the North, on the other hand, those with college and high school educations have tended to hold more similar viewpoints than in the South.

As a result of the greater spread between educational levels in the South, it is not surprising that, despite very large regional differences, we find somewhat less differentiation between the college-educated across regional lines than is true of those with less schooling. Opinion differences between northern and southern college-educated range between 30 and 48 percentage points; the range is 41 to 50 for those with a high school education and 39 to 47 for those with no more than a grade school education. There is some variation in the amount of difference between educational levels for each survey, but there is no discernible trend toward either greater or lesser regional difference.

The data summarized in Table II.1 show that, within either region, the group that was most favorable to desegregation in 1956 normally showed the greatest increase in favorability by 1965. This is true in all cases except college-educated northerners, who, with a favorability rate greater than 75 per cent in 1956, had an imminent ceiling on rate increase before achieving complete consensus.

TABLE II.1

NEGRO AND WHITE CHILDREN SHOULD GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS

(Per Cent Difference between 1956 and 1965)

Education	Region		
Education	South	North	
College	+27	+ 9	
High school	+21	+15	
Grade school or less	+17	+14	

While it is clear that the majority of southerners are still far from accepting the desirability of integrated schools, at least the momentum of change is greater in the South than in the North.

With All Deliberate Speed

The Supreme Court decision on school desegregation did not issue any directives for the implementation of new procedures. "The Court did not, as proposed by the department [of Justice], direct the lower courts to make local school authorities present desegregation plans within a specified time. It said only that the lower courts require a 'prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance.' The process of desegregation, the opinion concluded, must proceed 'with all deliberate speed'--a phrase first used in the Supreme Court in 1911, by Justice Holmes, and often invoked in recent years by Holmes's great admirer, Justice Frankfurter." No matter how hallowed by tradition, the language of the Court was to be a source of heartbreak and frustration to civil rights groups and to serve as a defense for the delaying tactics of recalcitrant states. But there was and is no question that social and administrative patterns passed down for generations are difficult to change, with or without "deliberate speed." Public recognition of the difficulties of effecting change, or at least of the reluctance to accept rapid change, is reflected in the answers to several questions asked by Roper and Gallup in 1956, 1957, 1958, and 1961.

The 1956 Roper question was as follows: "Now there have been a number of different viewpoints about the Supreme Court decision against separate schools for Negro students. Which of these comes closest to expressing your own personal opinion? (1) Negroes should go to the same schools that white children do, and separate schools should be done away with immediately in all parts of the country. (b) Every attempt should be made to do away with separate schools for Negro students, but a reasonable time should be given to work out the problem. (c) The time may come when Negro and white children should go to the same schools, but it will take years in some places and it shouldn't be pushed. (d) The Supreme Court decision was a mistake and white and Negro students should never be forced to go to the same schools."

The largest proportion, 31 per cent, felt that the Court decision had been a mistake. Twenty-three per cent were of the opinion that school integration, while desirable, would take many years and should not be pushed. Another 22 per cent wanted separate schools done away with, but agreed that "reasonable time" should be allowed for this. Altogether, then, 45 per cent opted for a

⁶Anthony Lewis and the <u>New York Times</u>, <u>Portrait of a Decade</u>, <u>The Second American Revolution</u> (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 30.

Roper Survey No. 64, September, 1956.

gradual approach to school integration. Only 12 per cent were in favor of immediate integration. $^{\mbox{\scriptsize 8}}$

In that same year, Gallup asked respondents a similar question, but allowed them only two alternatives: "(1) The government should try to bring about the integration of white and Negro children in public schools gradually—that is, over a long period of years. (2) The government should do everything it can to see that white and Negro children in all parts of the country go to the same public schools within the coming year." Although this survey did not provide a separate answer category for the possibility of a complete rejection of school integration, approximately 18 per cent volunteered that they never wanted integration to come about. Fifty—three per cent wanted gradual integration, and 18 per cent wanted it in the coming year.

In 1957, Gallup used a slightly different wording in a question on this subject: "Generally speaking, do you think segregation [sic--changed to integration] should be brought about gradually, or do you think every means should be used to bring it about in the near future?" Gradual integration was favored by 47 per cent; 20 per cent were totally opposed to integration; and 27 per cent thought it should be brought about in the near future. 10

In the following year, Gallup focussed directly on the situation in the South, explaining the extent of school segregation in a preamble. "In many communities in the Deep South states, the number of colored school children is greater than the number of white school children. Now the next question has to do with how much time the Federal courts should give schools in these areas to integrate, that is, to require white and colored children to attend the same rather than separate schools. Would you say that these communities in the South should be required to integrate immediately, should they be given a few years to do this, should they be given a longer time such as ten to twenty years, or should they not be required to integrate at all?" Immediate integration was selected by 27 per cent; 24 per cent hoped that the South would be given a few years to integrate; 9 per cent suggested from ten to twenty years; and 32 per cent were opposed altogether to integration. 11

Finally, in 1961, Gallup resumed asking about integration without reference to any particular region. The question, posed in still different terms, was, "Do you think integration--that is, bringing Negro and white children

 $^{^{8}}$ The remainder had no opinion.

 $^{^9\}mathrm{AIPO}$ release, May 9, 1956. The "gradual" and "never" categories are estimates. The sample presumably includes some Negroes.

¹⁰AIPO study 589-K, September, 1957.

¹¹AIPO study 604-K, September, 1958.

together in the schools--should be brought about gradually, or do you think every means should be used to bring it about in the near future?" Sixty-one per cent said that school integration should be gradual; 23 per cent thought it should occur in the near future; and 7 per cent volunteered that they believed that there should never be integration.

The purpose of presenting these data is to trace trends in opinion over time, but obviously this comparison is seriously limited by the changes in the wording of questions from one time to another. At best, a comparison of the proportions in favor of immediate integration can be made, as shown in Table II.2. While it would appear that there has been a slight upward trend in the proportions desiring immediate integration, it is preferable to interpret the findings as showing little or no change, since the changes in wording undoubtedly were responsible for some of the appearance of growing favorability to integration.

 $\mbox{ TABLE II.2} \\ \mbox{ PER CENT IN FAVOR OF IMMEDIATE SCHOOL INTEGRATION}^{\mbox{a}} \\$

Source	Per Cent
May, 1956: AIPO release, May 9, 1956	. 18
September, 1956: Roper survey 64	. 10
September, 1957: AIPO study 589-K	. 27
September, 1958: AIPO study 604-K	. 27
June, 1961: AIPO release, June 28, 1961 .	. 23

aSince the questions differed for each year, these data can only be treated as approximating a trend. The actual questions are reported in the text.

While the strongest opposition to immediate or even gradual school integration remains in the South, there are some interesting differences between educational levels in both regions of the country. Since our data are derived from three different questions, full distributions for each question, for each of the six subgroups involved, are presented in Table II.3. It is clear that almost all sentiment for immediate school integration is confined to the North. While education is normally a good predictor of attitudes toward Negroes, it does not serve to differentiate those in favor of immediate integration in the case of these three questions. Those with a college education either are not much different than others on this measure, or show an inverse relationship to wanting immediate desegregation.

 $^{^{12}\}mathrm{AIFO}$ release, June 28, 1961. Negroes are presumably included in these totals.

However, those with a college education are clearly differentiated from those with less education on measures of gradualism versus refusal to acknowledge the inevitability of desegregation. In both regions, the college-trained are clearly gradualists, while those who never want to see desegregation have grade school-training or less. The high school-educated tend to be more like the grade school educated on this issue. Responses to the 1957 question, which did not indicate the region at issue and offered a gradual solution as one of three alternatives show that gradualism was clearly the most favored alternative, with college trained in both North and South indistinguishable in this respect (65 per cent of both groups choosing a gradual solution). In the following year, when the question dealt specifically with the southern situation, the sharpest differences emerged between southerners with or without a college education. Half the college educated were in favor of gradual integration, and one-seventh even acknowledged the rightness of immediate integration. In contrast only 36 per cent were utterly opposed to integration in the South, compared to about 75 per cent with less than a college education. The data do not permit us to draw any conclusions

TABLE 11.3

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SPEED OF INTEGRATION, BY REGION AND EDUCATION, 1956-1958

(Per Cent White Respondents)

		Res	ion and	Educatio	n		
Survey		South			North		Total ^a
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
Roper #64, Sept., 1965: b Immediate	* 2 8 85 5	1 5 21 65 '8	1 19 31 46 2	13 17 19 30 21	13 28 28 21 10	11 41 36 8 4	10 21 23 34 14
N	(246)	(263)	(93)	(627)	(891)	(311)	(2,514)
AIPO #589-K, Sept., 1957	Ъ			, ,	, ,		, ,
Near future	4 18 68 10	7 39 52 2	5 65 23 7	38 39 12 11	33 52 9 6	29 65 4 2	27 47 20 6
N	(136)	(143)	(60)	(297)	(514)	(219)	(1,377)
AIPO #604-K, Sept., 1958 Immediately Few years 10-20 years Never No opinion	.b 6 9 7 74 4	6 9 6 77 1	14 38 12 36	35 14 4 33 14	32 30 11 19 8	28 41 13 12 6	27 25 9 32 8
N	(101)	(140)	(42)	(319)	(625)	(181)	(1,410)

^aTotal includes respondents for whom educational level was not known.

^bSee text for actual wording of questions.


about opinion trends for these different groups, but they do document the continuing significance, at least until 1958, of differences between regions and educational groups in their receptiveness to integration. In general, it is fair to conclude that immediate integration is still wanted by only a small minority of the population, even among the usually more liberal college-educated groups.

The Supreme Court and the Impact of Events

The law has been an important instrument in the struggle for full civil rights: In the decade between the Supreme Court decision of 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, increasing numbers of barriers to Negro participation in American society have been breached, if not yet overcome. These results have been achieved with painful slowness, sometimes accompanied by violence. The remark attributed to President Eisenhower, "You cannot change people's hearts merely by laws," has continued to have considerable significance to many people. Apart from some kind of unusually probing research to get at how people "really feel," we are left with the alternative of watching responses and listening to opinions. We know that the laws exist, that some institutional arrangements have already been changed, and that many people's behavior has been altered in ways that might not have been predicted. Our problem is to determine how people's opinions have been affected by these events, if at all.

An analysis of the interaction between events and opinions is aided by the repetition of a single question by the Gallup organization nine times between 1954 and 1961. The question asked, "The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation in the public schools is illegal. This means that all children, no matter what their race, must be allowed to go to the same schools. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision?"

In general, this report specifically avoids looking for particular causal factors involved in opinion fluctuations. An examination of responses to questions which have been repeated reveals that normally there is a cumulative effect, attributable to the passage of time and a combination of events, that leads to growing favorability to Negro aspirations. This general observation, then, provided one rationale for the presentation of data in the form of regression lines: Since the overall tendency is for opinions to move in a linear direction, such a presentation is most effective in illustrating the data. In the case of questions on the Supreme Court decision, however, linearity is not so clear-cut. Between 1954 and 1961 there certainly has been a trend to increasing favorability, as illustrated by Chart II.5. But equally noteworthy is the shallowness of the slope, b equal to 0.97, indicating a relatively small amount of change, and the dispersion of the actual results around the trend line. This latter finding, in particular, suggests that it would be worth considering the impact of specific events on fluctuations in opinion over short time periods.



Three distinctions were made in order to interpret the response to this question: the influence of the Supreme Court in general, the impact of the decision itself, and the impact of other events were differentiated.

The Supreme Court is a powerful segment of the political machinery of the United States government, participating in the process of political decision-making, though removed in important ways from the contamination of partisanship, and able to confer legitimacy on major social changes. The inviolate authority of the Court was reflected, during Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term as President, in the reluctance of public opinion to sanction an alteration of the Court, despite general support for the New Deal policies that were being thwarted by the Court. Direct evidence of the prestige of the justices themselves comes from NORC's 1947 and 1963 studies of occupational prestige, in which Supreme Court justice was rated as the occupation with most prestige from a list of ninety occupations. The combination of these indicators lends credence to the theory that a Supreme Court decision, from the very fact that it emanates from the Court, will elicit a considerable sentiment of approval. As a highly prestigious source of opinion, decisions of the Supreme Court should, independent of their content, result in a high measure of public acceptance. 16

While it is thus highly probable that actions of the Supreme Court will favorably influence public opinion, one cannot discount the possibility of reactionary effect. Two sources suggest this possibility: An early report on the effects of question wording concludes that a question stating that "a law must be changed in order to carry out a specified policy immediately creates a certain amount of opposition on the part of many people who would otherwise be in favor of the adoption of such a policy." While the examples cited in support of this statement may not be relevant to our question, they do introduce a cautionary note to our otherwise optimistic assessment of the nature of the Supreme Court's influence on public opinion. Further doubt is cast by an even more telling

¹³ Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy, The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," <u>Journal of Public Law</u>, 1958, <u>6</u>, 279-95; Charles L. Black, <u>The People and the Court</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

¹⁴ Frank V. Cantwell, "Public Opinion and the Legislative Process," Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., 1946, 55, 924-35.

¹⁵ Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-1963," Amer. J. Sociol., 1964, 30 (November), 286-302.

¹⁶ This is inferred from experimental evidence of the influence of "communicator credibility." See, for example, Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, Harold L. Kelley, <u>Communication and Persuasion</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 19-48.

¹⁷ Hadley Cantril, Gauging Public Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 43.

source--a Gallup poll that asked, "In general, what kind of a rating would you give the Supreme Court--excellent, good, fair, or poor?" Ten per cent answered, "excellent," 33 per cent, "good," 26 per cent, "fair," 15 per cent, "poor," and 16 per cent had no opinion. In other words, approximately equal proportions were favorable to or critical of the Court. While actual data were not reported, the release in question notes that the South is most critical, with about twice as many saying that the Court is fair or poor than saying that it is good or excellent. There is, then, some reason to believe that attitudes toward Supreme Court decisions will not be characterized by unqualified approval, and that there are likely to be significant differences among population groups in the way the Court is seen.

The 1954 decision, by virtue of the ensuing publicity and the expected far-reaching effects on major population groups, could be anticipated to have had a direct effect on public opinion. If the influence of the Supreme Court is found to be mainly in the direction of encouraging approval of its actions, then it follows that this particular decision should also have been received with favor. The model of change implied here is a simple, sequence-of-events model, in which alterations of opinion follow directly from a particular event. 19 It is necessary, in order to trace such a causal sequence, to have a prior measure of public opinion on the issue in question. Thus we would need data on public reactions to desegregation, or opinions on the desirability of desegregation immediately before the Court decision was handed down. Although such an initial bench mark is missing from our data, an attempt will be made to trace the probable relationship among events.

Ideally, a study describing the impact of events on opinions should try to duplicate the conditions of an experimental situation. This means not only having a measure of opinion prior to the event in question, but also controlling for the influence of extraneous factors. Since, in this case, there is no way of preventing possible contamination, and no method of evaluating the relevance or direction of influence of extraneous variables, we can only infer that the decision itself should elicit approval.

But what guidelines can be used to select other influential factors? For example, will public knowledge that some southern communities have subverted the decision lead to a hardening of opinion, with a majority in favor of implementing the decision, by a show of force if necessary? Or will obstinacy on the part of the South lead to general discouragement and a feeling of futility? Will

¹⁸AIPO release, August 30, 1963.

¹⁹ For a fuller discussion, see Mildred A. Schwartz, "Survey Research and the Study of Change" (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1965), p. 22.

²⁰Op. cit., pp. 13-15, 22.

evidence of increasing compliance with the decision mean that the general population will respond to it with growing approval?

Some clues to these questions might be found if a number of related questions used in the same surveys were available for study. But since questions were selected piecemeal, according to availability, this is not ordinarily possible. The one exception is a Gallup survey of September, 1957. Some review of the background against which the survey was conducted will be helpful.

The federal courts had approved a gradual program of school integration for Little Rock, Arkansas, beginning with the senior high school. On September 2, 1957, a day before classes were to begin, Governor Faubus announced that it would "not be possible to restore or maintain order if forcible integration is carried out tomorrow" and ordered the posting of National Guard troops outside the high school. The troops, he insisted, were to be neutral, but in fact they acted in support of segregationists. Mobs gathered outside the high school, in fulfillment of Faubus' prophecy, and prevented its integration. On September 20th, an injunction was issued against the governor, and the guardsmen were withdrawn. However, mobs once again formed outside the school, under the very noses of state and local police, when nine Negro children were admitted. The children were forced to withdraw. As a result of these events, President Eisenhower sent federal troops to Little Rock to protect the Negro population.

The Gallup survey was conducted after Faubus mobilized the National Guard but before the court injunction was issued. Table II.4 presents the responses given to three relevant questions concerning opinions of the Supreme Court decision, reactions to the suggestion that integration be put off for a year in Arkansas, and opinions of integration generally. For the present purposes, the most noteworthy finding is that, for each group considered, proportions in favor of a hard-line integration policy in Arkansas are consistently greater than those desiring integration some time in the near future. This is especially the case in the North. In addition, there appears to be a linear relationship between approving of the Court decision, wanting immediate integration in Arkansas (in the case of southerners), and taking a gradualist approach to integration generally (as contrasted with total opposition to integration). The inference is that southern opposition to integration is countered with some obstinacy on the part of the public generally, even when respondents themselves have only a limited commitment to integration. This slender evidence appears to indicate that when southerners have attempted to avoid school integration, especially through the use of violence, public opinion has generally reacted in a direction favorable to the Supreme Court action. However, by choosing to

 $^{^{21}}$ Quoted in Anthony Lewis and the New York Times, op. cit., p. 49. The following summary of events comes from this book as well.

TABLE II.4

ATTITUDES TOWARD ISSUES OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION, BY REGION AND EDUCATION (Percentage Distribution)

			Reg	ion and	Region and Education	uc		
School Integration Issue	a)		South			North		Tota1ª
		Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
Court has ruled illegal	that racial segregation in the Do you approve or disapprove							
Approve		9	13	22	56	7.1	78	54
Disapprove		93	82	7.0	37	22	19	40
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		_	2	8	7	7	e	9
the only solution to the present trouble in Arkansas would be to wait until next year Do you think they should wait or shoulthey admit the nine Negro children now?	e in Arkansas would be sy should wait or should							
Wait		27	34	50	24	23	25	26
Admit them now		7	13	17	26	62	99	49
No oninion		58	48	22	6	7	5	17
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		∞	9	11	1	∞	4	œ
Generally speaking, do you think desegregation should be brought about gradually, or do you think every means should be used to bring it about in the near future?	should be brought hould be used to							
Gradually		18	39	65	39	52	65,	47
Near future		4	7	5	38	33	29	26
Uppose integration		89	52	23	12	6	4	20
No opinion		10	2	7	11	9	2	7
		(136)	(143)	(09)	(297)	(514)	(219)	(1,377)
alncludes eight cases where education was not given; source.	n was not given: source.	ATPO ST	ATPO SHEETS NO	580-7	Contembor 17		1057	

Includes eight cases where education was not given; source: AIPO survey No. 589-K, September 17, 1957.

introduce only those events related to school questions, we may well be over-looking significant variables bearing on such opinions.

A closer look at the findings reported in Table II.4 leads to some nagging suspicions about the accuracy of our predictions. Compare the question on the Supreme Court with the one on integration generally. If we combine the categories of "gradually" and "near future" for the latter question, we find a larger proportion who felt that integration should eventually take place than who approved of the Supreme Court decision. The amount of difference is shown in Table II.5.

TABLE II.5

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PER CENTS FAVORING EVENTUAL INTEGRATION AND APPROVING OF SUPREME COURT DECISION

(Differences in Direction of Favoring Integration)

Education	South	North
Grade school or less .	+16	+21
High school	+23	+14
College	+48	+16

^aDer**i**ved from Table II.4.

The table also shows clearly that southerners with a college education are more accepting of the inevitability of school desegregation than are other whites living in their region. This implies that the Court decision has increased the feeling that integration will come about, no matter what delaying tactics are used. But it lays open to question our previous assumption that the decision would itself elicit public approval. There may exist a fairly widespread feeling that the Court made a decision that is unfortunate but is part of the law of the land, and that it is absurd to think that the law can be resisted successfully over any period of time.

This rather lengthy discussion of the probable effects of the Supreme Court decision on public opinion, and the probable impact of related events, provides a framework for viewing opinion trends. Some expectations about how trends should move, the sources of these expectations, and the very real difficulties involved in tracing possible influences on the direction of trends, have been made explicit. The trend data are presented in Table II.6, along with brief capsules of important events, selected because of their direct relation to education (with the exception of the 1957 Civil Rights Act) and because they received broad coverage by the mass media. As has already been suggested, the Court decision did not result in a high level of nationwide approval. But relatively tangential evidence indicates that it did have some impact on public opinion. In the 1950 Roper

TABLE II.6

A CHRONOLOGY OF CIVIL RIGHTS EVENTS AND TRENDS IN PER CENT APPROVING OF SUPREME COURT DECISION ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Survey or Release Date ^a	Per Cent Approving	Event
		May, 1954: Supreme Court school decision
July, 1954	54	
Мау, 1955	56	
		August, 1955: trouble in Hoxie, Arkansas, school
•		January 1956: southern governors agree on policy of "massive resistance"
February, 1956.	57	February, 1956: admission and expulsion of Autherine Lucy at University of Alabama
		September, 1956: violence in Clinton, Tennessee school; disturbances in school districts in Kentucky and Texas
	_	Congressional session, 1957: preliminaries to passage of Civil Rights Act
Мау, 1957	63	
August, 1957 .	58	August, 1957: passage of Civil Rights Act
September, 1957	56	September, 1957: Governor Faubus' prophecy of trouble in Little Rock
October, 1957 .	59	Later: federal troops sent to Little Rock
october, 1937 .	39	Throughout 1958: public schools closed in Virginia, Arkansas
		October, 1958: Clinton high school dynamited
		Summer, 1959: Prince Edward county schools closed
July, 1959	59	May, 1960: Civil Rights Act passed
	ì	November, 1960: New Orleans school troubles
		January, 1961: admission of Negroes to
		University of Georgia
June, 1961	62	

^aSources: AIPO No. 532-K (Jan., 1954); AIPO release, May 18, 1955; AIPO release, February 27, 1956; AIPO release, May 17, 1957; AIPO release, August 14, 1957; AIPO No. 589-K (September, 1957); AIPO release, December 2, 1957; AIPO release, July 3, 1959; AIPO release, June 23, 1961.

survey previously referred to, 41 per cent of respondents indicated that they favored integrated schools everywhere in the country. In the next year for which we have comparable information, 1956, about 49 per cent of the white population said that white and Negro children should go to the same schools. These survey results give some indication of the initial impact of the 1954 Court decision: The prevailing opinion climate seems to have been less favorable to school integration than it was to the Court decision. This is true at a later period as well—in 1956, Gallup found 57 per cent approving the decision, compared to the NORC finding of 49 per cent favoring integration that year.

The data on this Supreme Court decision as a factor influencing the favorability of opinions, however, do not account for the fluctuations over time seen in Table II.6. Overall, there has been a slight, but fairly regular, increase in public approval of school desegregation. Some increase may be due simply to growing compliance to a Court decision with revolutionary effects on American society. Although the prestige of the Court alone may not have been sufficient to carry with it large-scale public support, the impact of the decision on society, over time, has helped to convince some of the doubtful and to produce a cumulative effect.

Results from one survey to the next, while never dropping below the level of approval recorded in 1954, do drop from the high of 63 per cent in May of 1957. In two surveys conducted later that year, approval dropped a total of 7 percentage points. There is no ready explanation for the rise between February, 1956 and May, 1957 or for the decline noted in August and September of 1957. The events we chronicled in 1956--massive resistance and the expulsion of Authorine Lucy from the University of Alabama--either occurred or received publicity early in the year. They probably served to keep opinion measured in February at a conservative level. In September of 1956, there was some violence at Clinton High School in Tennessee, under the instigation of John Kasper, but the community's resistance to agitation was soon demonstrated through the vigorous action of its leaders. 22 Ten months later Kasper and his supporters were tried and convicted by a Knoxville, Tennessee court. This evidence of southern willingness to stand up to a segregationist agitation may have led to an increase in receptivity to school integration. For the rest of 1956, coverage of racial unrest by the mass media was not so extensive, since newsworthy events were occurring on the international scene, notably the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising. When Gallup interviewers asked a national sample to indicate the most important problem currently facing the nation, only 18 per cent mentioned civil rights, compared to 46 per cent who cited the threat of war, the Suez situation, and foreign policy. 23

²² Lewis <u>op cit</u>., pp. 37-42.

²³AIPO release, September 28, 1956.


These crises may have served to deflect attention from racial problems and to consolidate approval for domestic policies in the face of external threats. By August, however, civil rights issues were again back in the news, as the new Civil Rights Act became law. The September survey, conducted after Faubus had called in the National Guard in a move inflammatory of civil unrest, showed a 96 per cent public awareness of the troubles in Little Rock. This focus of attention on unrest, occurring even before the national publicity given to the second attempt at integration in Little Rock and the subsequent entry of federal troops, may have had a depressing effect on favorable opinions. In October, when federal troops were mobilized, approval of the Court decision rose by 3 per cent, perhaps reflecting increased public confidence that violence would not go unchecked.

Obviously these attempts to trace a connection between events and opinions are, at best, tenuous. The fluctuations are quite small and could easily be due to sampling variability or to the context in which the questions were asked. But if they do have a significance, some rationale for connecting them with the social milieu has at least been suggested. Moreover, the long-range trend to approval of the Court decision, while not pronounced, lends some credibility to the interrelations traced here. Clearly, none of this can be taken as an effective demonstration of the connections between events and opinions in the sense of the quasi-experiments or sequence-of-events models of change introduced at the outset of this discussion.

Much more impressive, from the point of view of clear-cut findings, is evidence of regional and educational differences in opinions. Such data are available for two points in time: June, 1954 and September, 1957. (See Chart II.6 and Appendix Table 3.) As we would expect, both studies show a great difference in the views of northerners and southerners. The difference between the most approving southerners (those with a college education) and the least approving northerners (those with a grade school education or less) was 23 percentage points in 1954 and 34 points in 1957. During this time, the trend in the South was to a decline in approval, especially among the college educated, and to a slight increase in the North, most noticeable for those with a high school education. Little Rock, then, may have been especially important in convincing southerners that the Supreme Court ruling permitting federal government intervention in the education of their children was very ill-advised. If anything, it had just the contrary effect on high school-educated northerners.

Would You Want Your Own Children . . .

Myrdal's critical observations of American society led him to conclude that Americans experience a basic ambivalence between society as it should be--incorporating the values of the founding fathers--and society as it is--functioning



with actualities of day-to-day existence. In a test of some of Myrdal's assumptions, Frank Westie asked respondents a series of questions, one set dealing with general values and the other with specific issues. 24 The general and specific statements dealing with education are especially pertinent. Ninety-eight per cent of the sample agreed with the general statement, "Children should have equal educational opportunities." Seventy-nine per cent said, "I would not mind having Negro children attend the same school my children go to." While there was a high level of agreement with both statements, the difference of 19 per cent is statistically significant. Both Myrdal's generalizations and Westie's limited research, then, suggest that it would be worthwhile to consider the difference in responses to questions dealing with normative ideals and those dealing with personal behavior.

Between 1954 and 1963, Gallup asked several questions about attitudes toward the attendance of the respondents' own children at schools with Negro children. The questions are not completely comparable, but they do permit some comparisons. In 1954 the question, "Would you object to having your children attend a school where the majority of pupils are Negroes?" was asked of all white respondents, regardless of whether or not they had school-aged children. In 1958 and 1963, however, the questions were addressed only to those with children at school. In order to achieve some measure of comparability, the 1954 question was tabulated only for those with children under twenty-one years of age and living in the same household with respondents. Fifty-five per cent of these said that they would object; 41 per cent said that they would not; and the remainder gave qualified answers or had no opinion.

In 1958 and 1963 Gallup asked the following series of questions of respondents with children in grade or high school: "Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are colored?" If the answer was "no," respondents were then asked this in terms of, "... where half of the children are colored?" If the answer was still "no," they were asked, "... where more than half of the children are colored?" Expense with children are colored? "25 We have tabulated the results by using the numbers with children in school as the percentage base for all parts of this question. As Table II.7 indicates, the proportions with no objection to their children attending integrated schools shrinks noticeably as the number of Negroes in the school increases. In 1963, for example, 76 per cent had no objection if there were only a few Negroes, but only 25 per cent would not object if more than half of the children were Negro.

²⁴Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test," <u>Amer. Sociol. Rev.</u>, 1965, <u>30</u> (August), 531.

 $^{^{25}}$ There is some evidence that interviewers did not exert scrupulous care in excluding respondents who, according to specifications, were not to be asked these questions.

TABLE II.7

WHITE PARENTS WITH NO OBJECTION TO THEIR OWN CHILDREN ATTENDING SCHOOL WITH NEGRO CHILDREN, DEPENDING ON THE NUMBERS OF NEGROES IN THE SCHOOL (Per Cent by Region and Education)

					·		
		Reg	gion and	Educatio	n		
Proportion Negro		South			North		Total
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
1958							
Few are colored a.	18	23	61	82	89	93	76
Half are colored .	16	12	31	57	58	56	:49
More than half are colored	8	11	23	41	30	30	32
N	(38)	(73)	(13)	(114)	(311)	(69)	(618)
1963							
Few are colored .	19	42	64	75	89	97	76
Half are colored .	8	15	41	47	56	69	47
More than half are colored	2	5	11	24	31	38	25
N	(109)	(172)	(70)	(237)	(639)	(192)	(1,419)

^aPercentages were calculated individually for each question asking responses to specified proportions of Negro children. The base used for calculating the percentage for each question is the number with children presently in elementary or high school.

Source: AIPO No. 604-K, September, 1958; AIPO No. 673-K, May, 1963.

This relationship holds true in both 1958 and 1963 and in both the North and the South. Normally, a lack of objection to having one's own children attend integrated schools is associated with higher levels of education. But differences between regions are more striking than those between educational levels. While the college-educated are more amenable to integration in both regions, the greatest contrast between the college educated and the remainder of the population exists in the South. As a result, cross-regional differences tend to be relatively less great among those with some college training. The sharpest differences between groups occurs in the South, in response to questions on children's school attendance with a few Negro children. In other words, resistance to even token school integration, if it involves the respondents' own children, remains adamant unless there has been some exposure to college education. In 1958, for example, 61 per cent of college-educated southerners had no objection to integrated

schooling if there were only a few Negroes, compared to 19 per cent of those with a grade school education having no objections. $^{26}\,$


In Charts II.7 and II.8, we have shown differences between the 1954 and 1963 data in terms of regression lines. ²⁷ The data were derived from questions asking about a majority, or more than half, Negro fellow students. There appears to be a slight trend to a dropping-off in lack of objections to having one's own children in the company of a majority of Negroes, and this is true for almost all subgroups. These results are open to some question, since the 1954 question is not identical to those asked in later years, and, more important, the population to which the question was addressed is not the same. Despite our attempt to overcome this latter difficulty by using as our percentage base in 1954 only those known to have children between the ages of five and twenty-one living at home, some distinction may still exist. Despite the lack of full comparability of 1954 figures with those of 1958 and 1963, results for these last two years also show a slight but consistent downward trend. There is, however, no trend in the amount of difference found between regions and educational levels.


The trend to declining personal acceptance of school integration is clear-cut for all groups except the college educated in both regions. In the case of the college educated, opinions are not particularly linear for the three measures available to us. Aside from the possibility of a greater sensitivity to changes in question wording among the better educated, the data suggest no reason for this difference.

Regardless of the degree of credence lent to the foregoing results, they do provide some interesting contrasts. Most notably, they indicate that the normative push toward school integration is still stronger than personal willingness to participate in school integration. The trends to increasing favorability to school integration as a desirable goal and to decreasing willingness to send one's own children to integrated schools is especially intriguing. The only explanation I would suggest is that exposure to the very real problems of integrated education have made more parents unwilling to risk the problems involved for their own children. This sentiment is by no means confined to the white population, and especially not to the white liberals excoriated by militant civil rights workers. For example, in a recent controversy about the expansion of public high school facilities, middle-class Negroes resident in the integrated Hyde Park

 $^{^{26}\}mathrm{While}$ only thirteen college-educated southerners had children in school in 1958, the same difference is found in 1963, when a more adequate sample was found.

 $^{$^{27}\!\!\}operatorname{Actual}$ data on which Chart II.8 is based can be found in Appendix Table 4.





community of Chicago frequently aligned themselves with their social-class confreres across racial lines.

Summary

As befits the importance of the issue of integrated education, this chapter has covered a wide variety of topics, ranging from perceptions of the educability of Negroes to willingness to send one's own children to predominantly Negro schools. It is hardly necessary to repeat the findings for these questions. But a number of clearly established response patterns are worth noting again.

In light of the history of the United States, it is hardly surprising that we find major differences in the outlooks of those living in the South as compared to the remainder of the country. But the consistency and range of opinion differences are surprising. For example, out of seventeen repeated questions, almost half show a difference of at least 40 per cent between North and South, a far greater difference between population groups than normally measured by opinion surveys. From the available questions, it is also clear which issues are associated with the greatest difference of opinion. Beliefs about Negro intelligence and personal preferences about school integration reveal relatively fewer regional differences. In the case of intelligence, this is due to sharply increasing beliefs, in both regions, that Negroes are as intelligent as whites. Preferences on sending one's own children to schools where Negroes are in a majority is not a welcome prospect anywhere, and residents of both North and South reveal a declining acceptance of this possibility. The sharpest regional divisions relate to the desirability of sending white and Negro children to the same schools and to the Supreme Court decision on school desegregation.

A step-like progression in the proportions favorable to Negro civil rights emerges from an examination of educational groups within and between regions. While there are some exceptions, it is usual for favorability to increase with education, first in the South and then in the North. In other words, southerners with grade schooling or less generally have the smallest proportion accepting progress on civil rights. At the opposite extreme are the college-educated northerners. In all the trend questions we have examined, while college-educated southerners usually appear to be the most tolerant in their region, they still fall behind the least tolerant northerners, those with only grade schooling or less.

An exception to the step-like pattern described above occurred in questions on intelligence. There the inclination was for those with high school education or less to believe most often that Negroes have the same intellectual capacity as whites. This may well be a consequence of experience. Since there are

fewer college educated in the population than those with less schooling, and since there is some tendency to equate intelligence with education, the college-educated respondent is less likely to be exposed to Negroes at his educational level. Those with less schooling are more likely to find Negroes with similar training and consequently to assume that Negroes are their intellectual equals. None of this, of course, says anything about the validity of either view.

Despite the existence of educational variations in outlook by region, each region displays considerable solidarity across educational lines. The one major exception emerges in the responses to questions on school integration. Whether or not white and Negro children should go to the same school sharply divides all population groups, first regionally, and then according to respondents' own educational levels. This seems to indicate public recognition of the crucial nature of a problem not yet resolved—advisability of integrated versus separate schools.

CHAPTER III

HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES

Recognition of Need

The likelihood that Negroes will have access to good schools and to a diversified job market is inseparably related to the area in which they live. As in the case of schools and other public facilities, the concept of "separate but equal" housing is, for the most part, a myth. The ability of Negroes to enjoy adequate housing is largely conditional on their having equal access to the available property.

For a long time it was possible for most white people to ignore Negro housing conditions since the numbers of Negroes living outside the southern states was small. The first sizeable migration northward, and westward, began during World War I, when, as the southern economy underwent changes displacing Negro farm labor, new occupational opportunities opened outside the South. High visibility did not occur until World War II and its aftermath when, by 1960, 40 per cent of all Negroes were living outside the South. Along with this change in regional distribution has come an even more drastic change toward urbanization. In 1910, 73 per cent of all Negroes were living in rural areas; in 1960, 73 per cent were in urban areas. This complete transformation in urban-rural residence patterns has been accompanied by a heavy population concentration in the central cities of a relatively few large metropolitan areas. 1

Concern with the limited opportunity for Negroes to find other than over-crowded and run down dwellings might, then, be expected to rise with this new distribution of the Negro population. The importance of segregated housing, both as a correlate of other kinds of segregation and as a concomitant of less than adequate housing, is only recently becoming of critical priority for the civil rights movement. Only recently did Martin Luther King, for example, divert his energies from ore pressing concerns to directly tackle housing problems in the urban North, beginning with Chicago. Rank-and-file Negroes, when asked to assess the relative importance of various civil rights, assigned the lowest priority to housing. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that national samples of the white

 $^{^{1}\}mathrm{Philip}$ M. Hauser, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of Negroes," <code>Daedalus</code>, 1965 (Fall), 847-77.

 $^{^2}$ See above, Chapter 1, Tables I.1 and I.2.

population have almost never been asked questions on the need for changes in Negro housing opportunities. But, in keeping with other responses to questions on Negro aspirations, we could well anticipate that whites would, at least in expressed opinion, turn a sympathetic eye to the plight of the Negro householder.

The little evidence we do have comes first from an NORC survey conducted in May, 1944. The sample, composed entirely of whites, was asked: "Do you think anything should be done about making it possible for Negroes to have better housing than most of them have now?" Sixty-nine per cent answered "yes," 22 per cent, "no," and the remainder had no opinion. Positive concern was related to respondents' education and regions of residence, with college education and northern residence both associated with a higher incidence of concern. Yet even in the case of groups characteristically least interested in Negro claims for equality-southerners with less than college training -- a majority felt that steps should be taken to improve Negro housing. The data are shown in Table III.1. Those who replied that something should be done were then asked for their suggestions. Most of the comments which followed were based on a sympathetic assessment of the Negro's plight. Forty-one per cent of the suggestions mentioned improvement through government housing projects, and 36 per cent thought that housing standards could be improved through laws. Relatively few of those who felt that something should be done about Negro housing put the onus for the existing housing problems on Negroes themselves. Only about 5 per cent of the suggestions mentioned that the solution lay in some form of continued segregation of Negro housing.

TABLE III.1

OPINIONS OF WHETHER ANYTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE NEGRO HOUSING^a

(Percentage Distribution--White Respondents)

Improvement of	Region and Education							
Negro Housing		South			North			
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College		
Something should be done	53	56	80	63	74	84		
Nothing should be done	34	32	17	23	19	14		
No opinion/qualified	13	12	3	14	7	2		
N	(247)	(230)	(144)	(671)	(830)	(391)		

^aSource: NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

Further recognition of the needs for improved housing may well exist, but these have not been tapped by public opinion polls. One additional, but sketchy piece of evidence comes from a survey conducted in 1963. The sample was restricted

to residents of Minnesota, a state where the ratio of Negroes to whites in 1960 was 1 to 151. Given the limited exposure of most whites to the problems of Negroes, it is still of some interest to see how Minnesotans responded to the issue of housing discrimination. Asked, "Do you think Negroes in Minnesota generally are treated fairly or unfairly when it comes to buying homes or renting apartments?" 47 per cent answered, "unfairly," and 33 per cent, "fairly." In the Twin Cities area, where most of the Negroes live, 59 per cent believed treatment was unfair. While this question is somewhat tangential, it does indicate white awareness of the limited housing opportunities for Negroes. In sum, however, the amount of data available is far from adequate, despite the pressing nature of housing problems.

Acceptability of Negro Neighbors

An awareness that Negroes do not enjoy adequate housing facilities and do not have equal access to the housing market is probably fairly widespread. But when Negro housing rights are presented in terms of accepting Negro neighbors, a new issue is raised. To begin with, evidence of contrasting values toward these issues is revealed in a study by Frank Westie. At one point in his interview, Westie postulated, "Under our democratic system people should be allowed to live where they please if they can afford it." Sixty per cent agreed with this statement, and 34 per cent disagreed. But at a later point, when the same respondents were presented with the statement, "I would be willing to have a Negro family live next door to me," only 38 per cent agreed, and 54 per cent disagreed. 4 This turnabout in views is indicative of the threat that many whites feel in the face of more intimate contacts with Negroes as compared to their general willingness to accede to the legitimacy of Negro wants. Housing, along with the education of children, remains a peculiarly emotional issue. In the case of housing, home ownership in particular is evaluated as a fundamental right of Americans and anything that would threaten its value, be it financial or symbolic, elicits a violent reaction. Numerous cases of panic reactions to the movement of Negroes into previously all-white areas, despite the lack of evidence that such Negro homeowners or tenants will depreciate property values, 5 lend substance to our characterization of potential contacts with Negro neighbors as a highly emotional issue. The issues at stake are succinctly presented by one informant in a recent study of integrated neighborhoods:

Minnesota Poll, September, 1963.

⁴Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test," Amer. Soc. Rev., 1965, 30 (August), 532.

⁵Luigi Laurenti, <u>Property Values and Race</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).


No matter how liberal you think people are, no matter what pledge cards they sign or organizations they join, a funny thing comes over them when they hear that the first Negro family is going to move into their neighborhood. Some of them get scared. In this case [i.e., of the communities in question], not of the color of the skins--we've had every shade of skin in our pool for years and years. Plenty of all-races parties and friends here. It's their investment, their equity. They see themselves robbed of a valuable piece of property.


Questions from national samples on the acceptability of Negro neighbors have been worded in terms of contact next door, on the same block, or in the same neighborhood. Most of the questions asked by NORC have focussed on the block context. Once in 1942, once in 1956, twice in 1963, once in 1964, and once in 1965 NORC asked the question: "If a Negro with the same income and education as you have, moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?" As seen in Chart III.1, there has been a steady growth in the proportion of whites who answered that it would make no difference or who had some definite positive response to this eventuality. By 1956 a small majority was of this view, and the proportion had increased to two-thirds by 1965. In other words, Negroes of the same social—class background are increasingly acceptable to a majority of the population, despite expectations of the prevalence of sentiments of exclusiveness.

Trends found for the total white population apply, though less evenly, to the six subgroups upon which we have been focussing. They are shown as regression lines in Chart III.2, and the percentage distribution is given in Appendix Table 5. While the 1942 data are not available for subgroups, data from 1956 through 1965 indicate that the sharpest rise in favorability occurred among the college educated. In both regions, the college educated have become increasingly differentiated from their less well-educated regional counterparts. This does not, of course, gainsay the considerable significance of regional differences even among the college trained.

Most studies show the most racially prejudiced group to be those with a grade school education or less. In this case, however, it is southerners with a high school education who are most reluctant to accept Negroes as neighbors. A marked upsurge in opinions favorable to neighborhood integration occurred among this group in 1963, according to our survey, but since then the move has been away from this position. It may be that the high school-educated southerner has made the greatest relative investment in a move to an all-white neighborhood, and consequently reacts most negatively to the possibility of change. In the South, although segregated areas have long existed, it has not been unusual for Negro and white housing to be intermixed and differentiated only by the type

⁶Seymour Sudman and Norman Bradburn, <u>Social Psychological Factors in Intergroup Housing</u> (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1966), p. 86.





of house and accoutrements. But with the recent growth of suburbs around southern cities, patterns formerly more characteristic of the North have been repeated, with all-white suburbs the rule. It might be anticipated, then, that when those with a high school education move into such suburbs, the high costs involved would be sufficient to produce great anxiety about maintaining the segregated character of the neighborhood. Although this possibility cannot be demonstrated from the data, it seems a reasonable conjecture. Nevertheless, it is striking that, by 1965, only high school-educated southerners varied from the majority to whom Negro neighbors would "make no difference." In the North, between 1963 and 1964, there was a tendency for those with college training to be most tolerant of Negro neighbors. But by 1965 this view had spread to other educational levels, and only minor differences existed among northerners according to the extent of their schooling.

In 1948 and again in 1949, 7 questions on neighborhood composition were asked in two Roper surveys. In both cases respondents were presented with a list of eight racial, religious and national groups, among which Negroes were included. The general question first asked was, "Would you prefer not to have any of these kinds of people move into your neighborhood to live, or would it make no difference to you?" All those who expressed some prejudice were then asked, "Which kinds of people would you prefer not to move into your neighborhood? Any other?" While this study has no interest in any groups other than Negro, we should make clear that Negroes were mentioned about twice as frequently as any other group. Results for the second question asked in consecutive years are similar. Using as the percentage base only those who had expressed a prejudice against all eight groups listed in the first question, we find that 92 per cent in 1948 and 91 per cent in 1949 preferred not to have Negroes move into their neighborhood. If the total sample is used as a base, then anti-Negro feelings were expressed by 62 per cent in 1948 and by 42 per cent in 1949. The first set of percentages clearly shows that respondents who indicated that they did not wish to live among diverse groups were objecting mainly to Negroes. The decrease in anti-Negro feelings for the total sample, from 1948 to 1949, is, unfortunately, not as easy to account for. A similar drop was found for two related questions asked in the same surveys--one on job contact and the other on inviting Negroes home for dinner. Since no plausible reason for these changes is suggested by the events of the time, it seems likely that they were effected by the context in which questions were asked and by possible changes in the sampling frame. For these reasons, we hesitate to compare the Roper findings with those from NORC surveys. Otherwise, responses to the possibility of Negroes

 $^{^{7}\}mathrm{Roper}$ Fortune Survey No. 69, September, 1948, and Roper Commercial Survey No. 36, October, 1949. Tabulations were made by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

in the same neighborhood might have been expected to be similar to responses on Negroes in the same block.

Finally, there are some scattered data on the acceptability of Negroes as next-door neighbors. The first available item is a question by NORC, asked in May, 1944: "Would it make any difference to you if a Negro family moved in next door to you?" Of the total sample of whites, 69 per cent said it would make a difference and 22 per cent said it would not. In both North and South, educational differences between respondents were minor; the critical differences were regional ones. As would be expected, northerners were more open to the possibility of Negro neighbors than were southerners, but still no more than one-quarter felt that it would make no difference.

Although the questions are not completely comparable, published results from two Louis Harris surveys, which were part of a series on contact with Negroes, indicate that in 1963, 51 per cent of respondents said they would object to having Negroes as next-door neighbors, and in 1965, 37 per cent would object.

These varied data show that there has been a trend to growing acceptance to Negro neighbors, but they cannot readily be compared to each other. Not only are the questions worded differently, but the proportions favorable to Negroes are not always given. Questions dealing with Negroes living on the same block and in the same neighborhood probably suggest similar situations to most respondents. But questions about having Negroes as next-door neighbors refer to a form of contact that immediately suggests the possibilities of greater social intimacy as a result of proximity, and there is likely to be more resistance to this.

Responses to Negro Neighbors

The preceding questions dealt with white attitudes to Negro housing. The data reveal increasing acknowledgment of Negro problems and a growing willingness to at least tolerate Negro neighbors. What should now be considered are issues more closely related to the actual behavior of whites in this area. While expressed sentiments of commiseration or of tolerance may indicate increasing sympathy to Negroes, actual behavior may be quite different. Our data do not provide direct measures of behavioral reactions to the integration of previously all-white areas. But responses to a series of questions discussed below do give us at least a rough measure of probable behavior under such circumstances.

There has always been considerable sentiment in favor of formal or informal ways of restricting the freedom of Negroes to live where they please. In 1939, Roper asked the following question: "Do you think [that] (a) there

⁸The Harris Survey, published in the <u>Washington Post</u>, October 18, 1965.

should be laws compelling Negroes to live in certain districts; or (b) there should be no laws, but there should be an unwritten understanding, backed up by social pressure, to keep Negroes out of the neighborhood where white people live; or (c) Negroes should be allowed to live wherever they want to live, and there should be no laws or social pressures to keep them from it?" Only 13 per cent thought that Negroes should have the right to live wherever they wanted. Forty-one per cent wanted legal restrictions on housing, and 42 per cent wanted unwritten understandings.

In a 1963 survey, NORC asked white respondents their reactions to a series of statements about Negro-white relations. One-quarter of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, "White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes should respect that right." While lines were less sharply drawn in 1963 than in 1939, a majority still agreed, either strongly or slightly, that whites had a right to restrict the movement of Negroes in the housing market.

We have no data on population differences for the 1939 question, but in 1963 there were sharp distinctions between regions and educational levels. Regional opinion differences are not uncommon and have been found whenever data were differentiated by region. What is unusual is the extent of difference among educational levels in the North. For example, Table III.2 shows the contrast between northerners with college training and those with only grade school education or less. Sixty per cent of the former group disagree that whites have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods, while 68 per cent of the latter group agree with this statement. In this instance, also, the least prejudiced group in the South--educated southerners--expressed opinions at least comparable to some segments of the North, namely, grade school-educated northerners.

Despite the growth of favorability to the aspirations of Negroes, then, there remain strong attitudes of defensiveness against a perceived threat to the integrity of white housing. This defensiveness is strongest among the least educated, who presumably also have the smallest monetary investment in housing. Perhaps housing represents a much greater share of their total income than it does for the prosperous college-educated group. Moreover, the possibility of a Negro influx may well seem much more likely in their neighborhood than in higher-priced areas.

Data from the 1939 question show that Americans were even then not especially eager for legal protection against integration of their neighborhoods.

⁹Roper Fortune Survey No. 9, September, 1939. Results are based on a sample of 5,146 respondents. Data were tabulated by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

While they did not completely discount legal devices, they expressed preference for an informal enforcement of exclusiveness by whites. Comparable data on present attitudes are not available, but we would suppose that there is now even greater preference for informal mechanisms to prevent the free movement of Negroes in the housing market. But whether or not legal means were favored, from 1939 to 1963, a majority of whites acclaimed their rights to segregated housing, at the same time as they acknowledged the complaints of Negroes and indicated their own willingness to accept Negroes as neighbors.

TABLE III.2 $\begin{tabular}{llll} \textbf{OPINIONS} & \textbf{ON} & \textbf{WHETHER} & \textbf{WHITES} & \textbf{HAVE} & \textbf{A} & \textbf{RIGHT} & \textbf{TO} & \textbf{KEEP} & \textbf{NEGROES} & \textbf{OUT} \\ \textbf{OF} & \textbf{THEIR} & \textbf{NEIGHBORHOOD}^{\textbf{A}} \\ \end{tabular}$

(Percentage Distribution by Region and Education)

	Region and Education							
Whites Have a Right To Keep Negroes Out of Their		South			North			
Neighborhood	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College		
Agree strongly	68	53	43	48	30	21		
Agree slightly	21	23	25	20	22	17		
Disagree slightly	8	15	15	11	27	27		
Disagree strongly	3	8	16	19	19	33		
No opinion/no answer	-	2	1	. 2	2	2		
N	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)		

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

It is difficult to estimate how neighborhood contacts with Negroes affect these opinions. To add to the difficulty, there is no real agreement on what is meant by an integrated neighborhood. Two definitions are current. One defines an integrated neighborhood as having a certain proportion of whites to Negroes. But there is no unequivocal statement of what this proportion is. Another view defines integration operationally, in terms of the continued movement of whites into a given neighborhood. Thus, if only Negroes are moving into a white neighborhood, and whites are moving out, the neighborhood will become racially segregated in short order. The problem here is that of deciding how many whites moving in are sufficient to provide for neighborhood stability. Most observers would agree, however, that only a small minority of white Americans live in integrated neighborhoods. Moreover, despite early moves of the federal government to implement civil rights, governmental policy long promoted segregation in housing; therefore recent efforts to undo this have thus far had only minor impact.

 $^{^{10}\}mathrm{Charles}$ Abrams, "The Housing Problem and the Negro," <u>Daedalus</u>, 1966 (Winter), 64-76.

The transformation of all-white neighborhoods into all-Negro ones can take place rapidly, when white residents panic or are frightened by the activities of unscrupulous realtors. 11 Although none of the surveys we are dealing with provides evidence of such behavior, there are two interesting items of related information. Results are shown in Table III.3, and indicate that, while only a minority of white Americans were living on the same block as Negroes in 1965, a considerably larger proportion had done so in the past. The data are also indicative of the growing housing segregation in the South. Formerly, when status differences between whites and Negroes were unequivocal, there was little danger of status loss for whites from proximity to Negroes. In addition, it had been customary in the South for servants to live in alleys and byways close to white mansions. But recently-burgeoning suburbs in the South, as well as in the North, have provided exclusive havens for white residents. We can then interpret the greater past experience of living close to Negroes as reflecting different kinds of housing patterns. While our data neither confirm nor deny this interpretation, it is also likely that some of the previous contacts provided the impetus for movement away from a neighborhood.

TABLE III.3

HAVE YOU YOURSELF EVER HAD A NEGRO FAMILY LIVING ON THE SAME BLOCK AS YOU?

(Percentage Distribution by Region and Education)

Noone Barrian Time	Region and Education									
Negro Family Lived on Same Block		South			North					
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College				
Yes, live there now	6	3	5	15	10	15				
Yes, used to	21	27	14	24	25	22				
No, never	73	70	81	. 61	65	64				
N	(101)	(157)	(86)	(205)	(480)	(258)				

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-857, June, 1965.

Our second item of information on actual behavior is even more limited in scope. It comes from a study of St. Louis, primarily designed to discover


¹¹ For evidence from a number of communities see, Eleanor Leacock, Martin Deutsch and Joshua Fishman, <u>Integration in Suburban Housing</u> (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 1965); Eleanor Caplan and Eleanor Wolf, "Factors Affecting Racial Change in Two Middle Income Housing Areas," <u>Phylon</u>, 1960, <u>21</u> (Fall), 225-33; Eleanor Wolf, "The Invasion-Succession Sequence as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," <u>Journal of Social Issues</u>, 1947, <u>13</u>, 7-20.

concerns about air pollution. 12 Since these concerns were plotted in relation to a number of other community problems, the relative importance of racial problems with respect to housing can be assessed. The question posed was, "Have you ever moved from one neighborhood to another because of any of these problems?" ... (a) Recreation areas and programs? (b) Unemployment? (c) Air pollution? (d) Race problems? (e) Garbage and refuse collection and disposal? (f) Juvenile delinquency?" Responses given by whites ranged from less than 1 per cent for garbage disposal to 9 per cent for race problems. The frequency with which remaining problems were mentioned was 6 per cent for unemployment, 4 per cent for air pollution, 3 per cent for juvenile delinquency, and 2 per cent for recreation.

Slight differences among educational levels of those who mentioned race problems as a causative factor were noted. Nine per cent of those with grade schooling or less, 10 per cent of those with high schooling, and only 5 per cent of those with a college education felt that race problems had been the cause of their moving. While it cannot be argued that St. Louis is a typical example, answers to these questions give a rough indication of how residents of a large urban community respond to Negro neighbors. We have, of course, no idea of the nature of the problem. For some, it may have been simply the one or two Negro families moving in. Others may have objected not so much to the migration of Negroes but rather to changes in the racial composition of the schools to which they sent their children. Still others may have associated their new Negro neighbors with an increase in crime, especially crimes of violence. But whatever the nature of the race problem, by 1963 for at least one city, relatively few respondents said that race per se had led them to move. Yet race emerged in this study as the most prominent cause of white migration away from a particular locale.

Probable responses to Negro neighbors have been tackled most directly by two Gallup questions, both asked in September of 1958, in May of 1963, and in May of 1965. The first of these was, "If colored people came to live next door, would you move?" Between 1958 and 1963, there was almost no difference in the proportions who said they would not move under these circumstances. By the time of the 1965 survey, however, there had been a 10 per cent increase in those willing to accept Negro next-door neighbors, the proportion rising from 55 to 65 per cent. The results can be plotted along a trend line, as in Chart III.3, but they do not fit a straight line too well, as shown by plotting the actual findings. But available measures are few and the time spanned is short. Probably most noteworthy is the similarity in trends between this question and the NORC

¹² Public Administration and Metropolitan Affairs Program, Southern Illinois University, "Public Awareness and Concern with Air Pollution in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area," <u>Research and Information Monograph</u>: Report No. RI-3, March, 1964. Data come from NORC Survey No. 472.




question shown in Chart III.1, on whether it would make a difference if Negroes came to live on the same block. Both question forms apparently derive from a single attitude dimension—a general willingness to accept one or more Negro neighbors who, extrapolating from the NORC question, would be likely to be similar to the respondent in socio-economic status.

For the 1958 and 1963 questions, data on region and education are shown in Chart III.4. While this chart is based on the actual percentage distribution of responses, Appendix Table 6 has been constructed to facilitate reading the results. The distribution of responses reported in Chart III.4 differs from the more customary pattern of response revealed in Chart III.2. There, North and South remained divided, while differences between educational groups were most distinct in the South. In the North, the grade and high school educated were quite similar. Of course, these results are based on regression equations rather than on raw data, and this undoubtedly introduces some distortion. But checking the standard errors and the actual data show that, in fact, there is little distorting effect except in the case of high school-educated southerners, wherein the 1963 and 1964 surveys--respondents were less favorable to integrated housing than was predicted. In response to the question of possible reactions to Negro next-door neighbors, however, the pattern is quite erratic. For example, between the two time periods, college-educated northerners increased their acceptance of Negroes but the high school-educated northerners decreased in acceptance. Responses of high school-educated southerners remained unchanged, but the college trained increased quite sharply in favorability to Negro neighbors. In view of the unevenness of opinion changes, the lack of comparability to Chart III.2 and divergence from the customary step-like pattern of trends across regional and educational lines, data in Chart III.4 seem especially questionable.

We have only one possible explanation for some of the unevenness, primarily the low level of approval among college-educated southerners in 1958. The context in which the question was asked may have influenced results, since the immediately preceding question was, "Do you approve or disapprove of marriages between white and colored people?" Racial intermarriage is a highly emotionally charged issue, and one to which even those otherwise favorably disposed to Negro aspirations respond with disfavor. Attitudes toward intermarriage were found to be the second lowest ranking item on an eight-item scale, ranking from most to least favorable. ¹³ In the 1958 Gallup study in question, attitudes toward intermarriage were even more extreme. Almost every respondent interviewed in the South disapproved of Negro and white intermarriage. Feelings in the North were

¹³ Donald J. Treiman, "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice," Amer. J. Sociol., 1966, 71 (May), 651-64. The analysis was based on NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.




not much different, with 95 per cent of those with less than college education disapproving and 77 per cent of the college trained opposed to intermarriage. In the light of such widespread disapproval it is not surprising, then, that feelings about intermarriage might have spilled over to feelings about Negroes as next-door neighbors. The 1963 question was not asked in a completely neutral context, but the questions preceding it were more neutral, related ones about sending children to schools in which there were varying proportions of Negro students. This contextual explanation is not offered as conclusive, since it is not clear why it should have affected some groups more than others, and why it should even appear to have contrary effects on some groups (e.g., the more favorable attitudes of the high school-educated northerners in 1958 than in 1963).


The second direct question on probable behavioral responses, asked on the same three Gallup surveys, was, "Would you move if colored people came to live in great numbers in your neighborhood?" While here too, as shown in Chart III.5, there is a moderate trend to increasing acceptability of even large numbers of Negro neighbors, less than one-third of the white respondents held this view by 1965. There are, again, only two points in time when data are available for regional and educational subgroups. (See Chart III.6 and Appendix Table 7.) In neither region is there a distinct trend to increased favorability to Negro neighbors. College-educated northerners emerge as the most favorable. Attitudes in the South are probably fairly stable, despite a noticeable increase in acceptance of Negroes among the college educated. But, as in the question on a Negro next-door neighbor, the college-educated response was at an unusually low level in 1958, and by 1963 was probably measured at a level closer to the norm.

Summary

The problem of establishing adequate housing for Negroes is a pressing national concern. Solution of this problem is confounded by the widespread practice of residential segregation that restricts open access to the housing market. For example, in a survey of 221 cities, it was found that in 56 per cent of the cases, Negroes were permitted to live in only one or a few residential areas. 14 Despite the importance of the problem, there is little available information on the extent of public concern about Negro housing opportunities. Normative questions, directed to what the state of affairs should be, are totally unavailable. Thus our discussion has been confined mainly to situations of contact with Negro neighbors, either actual or potential.

^{14&}lt;sub>This</sub> study was done by a research team at Cornell University in the early 1950's. The sample of cities was apparently biased in favor of the large northern cities. See Robin M. Williams, Jr., <u>Strangers Next Door</u> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 130.





The public opinion data we examined revealed that there is a growing willingness to accept Negro neighbors with similar socio-economic characteristics. The potential acceptability of Negroes even extends to next-door neighbors. But resistance to the possibility of living among large numbers of Negroes remains widespread.

As was the case of educational issues, the major differences of opinion on housing integration were found to have a regional origin, differentiating southerners from the rest of the nation. No evidence of a trend to declining differences between North and South was uncovered.

In the preceding chapter on education, a step-like pattern in the distribution of responses most favorable to Negro rights was revealed. Within regions, beginning in the South, increased education was normally associated with greater proportions accepting Negro claims to equality. A similar pattern was displayed in the questions on housing, but with considerably greater variability. Most notably, high school-educated southerners proved most resistant to accepting Negro neighbors. Other divergences from the usual pattern were described, but these were less easy to account for.

CHAPTER IV

VIEWS OF DISCRIMINATION IN OTHER AREAS

Job Opportunities

What should be the priority criterion in a discussion of civil rights issues? In our examination of education and housing, up to this point we have been guided primarily by what are known to be important issues both to whites and Negroes, and by the public opinion data available. But in considering trends in opinions about jobs for Negroes, a disappointing lack of material was encountered. This is especially unfortunate because of the importance of equal job opportunities to Negroes. As was shown in Tables I.1 and I.2, Negroes interviewed in two NORC studies assigned top priority to job opportunities. The acuteness of the Negro job problem is emphasized by unemployment. While the unemployment rate among whites in non-farm industries was 4.6 per cent in 1960, it was 8.3 per cent for non-whites. 1 The meagreness of data on which the following discussion is based can hardly be attributed to lack of salience. It is probably due more to the perspective of the white community. Unlike other issues that we have discussed in some detail, many whites are not directly affected by equal employment opportunities. If only from the viewpoint of our objective--to trace trends in white opinions -- we must conclude that this lack of white interest has been unfortunate.

Perception of discrimination.—Perception of the inequities which Negroes suffer in the job world is not especially widespread. In 1944, when whites were asked, "Do you think Negroes have the same chance as white people to make a good living in this country?" 50 per cent answered in the affirmative, and 41 per cent in the negative. Later in the same survey, the focus was shifted directly to jobs, and the question asked was, "Do you feel that Negroes in the United States have just as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job?" Twenty-one per cent thought that they did, and 71 per cent thought that they did not. In other words, a considerably larger majority thought that Negroes had equal chances for earnings than thought that they had equal job opportunities.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Employment, Income, and the Ordeal of the Negro Family," <u>Daedalus</u>, 1965 (Fall), 749. While reference is to non-whites, there is evidence that the unemployed among this group are mainly Negroes. If anything, Negro unemployment rates are probably higher than those reported.

 $^{2}$ The remainder gave qualified answers or had no opinion. Data are from NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

A second question on job opportunities was asked in 1963, but this time in terms of the respondent's community rather than the country as a whole. Forty-three per cent of respondents replied that Negroes had as good a chance as whites to get any kind of job, but 48 per cent thought that they did not. Additional information comes from a 1964 survey of white Californians, in which the question asked was, "Do you feel that Negroes are denied job opportunities in California?" In this instance, 33 per cent felt that Negroes were denied opportunities, and 53 per cent said that they were not. 4 On the basis of the last three questions, some trend away from perception of job inequalities can be detected. At present, the majority of the white community is of the view that job opportunities for Negroes are equal to those for whites. Comparatively more whites were perceptive of the inequalities faced by Negroes in education and housing. It is difficult to say how accurately the public generally evaluates the restrictions on full participation by Negroes in the labor market, especially since considerable progress in removing barriers to participation has been made through legislative and educational efforts. Perhaps the ethic of the desirability of hard work, and the belief that rewards will automatically follow, prevent many whites from understanding the limited job opportunities of Negroes.

Regional and educational breakdowns are available only for the two questions asked in 1944 (see Table IV.1). While they do not permit any further analysis of trends, these data do allow us to compare differences in response to the two questions. In both regions, increased education goes along with increased awareness of Negro disadvantages. Only the college educated recognize that Negroes have fewer opportunities to earn a good living, and this is especially prominent in the North. As might be expected from the overall results, much larger proportions of all groups perceive that Negroes have limited job opportunities. Perception of such limitations appears to be strongly affected by the educational level of respondents, so that differences are greater within regions than among educational groups across regions. To some extent, this is also true for the question on earning a living. The overlap in regional differences in perception of job opportunities anticipates findings reported in the following section, where those most likely to be threatened by job competition from Negroes are least willing to feel that Negroes should have equal job opportunities. It is this same population-the undereducated--who are also least willing to recognize that Negroes do, in fact, suffer from job discrimination.

 $^{^3}$ AIPO release, July 20, 1963. Since Negroes were included in this sample, white awareness of limited opportunities was probably less than indicated by these data.

⁴The California Poll, May 21, 1964.

TABLE IV.1

PER CENT WHO THINK NEGROES DO NOT HAVE SAME OPPORTUNITIES


AS WHITE PEOPLE²


		Region and Education							
Negro Opportunities		South			North				
	Grade	South North High College Grade High College 29 53 31 42 67 81 61 77	College						
Not as good chance to earn a living	20	29	53	31	42	72			
Not as good chance to get any kind of job .	50	67	81	61	77	89			
N	(247)	(230)	(144)	(671)	(830)	(391)			

^aSource: NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

Differences among educational levels in the assessment of Negro opportunities point out an additional factor about the significance of perceptual experience. The grade school educated are more likely to have direct experience of, if not personal contact with, Negroes holding jobs similar to their own. In contrast, the college educated, who are normally employed in business and the professions, rarely see Negroes in job situations comparable to their own. It is not surprising, then, that they frequently evaluate the Negro's overall economic position as inferior to that of whites, although they generally hold more favorable opinions. The more prejudiced grade school-educated group, in contrast, comes in contact with many Negroes who attain jobs and earnings similar to their own, and their perception of Negroes as no more limited in opportunities than they are themselves is thus reinforced.

Evaluation of equal opportunity. -- In 1944, 1946, and 1963, white respondents were asked to evaluate the desirability of equal job access for Negroes. The question was, "Do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?" Results are presented in the regression line in Chart IV.1; actual distributions of responses appear on the chart as points plotted around the regression line. In either case, a major shift in opinions is evident in the less than twenty years spanned. During that time, acceptance of the legitimacy of Negro claims to equal job opportunities rose from over 40 per cent of the white population to over 80 per cent. Thus, despite a persistent tendency to view the job situation more optimistically than is probably warranted, whites are increasingly convinced that universalistic standards should apply to job competition.





Data on trends among regional and educational groups for the three surveys reported are shown in Chart IV.2 as regression lines, and actual data are presented in Appendix Table 8. Several interesting observations can be made on the basis of both the table and the chart. For one thing, majorities of all groups, including 62 per cent of the usually most prejudiced group--grade schooleducated southerners--had come to accept the desirability of equal opportunity by 1963. In the time covered by the surveys, there was also a movement to declining interregional differences among educational groups. This movement was accompanied by a phenomenon not previously witnessed on trend questions--a cross-over from one region to another. For the first time in trend data, a group in one region resembled its counterpart in another region more than it did its regional confreres. Specifically, grade school-educated northerners, while beginning at a level slightly lower than college-educated southerners (39 per cent versus 42 per cent in favor of equal opportunity), moved to a percentage of favorability more like that of grade school-educated southerners than like any other regional or educational group. While grade school-educated northerners still favored Negroes' having equal access to jobs in 71 per cent of the cases in 1963, the acceptance of universalistic criteria in the job market had become so widespread by that time that even this high level of favorability to equal rights was not sufficient to eclipse educational differences across regions. Altogether, then, those with less than a high school education in both North and South have become more sharply differentiated from those with more schooling. In the earlier surveys, differences were greatest between the college educated and the remainder, especially in the South. In 1963, however, the high school and college educated were much closer together in viewpoint.

Chart IV.2 illustrates two themes. One is an unusually strong trend to favoring equal job opportunities for Negroes when these are presented in normative terms. Regardless of personal feelings about Negroes, it has become increasingly difficult for most Americans to justify special job treatment for whites simply on the basis of their color. The second theme is the evidence of continuing resistance to an open job market, now confined to the minority of those most likely to experience competition from Negroes, given the present level of Negro training. The threat of increased competition for the segment of the population faced with a constricting labor market was apparently a factor contributing to their continual resistance to equal job opportunities.

On-the-job contacts.--Opinions about job contacts with Negroes have not been broadly explored, and national information is available only up to 1949. Although sketchy, this information permits some evaluation of how this issue was viewed by the American public. In a study done during the early years of World War II for the Office of War Information, NORC interviewers asked, "Suppose you were working in an office or factory and a Negro were hired to work

alongside of you, would it make any difference to you?"⁵ Of the total white sample of 3,587 respondents, 55 per cent said that it would make no difference, 39 per cent that it would make a difference, and the remaining opinions were not ascertained. The original data for this study are no longer available, and existing tabulations do not follow the same procedures we have been using. These tabulations do indicate, however, that there were major differences in outlook between the North and the South. In the North, less than 30 per cent felt that the possibility of working with a Negro would make a difference; in the South, about 70 per cent thought that it would.

A different form of questioning was used in 1944, when the respondent was asked to think of a situation in which a Negro would be doing the same kind of work as he did: "If a Negro with the same training had the same kind of job as you at the place where you worked, would it be all right with you, or wouldn't you like it?" Fifty-one per cent answered that it would be all right, 43 per cent said that they would not like it, and the remainder gave qualified answers or had no opinion. In this case responses were clearly affected by the region of residence of respondents. Although education had some bearing on the distribution of responses, respondents were differentiated by region for the most part. Only one-quarter of those in the South, but just under two-thirds of those in the North, expressed willingness to accept a Negro co-worker. In the North, this tolerance increased with education, although the grade school educated were the most tolerant in the South.

Two Roper questions are available, one asked in 1948 and the other in 1949, on the kinds of people respondents would prefer not to work with. Of all those who expressed a collective prejudice, in both years more than three-quarters singled out Negroes as the kind of people they would find most objectionable to work with. In the years for which we have information, it appears that a small majority were willing to accept Negro co-workers, although as the Roper surveys indicate, this acceptance was probably a grudging one and certainly did not represent a strong personal preference. Moreover, the roots of antipathy to Negro fellow-workers lie in the experiences of white southerners. Northerners who generally express more tolerant opinions, would have been considerably less likely to have had contact with Negroes.

More current information is limited to a 1964 California poll, in which respondents were asked, "If a colored person came to work next to you, would you object?" Ninety-one per cent of the white adults interviewed said that they

⁵NORC Survey No. 113, June, 1942.

⁶NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

 $^{^{7}\}mathrm{Roper}$ Furtune Survey No. 69, September, 1948; and Roper Commercial Survey No. 36, October, 1949.

would have no objection.⁸ It is not possible to project these findings onto the remainder of the country, but they do at least suggest that there has been a tendency to increased acceptance of Negro co-workers.

Public Transportation

The right of free use of public transportation occasioned several dramatic incidents in the course of the struggle for full civil rights. In 1896 the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of the Supreme Court first enunciated the "separate but equa." doctrine. The right of recourse to the Fourteenth Amendment as a guaranty of free use of public transportation facilities was firmly denied. This decision was to provide the legal basis for many subsequent claims to segregation.

The equal use of public transportation facilities provided an important focus of civil rights activities. On December 1, 1955, Mrs. Rosa Parks, a Negro woman returning home from work in Montgomery, Alabama, refused to give up her bus seat to a white man. As a result of her arrest, Montgomery, Alabama Negroes put into effect a bus boycott, and the Reverend Martin Luther King first came to national prominence.

The Montgomery bus boycott lasted for a year and ended only when a court ruling declaring such segregation unconstitutional was handed down. Integration of public transportation facilities was effected surprisingly peacefully, and relatively few incidents of violence resulted.


Segregated public transportation is unique among the issues thus far considered, in that it was confined to the South. While northern Negroes experience discrimination in jobs, housing, and education, they have, for the most part, been able to use transportation facilities freely. As a result, northern whites have limited exposure to this problem and thus we cannot predict how a national sample of whites will react to questions on segregated transportation.

Opposition to segregation. -- For whites generally, there has been a long-term growth in the proportions opposed to the establishment of sections for Negroes in public transportation facilities. Chart IV.3 shows the trend line resulting from regressing the per cent opposed to segregation along a time dimension, in answer to the question, "Generally speaking, do you think there should be separate sections for Negroes in streetcars and buses?" In the time spanned by the surveys, opinion shifted from less than half to over three-quarters in favor of integrated transportation.

Invoking the prestige of the President before asking respondents' opinions, may lead to an unusually high rate of approval. 9 But there does not appear

⁸ The California Poll, Release No. 433, May 22, 1964.

⁹For some early examples, see Hadley Cantril, <u>Gauging Public Opinion</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 38-40.



to have been such an effect in three questions asked by the Gallup organization with respect to interstate travel. The question was, "One of Truman's proposals concerns interstate travel. Do you think Negroes should or should not be required to occupy a separate part of a train or bus when travelling from one state to another?" This question was asked in January and July of 1948 and in April of 1949. On all three occasions the national results were similar, varying no more than one percentage point from 50 per cent. A comparison of these results with the regression line for the preceding NORC question shows that they lie exactly on the line, suggesting that the change in question wording probably did not alter respondents' general views of segregated public transportation.


The NORC questions on whether or not there should be separate sections for Negroes are presented in the form of regression lines for the six educational and regional subgroups shown in Chart IV.4. Actual data are given in the Appendix Table 9. Results show that approval for desegregated transportation increases with education, first in the South and then in the North. Southerners, who were much more prejudiced than northerners, shifted their opinions sharply over time, so that while the pattern of differences for the six groups remains, it is no longer quite so sharply defined. Educational differences remain prominent especially in the South, although the major difference is between regions rather than between educational levels.

Regardless of education, by 1956 a majority of whites living in the North felt that there should not be separate sections for Negroes in streetcars and buses. By 1963, almost all northerners sampled with at least a high school education were of this view. In the South, however, despite increased favorability to Negro rights in public transportation, only a bare majority of the high school educated agreed in 1963 that there should not be segregation of transportation, and only about one-third of the grade school educated accepted this view. Thus, despite a considerable shift in opinions, continuing reluctance to accept equal use of public transportation is evident in the South. In the North, acceptance of desegregation in this area has reached almost perfect consensus.

Support for the law.--Not until 1956 did the Supreme Court reverse the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling. Segregation of public transportation was ruled unconstitutional. In 1957 and 1961 Gallup poll interviewers asked, "The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that racial segregation on trains, buses, and in public waiting rooms must end. Do you approve or disapprove of this ruling?" Approval shifted from 60 per cent in 1957 to 66 per cent in 1961, virtually little change. In the time spanned by the surveys, two-thirds of the southerners remained adamant in their disapproval. These findings imply that, in both the

¹⁰AIPO releases, January 16, 1948; July 25, 1948; January 29, 1949.

¹¹AIPO release, June 21, 1961.



North and the South, demands for integrated transportation have met with wider approval than have the efforts of the Supreme Court to ensure those demands.

It may be that the use of legal means to effect change itself created some feelings of resistance on the part of people who might otherwise have supported the change. 12 It is also possible that the context in which the 1961 question was asked influenced results. Despite the Court's ruling, southern compliance was slow to follow, and national attention was focussed on the problem by the actions of white and Negro civil rights workers who, in 1961, boarded buses in Washington, D.C., and began a "Freedom Ride" through part of the South. At several places in Alabama the riders encountered violence. This, in turn, led to new federal intervention. Respondents to the 1961 Gallup survey were asked if they knew about the actions of the Freedom Riders. Of the 63 per cent who did know of them, two-thirds disapproved. 13 Moreover, 57 per cent of the national sample and 70 per cent of the South alone felt that "'sit-ins' at lunch counters, 'Freedom Buses' and other demonstrations by Negroes [would] hurt the Negro's chance of being integrated in the South." This suggests that some of the reservations about the Supreme Court decision on desegregating public transportation may have stemmed from disapproval of the direct-action tactics of civil rights groups intended to ensure enforcement of the decision.

In summary, then, demands for integrated public transportation have won wide approval in the North and increasing, though still reluctant, approval in the South. Smaller numbers of respondents are, however, willing to accept the intercession of the Supreme Court to ensure that such integration is enforced, and probably a majority are even opposed to citizens' enjoying their constitutional right to demand that the Court and other legal and administrative machinery take steps to ensure compliance with the Court's rulings.

Other Public Services

Full enjoyment of citizenship for the Negro means equal freedom of movement and enjoyment of the same public services as are available to white citizens. Facilities such as restaurants, parks, hotels, and theaters are included in this category. Limited trend data are available on the extent to which whites feel that Negroes should be able to enjoy the same public services as do whites. However, a general tendency toward growing approval for shared public facilities

¹² Evidence that the suggestion of a legal change creates some opposition is provided by Cantril, based on several questions from 1939 surveys. As far as we can tell, however, these kinds of effects have not been systematically explored. Cantril, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

¹³AIPO release, June 21, 1961.

¹⁴AIPO release, June 28, 1961.

can be reconstructed. To begin with, a 1942 NORC question, directed solely to the issue of integration of restaurants, asked, "Do you think there should be separate restaurants for Negroes and white people?" Sixty-nine per cent said that they favored separate restaurants, 27 per cent did not, and the remainder gave qualified or no answers. Two years later the question asked was, "Do you think some restaurants in this town should serve both Negro and white people?" This time 47 per cent disapproved of integrated restaurants, and 46 per cent favored them. After these two surveys, interest in integrated restaurant facilities all but disappeared, and it was not until 1963 that NORC again introduced a question dealing with this and other categories of public service. When asked, "Do you think Negroes should have the right to use the same parks, restaurants, and hotels as white people?" 71 per cent of a national sample of whites agreed, and two years later the per cent agreeing rose to 75 per cent. 18

Available tabulations for the 1942 study indicate that there then was almost total consensus among southerners who favored separate restaurants for whites and for Negroes. A majority of northerners shared this view, but it was not nearly so overwhelming, and there was some suggestion that increased education accompanied increased receptivity of integrated facilities. A summary of the relevant information for the three surveys following the 1942 survey is shown in Table IV.2. Most apparent is the large gap between North and South in the proportions favorable to Negro rights. A comparison of educational levels shows the sharpest difference to exist between those with a grade school education or less and the remainder of the group. While the grade school educated in both regions are least likely to approve of Negro rights in this area, southerners manifest most resistance. In comparison, there has been more of a tendency on the part of high school- and college-educated southerners to increased favorability to the claim for Negro rights. In total, however, in all three years there was a familiar progression in the proportions most favorable to Negroes, the least favorable being the grade school-educated southerners, and the most favorable, the college-educated northerners. The overall trend is to increasing favorability.

¹⁵NORC Survey No. 113, June, 1942.

¹⁶NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

¹⁷NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

¹⁸NORC Survey SRS-857, June, 1965.

TABLE IV.2

PER CENT AGREEING THAT NEGROES SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO INTEGRATED PUBLIC SERVICES, 1944-1965, BY EDUCATION AND REGION

	Region and Education						
Survey		South			North		
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
NORC No. 225, June, 1944: Some restaurants in town should serve Negroes and whites			²⁰ (144) ⁵⁹ (69)				
NORC SRS-857, June, 1965: Negroes should have right	(115)	. (157)	(69)	(209)	(400)	(209)	
to use same parks, restaurants, etc.	²⁹ (101)	⁵⁰ (157)	64 (86)	⁷¹ (205)	⁸⁸ (480)	⁹³ (258)	

Legal protection. -- The law has frequently been invoked as an instrument for attaining and protecting Negro rights. In the two instances when responses of the white public to the use of legal measures have been examined, only moderate acceptance of such instrumentality was evidenced. In recent years, Gallup has asked about legal protection of the rights of Negroes to service in public places. Again, support was not overwhelming, but was at least as great as that for laws or decisions already passed. Respondents were asked, "How would you feel about a law which would give all persons--Negro as well as white--the right to be served in public places such as hotels, restaurants, theaters, and similar establishments. Would you like to see Congress pass such a law, or not?" The question was asked in June and in August of 1963, and in January of 1964. During this short time span, support for such a law increased from 49 per cent to 61 per cent. As might be expected, support was much greater in the North than in the South. By 1964, 71 per cent of northerners and 20 per cent of southerners approved of a new law. Between June of 1963 and January of 1964, approval increased in both regions, but more sharply in the North than in the South. 19

<u>Eating with Negroes</u>.--We have some data on opinion trends on the rights of Negroes to non-discriminatory service and the desirability of legal guaranties of such service. Some indication of actual or anticipated behavior of whites when faced with integrated services is now needed. Unfortunately our information is confined to one question from a 1944 survey in which respondents were asked,

¹⁹All information from AIPO release, February 2, 1964.

"Do you think you would eat in a restaurant that served both Negro and white people?" Just over half said they would eat in such a restaurant, but with considerable variation by region. To some extent, the better educated were more tolerant. A resume of these results is given in Table IV.3.

TABLE IV.3

PER CENT WHO WOULD EAT IN RESTAURANT SERVING
BOTH NEGRO AND WHITE PEOPLE^a

	Region and Education						
	South North						
Would eat in restaurant	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
serving both Negro and white people	¹¹ (247)	¹³ (230)	³³ (144)	⁵⁹ (671)	⁶¹ (830)	⁶⁹ (391)	

^aSource: NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

How have these attitudes been affected over time? Have southerners now reached the level of favorability of northerners in 1944? This is another instance where valuable social information has been irrevocably lost through failure to follow through on critical questions. In the absence of such information, we would guess that, in both the North and the South, the trend has been to growing willingness to eat in integrated restaurants. In fact, we would anticipate that almost all better-educated northerners would express such willingness. Some support for this expectation comes from a 1963 survey question which asked, "How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner?" It is assumed that eating in the home is a much more intimate form of social contact than is eating in a restaurant-an assumption supported to some extent by an analysis of eight items from that survey, which were found to form a Guttman scale. Although no specific question was asked about restaurants, or about respondents' willingness to eat in integrated restaurants, the question on Negroes' rights to use integrated parks and restaurants was found to rank higher (that is, as more desirable) on a pro-integration scale than was lack of objection to inviting a Negro to dinner. 20 Thus we might conservatively assess eating together in the home as a more critical determinant of pro-Negro feelings than eating in an integrated restaurant. A comparison of tables IV.3 and IV.4 shows that the proportions not objecting to a member of the family bringing home a Negro guest in 1963 are greater in every

 $^{^{20}}$ Donald J. Treiman, "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice," <u>Amer. J. Sociol.</u>, 1966, <u>LXXI</u> (May), 656.

case but two than the proportions who would eat in an integrated restaurant in 1944. It is likely, then, that there has been a trend to the acceptance of integrated restaurants, and that this trend has taken place among all population groups.

TABLE IV.4

PER CENT WHO WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO FAMILY MEMBER BRINGING NEGRO HOME TO DINNER^a

	Region and Education						
Would have no objection		South		North			
to family	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
member bring- ing Negro home to dinner	²⁷ (115)	²² (15)	. ³⁸ (69)	⁴⁵ (209)	⁵⁸ (466)	⁷⁰ (209)	

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

Summary

This chapter has reviewed existing public opinion data on three additional areas of Negro-white tension: jobs, public transportation, and public services. In all cases, the trend has been to increasing acceptance of demands for equal treatment.

In the past, there has been some denial on the part of whites of the existence of job discrimination against Negroes. But whites have increasingly come to feel that Negroes should have the same opportunities as whites to obtain jobs. The extent of change in opinions on this issue has been the greatest of any we have considered. One group, however, grade school-educated northerners, did not evidence the same sharp upsurge in tolerant views. While a majority of grade school-educated northerners now admit that Negroes should have equal opportunities, the increase in favorability has not been as great as that manifested by other groups. It appears that the slower rate of change among grade schooleducated northerners is a reflection of the greater job competition they face from Negroes.

Access to unsegregated public transportation facilities has long been a focal point of civil rights interest. In 1896, it occasioned the promulgation of a "separate but equal" policy which was applied to other areas as well. In 1955, it provided the occasion for the emergence of the new civil rights movements based on direct action. Throughout the country, the trend has been to growing acceptance of desegregated transportation, although by 1963 only a minority

of grade school-educated southerners indicated acceptance. Questions on transportation also provided evidence of the reluctance of many people to use the law to ensure desegregation. Some of this appeared to arise from the objections of whites in both the North and the South to the activities of civil rights workers in bringing their grievances directly to the attention of the legal authorities and the public at large.

Information on other public services is even more sketchy, but it points in the same direction of growing willingness to equal enjoyment of the same facilities, such as restaurants, parks, hotels, and theaters by Negroes and whites.

CHAPTER V

AN EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

One hundred years late, the promise of emancipation is finally becoming realized. New legislative acts, new interpretations of old laws, new impacts of civil rights organizations, new militancy on the part of Negroes, and new receptivity on the part of many whites all are contributing to the still slow and painful move toward the guarantee of full civic rights for Negroes. In this report, we have provided evidence from survey data of growing responsiveness to the civil rights cause.

Our review of available data has centered on changes regarding specific issues, such as education and housing. This chapter is concerned with assessing more general perspectives on civil rights. Among the questions to be dealt with are the following: Are whites disturbed by the new Negro militancy? Do they feel civil rights groups are moving too fast? How is the government fulfilling its obligations to both majorities and minorities? Will the future bring further changes? Will these come about peacefully or not?

In the following section, opinions about the civil rights movement will be reported. Because of the recency of its latest activities, there is little trend data available. While this report has been concerned primarily with tracing opinion trends, the relevance of the time-bound data presented in this chapter should soon become clear. In a very real sense, they indicate the boundaries of white tolerance.

The Civil Rights Movement

Degree of concern. --In our brief survey of questions asked by the Gallup organization on the most important problems facing the United States, we found that civil rights problems came to the fore of public attention in the 1950's, especially during nationally publicized crises. Since 1963, civil rights and important international issues have been alternating for first place in public concern. In a 1963 NORC survey, a national sample was asked to indicate the extent of interest in three issues--the next year's presidential election, United States relations with Cuba, and Negro-white relations in the United States. All three were issues of considerable interest to respondents, but the greatest proportion (64 per cent) indicated that they were "very interested" in Megro-white

See above, Chapter I.

relations. Fifty-one per cent indicated comparable interest in the election, and 50 per cent in Cuba. Among white respondents, a high level of interest was somewhat related to region and education. As Table V.1 shows, the relationship is not as clear-cut as that usually found. For the most part, though, it is clear that greater education is associated with greater interest, and, controlling for education, southerners are more likely to be very interested than are northerners. We do not really know what this high level of interest means, but we suspect that it is indicative of considerable concern with, rather than mere interest in, the nature of race relations in America.

TABLE V.1

PER CENT OF WHITE RESPONDENTS VERY INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION OF NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS^a

	Region and Education							
Negro-White Relations		South			North			
TC FGC FOILD	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College		
Very interested	⁶⁶ (115)	⁶² (157)	84 (69)	⁴⁷ (209)	⁶⁰ (466)	⁷⁵ (209)		

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

More telling than measures of interest or concern is a direct evaluation of how Negro-white relations have changed. Twice in 1963, NORC interviewers asked respondents if they had become more or less favorable toward racial integration: "In general, would you say you have become more favorable toward racial integration in recent years, or are you <u>less favorable</u> to integration? Results are presented in Table V.2. While the two surveys reveal some change, this need not be taken seriously, since it is probably due to normal sample variability and to the differential effects of the context in which the questions were placed. More noteworthy is the increased favorability to integration reported for both surveys. Except for the grade school educated and, to some extent, the high school educated in the South, all groups evidence proportionately increased favorability to integration than increased opposition. In general, greater education is associated with increased approval for integration, and less education with the opposite attitude. This pattern holds true for both regions. These results are perfectly consistent with our previous findings on attitudes toward specific issues.

A full appreciation of the proportion of whites who now approve of racial integration is lost to us because of the form the questions took. Approximately half the respondents in both surveys said that their opinions had remained "about

²NOR**C** Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

the same." We do not know whether these people began and remained favorable or unfavorable to integration. Our only observation is that the higher the educational level, the more likely this is to be associated with a change in opinion, either pro or con.

TABLE V.2

CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL INTEGRATION IN RECENT YEARS

(Per Cent White Respondents)

Attitude toward		Reg	gion and	Education	on	
Racial Integration		South	<u> </u>	North		
in Recent Years	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
Source	: NORC	SRS-160,	May, 196	53		
Become more favorable	17	21	37	25	27	39
Become less favorable	37	35	27	11	17	13
About the same	46	43	36	62	55	48
Don't know or no answer	-	1	-	2	1	-
N	(101)	(149)	(105)	(212)	(511)	(271)
Source	: NORC	SRS-330,	December	, 1963		
Become more favorable	16	31	35	27	35	45
Become less favorable	33	28	23	23	20	15
About the same	50	40	42	49	45	40
Don't know or no answer	1	1		1	-	-
N	(115)	(159)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)

Perhaps the most surprising finding is the narrow range of difference between educational levels in the North and in the South in the per cent who became more favorable. This is apparent when these results are compared with previous ones on the proportions favorable to integration in housing, schools, transportation and jobs. Instead of differences of 70 per cent or more between the most and least prejudiced groups (grade school-educated southerners and college-educated northerners), here the maximum difference is 29 per cent. While this is certainly a sizeable difference, it is nowhere as great as those to which we have become accustomed. Why should this be so? The data can only suggest some possible explanations, and these are well worth exploring.

In representing shifts in opinions over time as a linear trend line, we have drawn attention to both the gradual and the cumulative nature of the opinion changes. At any one point in time, then, we cannot expect to find proportions that admit changing their opinions as large as the total proportions currently in favor of integration in any given area. That is, at any point in time,

the proportions that approve of integration represent the proportions that were favorable at the previous time, plus an additional group that has since altered its views in favor of integration. The per cent in the North who say they have become more favorable to integration is, then, reasonably modest, though greater than the per cent who say that they have become less favorable. The South, in contrast, reveals a sharper ambivalence, with larger proportions saying they are now less favorable. At the same time, a similar trend toward the acceptance of integration is going on in the South. We can anticipate and do find that a small but important segment of the population admits to having become more approving as well. Since the total white population is moving in the same direction in overall terms, both southerners and northerners are caught up in the same forces, although the former to a lesser degree.

Assessment of the civil rights movement. -- "In recent months a lot of attention has been paid to what has been called the Negro Civil Rights Movement. In your own opinion, what are the main things that American Negroes are really trying to get?" With this question, asked by NORC interviewers in December, 1963, we can begin to understand how white Americans see the current movement to obtain equal rights for Negroes. Respondents could give more than one answer, and the distribution of responses is given in Table V.3. Answers are ranked in the order of frequency with which they were mentioned by the total white sample.

TABLE V.3

GOALS OF THE NEGRO CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT⁸

(Per Cent White Respondents)

Goals of		Reg	gion and	Education	on ^b		
Negro Civil Rights	South				Total		
Movement	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
Economic equality .	30	32	43	34	51	61	45
Educational equality	33	38	43	35	44	49	41
Access to public places	24	31	22	10	19	29	21
Housing equality .	8	14	10	19	22	35	21
Political equality.	14	17	22	15	16	- 16	16
Equality, n.o.s	14	16	16	19	18	13	17
Domination	27	20	10	14	9	5	12
Understanding, dignity	3	7	9	7	6	14	7
Marry whites	7	8	13	2	3	1	4
Other	5	6	4	5	5	6	5
Don't know, no answer	4	1	-	7	2	1	5
N	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)	(1,225)

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

 $^{$^{\}rm b}${\rm Responses}$ for educational categories do not add to 100 per cent since respondents could give more than one answer.

The two most frequently mentioned goals were economic and educational equality. The right to hold jobs for which they are qualified, the right to obtain higher pay and better living standards, and the right to attend the same schools as white children and to obtain equally good educations—these are the issues that over 40 per cent of the respondents recognized as critical concerns for Negro Americans. On the whole, these issues were mentioned more often in the North than in the South, and the likelihood that they would be mentioned increased with greater education. Differences between those with the same level of education were only moderately affected by region in the case of those who suggested that the civil rights movement was concerned with educational equality. There is almost no difference in the frequency with which economic equality was cited by the grade school educated in both the North and the South. However, the high school and college educated displayed considerable difference, with those in the North suggesting that this was an important goal about 20 per cent more often than did their educational counterparts in the South.

Access to public places and the desire for equality in housing represent a second degree of frequency of issues mentioned, this time by about 20 per cent. Desire to freely use parks, restaurants, churches, hotels, theaters, buses, trains, and lunch counters is more often attributed to Negroes by those in the South. This contrast between North and South exists for those with less than college training. In the North, however, the characteristic increase in mention of access to public places corresponding to greater education is found. Improved housing conditions, and the right to live anywhere without racial discrimination, are goals noted more often by northerners. Here the contrast is especially great between the college educated and all other groups in both regions.

About 15 per cent of the respondents mentioned political equality or equal rights without further specification. In both of these cases regional differences were minor, as were educational ones. In view of the efforts of civil rights groups to ensure that Negroes in the South are permitted to register to vote and to exercise their voting privileges, it is probably surprising that this goal has made so little impact on whites, either in the North or South. Instead, whites recognize the more directly instrumental rights as the primary aspirations of the civil rights movement.

Both the desire for domination and the desire for understanding were cited by about 10 per cent. Southerners with less than a college education most frequently expressed the beliefs that Negroes want to become superior, to gain control over the society, to take over, to obtain more than their share, or to receive preferential treatment. Considering that these groups have elsewhere been most reluctant to express opinions favorable to Negro integration, it is not surprising that they were the most outspokenly anti-Negro in assessing the rights movement. At the same time, only small minorities in either region

recognized the rights movement as a claim for Negroes to be treated with dignity and respect.

In terms of the population sampled, relatively few saw the rights movement as a means for Negroes to further their intention to marry whites. As might be expected, this view was expressed more often in the South than in the North. The college educated represented the largest group giving this opinion-13 per cent. Since we would have expected those with less education to make up the largest group with this view, we cannot account for this finding, beyond suggesting the possibility that it is merely the result of sampling variability.

Turning to an evaluation of how much Negro rights groups have been asking for, at a later point in this same survey respondents were asked, "All in all, do you think Negro groups are asking for too much, too little, or just about what they should be asking for?" By now we can easily anticipate the findings, reported in Table V.4. In the South, the balance is on the side of those who say Negro groups are asking for too much, while the opposite is the case in the North. The contrast is especially sharp between the most disapproving grade school-educated southerners and the least disapproving college-educated northerners.

TABLE V.4

OPINIONS OF HOW MUCH NEGRO RIGHTS GROUPS ARE ASKING FOR (Per Cent White Respondents)

	Region and Education						
Negro Rights Groups Are Asking For:	South			North			
<u> </u>	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
Too much	63	49	52	37	38	32	
Too little	-	1	-	1	1	4	
About what they should	36	45	45	54	57	61	
Don't know, no answer	1	6	3	7	4	3	
N	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)	

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

In a study conducted by NORC on changes in feeling states, several questions were asked about the civil rights movement. Since the sample was selected

³This is NORC Study No. 458. Data reported here come from Wave III, previously unpublished. A description of the communities and of questionnaire responses to the first wave of the panel study are contained in David Caplovitz and Norman M. Bradburn, "Social Class and Psychological Adjustment: A Portrait of the Communities in the 'Happiness Study.' A Preliminary Report" (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1964).

so as to maximize the possibility of obtaining groups or communities expected to undergo changing social and economic conditions, there is no way to aggregate the findings so as to compare them to national findings. Instead, the accompanying Table V.5 shows results for individual communities. These were either totally or predominantly white. Community A is a white-collar suburb, Community B a blue-collar suburb, Community C an urban working-class ethnic community, and Community D a combination of ten metropolitan communities with mixed socioeconomic characteristics. The question asked was, "Some people seem to feel upset or uneasy about the current equal rights movement. Other people are pleased about it, and still others have no feelings one way or the other. Which comes closest to how you feel, upset or uneasy, pleased, or no feelings one way or the other?" In each type of community sampled, the largest share of respondents said that they felt upset or uneasy. Uneasiness stemmed mainly from the impact of violent incidents, concern about the breakdown of social barriers, and belief that Negroes already enjoyed legal rights.

TABLE V.5

FEELINGS ABOUT RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMMUNITIES^a

(Percentage Distribution)

Community			
А	В	C	D
43	58	39	44
26	12	18	30
7	2	4	3
23	28	38	22
1	-	1	1
(1,001)	(427)	(177)	(208)
	43 26 7	A B 43 58 26 12 7 2 23 28 1 -	A B C 43 58 39 26 12 18 7 2 4 23 28 38 1 - 1

^aSource: NORC Survey No. 458-III, September, 1963.

As the above question stands, it does not tell us a great deal about how these feeling states reflect on the civil rights movement, or even more important, on specific issues with which the movement has been concerned. Yet it does give some indication of the extent to which white respondents feel reservations about civil rights organizations.

Some evidence for the sources of this uneasiness comes from answers to another NORC survey conducted in the same year. While not directed specifically to the civil rights movement but rather to the actions of Negroes in obtaining their civil rights, the general context of the questionnaire makes the connection

between actions and the movement fairly clear. Respondents were asked, "Who do you think is really behind the recent Negro actions--would you say it is the Negro people themselves, or some other person or group?" More respondents believed that others were involved in the actions in question than believed that they were solely the doing of Negroes. Differences between regions and educational levels appear in Table V.6. This question apparently taps the same general dimension as questions on discriminatory attitudes in more specific areas. This is a reasonable assumption because of the pattern of response that emerges in Table V.6. That is, the likelihood of saying that Negroes alone are behind rights actions is greater in the North, and in both regions it increases with greater education. The feeling that some other persons or groups are involved accompanies a conspiratorial view of the rights movement. All those who answered either that other persons or groups were involved, or that both Negroes and others were involved, were then asked, "Who would you say is really behind these actions?" By far the largest group in this category then mentioned communists, either domestic or foreign. Forty-four per cent of the whites who felt Negroes were not alone answered in this fashion. Interestingly, differences between regions and educational levels are almost non-existent. Seventeen per cent answered that Negro or civil rights leaders or organizations were behind the actions. These Negro leaders and organizations were differential, in the eyes of white respondents, from the Negro people generally. Of other groups or individuals, politicians were mentioned next most frequently, but by less than 10 per cent of the respondents. This clearly points up the significance of the numbers who selected communists as fomenting civil rights actions.

TABLE V.6

PERSONS OR GROUPS BEHIND RECENT NEGRO CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS^a

(Per Cent White Respondents)

Group behind Recent	Region and Education						
Negro Civil Rights Actions	South			North			
Accions	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
Negro people	25	31	41	44	45	55	
Other person or group	57	52	43	40	42	30	
Both	12	14	13	4	7	11	
Don't know, no answer	6	4	3	12	6	4	
N	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)	

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

Finally, there is some information about how people feel about specific rights groups. In December of 1965, Gallup asked respondents to rate eight

organizations frequently involved in controversial issues. These were the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR). In Table V.7 we can see these relative ratings. While the two civil rights organizations, CORE and NAACP, received about as many favorable mentions as did the DAR and ADA, they also obtained many more unfavorable ones. This becomes clearer if we recalculate the percentages so that our base is only those who offered an opinion. Then we find unfavorable ratings for CORE by 41 per cent, for NAACP by 40 per cent, for ADA by 33 per cent, and for DAR, 18 per cent. Thus, while the two rights organizations in question were unquestionably viewed more favorably than either the Ku Klux Klan or the John Birch Society, they were also the object of suspicion to many Americans.

TABLE V.7

OPINIONS OF EIGHT NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS^a

(Percentage Distribution)

National Organization	Favorable	Unfavorable	No Opinion
Ku Klux Klan	6	84	10
John Birch Society	14	52	34
Congress of Racial Equality	41	29	30
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	52	34	14
Daughters of the American Revolution .	51	11	52
Americans for Democratic Action	32	16	38
American Medical Association	80	7	13
Federau Bureau of Investigation	96	2	2

 $[\]frac{a}{\text{Source}}$: Adapted from Gallup Political Index, Report No. 7, December, 1965, pp. $\overline{13\text{-}21\text{-}}$

The impact of direct action. -- In assessing the civil rights movement, it is apparent that many whites have in mind the actions in which the movement has been involved. The most characteristic feature of the new rights movement has been a widespread reliance on direct action--freedom rides, sit-ins, eat-ins, pray-ins, and similar demonstrations. The underlying theme of the previous section was the existence of a worrisome undercurrent of feeling among whites concerning the rights movement. This exists regardless of other feelings, demonstrated in previous chapters, of a growing trend toward acceptance of the Negro's

⁴Gallup Political Index, Report No. 7, December, 1965, pp. 13-21.

claim to equal rights, both as an ideal condition and as actual circumstance. These feelings become more clear in the following discussion, where we focus directly on questions about the actions in which Negroes are currently engaged.

One of the sources of concern about the rights movement stems from the fear of violence. While most civil rights groups have been committed to peaceful demonstrations, and indeed have used the violence of the white community in the face of their own restraint as an important instrument to arouse the conscience of whites, almost as many whites feel that Negro actions have been generally violent as think that they have been peaceful. The question asked was, "During the past year or so, would you say that the actions Negroes have taken to get the things they want have been generally violent or generally peaceful?" Responses for subgroups are shown in Table V.8, giving only the distributions for those who thought that actions had been peaceful. Here again, those who most often thought that actions had been mainly peaceful were the groups we have come to associate with least prejudice toward Negroes. That is, the frequency of answering, "peaceful," increased from South to North and from one educational level to the next.

TABLE V.8

SYMPATHY WITH ACTIONS OF NEGRO CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT^A

(Per Cent White Respondents)

	Region and Education						
Actions of Negro Civil Rights	South			North			
Movement	Grade	High	College	Grade		College	
Actions have been generally peaceful	23	38	46	33	46	62	
Actions have, on the whole, helped Negro cause	23	38	46	39	48	64	
Generally approve of actions	13	20	30	26	30	47	
N	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)	

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.

The same respondents were next asked, "Do you think the actions Negroes have taken have, on the whole, <u>helped</u> their cause, or, on the whole, <u>hurt</u> their cause?" The pattern of responses, shown in Table V.8, is also almost identical to that for the previous question.

A slightly different question asked by the Gallup organization found fewer whites receptive to the helpfulness of Negro actions than did the NORC sample. Probably more significant, however, is the evidence that growing numbers are

becoming convinced that demonstrations hurt the cause of racial equality. In 1963 and 1964, Gallup asked, "Do you think mass demonstrations by Negroes are more likely to help or more likely to hurt the Negro's cause for racial equality?" As Table V.9 shows, the per cent who feel that Negroes will be helped declined from 21 to 10 in the year spanned.

TABLE V.9

DO DEMONSTRATIONS HELP OR HURT NEGROES' CAUSE?

Effect of Demonstrations on Negroes' Cause	1963	1964
Help	21	10
Hurt	66	81
No difference	4	3
No opinion	9	6

^aSource: AIPO release, June 7, 1964.

What has been the personal impact of all of this? A further question from the 1963 NORC survey aids our assessment. Respondents were asked, "How do you yourself feel about these actions -- do you generally approve of them or generally disapprove of them?" Patterns of those approving are again reported in Table V.8. The pattern is expectedly familiar. More noteworthy are the relatively small proportions who say they approve, in no case representing a majority of any of the six groups. In presenting responses favorable to the actions of civil rights groups from three questions in the same table, it becomes clearer where the tension lies. While there are considerable numbers who consider civil rights activities to have been generally peaceful and helpful to the Negro cause, it is only among college-educated northerners that a majority holds these views. Moreover, in all cases, from 10 to almost 20 per cent fewer are themselves in personal agreement with how civil rights groups have behaved. In other words, there appears to be a grudging recognition among many whites that demonstrations, peaceful or otherwise, are an important part of the struggle for equal rights. Yet while they are increasingly in favor of these rights for Negroes, they are personally much less likely to appreciate the steps which civil rights leaders feel are important to take, steps which are more likely to upset the equilibrium of white society and point up the history of chronic injustice.

Another indication of the extent of disapproval comes from a Harris survey, conducted in 1965. Respondents were presented with a list of different kinds of people including American Communist Party members, people who don't believe in God, civil rights demonstrators, working career women with young children, homosexuals, women who gossip all the time, and young people who read books most of the time, and were asked, "America has many different types of people in

it. But we would like to know whether you think each of these different types of people is more helpful or more harmful to American life, or don't they help or harm things much one way or the other?" Civil rights demonstrators were considered more harmful by 68 per cent, more helpful by 16 per cent, and 16 per cent said they did not make much difference. Out of nine political or professional types of behavior, civil rights demonstrators ranked fourth as more harmful. This seems a pretty sharp indictment of civil rights demonstrators, and in fact may reflect the views of the majority, although we suspect that the question somehow evoked a highly critical response generally. For example, among nine types of social behavior, women who gossip all the time ranked third, with 65 per cent saying they were more harmful. Still, in company with the previous NORC data, this question does suggest that the actions of civil rights groups are viewed with distaste by majorities of whites.

There is some supporting data available for four types of communities from the NORC study of feeling states. As Table V.10 shows, there is considerable variation by community, but the general direction of opinions is clear. The civil rights march on Washington in August, 1963 was hardly viewed with widespread favor, yet disapproval was expressed less frequently than was the case on two other items. Opinions were more often critical of restaurant sit-ins, while the picketing of segregated schools was viewed with general disapproval. This suggests again that in those areas of life where whites are more likely to be directly affected, they respond negatively to the efforts of rights groups to bring about changes in the status quo.

TABLE V.10

PER CENT DISAPPROVING OF RECENT CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITIES
IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMMUNITIES^a

A	Community			
Activity	A	В	С	D
March on Washington	49	44	44	63
Restaurant sit-ins	62	58	54	64
School picketing	64	63	65	73
N	(1,001)	(427)	(177)	(208)

^aSource: NORC Study No. 458-III, September, 1963.

The Harris Survey, <u>The Washington Post</u>, September 27, 1965.

To briefly summarize, then, evidence from different surveys and questions asked in recent years enables us to see that the activities of civil rights groups, which employ direct-action techniques to ensure that Negroes can enjoy their civil rights, arouse concern and disapproval among whites. Whites may agree that Negroes should have these rights, but they hide from the fact that actions distasteful to them must be employed to guarantee that equal rights become reality. We have also suggested that the pattern of approval for rights actions follows that established on questions of specific rights. In other words, amount of education and region of residence are also associated with approval of direct action. The most unequivocal demonstration of white disapproval of demonstrations comes from a 1964 Gallup question: "People have different views about the Negro demonstrations. With which view do you agree? Some people say the Negroes should stop their demonstrations now that they have made their point, and even though some of their demands have not been met. Others say they have to continue demonstrating in order to achieve better jobs, better housing, and better schooling. With which view do you agree?" Nationally, 73 per cent said Negroes should stop, 19 per cent felt they had to continue, while 8 per cent had no opinion.6

Further insight on the impact of direct action on the white community comes from a California poll conducted in November, 1965. Here the focus was not on protests organized by civil rights groups but on the more spontaneous outbursts arising from the frustrations of ghetto life. In August of 1965, the Watts area of Los Angeles was torn by days and nights of riots, and several months later, a sample of respondents throughout the state was interviewed concerning their feelings. Asked what they thought were the most important causes behind the riots, 36 per cent of the white respondents replied that it was lack of respect for law and order and 28 per cent answered that it was caused by outside agitators. Widespread unemployment received 22 per cent of the mentions and bad living conditions, 15 per cent. Publicized grievances, such as lack of communication between Negroes and whites, police mistreatment, and unfair practices by white merchants and landlords apparently made little impression on the white public, and altogether received less than 10 per cent of the mentions. In answer to the question, "One thing that riots did was to bring attention to the bad conditions that exist in Negro slums." Seventy-two per cent of respondents agreed. But, more crucial to our interest, 70 per cent agreed that "People are

⁶AIPO release, November 13, 1964.

⁷Findings are based on a sample of 1,260 adults, 1,167 of whom were white. Only the responses of whites are reported here. Respondents could mention more than one cause for the riots. The California Poll, Release No. 502, November 24, 1965.

less sympathetic now toward the civil rights movement than they were before the riots. $^{\rm 18}$

The pace of change.--We can well anticipate from the foregoing that whites will object to the speed with which changes are being introduced. 9 For example, in the four types of communities previously referred to, the largest share of respondents in each community answered "too fast" to the question "How fast do you think the equal rights movement is moving?" This ranged from 48 per cent in Community B to 70 per cent in Community D.

The only other relevant questions available on the speed with which the civil rights battle is being pushed concern the activities of government. Since participation of government agencies and the executive branch in the introduction and enforcement of equal rights is more prominent now than at any time since the Civil War and its aftermath, these questions certainly have considerable timeliness. Beginning in 1963, Gallup asked, "... do you think the Kennedy administration is pushing racial integration too fast, or not fast enough?" Since then the question has been asked three times in 1965, in terms of the Johnson administration. A majority of respondents in each case expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of change, as contrasted with those who felt that things were about right or who had no opinion. But those who felt that the administration was pushing integration too fast outnumbered those who felt that it was not fast enough by at least two to one. The per cents who believed the pace to be too fast are shown in Table V.11, contrasting northern and southern views.

TABLE V.11

PER CENT WHO FEEL ADMINISTRATION IS PUSHING INTEGRATION TOO FAST

0	Region		Total
Source	South	North	10041
AIPO 673-K: May, 1963	62	34	36
AIPO release, April 11: March, 1965	67	34	34
<u>AIPO release, May 12</u> : May, 1965	70	45	45
AIPO release, August 6: August, 1965	NA	NA	40

⁸The California Poll, Release No. 503, November 25, 1965.

See above, Chapter II, on the speed of school desegregation.

The growing proportion who felt that things were moving too fast, especially between March and May, 1965, is striking. While detailed information is not yet available, it seems clear that the bulk of the change in opinions took place in the North. During this period, civil rights demonstrations were moving north on a large scale for the first time, and as we know, whites, regardless of region, do not like them. Since then, however, there is some indication that opposition is subsiding slightly in both regions. 10

From a somewhat different perspective, there are other indications that a more moderate pace is desired by the majority of whites, in both the North and the South. In a survey done about the time of the 1964 presidential election, Gallup asked respondents, "Some people say the Civil Rights Law guaranteeing equal rights for Negroes should be strictly enforced right from the beginning. Others say a gradual persuasive approach should be used at first. Which approach would you rather see used?" National results show 23 per cent in favor of strict enforcement, 62 wanting a gradual approach, and the remainder giving qualified or no answers. 11 Not only do a majority of southerners favor a gradual approach, but this view is also shared by over 60 per cent of northerners.

Future Prospects

Tieing together our discussion of the rights demanded by Negroes, the willingness of whites to participate in an integrated society, and the reluctant acceptance of civil rights groups and their activities are questions of how whites perceive the future. Will there be more violence, as Negroes press even more strongly for their rights? Is there any hope of solution to the conflict between Negroes and whites? These and related questions will be considered as a conclusion to this chapter. Fortunately, much of this discussion will have the benefit of trend data.

Race problems.--Expectations of violence underlie the opinions of many whites regarding the outcome of the current struggle for Negro rights. For example, in 1963 Gallup asked southerners, "Do you think it [integration] will come about in a more or less peaceful manner, or do you think there will be a great deal of racial strife?" Only 21 per cent answered "peacefully," while 42 per cent said there would be some strife, and 30 per cent a great deal of strife. In 1965, NORC asked about the prospects of race riots in the North: "As you probably recall, there were race riots in several northern cities in this country last summer. The way it looks now, do you expect that this summer there will be

 $^{^{10}}$ Gallup Political Index, Report No. 3, August, 1965, p. 13.

¹¹AIPO release, November 13, 1964.

¹²AIPO release, July 19, 1963.

many race riots around the country, some, hardly any, or none at all?" In reply, more than 80 per cent of the sample said that they expected at least some violence. The accompanying Table V.12 gives the distribution of responses for regional and educational groups. While those in the North are inclined to be more optimistic than are southerners, both groups expected at least some violence. These expectations are apparently not related to other views on integration, since the normally least prejudiced group-college-educated northerners--are not much different than the most prejudiced--grade school-educated southerners--when the categories of "many" and "some" riots are collapsed.

TABLE V.12

EXPECTATIONS OF RACE RIOTS IN SUMMER OF 1965^a

(Per Cent White Respondents)

	Region and Education					
Expected Race Riots in	South		North			
Summer of 1965	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
Many	35	29	27	16	23	19
Some	53	60	64	55	62	68
Hardly any	6	9	7	15	10	10
None	3	-	-	5	1	1
Don't know	3	2	2	9	4	2
N	(101)	(157)	(86)	(205)	(480)	(258)

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-857, June, 1965.

A survey conducted in 1963 by the Gallup organization was again concerned with future prospects. In that case, however, results were quite different from those just reported. No mention was made of violence, but only of possible troubles, and this may have swung the majority of respondents to an optimistic view. Moreover, the reference was not to the respondent's own community; this, too, may have increased optimism. The specific question was, "Do you think there is likely to be any serious racial trouble in this community in the next two or three years?" Respondents in both the North and the South answered most frequently that trouble was not likely. As Table V.13 shows, educational differences are minor within the two regions. Least optimistic, however, are the grade schooleducated southerners. In total, northerners are more likely than their counterparts in the South to believe that trouble will be avoided in their community in the coming years.

TABLE V.13

EXPECTATIONS OF RACIAL TROUBLE IN OWN COMMUNITYA

(Per Cent White Respondents)

Trouble	Region and Education								
Expected in Own		South		North					
Community	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College			
Trouble likely .	32	26	28	17	20	21			
Have it now	2	*	-	2	1	1			
Not likely	54	63	69	72	74	73			
No opinion	12	11	3	9	5	5			
N	(358)	(351)	(170)	(870)	(1,307)	(535)			

^aSource: AIPO Survey No. 673-K, May, 1963.

Speaking only in terms of problems and transferring the reference to the entire nation, NORC interviewers asked, "Do you think that Negro-white relations will always be a problem for the United States, or that a solution will eventually be worked out?" Optimism was moderated, presumably because focussing on the nation as a whole directed respondents to think of communities in both the North and the South where violence had occurred, and where whites showed themselves as intransigent. As Table V.14 shows, optimism was somewhat more prominent in the North, and increased with more education. In the South, however, the distribution of responses was uniform across educational lines. In other words, the amount of schooling was not a critical factor affecting views of southerners on the outcome of Negro-white problems. For all groups, however, the amount of pessimism expressed in answer to this question is especially noteworthy.

TABLE V.14

ASSESSMENT OF NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS AS CONTINUING PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES²
(Per Cent White Respondents)

Future	Region and Education								
Negro-White Relations as		South			North				
Problematic	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College			
Always a problem .	50	50	45	48	42	37			
Eventual solution .	47	49	48	49	57	60			
Don't know, No answe	r 3	1	7	3	1	3			
N	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)			

^aSource: NORC Survey SRS-330, December, 1963.


Short-run prospects. -- Questions ignoring direct reference to riots, violence, or mere trouble, but asking respondents to look ahead for the next year or two, indicate the widespread prevalence of pessimistic attitudes toward the short-term course of race relations. In 1944, as the tide of the war had turned to the advantage of the Allies, respondents were asked, "After the war, do you expect Negroes and white people to get along with each other better, or not as well as they did before the war?" Of the total sample of white respondents, 23 per cent said things would become better, 39 per cent worse, 23 per cent the same, and the remainder gave qualified responses or did not know how things would turn out. 13 It is difficult to interpret this question, since what people mean by "better" or "worse" depends on their general outlook on race relations. For example, a respondent prejudiced against Negroes might see the prospects of increased racial equality as worsening of relations. Despite this very ambiguity, we have chosen to interpret such questions as referring to the possibility of increased or decreased racial tension. This applies particularly to a series of Gallup polls, asked between 1957 and 1964.

The question asked was, "Do you think the situation in the South between the races will get better or worse during the coming year?" In 1964, the question was altered so that "in the South" was omitted, and the time covered was shortened to six months. Results are shown in Chart V.1 in the form of a regression line, where the per cent believing that the situation will get better is regressed on time. Not only do those optimistic make up a minority of the populations sampled, but their share has declined over time. This is especially noteworthy in view of the change of emphasis in the 1964 question from the South to the nation as a whole. At that time, only 17 per cent thought that things would get better, as compared to 57 per cent who said that they would get worse.

Long-range prospects.--When we turn to longer-range assessments, it becomes clearer that the majority do not see problems of Negro-white relations as utterly hopeless, despite the foregoing results. This interpretation is supported by consideration of a question first used by Gallup and repeated by NORC asking, "Do you think the day will ever come in the South when whites and Negroes will be going to the same schools, eating in the same restaurants, and generally sharing the same public accommodations?" National data, available for 1957, 1958, and 1963, are presented in Chart V.2. The per cent believing in the inevitability of integration as a regression on time shows a sharp trend upward. While it would obviously have been useful to obtain more than these three measures for a national sample, Gallup releases from 1956 to 1963 provide confirmation of increasing, although not necessarily willing, acceptance of integration. These

¹³NORC Survey No. 225, May, 1944.

CHART V.1	LEAST SQUARES LINEAR TREND LINE IN PER CENT FEELING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH BETWEEN THE RACES WILL GET BETTER IN THE COMING YEAR, 1957-1964 (Total Respondents)			• /	-	•		-1964 -1963 -1961 -1960 -1959 -1958 -1957
	GAST SQUARES LINE THE SITUATION IN ' BETTER			Standard Error of Estimate	4.51	June 25, 1961) June 25, 1961)	outh."	
	1.1			Standard Error of b	0.74	Sources: 7 (released 7 (released £., 1958 mne 25, 1961 mne 5, 1964	^a Omitting "in the South,"	
				Ф	-2.51	Sou ., 1957 (., 1957 (K, Sept., ase, June ase, June	Omitting	
				cŋ	73.31	Sources: AIPO, Jan., 1957 (released June 25, AIPO, Aug., 1957 (released June 25, AIPO 605-K, Sept., 1958 AIPO release, June 25, 1961 AIPO release, June 5, 1964	<i>a</i>	
	-70	09-	-50	40	-30	-20	10	



results, in Table V.15, are normally reported for all southern respondents. While it might be anticipated that the inclusion of Negroes would distort the findings, on three surveys where it was possible to separate whites from the total, the maximum difference was 2 percentage points in the direction of less acceptance among whites. In combination with Chart V.2, it is easy to conclude that an increasing majority believe that integration is inevitable.

TABLE V.15


PER CENT SOUTHERNERS BELIEVING THAT INTEGRATION IN SCHOOLS, RESTAURANTS, AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS WILL EVENTUALLY COME TO THE SOUTH

	Per Cent
Gallup Poll Release Date:	
March 1, 1956	55 ^a
August 16, 1957	45
October 15, 1958	53
February 12, 1961	76
May, 1963 (NORC Survey SRS-160)	80
July 18, 1963	83

^aWhites only.

Data available for subgroups for 1958 and 1963 are shown in Chart V.3as trend lines joining the two sets of per cents accepting as inevitable the long-range possibilities of southern integration. 14 Here in particular we regret the sparsity of data, since this chart shows the first instance, of a total of eleven trends examined over time, where regional differences are relatively unimportant while educational ones are the main sources of opinion cleavage. We again find the now normal association between educational level and prejudice, with the most prejudiced--the grade school educated--also being the least willing to admit that integration will come, and the least prejudiced--the college educated--most willing to admit its inevitability. But the usual progression from most to least prejudiced associated with increased education, first in the South and then in the North, is not found. Educational differences across regional lines are minor. About the only regional difference worth mentioning is the increasing trend for southerners to feel that integration is inevitable even more frequently than do northerners, especially among those with more than grade schooling.

 $^{^{14}\}mathrm{Even}$ though Chart V.3 is based on actual data, we have also included the same data in Appendix Table 10 in tabular form, for ease of reading.



How can this new pattern of responses be interpreted? It suggests, for one thing, that while die-hard segregationists may still be prominent in the South, the majority of southerners have come to realize the inevitability of integration. From the perspective of southerners who take this position, the opinion is probably one of resignation or fatalism. Having witnessed changes in established customs, those living in the South have come to accept that greater changes are in store even more than those in the North.

While Chart V.3 omits the usual regional differences, it does reveal the typical progression among educational groups in the per cent less prejudiced, in this case, the per cent less willing to acknowledge the inevitability of integration. That is, the proportions expecting future integration increase with more education. This may be an illustration of the shorter time perspective of those in lower social classes, manifested by the lesser frequency with which those with lower levels of education express acceptance of future integration. In other words, increased education is associated with an increased ability to look ahead and to assess the probable outcomes of the civil rights movement, whether these outcomes are desired or not. 15

Summary

This chapter has described a shift from an emphasis on looking at opinions of civil rights issues to opinions of the civil rights movement itself. Among white Americans the trend has been to greater favorability to integration and to positive assessment of the goals of the civil rights movement. There is, for example, considerable recognition that rights groups are striving primarily to improve the lot of the Negro with respect to education and jobs. Negative assessments of the goals of civil rights groups are minor, and come from those who usually have more prejudiced outlooks--grade school-educated southerners.

Against this backdrop of a climate of opinion increasingly favorable to the growth of civil rights, there is also evidence of fear, suspicion, and serious reservation. Specifically, white respondents indicated that they were concerned about the political associations of those participating in the civil rights movement, about their actions, and about the speed of changes. Wherever this information was available, we also found the familiar pattern of educational and regional differences. Results are not too clear-cut here, but they do suggest that there are important reservoirs of resistance to the actions of the civil rights movement among all population groups considered.

¹⁵ For supporting data on the longer-range time perspective of the better educated, see Kurt W. Back and Kenneth J. Gergen, "Apocalyptic and Serial Time Orientations and the Structure of Opinions," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, 1963, 27 (Fall), 427-42.

The future looks fraught with tension to many whites when they consider the course of Negro-white relations. Yet this is apparently true only for the immediate future. In the long run, majorities have come to believe that integration is certain to occur. This is more likely to be true of opinions expressed in the South. Belief that integration is unavoidable does, in fact, cut across regional lines, with the better educated, who are presumably also those with a longer time perspective, most willing to concede the inevitable.

CHAPTER VT

THE CONTINUITY OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGROES

The Present Situation

For the most part, we have been able to document a growth in favorable attitudes to civil rights for Negroes. As yet, however, there are still major boundaries to the widespread distribution of tolerant views. Tolerance limits appear whenever there is the possibility of contact with large numbers of Negroes. Another source of tension derives from the actions of civil rights groups. Concerns stemming from these sources are shared by many, and at times by a majority of, white Americans. On other issues, the trend has been to growing favorability, but always accompanied by continuing and large-scale differences between population groups. Primarily, these differences are found between those living in the South compared to those living in the remainder of the country. To a lesser extent, they are also found between different educational levels.

This final chapter will further explore possible explanations of the findings and attempt to assess changes likely to occur in the future.

The Cumulative Nature of Change

When the direction, rate, and social context of opinion changes which occur through time are examined, what inferences can be drawn about the causal connection between opinions and events? Can we assume an association between a course of events and subsequent public opinion? Or do particular events appear to result in only minor fluctuations in opinion, so that recurring measures of opinion remain more or less uniform in direction?


To a large extent, our manner of presentation of the opinion data has presumed the second of the two alternatives. That is, part of our rationale for

The focus of this study has been on aggregate units--samples of the total white population or regional and educational subgroups--and the opinion shifts examined have been those of entire groups. Despite the very real importance of focussing on the dynamics of opinion change at the individual level, we have devoted our attention in this study solely to group changes. The questions which we ask about the possible causative factors that bring about opinion shifts must, then, necessarily be posed in terms of broad social considerations rather than in terms of social-psychological ones.

using a regression analysis was to direct attention away from minor fluctuations in the distribution of responses and to concentrate instead on long-range trends. Yet we acknowledged the possibility that the linearity of the results was at least partially due to the small number of measures available. Now, raising some basic questions about the nature of opinions change makes it necessary to present more support for a cumulative theory of change, rather than simply the attractiveness and convenience of the method.


Of all the events which have occurred in the last twenty years in the civil rights arena, surely the 1954 Supreme Court decision had the most dramatic impact, initiating, as it did, a revolution in American society. It is hence the single event that could conceivably mark a turning point in white viewpoints. In 1954 the Supreme Court unequivocally stated a judicial opinion on the treatment of Negroes. If anything would reverse the habits of the past hundred years, it was this decision. For the purposes of this study, we have three tests of the influence of the Supreme Court decision on changing opinions, none terribly good, but all contributing to an assessment of the best way to describe opinion changes on civil rights questions.

One test of the impact of the Court decision requires that we have trend data, some obtained prior to the decision, some at about the time of the decision, and some later. If the decision had a decisive effect on opinions, we would expect a trend line something like the following:



If, however, the decision was just one of many factors that contributed to a generally favorable climate of opinion, then we would find a trend line much like the following:

Model 2



In making this test, we unfortunately do not have much data with the required time measures. But in the four instances where there is suitable information, the trends follow the second, rather than the first model of change. This can be seen from the actual data plotted in Chart II.1 on Negro intelligence, Chart II.3 on integrated schools, Chart III.1 on integrated neighborhoods, and Chart IV.3 on integrated transportation. In all these instances, the pattern is for opinions to move essentially along a straight line.

Further support for the contention that opinion changes are cumulative in nature comes from a series of questions, previously analyzed, dealing directly with attitudes toward the Supreme Court decision. We did not have data prior to the decision against which to compare subsequent findings, but there were sufficient measures to permit at least some examination of short-term fluctuations. Our findings, we recall, were that over the short run, there was some evidence of responsiveness to immediate events. But the connection between opinions and events was not a close one, and over the long run, it was possible to discern a moderate trend toward increasingly favorable attitudes, regardless of the public issues at the time when opinions were being measured.

Our final piece of evidence is an observation by Paul Sheatsley of questions, also analyzed in this report, on whether white and Negro students should attend the same schools. The same question was asked three times in 1956 and three times in 1963. What was especially striking to Sheatsley was the resistance to short-term fluctuations indicated by responses to these questions:

One would not necessarily have expected such short-term stability. Though largely forgotten now, there appeared between the June and September surveys the first banner headlines of racial conflict as the long slow task of Southern school desegration began in Clay, Ky., Clinton, Tenn., and other small towns in border states across the country. Between June and November 1963, there occurred the March on Washington and the September school openings, while between

²See Chapter II, pp. 32-41.

the November and December surveys there intervened the shocking assassination of President Kennedy in a Southern metropolis. But even so dramatic an event, with all its implications for the civil rights movement, failed to disturb, in either North or South, the attitudes which had been expressed a month earlier.³

Thus, even in the short run, at least on this one issue, the long-term movement of opinions is barely deflected by even the most dramatic events.

Altogether, then, we feel that these different items of information substantiate our claim that opinions on civil rights issues are best understood as moving in a uniform direction, and becoming increasingly more favorable to Negro aspirations, regardless of immediate events. This is not to say that events are irrelevant, but rather that shifts in opinions on civil rights are better understood as responding to a host of events, such as the Supreme Court decision, school boycotts, sit-ins, and new contacts between whites and Negroes, that act in such a way as to produce a climate of opinion generally favorable to Negro rights.

If we accept this cumulative view of change, it is then possible to make some predictions about the future course of opinion change. Assuming events continue to have the same impact in the future as they have had in the past, we could assume that the rate and direction of opinion change would continue as it has in the past. These assumptions may not be wholly valid; it is conceivable that there may be a dramatic turn in events altering the manner in which white Americans view race problems. Conceding this, it is still possible to engage in what may only be a speculative exercise, but which has at the same time some likelihood of forecasting future opinion distributions. The procedure for making the following predictions was a simple one, requiring ruler, pen, graph paper, and the charts on which we had already plotted trend questions. The results, reported in Table VI.1, are hardly precise, but they can be treated as rough indicators of future developments. In the case of each population group for each of eleven questions, the problem posed was, given the current direction and rate of change, how long will it take until 90 per cent of the group adopt a view favorable to Negro rights?

Table VI.1 gives this information for all eleven questions on which two or more measures were taken. On all questions where interviews were done at only two points in time, the direction of change was normally not sufficiently consistent to allow a prediction. Even where one was made, it cannot be regarded as particularly reliable. Moreover, most of these same questions showed a decline in the proportions favorable to equal rights, either for all or some subgroups. It was obviously not possible in these cases to predict when 90 per cent would

 $^{^3\}mathrm{Paul}$ B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," <u>Daedalus</u>, 1966 (Winter), 220.

favor the issue in question, and these issues have simply been noted with a question mark. Where three or more opinion soundings were available, the regression line was used for making predictions, thus possibly underestimating short-term fluctuations.

TABLE VI.1

APPROXIMATE YEAR IN WHICH 90 PER CENT OF THE WHITE POPULATION CAN BE EXPECTED TO HOLD OPINIONS FAVORABLE TO NEGROES AND NEGRO RIGHTS

		Re	gion and	Education	on		
Opinion		South			North		Total
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
Expect future integration	1967	1963	1963	1968	1966	1966	1965
Should have equal jobs	1974	1967	1969	1976	1964	1959	1968
Negroes of equal intelligence	1984	1976	1981	1967	1963	1965	1968
Should have integrated services ^a	1992	1981	1972	1974	1965	pre'63	1970
Should have integrated transportation	1984	1976	1970	1973	1964	1959	1972
Should go to same schools	2026	1990	1984	1988	1973	1968	1981
No objection to living on same block	2001	2006	1980	1980	1977	1971	1982
Would not move if next door b	2040	?	1967	?	?	1977	1986
Approve Supreme Court decision ^b	?	?	?	1992	1963	?	1989
Would not move if great numbers in neighborhood ^b	2102	?	1997	?	2067	1997	2011
Would send own children to school with Negro majority b	?	?	?	?	?	?	?

^aProjections are based on only two measures.

Insofar as possible, the questions have been ordered on the basis of the earliest time at which 90 per cent consensus can be expected. The results indicate a rough ranking of issue types. Beliefs favorable to civil rights will be shared by 90 per cent of the white population soonest--some time in the 1960's-if attitudes toward the Supreme Court are omitted. Approval of Court decisions, however, remains as one of the issues slowest to change. Collectively, normative attitudes show the next fastest tendency to change, with 1981 the latest year for

^bProjections for subgroups are based on only two measures.

achieving consensus along this dimension. Slowest to change are opinions relating to social contacts. If the pace of change continues as it has in the past, it will be well into the next century before whites will willingly accept participation in situations where they are a racial minority. In total, however, this kind of ranking has an air of artificiality. For one thing, the numbers of questions in each category are exceedingly limited and hardly even representative of the attitude dimensions. For another, of the questions available, it is clear that the crucial factor in predicting the rate of change is the issue in question. The two areas slowest to change are opinions pertaining to schools and those pertaining to housing. But some difficulty in interpretation is introduced by asking about living among or sending children to school with large numbers of Negroes. While this, in fact, is the situation faced by some whites, it is a highly unlikely circumstance for most whites. Questions of this sort are useful in indicating the limits of tolerance, but they are not so useful as predictors of future behavior. Still, contacts in schools and neighborhoods remain as barriers against the full acceptance of Negroes. But as the predictions show, this does not mean that whites are impervious to change. It only means that, comparatively speaking, these areas remain as citadels of prejudice still to be overcome.

The Effects of Education

Many of the group differences discussed in this report have documented the now familiar finding that the better educated, especially if they have schooling beyond high school, are more tolerant of racial and ethnic minorities and more responsive to the protection of civil rights. Unfortunately, the literature is much more meager when it comes to accounting for the reason that higher education has such effects. Several reasons for the socially liberalizing consequences of college training can be suggested. To begin with, attendance at college is frequently the first serious challenge to students' standards and beliefs acquired from, and supported by, family, community, religious, and other salient groups. This challenge comes from exposure to new ideas in a new learning environment, and from exposure to a frequently heterogeneous social environment. For many students, the results of these new experiences include the acquisition of different values and interests and a willingness to consider the previously unknown as

⁴For example, see Samuel A. Stouffer, <u>Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties</u> (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy," <u>Journal of Politics</u>, 1960, <u>22</u> (Spring), 276-94; G. H. Smith, "Liberalism and Level of Information," <u>Journal of Educational Psychology</u>, 1948, <u>39</u>, 65-82; Charles Herbert Stember, <u>Education and Attitude Change</u> (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1961); James G. Martin and Frank R. Westie, "The Tolerant Personality," <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 1959, <u>24</u> (August), 521-28.

⁵A good sampling of the writing on this subject is contained in Sanford Nevitt (Ed.), <u>The American College</u> (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

at least engaging if not attractive. This is a period when students become more sophisticated and set off from those with less education in their understanding of and support for abstract principles. The opening of new intellectual and social horizons brings with it a feeling of greater mastery over the external environment. For example, in a study of voting behavior, the Survey Research Center found that increased education was associated with an increased sense of "political efficacy," of conviction of an ability to personally affect the political process. ⁶ The greater ego strength associated with advanced education decreases the likelihood of a need to project hostility onto outgroups or to curtail the freedom of those who are somehow different. Of course, the processes set in motion by attendance at college do not affect all those with some college education, but they do suggest the ways in which higher education has liberalizing consequences. Finally, we should not overlook the very real possibility that the more tolerant views of the better educated stem partly from their greater verbal facility and their awareness of the more socially acceptable responses.

The greater tolerance of the better educated has not, despite the evidence cited, gone unchallenged. Charles Stember, in reviewing some of the same data used in this report, along with additional data on both Negroes and other minorities, presents more limited conclusions on the effects of education. He sees the better educated as more likely to reject some stereotypes about minorities, for example, those about such inherited characteristics as racial differences in blood. But he suspects that, if public opinion polls were geared to reveal more subtle aspects of stereotyping, we would find that the better educated were not free from some generalized prejudices. For example, there is a greater tendency for the better educated to see Jews as Communists or racketeers, Strongest support for legal measures against discrimination comes from the better educated, parallel to our own findings on laws and general normative views. But Stember feels that intimate forms of social contact are as much rejected by the college educated as by the less well educated, although causal forms of contact are more acceptable to the former.

Our own conclusions are much less equivocal, though of course we have avoided the complication of considering attitudes toward different minorities. For example, it is clear from Stember's work that attitudes toward Jews are especially salient to the better educated and the upper class. This is not true of attitudes toward Negroes. Still, Stember's reservations prompted a review

⁶Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, <u>The American Voter</u> (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p. 479.

Stember, op. cit., p. 20.

⁸<u>Ibid</u>., p. 180. Interestingly enough, Stember does not feel that the particular group that is the target of prejudice is especially important.

of the data presented here. The question at issue was whether there were any instances when the college educated were more prejudiced than the remainder. Out of sixty-nine questions where data were reported by education, there were six instances where the college educated showed more prejudice than did their less well-educated regional counterparts. Three of these questions referred to the possibility of contact with large numbers of Negroes. In two Gallup surveys in 1958, the college-educated northerners, normally the most tolerant, were more reluctant than others in their region to send their children to schools where there would be a majority of Negro students or to feel that they would not move if Negroes came to live either next door or in their neighborhood in large numbers. Yet in the face of all the data examined in this report, these findings are hardly sufficient to presume that the college educated are notably more reluctant, as Stember has concluded for his data, to engage in intimate relations with Negroes. Our own conclusions remain that, for the issues considered here, there is a clear-cut association between education and attitudes toward integration.

Referring back to Table VI.1, and considering only those issues where more than two measures are available, some further comment can be made about the amount and nature of differences between educational levels. Within each region, the greatest amount of difference, in this case in the time it will take to achieve 90 per cent consensus, is between the college and grade school educated. The high school and grade school educated are next in extent of difference in outlook, and the college and high school educated are most alike.

The greatest gap between educational levels is found in the South. The most divisive issues there are education and housing, with education setting off the grade school educated from the remainder, and housing differentiating between those with a college education and those with less schooling. It will take the grade school educated approximately forty-two years to catch up with the college educated in per cent agreeing to the desirability of integrated schools. These two groups will be separated for about twenty-one years until 90 per cent do not object to having a Negro live on the same block. The grade school educated will take fourteen years longer than the college educated before 90 per cent agree to the appropriateness of integrated public transportation. The most divisive issue between high school and grade school educated is integrated schools. If trends continue in their present direction and at their present rate, it will take the high school educated until 1990 before 90 per cent agree that schools should be integrated and until 2026 before the grade school educated have a similar consensus. The college and high school educated have one major bone of contentiona willingness to live on the same block with a Negro family. Ninety per cent of

Data are reported in Table II.7, charts III.4 and III.6.

the former can be predicted to accept this by 1980, but it will take approximately until the year 2006 for this level of acceptance to be achieved by the latter.

In the North, differences between educational levels are not of such great magnitude. Still, it will take the grade school educated between fourteen to twenty years longer to achieve the same level of tolerance as the college educated on integrated schools and transportation and on equal job opportunities. Jobs and schools also, though to a somewhat lesser extent, differentiate the grade school from the high school educated. Of the six issues under review, none shows a predicted time separation of more than six years in which it will take the high school and college educated to achieve consensus.

These findings are simply another way of stating what we have concluded from previous chapters: that educational increments from grade school to high school to college are associated with greater tolerance for Negroes and Negro rights. Yet the procedure of predicting changes does draw attention to two important phenomena. The first relates to issues where subgroup differences are greatest, the second to the extent of differences within regions. These issues are jobs, housing, and schools.

We previously noted the salience of equal job opportunities in the North. In Chapter IV we observed that the grade school educated were slower to acknowledge that Negroes should have the same opportunities as whites to obtain employment. At that time we attributed this to the threat of increased job competition from Negroes felt by poorly-educated whites. According to Table VI.1, grade school-educated northerners have been moving so slowly in their rate of opinion change, that 90 per cent of their educational counterparts in the South may come to accept the morality of equal job opportunities about two years earlier than they.

In Chapter III the opposition of southerners with less than a college education to the possibility of living on the same block with a Negro family of similar education and income was discussed. This was the one major instance when the high school educated took a stand similar to, in fact more extreme, than the grade school educated. The data at hand offered no explanation for these viewpoints, but changing patterns of housing in the South, especially the movement to all-white suburbs, suggested that southerners felt most vulnerable to the impact of Negro neighbors on their privileged position.

In both the North and the South, though to a greater extent in the South, probably the most notable opinion differences revolve around the issue of integrated schools. Data reported in Chart II.4 revealed the great gaps existing between and within regions. These data suggest that a greater amount of opinion change took place in the South than in the North between 1956 and 1963. But predicted changes reported in Table VI.1 show that, continuing at the present pace, it will take the South several generations longer to catch up with the

North. Table VI.1 also points up the extent of differentiation in the rate of change for the grade school educated as compared to those with at least some high school education. Why should the grade school educated be dragging their feet to such an extent? We can suggest two seemingly contradictory reasons. On the one hand, the better educated are more apt to, first, recognize the morality of integrated education in terms of the opportunities this represents for Negro children and to, second, appreciate the benefits of exposure to a diversified social environment for whites as well as for Negroes. Insofar as higher education tends to broaden perspectives and increase appreciation of exposure to varied experiences, it might be assumed that those with college training will feel that white children have much to learn from attending schools where there are also Negro children. Yet, at the same time, the better educated, who are also more likely to be among the higher income groups, have an alternative available to them. While paying lip service to integrated schooling, they can, and frequently do, withdraw their own children from the public schools whenever they feel that the caliber of education is not at a desired level. We have no evidence one way or the other that integration lowers the quality of education for white children, but it often does add new problems, especially when the Negro children come from lower-class homes. In response to these new problems, or in anticipation of them, those with the financial resources often enroll their children in private schools, thereby helping to make a self-fulfilling prophecy out of their prediction that schools will decline in quality as soon as Negroes are enrolled. The grade school educated do not have these alternatives, nor do they have the imagination to see any positive advantage to their own children attending integrated schools. It is this segment of the population, then, that presents greatest resistance to school integration, either in law or in fact.

Our final question is why there is more difference between educational levels in the South than in the North, particularly between the college and grade school educated. To some extent, as we have pointed out, this difference is due to the differential impact of issues, a phenomenon noticed in the North as well. Yet it is also apparent that there is something about southern society that creates and perpetuates this difference between educational levels. Enough has been said and written about the uniqueness of the South, even when recognizing that there are many Souths, to make further discussion of this subject tiresome. It was hardly necessary, for example, to ask why southerners were so different in their responses to questions on Negro rights. The whole history of the South has been such as to make relations with Negroes the central core of southern identity. Here, however, we are faced with another kind of question—not why the South in general is different from the North, but rather why internal differences are greater in the South than in the North. Our data provide no answers, but we can garner some suggestions from a number of other sources.

The college educated in the South, as elsewhere, are better informed, more exposed to the mass media, and generally more aware of and responsive to the national climate of opinion. We can imagine that the less parochial attitude of the college educated has special significance in the South because of how it must heighten awareness of southern differences. If living in the South still hinders a full acceptance of Negro rights, the mind-opening experiences of college training have at least made some impact. But living in the shelter of southern society, those with less education are less frequently exposed to national viewpoints and, when they are, are generally more resistant to changing their accustomed ways.

The South still possesses aspects of an aristocratic society, based on a landed gentry. In such a society, the social differences between classes are manifestly greater, in fact or in perception, than in a more open society. The closed nature of the society contributes to greater differences in outlook. This has been reinforced by a tradition of lukewarm support for, or even outright opposition to, public primary and secondary education. For many generations, there was hardly such a thing in the South, and what existed was distinctly inferior in quality to that available elsewhere in the country. Anti-populist sentiments were strong in the South, and it should be remembered that such things as literacy tests and poll tax requirements were aimed at keeping poor whites from voting almost as much as Negroes. As a result of a variety of steps taken to perpetuate an archaically aristocratic society, it should not be surprising that there is evidence of great differences in outlook between the most and least educated.

As the civil rights movement increased in militancy, there was a tendency for white southerners to blame "outsiders," white as well as Negro, for bringing about changes in established social patterns. Yet northerners who settle in the South are frequently constrained from expressing views or behaving in ways different from their new neighbors. This sense of constraint need not be true, however, in answering survey questions. Responding to a survey is a reasonably private act, and northerners living in the South need not fear reprisals for answering in a liberal fashion. It is a real possibility that part of the greater

¹⁰ William H. Nicholls, Southern Tradition and Regional Progress (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Alfred O. Hero Jr., The Southerner and World Affairs (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), pp. 247-73; Solon T. Kimball, "Education and the New South," in John C. McKinney and Edgar T. Thompson, The South in Continuity and Change (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 260-76; Allan M. Cartter, "The kole of Higher Education in the Changing South," in McKinney and Thompson, op. cit., pp. 277-97.

¹¹ V. O. Key Jr., <u>Southern Politics in State and Nation</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), p. 531.

¹² Hero, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 457.

difference between educational groups in the South may be due to the responses of migrants. There is, unfortunately, no way of relating geographic mobility to opinions for our data, with the exception of one NORC survey conducted in 1963. Since results have been reviewed elsewhere, a quotation should be sufficient to establish our point.

Present northerners who formerly lived in the South (and these may be either southern migrants or northerners who spent some time in the South) are only slightly less pro-integrationist than their neighbors who have never been exposed to southern life. In contrast, southerners who have previously resided in the North differ greatly from their co-regionalists who have known nothing but southern life. The net effect of migration from one of the regions to the other seems to be a strengthening of the cause of integration. Ex-southerners who move to the North appear generally to conform to northern attitudes, while ex-northerners who move to the South (and southerners who have been temporarily exposed to northern living) tend to reject the more extreme segregationist views of the lifelong southerner. 13

All that this tells us, of course, is that having once lived in the North, respondents are more likely to be in tune with the general opinion climate on integration. But the question at issue here relates to educational differences within the South. Data compiled by the Survey Research Center suggest that these, too, may be affected by migration. From a 1956 study on voting behavior, it was discovered that those persons who move to the South are disproportionately better educated. Thirty per cent of northern migrants to the South had attended college, and 90 per cent had at least a high school education. All this suggests the possibility that at least part of the greater difference between educational levels in the South is attributable to the influence of college-educated migrants from the North.

The level of education of the American populace has risen phenomenally over the years. The evidence of change can even be seen over a relatively short time span. For example, in 1940, 57 per cent of the white population twenty-five years of age and over had only a grade school education or less. At the time of the 1960 census, this proportion had dropped to 38 per cent, with commensurate increases in the proportions who had attended either high school or college. These changes continue to take place throughout the nation, though more slowly in the South than elsewhere. Yet, as Table VI.2 indicates, the difference between the North and the South in the proportions with some college training in both 1950 and 1960 is minor. This may mean that it is necessary for the South to share in a general upgrading of education before the effects of a more liberalized outlook become widespread. As Myrdal said twenty-five years ago, "... Southern liberalism has aristocratic traditions. As a movement it is as yet

¹³Sheatsley, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 227-28.

¹⁴Campbell <u>et al.</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 449.

almost entirely within the upper classes. <u>Its main weakness lies in its lack of mass support</u>. If it wants to see its ideals progressively realized, it simply must get its message out from the conference rooms and college lecture halls to the people on the farms and in the shops."

TABLE VI.2

SCHOOL ATTAINMENT OF THE WHITE POPULATION, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER, FOR THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONS, 1950-60 (Percentage Distribution)

Region	1950 ^a	1960 ^b
United States:		
Grade or less High school	45 39 14	38 45 17
N	(79,339,860)	(89,593,619)
South:		
Grade or less High school	49 35 14 (20,098,290)	41 42 17 (23,724,371)
North:		
Grade or less	43 40 14 (59,241,570)	36 46 18 (65,869,248)

Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census. <u>U.S. Census of Population: 1950</u>. Vol. IV, <u>Special Reports</u>, Part 5, Chapter 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 42-53.

Educational levels do not add to 100 per cent, since approximately 2 per cent did not report years of schooling.

bAdapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census. <u>U.S. Census of Population: 1960</u> Vol. II, <u>Subject Reports</u>, PC(2)-5B (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 15-40.

In essence, we have been able to do no more than suggest reasons why southerners with a college education are more different than their regional confreres with grade schooling or less than is the case in the North. One possibility is that the awareness of the better-educated southerners of their deviance

¹⁵ Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962 [20th Anniversary Ed.]), p. 473.

from national viewpoints and norms produced more push to adopting pro-integration-ist opinions. Some of the difference is probably also related to the carry-over of an aristocratic tradition in the South, reinforcing differences in outlook between educational groups. Finally, some of the difference was probably due to the direct impact of northern society, through the differential migration of those with above-average years of schooling into the South.

Limits on Change

There has been no attempt in this study to disguise our own feelings about the results of opinion change over the twenty-year period studied. The intrusion of personal feelings into a research enterprise frequently creates difficulties, but here it has been irrelevant. Our own views had no bearing on the selection of data or on the findings themselves. However, they may have entered into the assessment of past changes as these have implications for the future. Interpretations were optimistic in terms of predicting how white Americans would continue to react to the claims of Negroes for full rights and opportunities. It would be misleading, however, to stop at this point without considering some of the limits on future change. Opinion changes in the coming years may be restricted by a number of social factors. In addition, our interpretations and predictions may have been unduly optimistic because of our prior assumptions. Prior assumptions could, of course, have no bearing on future developments, but they must be considered since they could affect the validity of our interpretations. The following five factors could circumscribe the possible limits of change: (1) the continuity of population differences; (2) the relationship between opinions and behavior; (3) the role played by education; (4) possible fallacies in the conception of change presented here; and (5) the adequacy of our data for developing generalizations about the nature of opinion change.

- 1. Continuity of differences: One of the striking results derived from this review of public opinion data is the large and continued difference of opinion between North and South. If these differences have continued for so long, regardless of the evidence of some change, why should we expect that the South will ever be identical to other parts of the country in its outlook on racial questions? Southerners have neither the ability nor the desire to insulate themselves from the rest of the nation, and, consequently, they will undoubtedly change even more. But how much more? It could well be that southerners will reach a ceiling on tolerance before they attain the level of tolerance presently found in the North.
- 2. Opinions and behavior: By focusing on opinions and opinion changes, the view that emerges may well have only a passing relationship to actual behavior. Regardless of whether or not sentiments of tolerance are strong, patterns of discrimination may be so entrenched as to nullify efforts to bring about

behavioral changes. What needs to be emphasized, then, is that this study has been concerned only with the nature of public opinion and of changes in the distribution of opinions over time. The manner in which these changes may affect behavior, either of the individuals sampled or of participants in such critical institutional areas as the legal, political, educational, and economic, is quite another point, and one beyond the limits of this study. Some attempt was made to consider behavioral changes by looking at questions dealing with possible responses to social contacts with Negroes. However, coverage of significant areas of contact was sketchy, and questions did not always deal with meaningful situations in terms of actual events. We would consider behavior to be an inadequately covered subject in this report, at the same time as we see behavioral changes as critical ones. This is not to discount the relevance of examining opinions, but only to say that opinions in themselves have but partial validity as predictors of behavior.

3. Role of education: Why should we regard education as a panacea for the ills of prejudice? It is true that there is a strong correlation between advanced schooling and tolerant opinions, but this is not to say that education is necessarily the cause of tolerance. While we have suggested a variety of reasons why college education leads to a more open mind about social diversity, there is still no reason to categorically assume that increased levels of education will always be accompanied by the same results. Increased education may still not be sufficient, in itself, to offset the influences of other social factors that perpetuate opinions unfavorable to Negro rights. If the educated man is not a demogogue who rants against Negroes, he may still be a man who politely but firmly sidesteps the obligations of integration.

One of the peculiarities of the current civil rights movement is that greater intransigence on the part of whites has been associated with greater gains for Negroes. For example, North Carolina was the first of the southern states to willingly integrate its schools. In comparison, Virginia strongly resisted implementing the Supreme Court decision and even went so far as to close some of its public schools. But since 1961, when Virginia began to comply with court orders, there has been a higher proportion of integrated schools in Virginia than in North Carolina. A similar contrast can be seen between Georgia and Alabama. Georgia did not desegregate its schools until 1961, but then it did so peacefully. Alabama continued strong resistance until 1963. Yet by 1964, the apparently more compliant Georgia had desegregated fewer school districts than Alabama. ¹⁶

Robert L. Crain, <u>School Desegregation in New Orleans: A Comparative Study of the Failure of Social Control</u> (Chicago III.: National Opinion Research Center, Report No. 110B, 1966), p. 9.

Education indeed appears to give people more sophisticated tools with which to fight integration. In an analysis of factors associated with Negro voter registration in the South, Matthews and Prothro found that there was a negative relationship between the median school years completed by whites and Negro voter registration. That is, as median years of schooling increased for whites, the numbers of Negroes registered to vote declined. In those counties where median schooling for whites is high school completion or greater, there was a reversal of this trend. But the counties with the highest level of schooling for whites still did not reach a level of Negro voter registration equal to the counties with lowest white education. The authors conclude that:

Short of the highest levels, the more educated the whites the more actively and effectively they seem to enforce the traditional mores of the region against Negro participation in elections. The usual effect of an increase in average schooling for whites in the South as a whole appears to be to give the white people more of the skills that are needed to express effectively their anti-Negro sentiments. For example, the correlation between median school years completed by whites and the presence or absence of a White Citizens Council or similar organization is +.32. It seems to take considerably more formal education than the average southern white receives to alter his attitude toward the Negro's place in southern politics. 17

The success of the Negro civil rights movement is directly connected with the racism of whites. Cattle prods, police dogs, and other forms of brutality, especially as evidence of their use has been transmitted through the mass media, have been effective weapons not for the whites who use them, but for the Negroes who follow tactics of non-violence. For example, Martin Luther King has operated most successfully where he has met most violent opposition. "King's philosophy is actually a response to the behavior of others, effective directly in terms of the ferocity of the resistance it meets. It is not only non-violent; it is also assertive. It depends on the reactions of others for its own strength." Success becomes more problematic, however, when whites do not react violently.

In a situation of benign intransigence--like New York City--or a society of gentlemen--North Carolina, for example--a philosophy of love for the oppressor may be less effective than in Alabama. There Negroes do not face overt cruelty but rather the refusal to alter their status. What do you do in a situation in which you have laws on your side, where whites smile and say to you that they are your friends, but where your white "friends" move to the suburbs leaving you confronted with segregation and inferior education in schools, ghetto housing, and a quiet and tacit discrimination in jobs? How can you demonstrate a philosophy of love in response to this? What is the appropriate form of protest?

¹⁷Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," <u>Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.</u>, 1963, <u>57</u> (March), 38.

¹⁸ Kenneth B. Clark, "The Civil Rights Movement," <u>Daedalus</u>, 1966 (Winter), 255.

¹⁹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 257.

It is not our interest here to explore the effectiveness of different forms of protest, but these data and observations all emphasize the point at issue here: that the education of whites in itself does not guarantee greater tolerance. It may, instead, as these examples suggest, equip whites with new means of frustrating Negro aspirations.

4. Conception of change: The cumulative conception of opinion change underlying the treatment of our data implies that all significant population groups are caught up in the same general move, although not necessarily to the same extent. Thus, in each generation, while the older are less favorable to integration than the younger, the former are more tolerant than their age peers in the preceding generation. Part of this change is due to the overall rise in the level of education. The passing of older, less tolerant individuals and their replacement by younger, better-educated ones helps account for the incidence of greater tolerance in the population generally. At the same time, each new generation becomes socialized into a more tolerant opinion climate.

But suppose the younger were to be affected by events in such a way as to become less tolerant. If this were to occur, then the long-range implications would be a gradual decrease in tolerance. That this could conceivably occur is suggested by evidence presented by Hyman and Sheatsley. In two surveys in 1963, they found that southerners between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four were slightly less favorable to Negro rights than were the next oldest group, those between twenty-five and forty-four. This is in contrast to previous surveys, which found a linear relationship between age and prejudice. The reasons that Hyman and Sheatsley offer are based on what they see to be the disruptive experiences of school integration. Those in the youngest age group "have spent their high school and college years in the stormy decade since the Supreme Court decision, and it is they who have been most closely associated with the crises and dislocations that have accompanied the transition to integration in various communities."21 Presumably, then, exposure to such experiences has been associated with growing reservations about the cause of integration. While the evidence presented by these authors is based on exceedingly small differences, the fact that there is some reversal of trends does suggest that our long-range predictions may be overly optimistic.

More generally, we should not discount the possibility that major social changes will have an impact on opinions in such a way as to deflect them from their present course. Even though there has been no evidence up to this point

²⁰ Evidence is found in Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," <u>Sci. Amer.</u>, 1964, <u>211</u> (July), 8-9, and from an inspection of NORC Surveys No. 225 and No. 241.

 $^{^{21}}$ Hyman and Sheatsley, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 9. See also Sheatsley, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 228.

that even events which are disliked by majorities of white people, such as the activities of civil rights groups, alter the general movement toward growing support of integration, this does not preclude their future influence. Who can foretell what consequences would flow from a major economic recession, a basic political realignment that would permit the ascendancy of whites unsympathetic or indifferent to Negro rights, or a widespread movement of disillusionment among Negroes who are dissatisfied with the speed and character of change and who favor greater militancy, repudiation of white liberals, and self-segregation?

5. Data for the study of change: The analysis presented here was based on whatever data we could find. This does not mean that the data put any limits on the changes we can anticipate, but they did limit the interpretations we could make, either of past changes or of future trends. This is particularly troublesome when we try to do more than just describe isolated opinions. Thus, our exploration of the relation between different attitude dimensions and their differential rates of change was severely curtailed by our reliance on a limited number of questions, assumed to be indicators of these dimensions. Insofar as it is desirable to develop empirically-based generalizations about opinion change, and if we want to use survey data for studying such change, it will be necessary to do much more in the way of long-range planning than has been customary up to now. Methods for teams of researchers to plan at least twenty years ahead, in order to avoid reliance on secondary data and the consequent piecemeal approach employed here, would be most welcome.

We hope to have satisfied any concerns about the influence of our personal feelings on the interpretations presented here. A number of ways in which future changes might be limited, either through the emergence of unanticipated events with special impact on critical population groups, or through the limitations inherent in the procedures used for tracing changes, have been suggested. Nevertheless, our general conclusions are not altered by the inclusion of these considerations. The evidence, on balance, is still in favor of continued growth in support for the extension of civil rights to Negroes.

APPENDIX TABLES

TABLE 1

PER CENT THINKING NEGROES ARE AS INTELLIGENT AS WHITES
(By Region and Education)

	1		······				
Survey		South			North		
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College	
May, 1944	35	23	27	50	48	51	
(NORC Survey 225)	(247)	(230)	(144)	(671)	(830)	(391)	
May, 1946	34	30	23	64	60	55	
(NORC Survey 241)	(258)	(227)	(93)	(676)	(813)	(287)	
January, 1956	62	55	61	85	87	84	
(NORC Survey 382)	(104)	(144)	(57)	(237)	(417)	(156)	
April, 1956	54	62	59	84	87	76	
(NORC Survey 386)	(109)	(147)	(64)	(232)	(422)	(140)	
May, 1963	59	56	58	82	84	84	
(NORC Survey SRS-160)	(101)	(149)	(105)	(212)	(511)	(271)	
December, 1963	56	63	48	76	79	81	
(NORC Survey SRS-330)	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)	

TABLE 2

PER CENT THINKING WHITE AND NEGRO STUDENTS SHOULD GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS

(By Region and Education)

Carron		South		North		
Survey	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
April, 1956	5	16	27	52	65	76
(NORC Survey 386)	(109)	(147)	(64)	(232)	(422)	(140)
June, 1956	7	16	35	50	64	·74
(NORC Survey 390)	(128)	(141)	(52)	(253)	(436)	(144)
May, 1963	23	27	53	62	70	83
(NORC Survey SRS-160)	(101)	(149)	(105)	(212)	(511)	(271)
November, 1963	16	32	44	57	74	83
(NORC Survey SRS-350)	(106)	(123)	(55)	(280)	(429)	(204)
December, 1963	16	36	38	58	78	86
(NORC Survey SRS-330)	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)
May, 1964	12	31	51	58	74	87
(NORC Survey SRS-630)	(109)	(166)	(85)	(199)	(484)	(257)
June, 1965	22	36	53	65	81	85
(NORC Survey SRS-857)	(101)	(157)	(86)	(205)	(480)	(258)

TABLE 3

PER CENT APPROVING OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING THAT RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IS ILLEGAL

(By Region and Education)

		South		North		
Survey	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
June, 1954	14	15	30	53	61	81
(Gallup Poll 532-K)	(116)	(158)	(47)	(290)	(523)	(199)
September, 1957	6	13	22	56	71	78
(Gallup Poll 589-K)	(136)	(143)	(60)	(297)	(514)	(219)

TABLE 4

PER CENT NOT OBJECTING TO SENDING THEIR CHILDREN TO A SCHOOL WHERE THE MAJORITY OF STUDENTS ARE NEGRO

(By Region and Education)

Current		South		North		
Survey	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
June, 1954	14	13	17	45	50	52
(Gallup Poll 532-K) ^a	(70)	(106)	(30)	(138)	(361)	(129)
September, 1958	8	11	23	41	37	30
(Gallup Poll 604-K) ^b	(38)	(73)	(13)	(114)	(311)	(69)
May, 1963	2	5	11	24	31	38
(Gallup Poll 673-K) ^b	(109)	(172)	(70)	(237)	(639)	(192)

 $^{^{\}rm a}{\rm Base}$ is all those with children ages four to twenty-one.

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PER CENT SAYING IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE IF A NEGRO WITH THE SAME EDUCATION AND INCOME MOVED INTO THEIR BLOCK

(By Region and Education)

Carran		South		North		
Survey	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
June, 1956	40	34	40	58	57	58
(NORC Survey 390)	(128)	(141)	(52)	(253)	(436)	(144)
May, 1963	47	35	51	66	64	74
(NORC Survey SRS-160)	(101)	(149)	(105)	(212)	(511)	(271)
December, 1963	46	50	62	63	69	75
(NORC Survey SRS-330)	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)
May, 1964	48	46	55	68	68	74
(NORC Survey SRS-630)	(109)	(166)	(85)	(199)	(484)	(257)
June, 1965 (NORC Survey SRS-857)	51 (101)	41 (157)	59 (86)	74 (205)	73 (480)	77 (258)

 $^{^{\}mathrm{b}}\mathrm{Base}$ is all those with children in school.

TABLE 6

PER CENT WHO WOULD NOT MOVE IF COLORED PEOPLE CAME TO LIVE NEXT DOOR

(By Region and Education)

Survey	South			North		
· ·	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
September, 1958	47	40	11	68	55	59
(Gallup Poll 605-K)	(120)	(131)	(56)	(321)	(669)	(185)
May, 1963	49	40	49	54	55	66
(Gallup Poll 673-K)	(358)	(351)	(170)	(870)	(1,307)	(535)

TABLE 7 PER CENT WHO WOULD NOT MOVE IF COLORED PEOPLE CAME TO LIVE IN GREAT NUMBERS IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD (By Region and Education)

South North Survey Grade High College College Grade High September, 1958 16 28 19 (Gallup Poll 605-K)... (120)(131)(56) (321)(669) (185)May, 1963 (Gallup Poll 673-K)... 18 10 12 22 25 31 (358)(351)(170)(870) (1,307) (535)

PER CENT THINKING NEGROES SHOULD HAVE AS GOOD A CHANCE AS WHITES TO GET ANY KIND OF JOB (By Region and Education)

Survey	South			North		
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
May, 1944	10	14	42	39	50 (830)	65
(NORC Survey 225)	(247)	(230)	(144)	(671)		(391)
May, 1946	20	28	45	46	54	71
(NORC Survey 241)	(258)	(227)	(93)	(676)	(813)	(287)
December, 1963	62	80	80	71	88	96
(NORC Survey SRS-330)	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)

TABLE 9

PER CENT FEELING THERE SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATE SECTIONS FOR NEGROES IN STREET CARS AND BUSES

(By Region and Education)

Survey	South			North		
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
April, 1956	13	31	42	62	76	86
(NORC Survey 386)	(109)	(147)	(64)	(232)	(422)	(140)
May, 1963	32	50	71	76	88	96
(NORC Survey SRS-160)	(101)	(149)	(105)	(212)	(511)	(271)
December, 1963	36	55	64	72	91	95
(NORC Survey SRS-330)	(115)	(157)	(69)	(209)	(466)	(209)

TABLE 10 PER CENT EXPECTING THE DAY WHEN NEGROES AND WHITES IN THE SOUTH WILL BE SHARING THE SAME PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS (By Region and Education)

Survey	South			North		
	Grade	High	College	Grade	High	College
September, 1958	40	52	75	41	56	74
(Gallup Poll 605-K)	(120)	(131)	(56)	(321)	(669)	(185)
May, 1963	66	87	89	66	76	85
(NORC Survey SRS-160)	(101)	(149)	(105)	(212)	(511)	(271)